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| R48072 | Kenya: Current Issues and U.S. Relations | 2026-03-06T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T06:38:01Z | Active | Reports | Lauren Ploch Blanchard | Sub-Saharan Africa | Longstanding U.S. ties with Kenya have deepened over the past decade, as successive U.S. administrations have viewed the country as a strategic partner in Africa. Former President Joe Biden hosted Kenya’s President William Ruto for a state visit in 2024, and he designated Kenya as the United States’ first Major Non-NATO Ally in Sub-Saharan Africa, a designation that conveys defense trade and security cooperation benefits. Ruto was the first African leader to be invited by a U.S. president for a state visit since 2008. The Trump Administration has similarly appeared to value the bilateral relationship with Kenya, describing the country as one of the United States’ strongest partners in the region. Kenya became an important U.S. counterterrorism partner in Africa in the aftermath of Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2011, the country launched military operations in neighboring Somalia against the regional Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Shabaab, and subsequently joined the UN-authorized African Union stabilization mission there. Al Shabaab launched attacks against soft targets frequented by foreigners, including U.S. citizens, in Kenya’s capital, raising the group’s international profile. In 2020, Al Shabaab killed a U.S. servicemember and two U.S. contactors in an attack on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan base used by the U.S. military near the Somali border. Al Shabaab, which U.S. officials now describe as Al Qaeda’s largest and wealthiest affiliate, continues to pose a threat in Kenya and the broader region, and Kenya hosts an expanding U.S. military presence at Manda Bay that supports regional counterterrorism efforts. The 2024 state visit highlighted Kenya’s importance to the United States not only as a diplomatic and security partner in East Africa, but as an African counterpart on shared global priorities. Kenya participated in Operation Prosperity Guardian, a maritime taskforce launched by the United States in response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and it has been one of the on… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48072/R48072.17.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48072.html |
| IN12665 | U.S. Military Operations Against Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Programs | 2026-03-06T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:53:57Z | Active | Posts | Paul K. Kerr, Daniel M. Gettinger | Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons, Iran, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Middle East & North Africa, Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces, Aviation, Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation | On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran. The same day, President Donald J. Trump listed among the operation’s objectives preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, destroying Iran’s missiles, and “[razing] their missile industry to the ground.” Some Members of Congress have questioned the U.S. military operations in Iran given President Trump’s previous comments that, as a result of the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli strikes, “Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.” Other Members have supported the President’s action, citing Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its nuclear program and its ballistic missile capabilities. Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Drone Programs Iran has developed ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and space-launch vehicles, as well as drones (i.e., unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS). Iran’s ballistic missile inventory has included short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, the largest of which have an estimated range of approximately 2,000 kilometers (1,864 miles), according to a 2020 U.S. government estimate. Iran has also mass-produced the Shahed-136, a long-range one-way attack drone, and has provided these drones to Russia for use in its war in Ukraine. The 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment stated, “Iran has fielded a large quantity of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as [UAS] that can strike throughout the region and continues efforts to improve their accuracy, lethality, and reliability.” Since February 28, U.S. and Israeli aircraft have targeted bases and equipment associated with Iran’s ballistic missile program, including missiles Iran may have stored in underground facilities. The effect of the strikes on Iran’s inventory of ballistic missiles and production capacity is unclear. Following the Israeli and U.S. attacks, Iran has reportedly conducted ballistic missile and drone strikes on U.S. and partner military and civilian sites in several countries. The size of Iran’s ballistic mis… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12665/IN12665.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12665.html |
| IF13174 | The Stablecoin Yield Debate | 2026-03-06T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:54:20Z | Active | Resources | Paul Tierno, Marc Labonte | In July 2025, Congress passed the GENIUS Act (P.L. 119-27) establishing a regulatory framework for payment stablecoins. These digital assets use the same technology as cryptocurrencies but are backed by assets and their value, unlike that of cryptocurrencies, is intended to be stable against the dollar. Among the requirements established in GENIUS is a restriction on stablecoin issuers paying interest or yield or rewards (hereinafter, yield) to stablecoin holders. Crypto exchanges’ and banks’ opposing views on the yield restrictions has reportedly stalled crypto market structure legislation in the Senate. The GENIUS Yield Restriction Section 4 of GENIUS states that “[n]o permitted payment stablecoin issuer ... shall pay the holder of any payment stablecoin any form of interest or yield (whether in cash, tokens, or other consideration) solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention of such payment stablecoin.” While this appears to create a blanket prohibition on interest, the restriction may not apply to the current market practice for issuing and holding stablecoins involving exchanges (the “three-party model” shown in Figure 1). Most stablecoin issuers—those companies that create stablecoins, and to whom most of GENIUS applies—only sell stablecoins to exchanges and larger market participants. Much retail use of stablecoins currently occurs through an intermediary—usually a cryptocurrency exchange. The exchange holds the stablecoin in custody—on the blockchain—on behalf of the retail investor; the issuer passes interest on reserves to the exchange, which it uses to pay the investor yield. GENIUS does not explicitly prevent exchanges from paying rewards on stablecoins held on their exchange (which can be structured to be effectively equivalent to yield)—and many do. According to a regulatory filing, Circle, the issuer of the USDC stablecoin (the second largest stablecoin), pays a portion of the interest it earns on its reserves to Coinbase, the largest U.S.-based crypto exchange, proportionate to the … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13174/IF13174.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13174.html | |
| IF13173 | Federal Management of Tribal Trust Funds: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress | 2026-03-06T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:53:58Z | Active | Resources | Mariel J. Murray | Congress has enacted various laws to fulfill the federal trust responsibility, a legal obligation under which the United States—through treaties, acts of Congress, and court decisions—“has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust” toward federally recognized Tribes (Tribes) and individual tribal members. Over the years, this relationship has been interpreted to include a fiduciary duty to manage tribal trust assets. Tribal trust assets include lands, natural resources, funds, and other assets held in trust for Tribes and individual tribal members. Congress delegated performance of the fiduciary duty to manage tribal and individual trust funds primarily to the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Department of the Treasury. Tribal Trust Funds Tribal trust funds, the federal management of which began in the 1800s, comprise four main sources of funding: Treaty Payments. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the federal government entered into many treaties with Tribes, whereby Tribes often ceded their homelands in exchange for compensation. In 1820, the federal government adopted a policy of holding treaty payments in trust unless and until it distributed the funds. In 1837, Congress codified this policy and required the Secretary of the Interior to deposit these treaty payments into “special accounts” (i.e., tribal trust fund accounts) in the Treasury. Investment Income. Since 1837, Congress has required tribal trust funds to be invested in specific ways to generate interest income. Revenue from Tribal Lands. Since 1883, Congress has required the deposit in tribal trust funds of revenue from the lease and sale of products from the approximately 56 million acres of tribal trust lands as well as restricted fee lands, where the Tribe owns the land but the land may not be alienated or encumbered (e.g., sold, gifted, leased) without federal approval. Judgment Funds. These funds are awarded pursuant to a judgment or legal settlement, such as those reached before the former Indian Cla… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13173/IF13173.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13173.html | |
| IF13172 | Iranian Kurds and Possible Support | 2026-03-06T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T06:23:58Z | Active | Resources | Jim Zanotti, Clayton Thomas, Christopher M. Blanchard | Iran, Middle East & North Africa, Security Assistance, Security Cooperation & Arms Exports | Following U.S. and Israeli military operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran that commenced on February 28, 2026, press reports citing unnamed sources have stated that the Trump Administration may be considering possible efforts to provide material support to Iranian Kurdish groups to further weaken Iran’s regime. President Donald Trump has said he would embrace action by Iranian Kurds, but the Administration to date has not confirmed any U.S. support. Any such U.S. or Israeli support for Iranian Kurds, if confirmed, could form part of a broader campaign to decentralize and/or systemically change Iran’s political structure. A number of Iranian Kurdish groups actively oppose the Iranian regime, including some based in the neighboring Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Iranian state repression and economic marginalization appear to have prevented Iranian Kurds from mounting serious resistance to the Islamic Republic to date. Congress may seek clarity from Administration officials about any possible efforts, and evaluate potential plans, costs, benefits, and outcomes. Reportedly, U.S. and Israeli strikes have targeted Iranian military and intelligence facilities in Kurdish areas of northwest Iran (known in Kurdish as Rojhelat). Apparent Iranian attacks have struck some locations associated with Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the KRI. Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government and the national government of Iraq have both issued statements denying their involvement with or support of any potential cross-border incursion by KRI-based Iranian Kurds. Figure 1. Kurds in the Middle East / Source: CRS, based on open source material from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Washington Post. Attempts to weaken or overthrow a foreign government via support to a geographically peripheral group that differs ethnically or religiously from the regime’s leading figures may find points of comparison and contrast with: Afghanistan and the 2001 defeat of the Sunni Islamist, ethnic Pashtun-dominated Taliban regime by the Nor… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13172/IF13172.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13172.html |
| IF12976 | 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty: Issues in the 119th Congress | 2026-03-06T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:54:08Z | Active | Resources | Nicole T. Carter, Elena H. Humphreys, Charles V. Stern, Nicole T. Carter | Water Quality, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, Water Resource Management | A water treaty from 1944—the Treaty on Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 Water Treaty)—between the United States and Mexico and other binational agreements guide how the two governments share flows of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers. The 1944 Water Treaty states that the countries agree to give preferential attention to solving all border sanitation problems (e.g., flows of raw sewage and industrial wastewater in the Tijuana River Valley [TRV]). The binational International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), which was established in 1944 pursuant to the treaty and administers agreements on river flows and sanitation issues, is the principal venue for addressing related disputes between the United States and Mexico. The IBWC develops rules and proposed decisions, called minutes, on treaty execution and interpretation. Congressional considerations during the 119th Congress may include executive branch actions on U.S.-Mexico water matters and their role and effect on U.S.-Mexico cooperation, congressional responses to these actions and actions by Mexico, and forthcoming recommendations on addressing water management and sanitation issues. Rio Grande The 1944 Water Treaty addresses the Rio Grande basin below Fort Quitman, TX. Among other things, it establishes that the United States has a right to flows from tributaries that feed the Rio Grande in the United States and one-third of specified Mexican tributaries flows, which must average at least 0.35 million acre-feet (MAF) per year, measured in five-year cycles (1.75 MAF total). It also provides for the construction of international storage dams on the Rio Grande. Among other infrastructure, IBWC operates two international Rio Grande dams and their reservoirs. On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has not met its Rio Grande delivery obligations for a cycle. As of late October 2025, at the end of the previous five-year cycle, Mexico had delivered 0.88 MAF, according to IBWC. The Consolidated Appropriations A… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12976/IF12976.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12976.html |
| IF11548 | Assisting and Evacuating U.S. Citizens Abroad During International Crises | 2026-03-06T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:54:28Z | Active | Resources | Cory R. Gill | Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools | Congress has mandated that the U.S. Department of State (DOS; the Department) provide consular services to American citizens around the world. Such services include disseminating information regarding any major disaster or incident abroad affecting the safety of U.S. citizens and, when their lives are endangered by such crises, facilitating their safe and efficient evacuation. DOS scaled up consular assistance to U.S. citizens across the Middle East after the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran on February 28, 2026. Members of Congress are conducting oversight of DOS’s consular response and in some cases have expressed criticism of the timeliness and extent of DOS consular assistance. Some press reports have described factors that are complicating DOS’s work in this area, including airport and airspace closures and flight cancellations throughout the region, along with Iranian attacks targeting U.S. overseas posts in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. Travel Information and the STEP Program Section 43 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-885; 22 U.S.C. §2715; the BAA) requires DOS to share information on any major disaster or incident overseas affecting the health and safety of U.S. citizens. DOS carries out this responsibility through the Consular Information Program (CIP), which includes a range of products intended to inform U.S. citizens worldwide of potential threats to their health or safety and the availability of consular services (see Table 1). DOS disseminates CIP products through several means, including the Bureau of Consular Affairs’ website for U.S. citizens traveling abroad (http://travel.state.gov) and the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP). STEP is a digital service through which U.S. citizens traveling or living abroad can provide their contact information to receive CIP products applicable to any countries they select. While STEP helps overseas posts locate U.S. citizens in an emergency, U.S. citizens are not re… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11548/IF11548.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11548.html |
| R48877 | U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Background and Issues for Congress | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T21:23:15Z | Active | Reports | Daniel J. Longo | Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons, East Asia & Pacific, Security Assistance, Security Cooperation & Arms Exports, South Korea, Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation | In the wake of the Korean War (1950-53), the United States and South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) forged an alliance that remains one of the United States’ most significant military arrangements in Asia. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty that took effect in 1954, the United States and South Korea committed to defend each other against armed attack. Today, about 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea. The alliance has traditionally focused on perceived threats from North Korea (officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK), which have changed as North Korea has developed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile capabilities. South Korea is included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” also known as extended deterrence. Over the last few decades, the United States and South Korea have taken steps to reform the alliance. These steps unfolded as South Korea emerged as a wealthier country due to its rapid economic growth. For example, in 1991, bilateral negotiations led South Korea to begin defraying the cost of hosting U.S. troops. Both sides also are preparing a change in operational control in the event of war, moving from the existing structure of U.S. and South Korean soldiers operating under a binational command led by a U.S. general, to a binational command led by an ROK general with a U.S. deputy. Since 2022, the allies have upgraded their consultations over the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, partly to respond to growing calls within South Korea for the acquisition of an independent nuclear weapons capability. South Korea also has helped bolster trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan, particularly since a trilateral summit at Camp David in 2023. The U.S.-ROK alliance may have reached an inflection point, some observers say, as the administrations of Donald Trump and Lee Jae Myung seek to further “modernize” the alliance. Amid rapidly changing threats by the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and North Korea, Presidents Trump and L… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48877/R48877.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48877.html |
| R48876 | The U.S. Automotive Industry: Selected Issues | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T06:37:58Z | Active | Reports | Naseeb A. Souweidane | Highways & Highway Vehicles | According to industry estimates, the U.S. automotive manufacturing industry accounts for 4.8% of gross domestic product and employs 10.1 million people through direct and indirect jobs. The federal government has supported this industry through various policies, with Congress passing laws on industry issues such as trade and financial assistance, vehicle powertrain development, vehicle safety, domestic labor, and vehicle costs. There are a variety of policy issues and considerations for Congress related to the industry. Domestic market dynamics. From 1970 to 2024, the automotive industry underwent several changes as automotive manufacturers and suppliers from foreign countries entered the domestic market, new entrants with specialized product offerings emerged, and some traditional U.S. automotive manufacturers and suppliers changed ownership. Additionally, automotive manufacturers and suppliers both rely on international markets for sourcing and selling products, which has cultivated a dynamic environment. Both Congress and the executive branch have created policies—such as trade agreements, financial assistance programs, tariffs, and incentives for manufacturers—to support the viability of the automotive industry and, at points, foster integrated supply chains. Electrification. Electrified vehicles—including electric, hybrid, and fuel cell vehicles—differ from vehicles with internal combustion engines. The automotive industry has developed and introduced electrified powertrains in vehicles, with plug-in hybrid vehicles first becoming commercially available in 2010. The development of vehicles with electrified powertrains was spurred by a variety of factors, including consumer demand, technological advances, environmental concerns, and federal incentives and regulations. Though domestic demand and production of this type of vehicle slowed in 2025, electrified powertrain development continues to change product planning in the industry. These changes may affect investments, labor, and vehicle prices. The federal … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48876/R48876.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48876.html |
| R48873 | The Prohibitions on Private Inurement & Benefit by Tax-Exempt Organizations and Intermediate Sanctions | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:54:22Z | Active | Reports | Justin C. Chung | Nonprofits & Tax-Exempt Organizations, Excise & Other Taxes, Excise Tax, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) | The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) contains certain restrictions designed to ensure tax-exempt organizations serve public, not private, interests and cannot be used for personal gain. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), (4). These restrictions derive from statutory text in the I.R.C. and have antecedents in common law rules on charity. Id. Among these restrictions are two prohibitions: (1) the prohibition on private inurement, and (2) the prohibition on private benefit. Id. These two prohibitions are distinct requirements derived from different statutory language, yet they overlap substantially in interpretation and enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Id. Violation of either prohibition is grounds for revocation of an organization’s tax-exempt status. Treasury Regulations § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2), (d)(1)(ii). In addition to the prohibitions, the I.R.C. contains excise taxes on certain transactions that can result in personal gain. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4941, 4958, 4960. These excise taxes provide intermediate sanctions short of revocation of the tax exemption. This report discusses three types of excise taxes that differ in who is taxed, which transactions are taxed, how the tax is calculated, and the types of organizations subject to the tax. Application of the excise taxes to § 501(c)(3) organizations can depend on classification of the organization as (1) either a public charity or private foundation and (2) either a supporting organization or supported organization. Id. §§ 4941, 4958. Focusing on the two most common types of tax-exempt organizations, §§ 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations, this report explains the prohibitions on private inurement and benefit, how they differ, and how they overlap. This report also explains when and how excise taxes might apply in lieu of or in addition to revocation. It also describes related proposals that Congress has considered to modify the excise taxes, including to (1) expand the types of individuals upon whom the taxes are imposed, (2) expand the types of org… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48873/R48873.9.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48873.html |
| R47676 | Disaster Relief Fund State of Play: In Brief | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T14:52:54Z | Active | Reports | William L. Painter | Homeland Security Appropriations | The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is one of the most-tracked single accounts funded by Congress each year. It is the primary source of funding for the federal government’s domestic general disaster relief programs. Frequently, the annual and supplemental appropriations the DRF receives exceed the annually requested level. Even so, at the beginning of each fiscal year since 2023, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has projected that the unobligated balance available to pay the costs associated with major disaster declarations would be inadequate. Disaster Relief Fund, DRF, DRF shortfall, DRF deficit Immediate Needs Funding INF FY2023, FY2024, FY2025 Disaster Supplemental (As an In Brief, the Summary is suppressed.) | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47676/R47676.19.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R47676.html |
| R46259 | Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:53:58Z | Active | Reports | Kristin Archick | Europe, Russia & Eurasia | Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). Often referred to as “the Troubles,” the conflict has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland. At its core, the conflict has reflected a struggle between the different national, cultural, and religious identities of Northern Ireland’s two dominant communities: unionists, or Protestants who largely define themselves as British and support Northern Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK, and nationalists, or Catholics who consider themselves Irish and may favor a united Ireland. Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process. U.S. development aid provided through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) has sought to encourage economic development and reconciliation. Congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, human rights, and addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed dealing with the past). Some Members have expressed interest in how Brexit—the UK’s withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland. The Peace Agreement: Progress to Date and Ongoing Challenges In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement. The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK secu… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46259/R46259.17.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R46259.html |
| R44593 | Introduction to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T06:38:09Z | Active | Reports | Diane P. Horn, Baird Webel | Flooding, National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), Earth Sciences & Natural Hazards, Public Health Emergency Preparedness & Response, Disaster Risk Financing, Federal Disasters & Assistance | The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA; 42 U.S.C. §§4001 et seq.) and was most recently reauthorized to September 30, 2026, through a series of short-term reauthorizations. The general purpose of the NFIP is both to offer primary flood insurance to properties with significant flood risk, and to reduce flood risk through the adoption of floodplain management standards. Communities volunteer to participate in the NFIP in order to have access to federal flood insurance, and in return are required to adopt minimum standards. The NFIP is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its subcomponent the Federal Insurance Directorate. FEMA manages a Risk Mapping, Assessment and Planning (Risk MAP) process to produce Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). Depicted on FIRMs are Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs), which are areas exposed to a 1% or greater risk of annual flooding. FIRMs vary in age across the country, and are updated on a prioritized basis. The Risk MAP process provides extensive outreach and appeal opportunities for communities. Updating a community’s FIRMs can take three to five years or more. Participating communities must adopt a flood map and enact minimum floodplain standards to regulate development in the SFHA. FEMA encourages communities to enhance their floodplain standards by offering reduced premium rates through the Community Rating System (CRS). FEMA also manages a Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant program using NFIP revenues to further reduce comprehensive flood risk. Participating communities that fail to adopt FIRMs or maintain minimum floodplain standards can be put on probation or suspended from the NFIP. In communities that do not participate in the NFIP, or have been suspended, individuals cannot purchase NFIP insurance. Individuals in these communities also face challenges receiving federal disaster assistance in flood hazard areas. NFIP insurance uses one of three types of Standard Flood In… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44593/R44593.72.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R44593.html |
| R44389 | Statutory Framework for Congressional Management of DOD General and Flag Officers | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T07:23:09Z | Active | Reports | Sofia Plagakis, Barbara Salazar Torreon, Michael J. Vassalotti | Military Personnel, Compensation & Health Care | In the exercise of its constitutional responsibilities to shape and oversee the U.S. Armed Forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws that govern foundational aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. Some of these laws are directed specifically at the most senior military officers, known as general and flag officers (GFOs). Congress periodically reviews these laws and considers amending them. Areas of congressional interest have included duties and grades of certain GFO positions, the number of GFOs, the proportion of GFOs to the total force, and compensation levels of GFOs. Congress and the executive branch have used statutory authority to specify the grade and duties of certain GFO positions and affect the number of GFOs. As of September 30, 2026, there were 848 active-duty GFOs subject to statutory caps, 9 less than the maximum of 857 authorized by law. The current number is lower for the post-Cold War era and substantially lower than the number of GFOs in the 1960s-1980s, when the Armed Forces were much larger in size than they are today. The GFO corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. In 1965, GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force, while in 2024, they made up about one-fifteenth of one percent (0.067%) of the total force, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs has increased by 40%. Some argue that this increased proportion of GFOs is excessive and contributes to more bureaucratic decisionmaking processes. Others counter that the increased proportion is linked to the military’s emphasis on joint and coalition operations; core organizational requirements; management, budgeting, and program requirements; and the employment of automated, highly lethal, and destructive weapons systems that may require fewer personnel coupled with more discernment in employment of those weapons. Compensation for GFOs varies based on p… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44389/R44389.18.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R44389.html |
| R42769 | Federal Grants-in-Aid Administration: A Primer | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T08:37:59Z | Active | Reports | Natalie Keegan, Adam G. Levin | Federalism | The federal government administers a wide range of programs providing grants-in-aid (or simply “grants”) to nonfederal entities such as state, local, territorial and tribal governments, non-profit organizations, and individuals. These programs aim to advance federal policy goals that have generally been authorized by Congress. While federal grants have a long history, they have experienced dramatic growth over the past century, both in total grant award amounts and the number of programs. As of FY2025, there were at least 1,183 funded federal grant programs. In constant FY2017 dollars, federal outlays for grants to state and local governments grew from $17.7 billion in FY1940 to $882.8 billion in FY2024. Due to the broad range of policy objectives, grant program authorizing statutes, grant recipients, and agency-level administrative procedures, there is wide variation across and within federal agencies in the administration of federal grant programs. This variation can make it difficult for Congress to compare program performance, both within and among federal agencies, and to exercise its oversight of federal agencies. This report is designed to assist Congress in its oversight of federal grant programs by: discussing federal grants in the context of other federal financial assistance; describing the different types of federal grants; outlining the various authorities governing federal grants; reviewing the entities involved in federal grant administration; documenting the typical life cycle of a federal grant award; and analyzing selected considerations for Congress, discussing challenges tracking federal grant awards, oversight of federal grant subawards, and Congress’s role in federal grant management and administration. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R42769/R42769.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R42769.html |
| IF12125 | Section 301 and China: The U.S.-China Phase One Trade Deal | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T06:22:55Z | Active | Resources | Karen M. Sutter | East Asia & Pacific, Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations, Trade Agreements | On January 15, 2020, then-President Donald J. Trump signed a trade agreement with then-Vice Premier Liu He of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). The agreement sought to resolve some long-standing complaints by U.S. government and businesses asserting that China was engaging in unfair trade, investment, and technology practices, which the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) had investigated and identified under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2411). The deal is called the Phase One agreement because it was to be the first of subsequent agreements to address U.S. concerns. It appeared to have been difficult for USTR to secure commitments from the PRC in some areas, and some experts assessed that PRC negotiators pushed most issues identified by the USTR related to PRC industrial policies (e.g., state subsidies, technology transfer requirements, and IP theft) for future talks. In October 2025, USTR initiated an investigation of China’s implementation of the Phase One deal. China and Section 301 Context In August 2017, the USTR invoked Section 301 in an effort to address PRC industrial policies. These PRC policies’ stated objective is to seek PRC global commercial and technology leadership through trade, investment, and technology practices, which the USTR assessed to be discriminatory. The decision to invoke Section 301 followed 15 years of efforts by the U.S. government and U.S. industry to resolve concerns about PRC industrial practices, which PRC officials were mostly unwilling to acknowledge and address. These views were also informed by PRC intensification of such practices. Particular areas of concern included new Made in China 2025 industrial policies, increased reports of PRC corporate espionage, tightened control by the PRC government of information and data controls, and increased economic coercion and forced technology transfer requirements by PRC authorities. U.S. stakeholders assessed that China was deploying a web of mutually reinforcing government policies that favored PRC fi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12125/IF12125.8.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12125.html |
| IF10316 | Malaysia | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:54:25Z | Active | Resources | Ben Dolven | East Asia & Pacific, South & Southeast Asia | Overview The Federation of Malaysia is a majority Muslim parliamentary democracy in Southeast Asia. It has an ethnically and religiously diverse population of 32.7 million, with an ethnic Malay majority and large ethnic Chinese and Indian minorities. Malaysia plays an active role in regional diplomacy and is a partner in numerous U.S. initiatives in Asia, including trade and security programs as well as efforts to combat terrorism and religious extremism. Malaysia is a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and served as ASEAN’s chair in 2025, when it mediated conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia. It sees itself as both a regional leader and a moderate voice within the Islamic world. Despite generally cooperative bilateral relations, some issues constrain closer U.S.-Malaysia ties, including Malaysian opposition to much of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Malaysia has been sharply critical of Israel’s approach to Gaza and the March 2026 U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, strongly condemning what the foreign ministry called “violations of international law and the UN Charter.” Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim maintains outreach to groups in the Middle East, including Hamas. At the same time, U.S. concerns over some Malaysian economic and human-rights policies also has limited some elements of bilateral ties. Congress has overseen Malaysia policy, including trade negotiations in the 2000s and 2010s, as well as U.S.-Malaysia cooperation on security and counterterrorism issues. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about human rights issues in the country including Malaysia’s record in combatting human trafficking—Malaysia was listed on the Tier 2 Watchlist in the State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons report—and its treatment of refugees from Burma (Myanmar). Democracy and Politics in Malaysia Malaysia was led by a single governing coalition from its independence from the United Kingdom in 1957 until 2018. That coalition, known as the Barisan Nasional (BN), w… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10316/IF10316.19.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10316.html |
| IF10247 | U.S.-Indonesia Relations | 2026-03-05T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:54:10Z | Active | Resources | Ben Dolven | South & Southeast Asia, East Asia & Pacific | Overview With over 280 million citizens, Indonesia is the most populous country in Southeast Asia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, and the world’s third-largest democracy (after India and the United States). It has the world’s 16th-largest economy—the 7th-largest when ranked by purchasing power parity. The country straddles vital sea lanes and borders the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest trade routes, as well as the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Over the past 25 years, Indonesia has become a robust democracy, holding five direct presidential elections, each considered by international observers to have been largely free and fair. In the most recent, held in February 2024, Prabowo Subianto, a former defense minister who served as commander of the Indonesian military’s special forces in the 1990s, was elected to succeed President Joko Widodo. Prabowo took office in October 2024 and is to serve a five-year term. The U.S.-Indonesia relationship has broadened over the past two decades, with closer military and counterterrorism cooperation and a range of new educational, environmental, and energy programs. Congress has played a key role in guiding the relationship, including by restricting interactions with security services accused of rights abuses, promoting cooperation on issues such as maritime security and counterterrorism, and conducting oversight of assistance programs and Indonesia’s Millennium Challenge Compact, signed in 2023. (Some of the aid is in flux given the Trump Administration’s elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).) Indonesia’s foreign policy is guided by its historical role as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and successive Indonesian governments have resisted aligning too closely with the United States or others, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Indonesia is an active member in regional diplomatic institutions including the G-20 and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Some 87% of Indone… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10247/IF10247.58.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10247.html |
| R48872 | Nippon Steel’s Acquisition of U.S. Steel: Potential Implications for the Industry | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T16:38:00Z | Active | Reports | Yong W. Kwon | Manufacturing Policy | United States Steel Corporation (USS) is an iron and steel manufacturer that employs about 14,000 workers in the United States. It is one of two companies operating domestic facilities that produce both iron and steel on-site (integrated iron and steel mill). These domestic facilities can produce both new and high-quality grades of steel, which certain manufacturers (e.g., automotive companies) use in their products. Japanese firm Nippon Steel Corporation (Nippon Steel) finalized its acquisition of USS in June 2025, following approval of the transaction by President Trump. USS’s management under this new ownership may carry implications for domestic employment and the rate of innovation adoption in the industry. In recent years, USS has taken some actions that coincided with falling steel prices. For example, the company reduced output and shuttered some of its legacy facilities, which has led to layoffs of workers in Michigan and Illinois. In addition, the company made investments in new facilities (away from legacy iron and steelmaking facilities located in the Great Lakes region) that produce raw steel using scrap steel—a process that is less labor-intensive than making new steel from iron. After USS publicly announced its acquisition by Nippon Steel in December 2023, the parties sought two regulatory approvals from the U.S. government. First, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) began a review of the implications of Nippon Steel’s ownership of USS for U.S. national security. Second, the Department of Justice conducted a separate U.S. government inquiry on antitrust concerns. Workers employed by USS, a rival steelmaker of USS, some steel buyers, and some Members of Congress, responded to USS’s announcement by publicly raising concerns on how a successful acquisition or an alternative outcome may affect employment and the performance of steel and steel-using industries. In response to some of these stakeholder concerns, Nippon Steel made commitments to maintain existing USS facili… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48872/R48872.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48872.html |
| R45951 | Apportionment and Redistricting Process for the U.S. House of Representatives | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T13:37:56Z | Active | Reports | Sarah J. Eckman | Voting, Elections & Redistricting | The census, apportionment, and redistricting are interrelated activities that affect representation in the U.S. House of Representatives. Congressional apportionment (or reapportionment) is the process of dividing seats for the House among the 50 states following the decennial census. Redistricting refers to the process that follows, in which states create new congressional districts or redraw existing district boundaries to adjust for population changes and/or changes in the number of House seats for the state. At times, Congress has passed or considered legislation addressing apportionment and redistricting processes under its broad authority to make law affecting House elections under Article I, Section 4, of the U.S. Constitution. These processes are all rooted in provisions in Article I, Section 2 (as amended by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Seats for the House of Representatives are constitutionally required to be divided among the states, based on the population size of each state. To determine how many Representatives each state is entitled to, the Constitution requires the national population to be counted every 10 years, which is done through the census. The Constitution also limits the number of Representatives to no more than one for every 30,000 persons, provided that each state receives at least one Representative. Additional parameters for the census and for apportionment have been established through federal statutes, including timelines for these processes; the number of seats in the House; and the method by which House seats are divided among states. Congress began creating more permanent legislation by the early 20th century to provide recurring procedures for the census and apportionment, rather than passing measures each decade to address an upcoming reapportionment cycle. Federal law related to the census process is found in Title 13 of the U.S. Code, and two key statutes affecting apportionment today are the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929 and the Apportionment Act of 1941. A… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45951/R45951.10.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R45951.html |
| LSB11401 | The United States’ Prosecution of Nicolás Maduro Moros: United States v. Maduro | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T14:37:54Z | Active | Posts | Karen Sokol | Cocaine, Drug Trafficking, Executive Branch, International Terrorism, Trafficking & Crime, Judicial Branch, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, Separation of Powers, Venezuela, International Law | Following the seizure of Nicolás Maduro Moros (Maduro) by U.S. armed forces in Caracas, Venezuela, on January 3, 2026, a superseding indictment charging him and other defendants with narco-terrorism, narcotics, and weapons offenses was unsealed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY). The January 2026 indictment supersedes an indictment filed against Maduro in the SDNY in March 2020. This Legal Sidebar describes the charges in the January 2026 indictment and analyzes potentially relevant precedent that may govern this case, including the judicial opinions arising out of the United States’ prosecution of Panama’s military leader Manuel Noriega for drug trafficking offenses in the 1990s. This Sidebar then discusses some considerations for Congress. The Charges in the January 2026 Indictment The January 2026 indictment names Maduro and five other defendants: Cilia Adela Flores de Maduro (Maduro’s wife), Diosdado Cabello Rondon and Ramon Rodriguez Chacin (current and former high-ranking Venezuelan government officials and politicians), Nicolás Ernesto Maduro Guerra (Maduro’s son), and Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores (identified in the indictment as the alleged leader of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) as designated by the State Department under 8 U.S.C. § 1189 in February 2025). The indictment charges Maduro, Rondon, and Chacin with narco-terrorism conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 960a, and all five defendants are charged with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States and weapons possession offenses. The first count alleges narco-terrorism conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 960a, which prohibits engaging in certain drug trafficking offenses, or attempting or conspiring to do so, “knowing or intending to provide, directly or indirectly, anything of pecuniary value to any person or organization that has engaged or engages in terrorist activity ... or terrorism.” The indictment alleges that Maduro and the two Venezuelan government offici… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11401/LSB11401.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11401.html |
| IN11618 | Congressional Redistricting Criteria and Considerations | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T17:38:13Z | Active | Posts | Sarah J. Eckman | Voting, Elections & Redistricting | Congressional redistricting involves creating geographic boundaries for U.S. House districts within a state. Following each decennial census, House districts are first allocated among states through apportionment (or reapportionment), then allocated within states based upon each state’s redistricting process. The sections below describe selected federal and state redistricting criteria for congressional districts, followed by a brief discussion of recent related congressional proposals. This product does not provide a legal analysis; for discussion of redistricting law, see CRS Report R44199, Congressional Redistricting: Legal and Constitutional Issues, and CRS Report R44798, Congressional Redistricting Law: Background and Recent Court Rulings. Selected Redistricting Criteria Redistricting criteria commonly reflect a combination of state and federal statutes, judicial interpretations, and historical practices. They may be viewed as efforts to provide fair representation for residents and prevent arbitrary or discriminatory boundaries. Certain federal standards apply to House districts, related to population equality and minority protections, but other standards are largely determined by states. Redistricting processes can require, permit, or prohibit consideration of certain factors when drawing districts. Often, decisionmakers weigh trade-offs between criteria, and some states specify a priority order in which factors are considered. Population Equality Federal standards address population equality among a state’s congressional districts. The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed population size variance among congressional districts within a state, or malapportionment. Under the “equality standard” or “one person, one vote” principle, the Court has found congressional districts within a state should be drawn to approximately equal population sizes. Across states, however, district population sizes can vary. Racial and Language Minority Protections Another federal requirement comes from Section 2 of the Voting Rig… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN11618/IN11618.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN11618.html |
| IN11053 | Redistricting Commissions for Congressional Districts | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T17:08:00Z | Active | Posts | Sarah J. Eckman | Historically, state legislatures have determined congressional district boundaries, and this remains true in most states. The role of political actors in redistricting at times leads to concerns, by some, about conflicting incentives, if the process is used by incumbents to help boost their parties’ electoral gains. In recent Congresses, several bills have been introduced that could require states to use independent redistricting commissions for U.S. House redistricting; the House passed two such bills in previous Congresses, H.R. 1 (117th Congress) and H.R. 1 (116th Congress). Some states have adopted independent redistricting commissions, which are typically composed of members of the public and often described as bipartisan or nonpartisan, as an alternative method for congressional redistricting. Proponents believe such commissions can prevent opportunities for partisan gerrymandering and may create more competitive, representative districts. Others, however, have argued that the effect of redistricting methods on electoral competitiveness is overstated and the structure of many commissions can allow political considerations to remain. Some redistricting commissions, for example, may not prohibit certain political officials from membership. For congressional districts, redistricting commissions had the primary responsibility for drawing district lines in 11 of the 44 states that were apportioned multiple U.S. House seats following the 2020 census, as shown in Figure 1. Several states (Colorado, Michigan, New York, and Virginia) adopted such commissions since the 2010 census. Other states have different types of commissions associated with congressional redistricting. Iowa, for example, convenes a temporary advisory committee and also uses a redistricting commission composed of nonpartisan legislative staff to draft maps, which then must be approved by the legislature. Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Utah have advisory commissions. In Connecticut, Indiana, and Ohio, a commission can serve as a b… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN11053/IN11053.7.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN11053.html | |
| IG10076 | U.S. Coal Production & Federal Lands | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T13:37:55Z | Active | Infographics | Lexie Ryan | Federal Land Management, Natural Resources Policy, Fossil Energy, Energy Policy | / U.S. Coal Production & Federal Lands Almost half of coal production in the United States today occurs on federal lands. The Western coal region contains some of the top coal-producing states in the country. In 2024, coal generated$446.3 million in federal revenue, and oil and gas generated over 30 times that amount. Federal revenues are partly derived from royalties, the rates of which have recently changed. Map Federal estate Coal-producing areas as designated by EIA Dotted lines roughly indicate region boundaries. Onshore surface acres administered by the Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, and National Park Service. Excludes lands administered by other federal agencies. Hawaii does not produce coal. 2024 Total U.S. Coal Production Production on Nonfederal Lands Production on Federal Lands Federal Revenue from Coal 2004-2024 Coal production on federal lands and Federal revenue from coal Federal Revenue from Oil and Gas Data exclude “refuse recovery” and production and revenues from Native American lands. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. While production is the most significant driver of revenues, payments on new and nonproducing leases, fees, and more also contribute to revenues. Revenues may vary across states depending on these factors, different royalty rates, and more. Revenues may come from nonproducing leases or reflect past production. Sources: Federal production and revenues from the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR). Total production from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Nonfederal production is the difference between ONRR and EIA production values. Map geography based on data from EIA, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, and ESRI. Information as of March 4, 2026. Prepared by Lexie Ryan, Analyst in Energy Policy; Molly Cox, Geospatial Information Systems Analyst; and Amber Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10076/IG10076.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10076.html |
| IF13171 | Rare Earth Elements and U.S. Supply Chains | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T12:07:53Z | Active | Resources | Linda R. Rowan | Energy & Natural Resources, Rare Earth Elements (REEs) | Rare earth elements (REEs) have catalytic, magnetic, electrical, and luminescent properties vital for civilian and defense purposes. REEs may include 17 elements—scandium (atomic symbol Sc), yttrium (Y), and the 15 lanthanides—although some classifications exclude Sc. REEs typically are found together in nature (Sc is not found in nature with other REEs) and are not rare in the Earth’s crust. The U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS’s) 2025 Critical Minerals List (2025 CML) includes most REEs, except for promethium (Pm), because these elements are essential for the U.S. economy and security, have vulnerable U.S. supply chains, and are vital for products and services. Congress may consider the role of the federal government, international diplomacy and partnerships, and public-private partnerships in making U.S. REE supply chains more resilient to help promote a strong economy and national security. Light to Heavy REEs The 15 lanthanides—which have similar electron configuration and atomic size, making them essential for some applications—make up one row of the periodic table. They generally can be categorized as light to heavy REEs. The light REEs (LREEs, with lower atomic numbers and atomic weights than the heavy REEs [HREEs]) include lanthanum (La), cerium (Ce), praseodymium (Pr), neodymium (Nd), Pm (rare and unstable), samarium (Sm), europium (Eu), and gadolinium (Gd). The HREEs include terbium (Tb), dysprosium (Dy), holmium (Ho), erbium (Er), thulium (Tm), ytterbium (Yb), and lutetium (Lu), plus Sc and Y. U.S. Applications Some U.S. REE applications, listed from greatest to least demand, include catalysts (primarily Nd, La, Ce and Pr; used in oil refineries, catalytic converters, fuel additives, chemical processing, air pollution controls); magnets (primarily Nd, Tb, Dy, Pr; used in electronics, vehicles, refrigeration, power generation, medical imaging) and metal alloys (primarily Nd, Y, La, Ce, Pr; used in batteries, fuel cells, steel, superalloys, aluminum/magnesium); glass and polishing (primarily Nd, Gd, … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13171/IF13171.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13171.html |
| IF13082 | Mid-Decade Congressional Redistricting: Key Issues | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T17:38:15Z | Active | Resources | L. Paige Whitaker, Sarah J. Eckman, L. Paige Whitaker | Voting, Elections & Redistricting | States typically begin their congressional redistricting processes following the decennial U.S. census and apportionment, at which point states with multiple House seats draw congressional district boundaries to account for population changes in the intervening decade. After redistricting plans are enacted, states may face legal challenges regarding elements of their plans; these lawsuits can continue for a number of years and result in courts approving subsequent modifications to states’ congressional district maps. Aside from these court-ordered redistricting efforts, states have not typically undergone significant redistricting efforts until after the next decennial census, though there are some recent and ongoing examples. In 2025 and 2026, lawmakers in a number of states (including California, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Utah) have redrawn their congressional district maps ahead of the 2030 Census; others have demonstrated an interest in doing so. This practice is often referred to as mid-decade redistricting. Mid-decade redistricting is prohibited by neither the U.S. Constitution nor federal law. Congressional Apportionment and Redistricting Background Article I, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, as amended by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that representation in the House of Representatives is based on state population size, as determined by a national census conducted within each 10-year period. Dividing House seats among the 50 states is referred to as apportionment; determining where district boundaries exist within a state is referred to as redistricting. The Constitution does not specify how House seats are to be distributed within each state, but it does limit the number of Representatives to no more than one for every 30,000 persons, provided that each state receives at least one Representative. States largely set, and can potentially revise, their own practices for redistricting, including its timing, and mid-decade redistricting may be permitted under current s… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13082/IF13082.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13082.html |
| IF11681 | Defense Primer: LGM-35A Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T11:52:53Z | Active | Resources | Anya L. Fink | Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation | The LGM-35A Sentinel is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system that is expected to replace the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM in the U.S. nuclear force structure. MMIII has served as the ground-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad—land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable bombers—since 1970. The Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, requested $4.1 billion for Sentinel research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) in FY2026. This request assumed $1.5 billion from FY2025 reconciliation legislation (P.L. 119-21), commonly referred to as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. The FY2025 reconciliation legislation included $2.5 billion for Sentinel “risk reduction activities.” The FY2026 budget request for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) included $649 million for the W87-1 nuclear warhead for the Sentinel. The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA P.L. 119-60) authorized $3.8 billion for Sentinel RDT&E and $649 million for the W87-1 warhead. What Is an ICBM? A U.S. ICBM can reach targets around the globe in approximately 30 minutes after launch. During the first three minutes, three solid fuel rocket motors power the missile’s flight. After the powered portion of flight, the missile follows a parabolic trajectory toward its target. The missile releases its warhead during the mid-course portion of its flight, and the warhead continues to the target. Once the President authorizes the launch of any U.S. ICBM, the missile cannot be recalled or destroyed in flight. The same is true for nuclear missiles launched from U.S. submarines. In contrast, U.S. bombers can return to their bases, without releasing their weapons, although their weapons also cannot be recalled after their release. The United States began deploying nuclear-armed ICBMs in 1959, and has maintained these systems “on alert,” or able to launch promptly, since … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11681/IF11681.25.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11681.html |
| IF11284 | U.S.-China Trade Relations | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T06:53:10Z | Active | Resources | Karen M. Sutter | Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations, Export Policy, Foreign Investment, East Asia & Pacific, U.S. Economy, U.S. Trade Policy | The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) is the second-largest global economy and has been a top U.S. trading partner since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. China is a major export market for U.S. aircraft, agriculture, semiconductor equipment/chips, gas turbines, and medical devices, and a top source of U.S. consumer goods and manufacturing inputs. At the same time, challenges that U.S. firms face from China include a lack of market access reciprocity, trade barriers in key areas, a strong PRC state role in commercial activity, and expanding industrial policies, export controls, and economic security and data rules. Trade issues raised by U.S. officials and executives since the 1990s have broadened into a U.S. government focus on strategic competition with the PRC. The executive branch and Congress have debated and adopted approaches, such as tariffs and restrictions on investment and market access, to counter PRC practices they say distort markets, hinder fair competition, and challenge U.S. economic leadership. PRC Trade and Investment Terms The PRC government controls or influences the purchase, financing, and price of top U.S. exports to China—aircraft, semiconductors, medical equipment, agriculture, and energy. It has sought to increase control of this trade and reduce its reliance on U.S. imports by diversifying trade with other countries and advancing industrial policies that exploit foreign commercial ties to develop PRC capabilities in top import sectors. For example, in aerospace, to meet PRC terms, some U.S. firms have partnered with and transferred advanced U.S. technology to PRC state firms to jointly develop a PRC single-aisle aircraft (C-919). The PRC government funds imports of U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment to support the development of China’s semiconductor industry. PRC policies have required firms to localize supply chains. PRC procurement rules in pharmaceuticals and medical devices have set fixed prices, which has increased cost pressures and encoura… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11284/IF11284.34.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11284.html |
| IF10951 | Problematic Substance Use in the Military: Prevention, Treatment, and Research Efforts | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T13:37:55Z | Active | Resources | Bryce H. P. Mendez, Bryce H. P. Mendez, Quadre Nichols | Military Personnel, Compensation & Health Care | In 1982, Congress enacted requirements for the Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, to “identify, treat, and rehabilitate members of the armed forces who are dependent on drugs or alcohol.” (10 U.S.C. §1090). Since then, Congress has held a sustained interest in understanding federal efforts and identifying options to address substance use and misuse, particularly among servicemembers. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §912a) and DOD policy generally prohibit the possession, distribution, sale, or use of certain substances and the misuse of certain substances. In light of this prohibition, DOD operates programs focused on prevention, treatment, and research to address illicit drug use and misuse of alcohol, prescription drugs, and other substances. In April 2025, the Trump Administration published its Statement of Drug Policy Priorities, which outlines federal priorities and objectives to address “illicit drug use that plagues our Nation” and acknowledges “the complexity of substance use disorder and addiction.” These priorities, among others, seek to “Reduce the Number of Overdose Fatalities, with a Focus on Fentanyl,” “Prevent Drug Use Before It Starts,” “Provide Treatment That Leads to Long-Term Recovery,” and “Innovate in Research and Data to Support Drug Control Strategies.” Terminology Problematic substance use. A DOD term that refers to “the use of any substance in a manner that puts the user at risk of failing in their responsibilities to mission or family and that is considered unlawful by regulation, policy or law.” (DOD Instruction 1010.04) Substance misuse. “A pattern of substance use marked by recurrent significant social, occupational, legal, or interpersonal adverse consequences.” (DOD Instruction 1010.04) Substance use disorder. “A cluster of physiological, behavioral, and cognitive symptoms associated with the continued use of substances despite substance-related problems, d… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10951/IF10951.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10951.html |
| IF10349 | Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs Funding for FY2026 | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T15:07:55Z | Active | Resources | Bryce H. P. Mendez, Bryce H. P. Mendez | Military Personnel, Compensation & Health Care, Veterans & Military Health Care, Defense Appropriations, Defense Budgets & Appropriations | Members of Congress are frequently lobbied to add funding to annual defense appropriation legislation for certain medical research programs on a wide variety of diseases and topics. In addressing annual appropriations bills, Members frequently seek information on enacted levels for such funding under the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDMRP). CDMRP Administration and Funding The CDMRP is a Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, program that receives congressional appropriations explicitly for biomedical research in specific, congressionally identified health matters. As such, it has not been part of the President’s budget request for DOD. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), with oversight from the Defense Health Agency, administers the CDMRP and is responsible for awarding and managing competitive grants. Congress typically inserts CDMRP funding as Undistributed Medical Research in the Defense Health Program’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DHP RDT&E) account in the annual DOD appropriation. Congressional documents accompanying the annual defense appropriation act (i.e., conference report or explanatory statement) typically identify the specific research areas for a given fiscal year. Division A, Title VI, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75), inserted $1.27 billion into the RDT&E account for CDMRP. This amount comprises 51% of the overall DHP RDT&E, as reflected in Figure 1. Biomedical research conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or other military research agencies is not included in this account. Table 1 lists the FY2026 CDMRP funding amounts for specific medical research areas. CDMRP Funding Requests Members may request funding for medical research during the annual defense appropriations process. The appropriations committees typically send Members a memorandum with instructions for submitting requ… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10349/IF10349.19.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10349.html |
| IF10250 | The Philippines | 2026-03-04T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T13:10:39Z | Active | Resources | Ben Dolven, William Piekos | East Asia & Pacific | Overview and Recent Developments The United States and the Republic of the Philippines maintain a relationship that includes a bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, close people-to-people ties, and many shared strategic and economic interests. The United States administered the Philippines as a colonial territory (1898-1946) after 300 years of Spanish rule. Over 4 million people in the United States identify as Filipino alone or in combination, and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs operates its only office outside of the United States in Manila, serving thousands of veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces. The United States is the Philippines’ third-largest trading partner, after China and Japan, and its largest export market. The Philippines has long played an important role in U.S. Asia policy as a security and counterterrorism partner. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) commits the two countries to help defend each other against external armed attack. Tensions between the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) over maritime claims in the South China Sea are a potential flashpoint. Trump Administration officials have reaffirmed the “ironclad” U.S. commitment to the Philippines, including by supporting the Philippines’ military modernization, deploying advanced missile systems in combined exercises, and initiating a new bilateral task force to deter PRC coercion in the South China Sea. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2026 (P.L. 119-60), Congress authorized up to $2.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and up to $1 billion in loans for military sales for the Philippines. In July 2025, Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. visited the United States, meeting with President Donald Trump and the U.S. secretaries of defense and state. In addition to reaffirming the importance of the alliance, the two sides announced that the United States would provide over $60 million in new foreign assistance to support energy, maritime, and… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10250/IF10250.69.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10250.html |
| R48732 | ROAD to Housing Act of 2025 | 2026-03-03T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T14:37:57Z | Active | Reports | Katie Jones, Henry G. Watson, Maggie McCarty, Libby Perl, Darryl E. Getter | Homeownership & Housing Finance, Homelessness, Housing-Related Assistance to Communities & Tribes, Public & Assisted Housing | The Renewing Opportunity in the American Dream to Housing Act of 2025 (S. 2651, also known as the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025) was introduced and reported to the Senate on August 1, 2025. The bill contains eight titles comprised of 40 sections, which address several housing policy topics. The ROAD to Housing Act of 2025 was incorporated into Division I of a Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (S. 2296) by S.Amdt. 3901 to S.Amdt. 3748. On October 9, 2025, this amended version of the National Defense Authorization Act was passed by the Senate. The text of the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025 in S. 2296, as amended, differs in several respects from the text of S. 2651; these differences are noted in the section summaries in this report. Most of the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025 sections contained in S. 2296 are similar to previously introduced stand-alone bills; CRS notes similar or identical stand-alone bills from the 117th, 118th, and 119th Congresses at the end of each section’s summary. If similar bills were introduced over multiple Congresses, only the most recent introduction is noted. On March 2, 2026, the Senate invoked cloture on H.R. 6644, the House-passed Housing for the 21st Century Act. A substitute amendment was then introduced in the Senate; it included many provisions of the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025. (For more information on H.R. 6644, see CRS Report R48849, Housing for the 21st Century Act.) This report does not include a discussion of the substitute amendment introduced on March 2, 2026. Major Components of the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025 Title I contains one section regarding changes to housing counseling requirements. Title II contains 13 sections predominantly concerning housing supply. The sections in Title II would seek to incentivize changes in local governments’ zoning and land use policies, authorize new housing construction and rehabilitation grant programs, modify the Community Reinvestment Act, and reduce federal environmental review requirements,… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48732/R48732.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48732.html |
| R47240 | Navigating the Appropriations Status Table | 2026-03-03T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T17:38:06Z | Active | Reports | Carol Wilson, Ben Leubsdorf, Ben Leubsdorf, Justin Murray, Carol Wilson | Budget & Appropriations Procedure | The CRS Appropriations Status Table is an online tool for tracking legislation that provides annual funding for federal programs, projects, and activities. It displays the status of regular appropriations bills, continuing resolutions, supplemental appropriations measures, and budget resolutions. This report describes how to access and navigate information presented on the Appropriations Status Table. A companion video is available on CRS.gov. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47240/R47240.9.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R47240.html |
| R45003 | Muslim Holidays: Fact Sheet | 2026-03-03T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T11:37:52Z | Active | Reports | Maya V. Thomas | Islam is one of the three major Abrahamic faiths, alongside Judaism and Christianity. According to the 2020 U.S. Religion Census, the number of followers of Islam in the United States has risen to 4.5 million. Muslims annually observe two major holidays: Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. This fact sheet describes the two holidays’ significance and American Muslims’ observance of them and addresses the ways the holidays have been recognized by elected officials. The fact sheet also briefly describes two other widely celebrated Muslim holidays. This fact sheet is designed to assist congressional offices with work related to Islamic holidays. It contains sample speeches and remarks from the Congressional Record, presidential proclamations and remarks, and selected historical and cultural resources. This is part of a series of Congressional Research Service fact sheets on religious holidays in the United States. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45003/R45003.16.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R45003.html | |
| R41364 | Capital Gains Tax Options: Behavioral Responses and Revenues | 2026-03-03T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T12:53:13Z | Active | Reports | Jane G. Gravelle | Compared with most other tax provisions, the potential revenue gain scored for an increase in capital gains taxes is strongly affected by behavioral responses assumed by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the Department of the Treasury. As an illustration, the Obama Administration estimated in February 2010 that allowing the 2003 tax cuts enacted in the George W. Bush Administration for capital gains to expire would have raised $16 billion of revenue in FY2019. Yet, based on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections in January 2010, the effective capital gains tax was 13.3% in 2008 and would have increased to 17.9% in 2019; applying the differential in these rates to the realizations in 2019 would have produced a revenue difference of $40 billion. Although some of this differential could arise from different forecasts, assumptions about behavioral responses are the main reason for the reduction in projected revenues. Because these behavioral responses limit the potential revenue scored from a tax increase on capital gains and because of concerns some have raised that most income of very high-income individuals is in the form of capital gains (whether accrued or realized), proposals have been advanced to tax capital gains currently (as accrued) by marking to market publicly traded securities and imposing a look-back tax on difficult-to-value assets. Such a change could face a number of difficulties; thus it is important to understand the evidence of the behavioral responses. The analysis in this report suggests the Department of the Treasury’s projections and those of the JCT, absent a change in their realizations response, may understate revenue gains from increasing capital gains tax rates. Realizations responses in revenue projections by the revenue-estimating agencies (Joint Committee on Taxation and Treasury) were publicly discussed at the end of the 1980s, in the midst of a contentious debate. The larger the absolute value of the elasticity (the percentage change in realizations divided by the per… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R41364/R41364.14.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R41364.html | |
| IG10046 | Middle East Natural Gas | 2026-03-03T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T07:55:44Z | Active | Infographics | Michael Ratner | Middle East, Middle East & North Africa, Natural Gas, International Energy Issues | / Middle East Natural Gas As natural gas becomes a more global commodity, transporting it by ship in liquefied form (LNG) is considered essential for its continued development as a global fuel. The Middle East is a pivotal gas supplier because of its location between the European and Asian markets, and because it accounts for almost a quarter of world LNG supplies. The region also has three waterway transport bottlenecks, which given the regional conflicts have made LNG shipping in the region more risky. Sanctions have prevented Iran from internationalLNG exports. South Pars/North Dome World’s largest natural gasfield. Jointly owned by Iranand Qatar. Gas pipelines, liquefaction / export facilities, Regasification / import facilities, gas storage, gas fields, operating as of 11/30/2023 Gas Reserves, Gas Production, Gas Consumption, Gas Exports (pipeline and LNG) Middle East global, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, Oman, and Other Middle East All data from 2024. Gas Reserves = Proven gas reserves. TCM = Trillion cubic meters. BCM = Billion cubic meters. UAE = United Arab Emirates. ME = Middle East. Member of Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). The GECF is an intergovernmental organization that gathers and disseminates information and data on the gas sector for its members. It has been referred to in the press as “gas-OPEC,” as it has similarities to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for oil. Information prepared by Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy; Calvin DeSouza, Geospatial Information Systems Analyst; and Amber Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist on March 3, 2026. Sources: 1. S&P Global, “Commodity Midstream Essentials Gold Worldwide” (accessed November 30, 2023). 2. IHS (2019). 3. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “World Oil Transit Chokepoint,” June 25, 2024. Map geography: U.S. Department of State. Gas reserves, production, consumption, and exports are from CEDIGAZ, an industry subscription database.. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10046/IG10046.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10046.html |
| IF13162 | U.S. International Food Assistance Primer | 2026-03-03T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T15:22:59Z | Active | Resources | Emily M. McCabe, Rhoda Margesson, Benjamin Tsui | Foreign Assistance, Agricultural Trade & Food Aid, International Food Aid | Global food insecurity generally refers to varying degrees of hunger and malnutrition among populations worldwide stemming from a lack of regular access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food. In 2026, an estimated 318 million people globally will face acute hunger. The drivers of food insecurity are often interrelated, far reaching, and lasting. They may include conflict and forced displacement, natural disasters and effects of climate change, economic downturns and high prices, and public health events. Congress has authorized and appropriated funds for international food assistance for over 70 years. In FY2024 (latest data available) such assistance totaled nearly $5.5 billion. The United States has provided international food assistance for a range of reasons, including to respond to global humanitarian crises, support international development, and serve strategic interests, such as promoting political stability and strengthening agricultural markets. In addition, the purchase of U.S.-sourced commodities (e.g., beans, corn, vegetable oils, wheat) and absorption of food surpluses through in-kind food assistance programs have directly benefitted U.S. agriculture. Many U.S.-funded international food assistance programs are implemented through partners, including multilateral entities, such as the UN World Food Program (WFP), and bilateral contracts with nongovernmental organizations. The Administration’s decision to shutter the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as of July 1, 2025, shifted the implementation of U.S. international food assistance to different Department of State (State) bureaus and potentially other agencies. These structural changes may affect the delivery of international emergency food assistance, potentially reduce program scope and funding, and impact program efficiency and effectiveness. Food Assistance Programs USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have historically administered U.S. international food assistance programs. Statutory authorities for inter… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13162/IF13162.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13162.html |
| IF12094 | The Army’s XM-30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (Formerly the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle [OMFV]) | 2026-03-03T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T11:22:51Z | Active | Resources | Ebrima M'Bai, Andrew Feickert | Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces | Background The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is being designed to replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) (see Figure 1 for a notional example). Optionally manned means the OMFV is to have the capability to conduct remotely controlled operations while a crew is not in the vehicle. The M-2 Bradley, which has been in service since 1981, transports infantry on the battlefield, provides fire support to dismounted troops, and can destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defensive systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley—the Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program—were cancelled for programmatic and cost-associated reasons. Figure 1. Notional Example—OMFV / Source: U.S. Naval Institute (USNI), https://news.usni.org/2021/12/30/report-to-congress-on-armys-optionally-manned-fighting-vehicle-to-congress-on-armys-optionally-manned-fighting-vehicle, accessed April 18, 2022. Note: This is a notional example; the Army’s OMFV selected for production may differ from this example. OMFV Redesignated XM-30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle On June 26, 2023, upon the completion of the initial digital design phase, the Army redesignated the OMFV as the XM-30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle. Role of the XM-30 According to the 2024 Department of Defense (DOD) FY 2025 Program Acquisition Costs by Weapons Systems The XM-30 Combat Vehicle (previously OMFV), as part of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), will replace the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle to provide the capabilities required to defeat a future near-peer competitor’s force. The XM-30 is an optionally manned platform that maneuvers soldiers to a point of positional advantage to engage in close combat and deliver decisive lethality during the execution of combined arms maneuver. It is designed to operate with an… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12094/IF12094.19.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12094.html |
| IF11573 | USDA’s Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology | 2026-03-03T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T07:54:40Z | Active | Resources | Eleni G. Bickell | Agricultural Technology & Research | The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulates certain organisms developed using genetic engineering (GE) under its authority to prevent the introduction and dissemination of plant pests. In May 2020, USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) finalized the “Sustainable, Ecological, Consistent, Uniform, Responsible, Efficient (SECURE)” rule, which revised 7 C.F.R. Part 340. The rule was fully implemented in October 2021. In December 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California prospectively vacated the SECURE rule. Following the court’s decision, APHIS announced that it would reestablish regulatory and nonregulatory processes under the pre-2020 biotechnology regulations at 7 C.F.R. Part 340 (2019). As of 2026, USDA biotechnology oversight operates under these earlier regulations while APHIS evaluates potential regulatory revisions. In the Spring 2025 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (Unified Agenda), APHIS listed an anticipated interim final rule, “Regaining Lost Efficiencies for Products of Biotechnology.” The listing indicates that USDA intends to alter regulatory processes following the vacatur of the SECURE rule, with publication projected for 2026. This In Focus describes USDA’s statutory authority over agricultural biotechnology, the evolution of its implementing regulations, and the current regulations following the vacatur of the 2020 SECURE rule. It also outlines how USDA’s role fits within the broader Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology and highlights issues that may be of interest to Congress as agencies evaluate regulatory changes. The Coordinated Framework of the Regulation of Biotechnology The federal government’s 1986 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework) describes how USDA, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulate biotechnology products under existing statutes. Rather than acting upon a single biotechnology… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11573/IF11573.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11573.html |
| RL33865 | Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T11:52:46Z | Active | Reports | Paul K. Kerr, Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Anya L. Fink, Mary Beth D. Nikitin | Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation | Arms control and nonproliferation are two of the policy tools that the United States has used to implement its national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many others see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The United States and the Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate-range and long-range weapons. Since then, a series of progressive U.S.-Russian agreements reduced both sides’ nuclear warhead stockpiles and delivery vehicles. U.S.-Russian arms control cooperation has sharply deteriorated in recent years, as has Russian compliance with long-standing arms control commitments. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the further deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations in 2022, the prospect for new arms control negotiations and bilateral strategic risk reduction measures is uncertain, at least in the short- to medium-term. Nevertheless, the United States has sought to engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to reduce the risk of conflict involving the employment of nuclear weapons and promote other strategic stability measures. The United States is a prominent actor in an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries, or nuclear “nonproliferation.” This regime includes formal treaties, … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33865/RL33865.68.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/HTML/RL33865.html |
| R46963 | SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T16:52:55Z | Active | Reports | Bruce R. Lindsay, Darryl E. Getter, Anthony A. Cilluffo | Federal Disasters & Assistance | The Small Business Administration (SBA) is authorized to provide low-interest, long-term disaster loans, either on a direct basis or in partnership with private lenders, to eligible individuals, businesses, and nonprofit organizations to help them repair, rebuild, and recover from uninsured, underinsured, or otherwise uncompensated economic losses after a declared disaster. The SBA has relied exclusively on direct disaster loans since the early 1980s. In designing the disaster loan program, setting the interest rates charged on SBA disaster loans involves weighing competing policy tradeoffs. Lower interest rates reduce the cost of borrowing for disaster survivors, but increase the cost for SBA (and ultimately taxpayers). Higher interest rates reduce the cost to SBA for providing assistance—allowing it to assist more disaster survivors for a given amount of program appropriations—but increase the costs for participating survivors and risk making the program too expensive for some potential participants. Over time, interest rate policies for the disaster loan program have changed as different Congresses and SBA leaders have weighed these competing policy priorities differently. Congress provides appropriations for SBA disaster loan administrative expenses and disaster loan credit subsidies (the amount necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative expenses). As a direct lending program, the SBA deposits disaster loan payments, including interest, into the SBA Disaster Loan Financing Account. These payments are used to repay the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) for the funds that SBA borrows from Treasury to make disaster loans. The SBA’s disaster loan credit subsidy rate (the net present value of cash flows to and from the program, including loan payments, prepayments, interest subsidies, defaults, and recoveries) determines the amount of appropriations necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative expenses. The loan credit subsidy rate is the program’s non-administrative cost divided by the amount … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46963/R46963.7.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R46963.html |
| R45160 | Federal Election Commission: Membership and Policymaking Quorum, In Brief | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-03T13:53:02Z | Active | Reports | R. Sam Garrett | Voting, Elections & Redistricting | The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is the nation’s civil campaign finance regulator. The agency ensures that campaign fundraising and spending is publicly reported; that those covered by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and by commission regulations comply and have access to guidance; and that publicly financed presidential campaigns receive funding. As of this writing, two of six FEC commissioners remain in office. Four commission vacancies, one of which has been disputed, occurred during 2025. Initial developments left only three commissioners remaining in office, thus precluding a policymaking quorum of at least four votes, through September 2025. Due to a resignation, a fourth commissioner departed the agency effective October 3, 2025, leaving two commissioners remaining in office. FECA requires at least four agreeing votes from commissioners to take various policymaking, regulatory, and enforcement actions. The quorum loss that began in 2025 marked the fourth in the FEC’s history. The first lasted six months in 2008. The second lasted for approximately nine months and spanned parts of 2019 and 2020. The third lasted for approximately six months during the second half of 2020. FEC commissioners are presidential appointees who are subject to Senate advice and consent. Commissioners may remain in office in holdover status beyond the end of their six-year statutory terms. On February 11, 2026, President Trump sent two FEC nominations to the Senate. If both nominees were confirmed and no other vacancies occurred, the commission’s policymaking quorum would be restored. This CRS report briefly explains the kinds of actions that FECA precludes when a quorum is not possible because fewer than four FEC members are in office. Among other powers, without a quorum, the commission cannot hold hearings, issue rules, or enforce campaign finance law and regulation. Campaign finance law and regulation remain in effect and may be enforced once a quorum is restored. (An FEC quorum loss does not affect Department of … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45160/R45160.25.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R45160.html |
| IN12664 | Executive Office for Immigration Review Immigration Judge Staffing Issues | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T12:22:50Z | Active | Posts | Holly Straut-Eppsteiner | Immigration judge (IJ) staffing at the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR; immigration courts) has long been insufficient to adjudicate its pending caseload and keep up with the receipt of new immigration cases, particularly removal proceedings, contributing to large backlogs in the immigration court system. These backlogs have been exacerbated by record-high case receipts in recent years. IJs, career employees within the executive branch, are attorneys appointed by the Attorney General. IJ hiring is largely contingent on congressional appropriations. EOIR had steadily increased IJ hiring and grown its IJ corps (i.e., total number of IJs on staff) in recent years (Figure 1). In FY2023, EOIR hired 133 IJs, its largest annual number of hires. The IJ corps reached a high of 735 at the end of FY2024. Since FY2025, the IJ corps has declined, with substantially higher than typical levels of departures. Reportedly, some IJs have left EOIR under options for early retirement or deferred resignation while others have been fired. CRS estimates that 115 IJs separated from EOIR in FY2025, the highest annual number of separations since at least 2011 (see Figure 1 note for estimation methodology). In the first quarter of FY2026, 88 IJs departed EOIR. EOIR has continued to hire IJs (14 in FY2025 and 11 FY2026 Q1), but not at a level to restore its staffing to the previous level. By the end of FY2025, the IJ corps had declined to 634. At the end of the first quarter of FY2026, EOIR had 557 IJs on staff, down nearly one quarter (178 IJs) from the peak staffing level in FY2024. This number does not include temporary IJs (discussed below). The FY2025 reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21), appropriated $3.33 billion to DOJ for several purposes, including to hire IJs and support staff. The law authorizes EOIR for a staffing level of “not more than 800” IJs, effective November 1, 2028. Figure 1. Immigration Judges: Hired, Departed, and Total on Board, FY2011-FY2026 Q1 / Source: EOIR analysis … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12664/IN12664.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12664.html | |
| IN11693 | The Budget Resolution and the Senate’s Automatic Discharge Process | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-03T15:08:01Z | Active | Posts | James V. Saturno, Megan S. Lynch | Budget & Appropriations Procedure | The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (the Budget Act) provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget that establishes an agreement between the House and Senate on budgetary levels for the upcoming fiscal year (and at least four additional years). The budget resolution assists Congress in developing federal budget policy, and its adoption allows Congress to trigger the budget reconciliation process. Consideration of the budget resolution is guided by the Budget Act and Senate rules and precedents. Section 300 of the Budget Act includes a timetable specifying dates by which Congress is to complete certain budgetary actions. Under this timetable, the Senate Budget Committee is directed to report a budget resolution (pertaining to the upcoming fiscal year beginning October 1) by April 1, and Congress is directed to complete action on a budget resolution by April 15. Since 1983, the Senate has interpreted this timetable in a manner that affects how budget resolutions are referred to committee and placed on the Senate’s Calendar of Business. If the Senate Budget Committee has not reported a budget resolution by April 1, it is automatically discharged from the consideration of any budget resolution that has been previously referred to it, as well as any budget resolution that is subsequently introduced. Once the committee has been discharged from the consideration of a budget resolution, it is placed on the Calendar. For example, on March 29, 2012, a budget resolution for FY2013 (S.Con.Res. 37) was introduced and referred to the Senate Budget Committee. Once April 1, 2012, passed without the Senate Budget Committee reporting a budget resolution, the committee was automatically discharged from consideration of S.Con.Res. 37, and the resolution was placed on the Calendar of Business. Similarly, on April 26, 2012, another budget resolution for FY2013 (S.Con.Res. 42) was introduced. Because April 1 had already passed, the resolution was referred to the Senate Budget Committee, the committee was im… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN11693/IN11693.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN11693.html |
| IF13170 | The House Consensus Calendar: Principal Features | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T14:54:03Z | Active | Resources | Jane A. Hudiburg | Establishment in House Rules First established in the 116th Congress (2019-2020), the Consensus Calendar provides an alternative route to the floor for certain unreported House bills and resolutions that have accumulated at least 290 cosponsors. Clause 7 of House Rule XV delineates the Calendar’s principal features. Pursuant to the rule, the Speaker is to designate, and the House is to consider, at least one measure listed on the Consensus Calendar during each week that the House is in session. This provision does not apply “before March 1 of an odd-numbered year and after September 30 of an even-numbered year.” Unreported Measures To be placed on the Consensus Calendar, a measure must have been referred to at least one House committee but not reported by the committee of primary jurisdiction. Rule XV does not specify a minimum time period that a measure must remain unreported before the process of placement on the Consensus Calendar may begin. A measure is considered reported when the chair, as directed by committee vote, files the written committee report with the Clerk. If the primary committee of jurisdiction reports a measure after the Calendar motion is filed but before the measure is placed on the Consensus Calendar, the motion is deemed withdrawn. Similarly, if the primary committee reports the measure after it has been placed on the Calendar, the measure is removed from the Calendar. Thus, a primary committee may report a bill either to prevent its placement on the Calendar or, if already placed there, to secure its removal. 290-Cosponsor Threshold The Consensus Calendar is reserved for unreported measures that enjoy broad support. To demonstrate that support, the rule requires a House bill or resolution to have at least 290 cosponsors before its sponsor may file a motion to place the measure on the Consensus Calendar. All cosponsorships count toward the threshold regardless of whether the cosponsor subsequently resigns, dies, or otherwise leaves office after cosponsoring the measure. However, a cospo… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13170/IF13170.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13170.html | |
| IF12759 | The HIPAA Privacy Rule: Overview and Issues | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T07:55:44Z | Active | Resources | Amanda K. Sarata | Health Care Delivery | The final HIPAA Privacy Rule (the Rule) was first issued in December 2000, and a final modified rule was issued in August of 2002, pursuant to authority in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA, P.L. 104-191). HIPAA was enacted to improve the availability and continuity of health insurance coverage; promote long-term care insurance and the use of health savings accounts; and combat waste, fraud, and abuse, particularly in Medicare and Medicaid. HIPAA also included a series of requirements under the subtitle “Administrative Simplification” to improve the efficiency of, and decrease costs within, the health care system by supporting a transition to standardized electronic administrative and financial transactions. Among these requirements, the law directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary to promulgate privacy standards should legislation addressing privacy of personal health information not be enacted within a specified timeframe. The HIPAA Privacy Rule established for the first time a set of federal standards for the protection of personal health information. As part of Administrative Simplification [42 U.S.C. §§1320d et seq.], HIPAA required promulgation of both privacy and security standards in recognition of the increased risk to health data posed by promoting electronic data use and exchange within the health care system. More than a decade later, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH, P.L. 111-5) incentivized the move away from paper patient records to electronic patient records, building on the earlier shift to standard electronic financial and administrative transactions. These shifts—both on the administrative and patient care side—were considered by many to be a necessary precursor to broader health care reform efforts that culminated in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended). Privacy (and security) of personal health data was to some extent a second-order … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12759/IF12759.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12759.html |
| IF12744 | Patent Law: An Introduction and Issues for Congress | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-03T14:38:08Z | Active | Resources | Kevin J. Hickey | Intellectual Property | Patents, a form of intellectual property, give their owners certain exclusive rights in new and useful inventions. To encourage innovation, the Constitution gives Congress the power to grant patents to inventors for a limited time. Patents have been a part of federal law ever since Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790. Patents play a critical role in many industries, such as pharmaceuticals and computer technologies. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) estimated in a 2022 study that utility patent-intensive industries contributed $4.4 trillion to the U.S. GDP and directly employed 18.2 million people in 2019. In light of patents’ effect on innovation and technological competitiveness, Congress often considers amendments to patent law. This In Focus provides an overview of patent law and highlights potential areas of congressional interest. (For more detail, see CRS Report R46525, Patent Law: A Handbook for Congress.) Patent Prosecution To obtain a patent, an inventor must file a patent application with USPTO. The patent applicant must describe the claimed invention in detail through words and drawings in a written specification. The application must also propose written patent claims, which define the legal scope of the claimed invention. The patent application process is called patent examination or patent prosecution. During prosecution, a USPTO patent examiner determines whether the application and claimed invention meet the legal requirements for patentability discussed below. If so, USPTO issues (i.e., grants) the patent. In FY2025, USPTO received over 600,000 utility patent applications and issued nearly 350,000 patents. Patentability Requirements Patent-Eligible Subject Matter and Utility Section 101 of the Patent Act allows patents on any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Congress thus sought to ensure that almost anything made by humans may be patented if it meets the other patentability requirements. For example, new inventions in fields ranging from chemist… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12744/IF12744.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12744.html |
| IF12150 | Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-03T15:23:00Z | Active | Resources | Andrew S. Bowen | Europe, Russia & Eurasia, National & Military Intelligence | Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have defended and repelled Russian advances, despite ongoing disadvantages in personnel and a smaller defense industry. The UAF has demonstrated flexibility over the course of the conflict as well as an ability to integrate Western security assistance. Nevertheless, the UAF continues to face obstacles, including personnel and equipment losses. From FY2022 to FY2024, Congress enacted five supplemental appropriations measures to provide assistance to Ukraine. The UAF’s evolving condition and performance may be of interest to the 119th Congress as Members weigh the impact of U.S. support for the UAF and potentially consider any further assistance to Ukraine or conduct oversight of U.S. policies toward Ukraine and Russia. Personnel Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF has suffered high levels of casualties (data on Ukrainian casualties are sparse, but one estimate places UAF killed as high as 140,000), lowering force quality. In addition, desertion and draft evasion pose continued challenges to the UAF’s ability to sustain operations. In January 2026, Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov estimated that 200,000 soldiers were absent without official leave (AWOL) and 2 million men were avoiding draft notices. After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led forces in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (known as “the Donbas”). In 2022, Ukraine was able to quickly mobilize these veterans and other volunteers into new volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve without the need for lengthy training. This arguably contributed to UAF effectiveness, since Ukraine did not have a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. Many initial volunteers have been killed or wounded since 2022. Reportedly, the average Ukrainian soldier is over 40 years old, and some recruits have health or substance abu… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12150/IF12150.16.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12150.html |
| IF12014 | Social Security Retirement Earnings Test Overview | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T17:37:50Z | Active | Resources | Zhe Li | Background Social Security is a work-related, federal insurance program that provides monthly cash benefits to workers and their eligible family members in the event of a worker’s retirement, disability, or death. Social Security retirement benefits received between age 62 and the full retirement age (FRA)—which falls between 65 and 67, depending on year of birth—are generally subject to an actuarial reduction for early retirement and may also be reduced by the Retirement Earnings Test (RET) if the beneficiary has earnings that exceed an annual threshold. (The RET does not apply to Social Security disability beneficiaries.) The Social Security Administration’s Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) estimated that about 520,000 beneficiaries below FRA (or about 11% of all beneficiaries below FRA) would have had their benefits reduced or completely withheld due to the RET in 2019. How Does the RET Work? Under the RET, a beneficiary who is below FRA and will not attain FRA during the calendar year is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for every $2 of earnings above an annual exempt amount ($24,480 in 2026). During the calendar year in which a beneficiary attains FRA, he or she is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for every $3 of earnings above a higher threshold ($65,160 in 2026). Both thresholds are typically increased annually with growth in the national average wage. If a beneficiary is affected by the RET, his or her monthly Social Security benefit may be temporarily reduced in part or in full, depending on the total applicable reduction. The RET in Conjunction with Early Retirement Reduction When a worker elects to claim Social Security benefits before FRA, his or her monthly benefits are subject to a permanent actuarial reduction. In the initial benefit computation, retirement benefits are reduced for early retirement by a fraction of the worker’s basic benefit for each month of entitlement before FRA. The RET is applied to monthly benefits only after they have been reduced by the early retirement actuari… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12014/IF12014.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12014.html | |
| IF11200 | Gold Star Designation: An Overview | 2026-03-02T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T16:37:56Z | Active | Resources | Carly A. Miller, Barbara Salazar Torreon, Carly A. Miller | Military Personnel, Compensation & Health Care | Background During the years of U.S. participation in World War I (WWI, 1917-1918), an informal practice developed where some families would display service banners adorned with blue stars in the windows of their homes to signify participation in the armed forces. Each blue star symbolized a family member serving in the war. When a servicemember was killed or died, it became customary for families to replace the blue star with a gold star. In a separate but related practice, President Woodrow Wilson expressed support in May 1918 for a recommendation made by the Women’s Committee of the Council for National Defense that American women should wear a black band on the upper left arm, affixed with a gold star to signify the loss of a family member during the war. In October 1942, Congress enacted P.L. 77-750 “to authorize the Secretary of War to approve a standard design for a service flag and a service lapel button.” Current policy by the Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, regarding display of the gold star on the Service Flag is contained in DOD Instruction (DODI) 1348.36, Gold Star Lapel Button, Service Flag, and Service Lapel Button. The policy remains essentially unchanged, stating: “If the Service member symbolized is killed or dies from causes other than dishonorable, the star representing that individual will have a gold star of smaller size superimposed on it, so that the blue forms a border.” Gold Star Lapel Button In 1947, Congress enacted P.L.80-306, requiring the “Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy” to provide Gold Star Lapel Buttons (GSLB) “for widows, parents, and next of kin of members of the armed forces who lost their lives” in the U.S. armed services during World War II (WWII). The GSLB has a gold star mounted on a purple surface surrounded by laurel leaves. See Figure 1. GLSB eligibility has evolved over time. Current criteria are outlined under 10 U.S.C. §1126(a): “A lapel but… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11200/IF11200.9.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11200.html |
| IN12662 | U.S. and Israeli Military Operations Against Iran: Issues for Congress | 2026-03-01T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T12:53:18Z | Active | Posts | Clayton Thomas, Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp, Jim Zanotti | On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched military operations against targets in Iran. The United States and Iran had been engaged in talks over Iran’s nuclear program, amid broader U.S. concerns over Iran’s missile arsenal, terrorism, and support to armed groups. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed Iranian citizens directly in their public remarks, encouraging Iranians to use any opportunities created by the strikes to overthrow the Islamic Republic government, which has ruled Iran since 1979. International reactions have varied, with Russia and China condemning U.S. and Israeli actions, and some European and Arab governments denouncing Iran’s counterattacks. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior Iranian security leaders have been killed. Iranian officials have announced transitional leadership and continue retaliatory missile and drone attacks on Israel, bases in the region hosting U.S. forces, and targets in Arab Gulf countries and adjacent waters. As of March 1, civilians reportedly had been killed in Iran, Israel, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Syria, and some U.S. servicemembers had been killed or wounded. The State Department has advised U.S. citizens worldwide to exercise caution and “follow the guidance in the latest [embassy] security alerts.” Strikes by Iran have damaged airports and ports in the region, and regional airspace closures have caused global disruptions. Apparent Iranian strikes on ships near the Strait of Hormuz highlight threats to that critical chokepoint for transnational shipments of oil and natural gas. Developments in the conflict and global responses present Congress with short- and long-term policy questions across several domains. U.S. Objectives and Plans President Trump has stated a range of U.S. objectives and options since the start of the operations. On February 28, the President said “our objective is to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime.… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12662/IN12662.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12662.html | |
| R48874 | Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2026 State of Play | 2026-02-28T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-07T05:54:21Z | Active | Reports | William L. Painter | Homeland Security Appropriations | FY2026 marks the 23rd annual appropriations cycle with a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations measure. In six of the first seven years of its existence, the annual appropriations measure for DHS was enacted within a month of the beginning of the fiscal year it covered. Since FY2010, however, no annual DHS appropriations measure has been enacted within the first two months of its fiscal year, and twice DHS received its annual appropriations within the first fiscal quarter. Lapses in annual appropriations for the department lasting more than a week have occurred four times in that period. This report is a quick reference for tracking the “state of play” for DHS appropriations from the end of the August 2025 district work period until the resolution of the annual appropriations measure. It will be updated as events warrant. DHS appropriations 2026 Latest DHS appropriations DHS appropriations 2026 supplemental Homeland Security appropriations lapse 2026 DHS continuing resolution anomaly 2026 (This is an “In Brief” style report, and as such, should have its summary and TOC suppressed.) | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48874/R48874.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48874.html |
| R48875 | U.S.-Australia Relations: Background and Issues for Congress | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T13:23:01Z | Active | Reports | Jared G. Tupuola | The Commonwealth of Australia is a long-standing diplomatic, economic, and security partner of the United States with joint military cooperation dating back as early as World War I. Throughout the 20th century, U.S.-Australian relations advanced with Australia becoming a major non-NATO U.S. ally through the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) alliance of 1951. In the past decade, Australia has grown increasingly aligned with the United States over shared concerns of a militarily and economically capable People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). The U.S.-Australia defense partnership is multi-faceted and includes bilateral and multilateral engagement to advance what the United States and its allies refer to as a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the allies adopted a new element of U.S.-Australia defense cooperation with the Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership, or AUKUS. Under AUKUS, the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) are to help procure nuclear-powered propulsion technology for Australia and cooperatively develop advanced defense capabilities. Other shared foreign policy and security initiatives include the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with India and Japan, and the Five Eyes Intelligence Grouping with Canada, the UK, and New Zealand. Since re-assuming office for his second term in January 2025, President Donald Trump has pursued foreign policies that have strained U.S.-Australian bilateral relations, particularly the imposition of tariffs on Australia as part of U.S. global tariffs despite having a bilateral free trade agreement (which entered into force in 2005), and having a trade surplus with Australia. In June 2025, the Trump Administration announced it would conduct a review of AUKUS to ensure that the partnership aligns with an “America First foreign policy.” While the Australian government has expressed confidence in the U.S. commitment to AUKUS, there are rising voices in Australia calling into question U.S. reliability as a security partner and advocating… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48875/R48875.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48875.html | |
| R48868 | Separation of Powers and NATO Withdrawal | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-03T16:08:02Z | Active | Reports | Karen Sokol | North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Europe, Russia & Eurasia, Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools, International Law, Separation of Powers | In 2023, Congress enacted a law that prohibits the President from “suspend[ing], terminat[ing], denounc[ing], or withdraw[ing] the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty”—which established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—without the advice and consent of the Senate or an act of Congress. See Section 1250A of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 118-31. This provision emerged against the backdrop of debates concerning the United States’ policy toward NATO and whether the President possesses the power to withdraw the United States from treaties without receiving the legislative branch’s approval. Prior to Section 1250A’s enactment, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) published an opinion in 2020 concluding that the President has exclusive power over treaty withdrawal and that Congress is constitutionally prohibited from intruding upon this power. In contrast to the OLC’s legal position, which neither courts nor Congress are bound to consider as authoritative, Section 1250A’s sponsors stated that the legislation “ensures that no President can unilaterally dissolve our bond to this invaluable alliance without Senate approval.” If the President decided to unilaterally withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty, irrespective of Section 1250A, there are at least two ways in which the statute might affect a court’s analysis of any challenge to the President’s action. First, the statute may influence a court’s decision on whether to hear such a challenge at all, and second, the statute could affect the court’s evaluation of the President’s action in the event it decides to hear a case. With respect to whether a court would hear a challenge, two doctrines are relevant: the political question doctrine and standing. Historically, courts have generally left the issue of the constitutional distribution of treaty-withdrawal power to the political branches, concluding that challenges to unilateral treaty withdrawal by the President present a nonjusticiable political qu… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48868/R48868.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48868.html |
| R48866 | Toward Commercial Fusion Energy: Considerations for Congress | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T13:31:23Z | Active | Reports | Todd Kuiken | While there has been considerable U.S. public and private investment in developing fusion energy, scientific and technological hurdles remain for commercial viability. Congress may have an interest in U.S. strategic positioning in regard to fusion energy technology as countries around the world, including China, are competing to be the first to achieve commercialized fusion energy. Nuclear fusion is a process in which the nuclei of two lightweight atoms join, or fuse, to form a heavier nucleus, releasing energy. Achieving fusion requires three conditions: (1) heating a small quantity of fuel above its ignition point, (2) maintaining the reaction long enough for the release of fusion energy to exceed the energy input, and (3) converting the energy released to a useful form of energy (e.g., electricity). As of the date of this report, just one project claims to have successfully achieved the first condition and partially achieved the second. Once all three are achieved, electricity generated by a fusion reaction would then need to be integrated into the electric grid, which may introduce additional engineering and technical challenges. Different designs and technologies are being explored to achieve commercial fusion energy. Federally funded fusion energy research and development (R&D) is primarily supported by the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Office of Science through its Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) program. In FY2025, the FES program budget was $790 million. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), from FY2020 to FY2023, about 70% of FES’s budget supported three projects, including two DOE user facilities and an international fusion project called ITER, formerly the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, which accounted for about 30% of the total FES budget. DOE also supports fusion energy research directed toward weapons activities and improved stewardship of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. This latter work includes inertial confinement, an approach used in the National I… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48866/R48866.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48866.html | |
| R48849 | Housing for the 21st Century Act | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T15:52:56Z | Active | Reports | Katie Jones, Maggie McCarty, Henry G. Watson, Andrew P. Scott, Darryl E. Getter | The Housing for the 21st Century Act (H.R. 6644) was passed by the House on February 9, 2026. The bill contains six titles comprising 38 sections, which address several housing policy topics as well as several banking topics. According to the committee report accompanying the reported version of the bill (H.Rept. 119-457), its purpose is “to make it easier to build and afford housing, including modernizing outdated government programs, lowering costs by removing unnecessary federal requirements, and increasing local flexibility over housing decisions.” The version of the bill passed by the House differs from the version reported by the House Committee on Financial Services in several ways. Among other things, the engrossed version adds a new Title VI, “Strengthening Community Banks’ Role in Housing.” Title VI contains 13 sections: 12 sections incorporate the text of banking-related bills that had previously been reported by the Financial Services Committee, and 1 provides budgetary savings. Most of the sections in the Housing for the 21st Century Act are similar to previously introduced stand-alone bills. Additionally, many of the provisions in the Housing for the 21st Century Act are similar to provisions included in the Renewing Opportunity in the American Dream to Housing Act of 2025 (S. 2651; also known as the ROAD to Housing Act); some sections are substantially identical, some have similarities but are notably different, and some are present in one bill and not the other. This includes the banking provisions and savings provision contained in Title VI of the Housing for the 21st Century Act, which have no corresponding provisions in the ROAD to Housing Act. Table A-1 provides a comparison of provisions from the Housing for the 21st Century Act to those in the ROAD to Housing Act. Major Components of the Housing for the 21st Century Act Title I contains seven sections concerning housing supply and housing development regulations. Several national indicators suggest that housing supply may be relatively low … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48849/R48849.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48849.html | |
| R43419 | NASA Appropriations and Authorizations: At a Glance | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T07:54:53Z | Active | Reports | Rachel Lindbergh | Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations, R&D Programs & Policies, Space Policy | Congressional deliberations about the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) often focus on the availability of funding. This product provides data on past and current NASA appropriations, as well as the President’s FY2026 budget request and congressional action on FY2026 appropriations and authorizations of appropriations. National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA budget NASA appropriations NASA authorization NASA reauthorization NASA funding NASA congressional budget justification NASA budget request NASA operating plan NASA Commerce-Justice-Science NASA CJS 2021 FY2021 NASA appropriations H.R. 7667 H.R. 7617 P.L. 116-260 2022 FY2022 NASA appropriations H.R. 4505 P.L. 117-43 P.L. 117-103 2023 FY2023 NASA appropriations H.R. 8256 S. 4664 P.L. 117-328 2024 FY2024 NASA appropriations H.R. 5893 S. 2321 P.L. 118-42 2025 FY2025 NASA appropriations H.R. 9026 authorization H.R. 8958 S. 4795 S.Rept. 118-198 P.L. 119-4 P.L. 119-21 2026 FY2026 NASA appropriations authorization reauthorization S. 2354 S.Rept. 119-44 H.R. 5342 H.Rept. 119-272 P.L. 119-74 | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R43419/R43419.123.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R43419.html |
| LSB11400 | Does Federal Law Preempt Negligent Selection Claims Against Freight Brokers? | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T17:07:54Z | Active | Posts | Bryan L. Adkins | In the trucking industry, freight brokers serve as intermediaries that match clients who have cargo to ship with trucking companies that provide trucks and drivers to complete the shipment. When a truck crash involves a trucking company selected by a freight broker, injured parties sometimes sue the broker under state tort law on the legal theory that the broker acted negligently in selecting a company that the broker knew, or should have known, had inadequate safety practices. A provision in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preempts certain state laws related to a freight broker’s services, however, and federal appellate courts have disagreed over whether the provision preempts negligent selection claims. The Supreme Court is scheduled to consider the issue this term in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC. This Legal Sidebar provides background on the relevant legal framework and circuit split, discusses the Montgomery case, and addresses considerations for Congress. Background Under federal law, trucking companies providing interstate transportation of property generally must register as a motor carrier with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and comply with FMCSA safety regulations. Motor carriers that violate FMCSA safety regulations may face civil or criminal penalties. The FMCSA also may revoke a motor carrier’s operating authority if the agency determines the motor carrier has unsatisfactory safety practices or has engaged in a pattern or practice of violating FMCSA rules or concealing non-compliance. Brokers who sell or arrange interstate transportation of property by motor carriers also must register with the FMCSA. Whereas the FMCSA has promulgated extensive safety regulations for motor carriers transporting cargo interstate, the FMCSA’s regulation of freight brokers that sell and arrange such transportation generally focuses on the financial aspects of the broker’s services. A personal injury or wrongful death lawsuit arising from a truck crash may result in a damages award totaling millio… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11400/LSB11400.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11400.html | |
| IN12663 | Elections in Bangladesh | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T13:31:25Z | Active | Posts | Maria A. Blackwood | Overview On February 12, 2025, Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority South Asian country of 174 million, held parliamentary elections and a concurrent referendum. Sixty-nine percent of voters endorsed the July National Charter, which proposed changes to “reconstruct the state on the foundation of democracy and human dignity.” At the same time, voters gave one of the country’s two historically dominant political parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a parliamentary supermajority. The party’s leader, Tarique Rahman, was sworn in as Prime Minister on February 17. The elections follow a period of turbulence; in August 2024, student-led protests led to the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League (AL). After Hasina fled to India, an interim government headed by Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist, assumed power and initiated a reform process. Although the interim government enjoyed general support, Yunus’s administration encountered ongoing challenges that the new government now faces, including crime, inflation, human rights concerns, and the rise of Islamist groups. Rahman has committed to bolstering democracy in Bangladesh, but some observers have questioned the extent to which his party may implement the July Charter. Background Since Bangladesh’s 1971 independence from Pakistan, the country’s politics have been dominated by two parties, the AL and the BNP, both of which have faced accusations from some human rights organizations and foreign governments of repression and corruption when in power. According to Human Rights Watch, for example, after returning to power in 2009, the AL “gradually consolidated power by silencing critics, harassing activists, and arbitrarily arresting, forcibly disappearing, and killing members of the opposition or civil society who spoke out against [Hasina].” Hasina secured a fourth consecutive term in office in January 2024 elections that were boycotted by major opposition parties and described by the U.S. Department of State as “not free or fai… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12663/IN12663.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12663.html | |
| IN12661 | Law Enforcement and the Evolving Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) Landscape | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T13:52:56Z | Active | Posts | Kristin Finklea | As the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)—commonly referred to as drones—for both commercial and recreational purposes has increased, so too has law enforcement agencies’ use of this technology. Simultaneously, law enforcement has been concerned about the malicious use of drones and the ability to counter it. UAS may pose unique public safety or security risks. Some have warned, for instance, that drones can be used as reconnaissance tools for criminals “because they can fly past bollards, checkpoints, and other security mechanisms.” For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has noted that transnational criminal organizations use drones to surveil and evade border officials. Drones have also been used to drop illicit drugs and other contraband into jails or prisons. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, for example, notes that criminal networks deliver illicit drugs, weapons, cell phones, and other contraband to inmates via drones and that these drone incursions are increasing. Yet another concern involves potential use of drones to “drop a bomb, shoot firearms, or spray a poison gas over large crowds of people” at a public event. Consequently, policymakers have questioned whether or how law enforcement may be able to engage in counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) activities—including detecting, identifying, monitoring, tracking, communicating with, and disrupting or disabling suspicious or malicious drones. Law Enforcement C-UAS Landscape Law enforcement C-UAS activities generally fall into two broad categories: detection (including monitoring and tracking) and mitigation (including both kinetic and non-kinetic solutions). However, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and other federal agencies have advised that various federal criminal laws have generally limited law enforcement C-UAS options. For instance, criminal surveillance laws, like the Wiretap Act and Pen/Trap Statute, may be implicated when law enforcement attempts to intercept signals or communications in order to detect, identify, monit… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12661/IN12661.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12661.html | |
| IF13116 | National Park Service: FY2026 Appropriations | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T10:53:15Z | Active | Resources | Laura B. Comay | Federal Agencies & Appropriations for Energy & Natural Resources, Interior & Environment Appropriations | The National Park Service (NPS) administers the National Park System, which includes 433 units valued for their natural, cultural, and recreational importance. System lands cover 81 million federal acres and 4 million nonfederal acres. As part of the Department of the Interior (DOI), NPS receives funding in annual appropriations laws for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. Selected issues for Congress related to NPS appropriations include the overall staffing levels supported by the appropriations, funding to address NPS deferred maintenance (DM), allocations for land acquisition, and NPS assistance to nonfederal entities. FY2026 Appropriations The Trump Administration requested $2.116 billion in discretionary appropriations for NPS for FY2026. The request was 37% lower than NPS’s FY2025 discretionary appropriation of $3.337 billion enacted in P.L. 119-4. The request would have decreased or eliminated funding for all NPS accounts compared with FY2025 (Table 1). P.L. 119-74, enacted on January 23, 2026, contained $3.267 billion for NPS for FY2026 in Division C. This was 2% less than the FY2025 regular appropriation and 54% more than the Administration’s request. The law increased funding for three NPS accounts compared with FY2025 and decreased funding for two accounts (Table 1). In earlier action, on July 24, 2025, the House Committee on Appropriations had reported H.R. 4754 (H.Rept. 119-215), with $3.124 billion for NPS for FY2026. Also on July 24, 2025, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 2431 (S.Rept. 119-46), with $3.270 billion for NPS for FY2026. Because appropriations were not enacted by the start of the fiscal year, NPS experienced an appropriations lapse from October 1, 2025, to November 12, 2025. NPS then received appropriations at FY2025 levels under a continuing resolution (P.L. 119-37) until enactment of P.L. 119-74. Separately, NPS receives mandatory appropriations from entrance and recreation fees, concessioner fees, donations, and other sources. NPS’s mandatory appropriati… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13116/IF13116.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13116.html |
| IF12310 | The Small Business Administration’s Growth Accelerator Fund Competition | 2026-02-27T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T17:52:57Z | Active | Resources | Adam G. Levin | Small Business, R&D Programs & Policies | Small businesses and startups sometimes benefit from assistance growing their companies, including support for commercialization, mentorship programs, and capital access. Accelerators—organizations often operated by experienced businesspeople—provide technical assistance and other services to new entrepreneurs in an effort to meet those needs and support the starting and scaling of businesses. Since 2014, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has administered the Growth Accelerator Fund Competition (GAFC) to provide financial support for accelerators assisting science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) and research and development (R&D)-focused small businesses and startups. Historically, the GAFC has often targeted accelerators that supported businesses and/or geographies that traditionally faced barriers in obtaining R&D funds and investment capital, including businesses owned or led by women, minorities, and veterans, or businesses located in rural areas. Until FY2023, the GAFC provided $50,000 awards to accelerators for operating capital. Since FY2023, the SBA has continued to fund accelerator operations, but now makes GAFC awards in two stages: in FY2025, stage one awards were worth $75,000, and stage two awards were worth $150,000. More information on the purpose and structure of these awards is available below. Purpose The SBA’s intent for the GAFC is to help facilitate the success of startups by supporting accelerators that advise such businesses on growing revenue, sourcing outside funding, and avoiding common mistakes. The GAFC’s goals include increasing the pipeline and success of STEM/R&D-focused entrepreneurs and small businesses; accelerating the growth and maturity of innovation-based entrepreneurship networks; catalyzing partnerships and relationships between accelerators to strengthen the national innovation ecosystem; and connecting both new and established participants in the national innovation ecosystem. Some GAFC award announcements have noted SBA’s desire for the GAFC to stimulat… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12310/IF12310.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12310.html |
| RL33487 | Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T16:52:55Z | Active | Reports | Christopher M. Blanchard | Middle East & North Africa, Europe, Russia & Eurasia | Since the December 2024 collapse of the government of Bashar Al Asad, Syrians have pursued political and economic opportunities created by the end of the country’s 12-year civil war. Internal tensions and external pressures pose obstacles to the country’s transition. Transitional President Ahmed Al Sharaa led a group long designated by the U.S. government as a foreign terrorist organization and still designated as a specially designated global terrorist entity. He has renounced former ties to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State and met with President Donald Trump in the White House in November 2025. Interim authorities have outlined a five-year transitional constitutional framework after limited consultation with Syrian citizens. Indirect elections were held in October 2025 for a transitional legislative assembly; elections were not held in some areas of eastern Syria, which were then under the control of ethnic Kurdish-led forces, and areas southeast of the capital, Damascus, which remain under the control of members of the Druze religious minority. Turkish forces remain in parts of the north, while Israeli forces have moved into formerly demilitarized areas between Syria and Israel and into some Syrian territory near the frontier. Sectarian violence involving government forces, their backers, and members of minority communities has marred the transition, highlighting the interim government’s limited capacity to ensure security and impose discipline on its forces. In this context, some observers have expressed skepticism about the transitional government’s commitments to inclusivity and the protection of all members of Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic fabric. Others have warned that domestic and foreign opponents of the transitional government may be exploiting communal tensions to advance their own agendas, and that fragmentation in Syria would threaten regional security. The Trump Administration has outlined a policy of robust but conditional support for Syria’s transitional government, pairing endorsement of i… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33487/RL33487.183.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/HTML/RL33487.html |
| R48864 | The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Reauthorization Act of 2025: SectionbySection Summary | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T20:22:52Z | Active | Reports | Johnathan H. Duff, Hassan Z. Sheikh, Alexandria K. Mickler, Lisa N. Sacco, Amanda K. Sarata, Nora Wells, Elayne J. Heisler | Behavioral Health Workforce, Substance Use Disorders, Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery & Treatment (SUPPORT) Act | The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Reauthorization Act (P.L. 119-44) was enacted on December 1, 2025. The act primarily reauthorized or amended existing behavioral health (i.e., mental health and substance use) programs originally authorized or reauthorized by the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271) in 2018. The SUPPORT Act of 2018 authorized or reauthorized discretionary appropriations for (1) behavioral health-related programs related to substance use disorder prevention, treatment, and recovery activities; (2) programs that seek to expand consumer education on opioid use; and (3) training for the medical and behavioral health workforce, among other activities. Many of those authorizations of appropriations expired at the end of FY2023, though most existing programs received annual appropriations in FY2024 and continued to operate. The SUPPORT Reauthorization Act of 2025 generally reauthorizes appropriations for many of these programs through FY2030. Several authorizations included in the SUPPORT Act of 2018 were not reauthorized by P.L. 119-44. In summary, the titles of the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Reauthorization Act address the following: Title I—Prevention focuses on activities related to the prevention of substance misuse and overdose and associated harms, including federal programs that target pregnant woman and infants, youth, and overdose prevention efforts. Title II—Treatment focuses on substance use disorder treatment activities, including federal programs that support behavioral health workforce training, disseminate best practices in the treatment of substance use disorders, and promote the use of approved medications for opioid use disorder and related overdoses. Title III—Recovery focuses on substance use disorder recovery efforts, including federal programs that support a spectrum of recovery-related services and resources. Title IV—Miscellaneous focuses on federal laws that regulate the delivery and dispensing of controlled substances and the t… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48864/R48864.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48864.html |
| R48191 | Connecting Constituents to Health Information and Services: Resources for Congressional Offices | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T15:37:57Z | Active | Reports | Sarah K. Braun, Angela Napili, Kate M. Costin, Michele L. Malloy, Kate M. Costin | Health Care Delivery | As part of their representational activities, Members of Congress and their staffs provide a range of information and services to constituents. Some constituent communications reflect concerns about health and health care. Constituents may have, for example, difficulty finding and using health coverage; questions about finding health providers and facilities; hardships related to medical costs; requests for information on diseases, conditions, or treatments; or complaints about health providers, facilities, and products. To address these concerns, congressional offices may refer eligible constituents to various federal, state, and local resources and programs. This report compiles selected resources and contacts that congressional offices can use when responding to constituents’ inquiries regarding health and health care concerns. When possible, it lists federally funded referral services that provide individual assistance to constituents and matches specific circumstances to relevant federal, state, or local programs. Constituents can use these online resources, or discuss their specific situations with trained staff at the listed hotlines, to identify and access programs, resources, and benefits relevant to their needs. This report is organized into five sections, with resources and contacts for finding and using health coverage; finding health providers and facilities; financial hardship related to medical costs; information on diseases, conditions, and treatments; and complaints about health care providers, facilities, or products. The Appendix lists selected CRS reports for congressional clients seeking (1) additional resources to support their work with constituents and (2) background on some of the programs and policy issues mentioned in this report. This report is not intended to be a comprehensive catalog of all relevant resources and contacts; rather, it emphasizes federal or federally supported resources and hotlines to address constituents’ frequently asked questions. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48191/R48191.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48191.html |
| R46858 | Europe: Fact Sheet on Parliamentary and Presidential Elections | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T17:52:50Z | Active | Reports | Sofia Plagakis | Europe, Russia & Eurasia | This report provides a map of parliamentary and presidential elections that are scheduled to be held at the national level in Europe in 2026, and a table of recent and upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections at the national level in Europe. It includes dates for direct parliamentary elections only, and excludes indirect elections. Europe is defined in this product as the 50 countries under the portfolio of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. The report does not include the Holy See (Vatican City), as there are no direct presidential or parliamentary elections held there. Electoral rules and governance structures can vary widely across European countries. Twelve European countries have held or are scheduled to hold direct presidential and/or parliamentary elections in 2026. Some dates may be subject to change due to snap elections, parliamentary votes of no confidence, or other factors. CRS has gathered information for this report from numerous sources, including the U.S. Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) World Factbook, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) Election Guide, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and other news sources. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46858/R46858.23.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R46858.html |
| IN12660 | The Child Support Enforcement Passport Denial Program | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T09:07:54Z | Active | Posts | Cory R. Gill, Jessica Tollestrup | Child Support & Family Formation, Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) Passport Denial Program is a mandatory enforcement mechanism that applies to noncustodial parents who owe past-due child support. The program was originally enacted as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA; P.L. 104-193) and was to apply to individuals owing more than $5,000 in past-due support. Subsequently, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA; P.L. 109-171) lowered this threshold to $2,500. As implemented, the program prevents individuals that meet the arrears criteria from obtaining or renewing a passport, and it can also revoke passports under certain circumstances. Overview of the Passport Denial Program All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and 63 tribal nations operate CSE programs pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (this report collectively refers to these as “state” CSE programs). The program is federally administered by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Administration for Children and Families at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The program is estimated to handle the majority of all child support cases; the remaining cases are handled by private attorneys and collection agencies, or through mutual agreements between parents. In FY2024, the program served 11.6 million cases and collected an estimated $26.7 billion in child support, of which $7.5 billion was for obligations that were past-due. The amount of arrears paid were about 6% of the $115.7 billion in cumulative arrears owed to cases enforced by the program. Title IV-D stipulates that child support collected on behalf of families receiving certain forms of public assistance be retained by the state to reimburse it and the federal government for the cost of that assistance; the rest is distributed to families. One of the enforcement methods available to the CSE program for collecting past-due support is denying, revoking, or limiting passports pursuant … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12660/IN12660.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12660.html |
| IF13169 | Fourth Amendment Search Warrant Requirements | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T11:08:14Z | Active | Resources | Cassandra J. Barnum, Peter G. Berris | Crime, Fourth Amendment, Surveillance, Search & Seizure | The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. As a result, law enforcement generally must obtain a search warrant from a “neutral and detached magistrate” before entering a private space to look for evidence. The Amendment states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This In Focus provides examples of judicial interpretations of this provision regarding what is required from law enforcement seeking to obtain a search warrant. Probable Cause Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must be based on probable cause, a standard the Supreme Court has described as “incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages.” Exact formulations vary, but the Supreme Court has characterized the probable-cause standard as “the kind of fair probability’ on which reasonable and prudent’” people act. The Court has said probable cause is a higher standard than “reasonable suspicion,” but does not require proof that something is “more likely true than false.” Under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, law enforcement may make the probable-cause showing to a magistrate through a written affidavit or, if “reasonable under the circumstances,” by sworn testimony—both of which embody the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant must be supported by “oath or affirmation.” Criminal Activity and Nexus to Location To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement must establish probable cause that the materials sought are contraband, evidence that will “aid in a particular apprehension or conviction,” or otherwise “seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity.” Law enforcement must also demonstrate “a fair probability” that these materials “will be found in a particular place.” (This may include a place occupied by a person not “implicated in the crime.”) In practice, some federal courts employ a simplified formulation of probable… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13169/IF13169.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13169.html |
| IF12990 | U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T10:52:49Z | Active | Resources | Karen M. Sutter | East Asia & Pacific, Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations | Since 2018, the U.S. government has imposed a series of tariffs on imports from the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) with the stated intention of addressing U.S. concerns about PRC trade practices and foreign policies. Since 2025, the Trump Administration’s trade policy and tariff actions have maintained a focus on China among other countries. Some actions explicitly target China; others involve sectors that affect China (Figure 1). China has responded to U.S. tariffs with its own tariffs and market restrictions. Given the trade imbalance (China exports to the United States more than four times what it imports), China has fewer goods on which to raise tariffs. In that context, China has focused its tariffs on top U.S. exports and turned to nontariff measures. It has canceled orders, implemented export controls on some production inputs, and imposed market restrictions on some U.S. firms. Both sides have exempted some products from tariffs. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the President cannot use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.) to impose tariffs, affecting some tariffs the United States imposed on China in 2025 (see “IEEPA (2025-2026)”). U.S. and PRC officials have been in talks since 2025 but have not reached a tariff deal. Members of Congress may consider whether to support, modify, or oppose the Administration’s approach to tariffs; sustain, expand, or pull back trade authorities Congress delegated to the President; and require approval by Congress for trade deals that result in tariff changes. See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade Relations; CRS In Focus IF12125, Section 301 and China: The U.S.-China Phase One Trade Deal; CRS In Focus IF12958, Section 301 and China: Mature-Node Semiconductors; and CRS In Focus IF12666, Section 301 and China: Shipping and Shipbuilding Issues. Escalating Tariff Rates As of February 20, 2026, U.S. and PRC average tariff rates on the other country’s goods were about 34% (U.S.) and 31% (PRC), not a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12990/IF12990.12.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12990.html |
| IF12964 | U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T12:22:52Z | Active | Resources | Anya L. Fink | Europe, Russia & Eurasia, Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation | The United States has periodically sought to advance its national security interests through the negotiation and conclusion of nuclear arms control agreements with its adversaries. Throughout 2025 and in 2026, President Donald Trump has discussed potential talks with Russia and China concerning nuclear weapons reductions. Congress plays an important role in arms control, which is implemented pursuant to treaties or agreements negotiated by the executive branch. The Senate considers providing advice and consent to the ratification of treaties and the confirmation of executive branch nominees for positions in the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy, and the intelligence community. Congress also authorizes and appropriates funds for, as well as provides oversight of, those U.S. government agencies that negotiate, implement, monitor, and verify compliance with treaties and agreements. Background During the Cold War and in its aftermath, the United States and the Soviet Union (which Russia and other Soviet republics dissolved in 1991) sought to minimize the costs and risks of nuclear competition and improve so-called strategic stability. Following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union created a “hotline” to communicate in a nuclear crisis, which, along with some later risk reduction agreements, sought to reduce dangers of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. After the Soviet Union achieved rough parity in strategic nuclear forces with the United States, and began to deploy ballistic missile defenses, the two countries engaged in Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). The 1972 SALT I Treaty and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiated by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations and the 1979 SALT II Treaty negotiated by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations resulted in some limits on strategic nuclear forces and ballistic missile defenses. Subsequently, the Reagan Administration concluded the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12964/IF12964.8.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12964.html |
| IF12640 | TikTok and China’s Digital Platforms: Issues for Congress | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T17:52:56Z | Active | Resources | Karen M. Sutter, Michael D. Sutherland | East Asia & Pacific, Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations | Congress and U.S. policymakers at the federal and state levels have taken steps to address their national security-related concerns about the extent to which the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC or China) influences digital platforms that are directly or indirectly tied to the PRC and operating in the United States. Most U.S. actions to date have focused on TikTok, owned by ByteDance, a company with ties to the PRC government. Other expressed concerns include PRC platforms’ large user bases, access to large amounts of U.S. data, and company data and content policies. In December 2024, TikTok said in its court filings that it had 170 million U.S. users. TikTok’s CEO testified to Congress in March 2023 that ByteDance retains in the PRC at least seven years of U.S. TikTok users’ data. Enacted in April 2024, P.L. 118-50 (Div. H and Div. I) requires ByteDance to divest from TikTok, allows the President to address other PRC-controlled digital platforms, and directs the Federal Trade Commission to enforce provisions that prohibit data brokers from transferring U.S. personally identifiable sensitive data to foreign adversaries, including the PRC. PRC digital firms are able to serve both the U.S. and PRC markets, while PRC investment and technology policies restrict U.S. firms from operating in China. This asymmetry raises issues for Congress about market access reciprocity, fair competition, and U.S. regulation of PRC firms. PRC digital platforms have expanded in the U.S. market over the past 10 years. Many firms have entered regulated or restricted parts of the U.S. economy—broadcasting, media, health, and finance—via mobile applications (apps). Digital platforms are internet-connected and software-based digital spaces that facilitate the exchange of goods, services, and information through online interactions. For this report, PRC digital platforms or platforms that have PRC ties refer to digital platforms that are headquartered in China, subsidiaries, or firms otherwise tied to a company headquartered in China, or w… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12640/IF12640.11.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12640.html |
| IF12473 | U.S.-China Competition in Emerging Technologies: LiDAR | 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T17:23:00Z | Active | Resources | Karen M. Sutter, Kelley M. Sayler | Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations, Technology, Information & Cyber Defense, East Asia & Pacific, Strategy, Operations & Emerging Threats | The governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) have both identified strategic and emerging technologies as a key element of economic competitiveness and national defense. Efforts to lead in such technologies are a core aspect of U.S.-China strategic competition. Some emerging technologies have both civilian and military uses. Among these technologies is Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), a remote sensing technology used in automotive, agriculture, manufacturing, weather, and other systems. The LiDAR market and its uses are developing quickly. U.S. firms have led in LiDAR to date, but PRC firms are advancing with the support of PRC industrial policies and access to the U.S. market and technology. Some PRC firms have used questionable practices to obtain U.S. LiDAR intellectual property (IP). LiDAR Technology LiDAR is a remote sensing method that uses pulsed laser light to measure the distance, speed, and/or altitude of physical objects to map the surrounding environment. LiDAR allows for precise, accurate, and rapid three-dimensional measurements of natural and manmade environments with high resolution and long-range detection. Unlike other sensing technologies (e.g., cameras), LiDAR’s performance is not degraded in low-light conditions. There are different types of LiDAR. Scanning LiDAR uses mechanical rotation to spin the sensor and enables 360-degree detection. U.S. firm Velodyne (now merged with U.S. firm Ouster) developed the first scanning LiDAR. Microelectro-mechanical system (MEMS) LiDAR uses miniature mobile mirrors to scan the environment. MEMS firms include the U.S. firm Atomica. Optical phased array (OPA) LiDAR does not require sensor movement and is thus more durable than alternative LiDAR technologies. OPA firms include Quanergy. Flash LiDAR works like a camera to map environments using a single laser pulse. Flash LiDAR firms include LeddarTech (Canada), Sense Photonics (United States), and Continental (Germany). LiDAR Development and Applications The Unite… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12473/IF12473.8.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12473.html |
| RL33003 | Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T17:23:02Z | Active | Reports | Jeremy M. Sharp | Middle East & North Africa | Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which opened in 1869 and is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Its population of more than 108 million people makes Egypt by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Its majority Sunni Muslim population and institutions have transnational influence, and its large Coptic Christian minority is the Middle East region’s largest Christian population. Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel stands as one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. During the war in Gaza, Egypt worked with U.S. officials to serve as a mediator between Israel and Hamas. Egypt was one of several nations which played a key role in mediating the October 2025 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. In October 2025, Egypt hosted the Sharm el Sheikh Peace Summit, where President Trump, President Sisi, and other world leaders jointly signed a declaration endorsing the ceasefire. In 2026, Egypt is experiencing a period of relative economic growth and revived regional relevancy as the Trump Administration looks to Egypt (and others) to help stabilize Gaza. After several years of economic disruption and a balance of payments crisis caused by both domestic policies and international events, Egypt’s debt crisis has eased due to outside economic support from international financial institutions and Arab Gulf states. The Egyptian economy, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is now “showing signs of robust growth” In addition to Gaza, the Egyptian government is facing other foreign policy challenges. Egypt has had to contend with a politically divided Libya on its western border and a civil war in Sudan on its southern border. Conflict in Sudan and tensions with Ethiopia implicate the Nile River, a core Egyptian national security interest. In addition to in… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33003/RL33003.128.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/HTML/RL33003.html |
| R48863 | Local and Regional Project Assistance Program: Background and Selected Considerations | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T16:52:59Z | Active | Reports | Jennifer J. Marshall | Transportation Funding | Local and Regional Project Assistance (LRPA) is a competitive grant program for transportation projects of significant local and regional impact. The name of the program and grant requirements have changed across Administrations, and it is currently known as the Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development (BUILD) grant program. The program is administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT). The program originated in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5), in which Congress provided $1.5 billion for a discretionary grant program to make capital investments in surface transportation infrastructure through capital projects and planning projects. The program was funded through annual appropriations acts starting in FY2010 and through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58, §21202) from FY2022 to FY2026. FY2026 is the LRPA program’s 21st application solicitation round, with $1.5 billion available for grants. DOT competitively awards these grants based on certain criteria, which were amended most recently to align with Trump Administration executive orders. Notices of funding opportunities (NOFOs) have highlighted and prioritized different types of transportation projects over the years. Award amounts, modes of transportation funded, and the geographic distribution of funding has changed as well. Beginning in FY2010, Congress capped the maximum individual grant award at $25 million. Road, transit, and port/maritime projects have been awarded each year. Road projects have been 54% of all projects selected for grants for the program, followed by transit (16%), bicycle/pedestrian (11%), rail (10%), port/maritime (9%), and aviation (<1%) projects. Beginning in FY2019, Congress directed DOT to award 50% of the grant funding to projects located in rural areas (areas with populations below 200,000) and 50% to projects in urban areas (areas with populations 200,000 and above). DOT requires project sponsors to develop and monitor performance measures for pro… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48863/R48863.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48863.html |
| R48862 | Spectrum Provisions in P.L. 119-21, the FY2025 Reconciliation Law | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-26T17:08:12Z | Active | Reports | Jill C. Gallagher | The FY2025 reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21; commonly known as “the One Big Beautiful Bill Act”) was signed into law on July 4, 2025. The act was established pursuant to H.Con.Res. 14, a budget resolution, which set budgetary goals for certain House and Senate committees. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce and Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation each developed proposals to meet budgetary targets, which included provisions to auction radio spectrum, and to use the proceeds to meet budgetary goals. The spectrum auctions are expected to generate over $85 billion from FY2025 to FY2034, according to the Congressional Budget Office. P.L. 119-21 directs the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency in the Department of Commerce (DOC) responsible for managing federal spectrum use, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which is responsible for managing nonfederal spectrum use (i.e., commercial, state, and local spectrum use), to make 800 megahertz of spectrum available for commercial mobile services while also excluding certain bands from auction. Title IV, Section 40002, of the act contains the following provisions: The FCC’s general auction authority (which had expired on March 9, 2023) is reinstated through September 30, 2034, excluding the 3.1-3.45 gigahertz (GHz) and 7.4-8.4 GHz bands from auction. The FCC is required to grant licenses through competitive bidding (i.e., auctions) for 300 megahertz of spectrum, including not less than 100 megahertz in the 3.98-4.2 GHz band within two years of enactment. The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information (i.e., head of NTIA), with the FCC, is directed to identify 500 megahertz of spectrum in the 1.3-10.5 GHz range (excluding the 3.1-3.45 GHz and 7.4-8.4 GHz bands) for reallocation from federal use to (1) nonfederal use, (2) shared federal and nonfederal use, or (3) a combination thereof for full-power commercial licensed use. It directs the FCC to complete, within four years… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48862/R48862.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48862.html | |
| R48794 | Social Security Administration (SSA): FY2026 Annual Limitation on Administrative Expenses (LAE) Appropriation: In Brief | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-26T10:38:01Z | Active | Reports | Tamar B. Breslauer, William R. Morton | Retirement Security & Social Insurance, Appropriations Policy, Social Security Administration (SSA), Cash Assistance | The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for administering Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which are the nation’s primary income support programs for older adults and individuals with disabilities. (Social Security includes Social Security Disability Insurance [SSDI].) As part of its duties, SSA receives benefit applications and determines program entitlement or eligibility, holds hearings and other appeals, completes program integrity (PI) reviews of certain beneficiaries, issues new and replacement Social Security number (SSN) cards, and posts workers’ earnings to their Social Security records. SSA is also responsible for supporting the administration of a number of non-SSA programs and laws, such as Medicare, and provides and verifies data for a variety of purposes. Benefit payments for SSA’s programs are considered mandatory spending, which means that such spending is controlled by each program’s authorizing statute—not by appropriations acts. However, the resources to carry out SSA’s programs—as well as to support the administration of Medicare and other priorities—are generally considered discretionary spending and thus are controlled by appropriations acts. Nearly all of SSA’s administrative expenses are funded by appropriations to its Limitation on Administrative Expenses (LAE) account, and almost all of the funding for the LAE account is provided each year as part of the annual appropriations process. The annual LAE appropriation is a discretionary lump-sum appropriation composed of funds from the Social Security and Medicare trust funds for their respective shares of administrative expenses, the general fund for SSI’s share of administrative expenses, and a portion of user fees collected for SSA’s administration of certain activities. SSA’s annual LAE appropriation is traditionally provided under the Related Agencies section of the annual Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations act. The FY2026 commi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48794/R48794.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48794.html |
| R48643 | Overview of FY2026 Appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T09:22:51Z | Active | Reports | Nathan James | Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations | This report describes actions to provide FY2026 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. The annual CJS appropriations act provides funding for the Department of Commerce, which includes bureaus and offices such as the Census Bureau, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology; the Department of Justice (DOJ), which includes agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Offices of the U.S. Attorneys; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the National Science Foundation; and several related agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 (FY2025 CR, P.L. 119-4) provided FY2025 funding for most CJS accounts at the FY2024 enacted level. The CR reduced funding for several CJS accounts relative to the FY2024 enacted appropriation. The reductions were the result of eliminating certain funding in CJS accounts that was for community funding projects (also known as earmarks) in FY2024. The CR also increased funding for two DOJ accounts and increased the obligation cap for the Crime Victims Fund. For FY2026, the Administration requested a total of $67.442 billion for the departments and agencies funded through CJS. This amount was $14.992 billion (-18.2%) less than regular FY2025 enacted funding for CJS ($82.435 billion). The Administration’s request included $8.656 billion for the Department of Commerce, $35.359 billion for DOJ, $22.722 billion for the science agencies, and $705 million for the related agencies. The Senate Committee on Appropriations marked up and reported its FY2026 CJS appropriations bill (S. 2354) on July 17, 2025. The bill would have provided a total of $82.953 billion for CJS departments and agencies. This amount was $519 million (… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48643/R48643.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48643.html |
| R48568 | Federal Power Act: The Department of Energy’s Emergency Authority | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T16:54:31Z | Active | Reports | Ashley J. Lawson | Electricity, Energy Policy | Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. §824a(c)) grants the Secretary of Energy certain authorities over the temporary operation of the electricity system during emergencies. Actions by the Trump Administration have highlighted this authority and raised questions about its future implementation. The Federal Power Act was enacted in 1935 and included emergency authority language. At the time, federal oversight of the electricity system was conducted by the Federal Power Commission (FPC). Now, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has most responsibilities for electricity system oversight—but not for emergencies. The emergency authority was transferred to the Secretary of Energy when the Department of Energy (DOE) was established by the Department of Energy Organization Act (P.L. 95-91) in 1977. Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act provides DOE broad discretion to require almost any change to the operation of the U.S. electricity system on a temporary basis. Specifically, DOE may “require by order such temporary connections of facilities and such generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy as in its judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest.” DOE may execute this authority during war or at any other time it “determines that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, or of fuel or water for generating facilities, or other causes.” DOE and FPC have used the emergency authority several dozen times since 1935 in response to different kinds of emergencies. From 2000 through February 2026, DOE used its emergency authority in response to 26 events. Twelve events were weather-related and included hurricanes, heat waves, and winter storms. On April 8, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14262, “Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid.” E.O. 14262 dir… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48568/R48568.8.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48568.html |
| R48545 | Public Broadcasting: Background Information and Issues for Congress | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-05T14:07:53Z | Active | Reports | Brian E. Humphreys | Social Welfare, Telecommunications & Internet Policy, Public Broadcasting | Discussion of public interest in educational or noncommercial programming dates to the early days of broadcasting. In 1938, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) set aside a portion of available radio channels for noncommercial and educational broadcasting, periodically updating policy as technology evolved. In 1965, the Carnegie Corporation of New York created the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television to make policy recommendations on public broadcasting. It recommended that Congress create a private, nonprofit corporation to support the development of local and national programming for public television (and later radio). This was enacted as part of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (PBA; P.L. 90-129). The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) was subsequently incorporated in 1967 as a private nonprofit corporation governed by a board of directors appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The CPB served as primary custodian of federal investment in public broadcasting until it was defunded by Congress in July 2025. Congress rescinded previously enacted appropriations for FY2026 and FY2027 on July 24, 2025, through the Rescissions Act of 2025 (P.L. 119-28). However, appropriations authority remains under the jurisdiction of the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees should Congress decide to reestablish the CPB in the future. In addition to funds appropriated to it directly by Congress, the CPB was authorized to receive federal grant funds from other agencies for educational programming, support of public broadcasting emergency alerting functions, and other purposes. The White House took several actions in 2025 to curtail the CPB’s role in the public broadcasting enterprise, including directives to dismiss certain members of the CPB Board, to prohibit CPB funding of National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), and to terminate or repurpose all othe… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48545/R48545.16.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48545.html |
| LSB11399 | Congressional Court Watcher: Circuit Splits from January 2026 | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T07:07:54Z | Active | Posts | Michael John Garcia | Jurisprudence | The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the thirteen “circuits” issue thousands of precedential decisions each year. Because relatively few of these decisions are ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are often the last word on consequential legal questions. The federal appellate courts sometimes reach different conclusions on the same issue of federal law, causing a “split” among the circuits that leads to the nonuniform application of federal law among similarly situated litigants. This Legal Sidebar discusses circuit splits that emerged or widened following decisions from January 2026 on matters relevant to Congress. The Sidebar does not address every circuit split that developed or widened during this period. Selected cases typically involve judicial disagreement over the interpretation or validity of federal statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight functions. The Sidebar includes only cases where an appellate court’s controlling opinion recognizes a split among the circuits on a key legal issue resolved in the opinion. This Sidebar refers to each U.S. Court of Appeals by its number or descriptor (e.g., “D.C. Circuit” for “U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit”). Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to the CRS Legal Update and receive regular notifications of new products and upcoming seminars by CRS attorneys. Commerce: In consolidated cases, the Ninth Circuit rejected challenges to residency requirements in cannabis dispensary licensing schemes in Washington State and the City of Sacramento, California. Both California and Washington state laws permit marijuana sales for recreational and medicinal use, and the challenged licensing schemes allow only state or city residents to hold dispensary licenses. Plaintiffs argued these requirements discriminated against … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11399/LSB11399.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11399.html |
| IF13168 | Data Privacy vs. Bank Secrecy: Regulating the Flow of Information Within Bank-Fintech Partnerships | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-03T17:52:56Z | Active | Resources | Andrew P. Scott | Data Privacy, Financial Market Regulation, Banking, Financial Technology Innovation | Banks are increasingly interconnected with nonbank financial technology. As this trend continues, policy responses to update regulatory frameworks may be proposed. Bank-nonbank relationships—particularly ones involving data transfers—are often subject to different regulatory requirements across a range of legal frameworks. When policymakers change or update one set of rules for banks, it could cause confusion, inconsistencies, or even conflicting incentives among market participants. For example, financial institutions, including depository institutions such as banks and credit unions, are required to understand whom their customers are and what their purposes are for establishing accounts. This serves as a foundational element of the anti-money laundering (AML) regulatory framework in the U.S. financial sector. Concurrently, banks are required to protect consumer nonpublic personal information (NPI). Further, banks are responsible for ensuring that any partnerships they engage in comply with relevant banking laws, including AML and data privacy provisions. This In Focus explains how banks manage information in a manner that complies with three laws—the Bank Secrecy Act (P.L. 91-508), the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (P.L. 106-102), and the Bank Service Company Act (P.L. 87-856)—particularly in light of increased partnership activity between banks and nonbank financial technology companies (fintechs). Anti-Money Laundering The statutory foundation for AML policies was established in the 1970s in the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA, 31 U.S.C. §5311 et seq). At a general level, this framework requires financial institutions to keep certain records and report certain transactions. Over time, the regulations implementing this framework have been updated to reflect new ways of conducting transactions and to include novel business models. Further, in 2003, bank and credit union regulators jointly issued the Customer Identification Programs (CIP) rulemaking, which implemented provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) by settin… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13168/IF13168.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13168.html |
| IF11141 | Employer Tax Credit for Paid Family and Medical Leave | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-26T13:08:08Z | Active | Resources | Anthony A. Cilluffo | Business & Corporate Tax, Wages & Benefits, Tax Reform | Employers providing paid family and medical leave to their employees may be able to claim a tax credit under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 45S. This In Focus provides an overview of the employer credit for paid family and medical leave, its legislative history, and possible fiscal effects of the credit. For background on paid family and medical leave generally, see CRS Report R44835, Paid Family and Medical Leave in the United States, by Sarah A. Donovan. The Employer Credit for Paid Family and Medical Leave The employer credit for paid family and medical leave (PFML) can be claimed by employers providing paid leave (wages) to employees under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3, as amended). The tax credit is calculated as a percentage of either the actual PFML wages paid or the insurance premiums paid on a policy that would provide PFML wages. The credit percentage is the same in either case; it is based on the ratio of PFML wages to the employee’s normal hourly wage rate. If PFML wages are 50% of the employee’s normal hourly wage, then the tax credit is for 12.5% of the qualifying amount (either actual PFML wages or insurance premiums). The tax credit rate increases proportionately up to 25% of the qualifying amount if PFML wages are 100% of the employee’s normal hourly wage. No credit is available for PFML wages below 50% of normal hourly wages, nor for PFML wages above 100% of normal hourly wages. When the credit is claimed based on insurance premiums, the credit is available regardless of whether any employees took PFML during the year. The credit can only be claimed for PFML provided to certain lower-compensated employees. For wages paid to an employee to be credit eligible, compensation to the employee in the preceding year cannot exceed 60% of a “highly compensated employee” threshold. For 2026, that threshold is set at $96,000. To be eligible for the credit, an employer’s written policy must make PFML available to all employees who meet the income threshold and have been empl… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11141/IF11141.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11141.html |
| IF10538 | U.S. Intelligence Community (IC): Appointment Dates and Appointment Legal Provisions for Selected IC Leadership | 2026-02-25T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T13:08:06Z | Active | Resources | Michael E. DeVine, Michael E. DeVine | National & Military Intelligence | This In Focus provides the names and appointment provisions for selected Intelligence Community (IC) senior officials, as reflected in U.S. Code, public laws, executive orders, and custom. Table 1 also includes the committees involved when Senate confirmation is required. As a general rule, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has jurisdiction over the confirmation of those nominated to IC leadership positions outside the Department of Defense (DOD, using the Department of War as a “secondary title” under Executive Order (E.O.) 14347, dated September 5, 2025), while the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) has jurisdiction over the confirmation of IC leadership positions inside the DOD. In some cases (e.g., the Directors of the National Security Agency and National Reconnaissance Office), nominations may be referred sequentially to the SSCI and the SASC, with the order of referral depending on the nominee’s status as a member of the Armed Forces on active duty. If the nominee is a servicemember on active duty, the nomination begins with the SASC, if not, it begins with the SSCI.Table 1. U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) Leadership: Appointment Dates and Legal Provisions Element Leadership Appointment Date Appointment Legal Provisions Non-Department of Defense (DOD) Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard (sworn in February 12, 2025) Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) Aaron Lukas (sworn in July 24, 2025) 50 U.S.C. §3026(c) “Not more than one of [the DNI and the Principal Deputy DNI] may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in active status”; DNI: §3023(a), PDDNI §3026(a)(1): presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (SSCI). Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director of the CIA (DCIA) John Ratcliffe (sworn in January 23, 2025) 50 U.S.C. §3041(a)(2)(B) DNI recommends; then, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §3036(a), presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (SSCI). Department of Energy, Office of… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10538/IF10538.11.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10538.html |
| R48768 | The Department of Education’s Proposed Rule to Define “Professional Student”: Frequently Asked Questions | 2026-02-24T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-25T16:37:51Z | Active | Reports | Alexandra Hegji | Postsecondary Education | Title VIII of P.L. 119-21 (also referred to as the FY2025 budget reconciliation law) amended the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to update several aspects of the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) program, which is the single largest source of federal financial assistance to support students’ postsecondary education pursuits. Among other changes, P.L. 119-21 eliminates the availability of Direct PLUS Loans to graduate and professional students in future years and specifies one set of annual and aggregate loan limits for graduate students and a separate set of such limits, in higher amounts, for professional students. In general, these changes are applicable to individuals who, as of June 30, 2026, are not enrolled in a program of study for which they received a Direct Loan. Prior to P.L. 119-21, Direct Loan limits generally did not distinguish between graduate students and professional students, with the exception of certain health professions programs (e.g., Doctor of Allopathic Medicine, Doctor of Dentistry) for which the Secretary of Education invoked previous HEA authority to raise limits because such students were “engaged in specialized training requiring exceptionally high costs of education.” On January 30, 2026, the U.S. Department of Education published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with proposed regulatory text to implement the P.L. 119-21 amendments to the Direct Loan program. This proposed regulatory text reflects draft regulatory text on which a negotiated rulemaking committee reached consensus and includes definitions of “graduate student” and “professional student.” Under the proposed rule, “professional student” would be defined as a “student enrolled in a program of study that awards a professional degree,” and “graduate student” would be defined as a “student enrolled in a program of study that is above the baccalaureate level and awards a graduate credential (other than a professional degree).” “Professional degree” would be defined as one that “signifies completion of th… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48768/R48768.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48768.html |
| R46991 | Economic Development Administration: An Overview of Programs and Appropriations (FY2012-FY2026) | 2026-02-24T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T10:53:05Z | Active | Reports | Julie M. Lawhorn | U.S. Economy, Economic Development | The Economic Development Administration (EDA), a bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), is the only federal agency with economic development as its sole mission. The agency was established pursuant to the enactment of the Public Works and Economic Development Act (PWEDA) of 1965 (42 U.S.C. §§3121 et seq.) to assist state and local stakeholders with developing the conditions and amenities to grow businesses, create jobs, and expand investment in economically distressed areas. Changing industry dynamics, global competition, technological developments, and other events, conditions, and priorities have shifted EDA’s programs and priorities over time. During the agency’s first 30 years, its programs focused on industrial growth and emphasized public works, roads, and infrastructure. Since then, Congress has supported an expanded portfolio of EDA programs to also advance existing and emerging industry clusters, develop human capital, strengthen supply chains, expand access to capital, build new types of infrastructure, and implement regional innovation and technology strategies. Additionally, EDA has also taken on new roles in developing state and local capacity, resiliency, disaster and economic recovery, as well as economic development integration across federal agencies. EDA generally administers multiple programs that fund a range of construction and non-construction activities in both urban and rural areas—primarily through competitive processes that solicit community-directed proposals aligned with the agency’s investment priorities. EDA administers both flexible and targeted programs focused on innovation, technical assistance, and support for long-term, regional economic development planning. In 2025 and 2026 (to date), EDA has open funding notifications for a subset of its typical programs. Congress approves annual appropriations for EDA programs as well as administration expenses, and occasionally approves supplemental appropriations for economic recovery purposes. Between FY2012 and FY2026, EDA’s … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46991/R46991.30.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R46991.html |
| R43631 | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Part C: Early Intervention for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities | 2026-02-24T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-28T13:38:01Z | Active | Reports | Kyrie E. Dragoo | Early Childhood Care & Education, Students with Disabilities, Elementary & Secondary Education | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a statute that authorizes grant programs that support special education services. Under the IDEA, a series of conditions are attached to the receipt of grant funds. These conditions aim to provide certain educational and procedural guarantees for students with disabilities and their families. The grant programs authorized under the IDEA provide federal funding for special education and early intervention services for children with disabilities (birth through 21 years old) and require, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) (i.e., specially designed instruction provided at no cost to parents that meets the needs of a child with a disability) and an accessible early intervention system (a statewide system to provide and coordinate early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families). The IDEA also outlines and requires the use of procedural safeguards pertaining to the identification, evaluation, and placement of students in special education services that are intended to protect the rights of parents and children with disabilities. These procedures include parental rights to resolve disputes through a mediation process, and present and resolve complaints through a due process complaint procedure and through state complaint procedures. Originally enacted in 1975, the IDEA has been the subject of numerous reauthorizations to extend services and rights to children with disabilities. The 1986 reauthorization of the IDEA created a grants program that would provide early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families, what is now known as Part C, Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities. The most recent reauthorization of the IDEA was P.L. 108-446, enacted in 2004. Funding for Part B of the IDEA, Assistance for Education of all Children with Disabilities, the largest part of the act, is permanently authorized. Funding for P… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R43631/R43631.15.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R43631.html |
| IG10049 | U.S. Shale Gas and Federal Lands | 2026-02-24T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-25T16:07:54Z | Active | Infographics | Michael Ratner, Lexie Ryan | Natural Resources Policy, Energy Policy, Fossil Energy, Federal Land Management | / U.S. Shale Gas and Onshore Federal Lands The United States has been the largest producer of natural gas since the advent of shale gas development in the early 2000s. Shale gas production has mostly taken place on private lands, with the largest contribution coming from the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. Of the top five states for natural gas production and revenue generation from federal lands, only New Mexico is also among the top five producers of gas overall. Given that most of the rise in U.S. production has been on private lands, federal revenues from natural gas have not increased as rapidly as gas production on nonfederal lands. Most shale formations are not on federal lands Onshore federal lands Current shale play Prospective shale play Includes onshore surface acres of federal land administered by federal land management agencies (Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, National Park Service) in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. This excludes Department of Defense, Bureau of Reclamation, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers lands and other lands administered by other federal agencies. Excludes Tribal lands. 62% Shale gas production is 81% of overall U.S. gross production Plays that overlap are at dierent geologic depths 2024 U.S. Total Top 5 States % Total US Top 5 States Rest of U.S. onshore Total Gross Natural Gas Production*1 43,564 bcf 69% TX 12,918 PA 7,422 LA 3,609 NM 3,625 WV 3,418 Rest of US 12,580 Natural Gas Production on Federal Lands1 4,160 bcf 96% bcf NM 2,297 WY 973 CO 456 UT 145 ND 136 US 153 Production on Federal Lands as % of Total Gross Production, by State 10%3 WY 72% NM 64% UT 45% CO 25% MO 18% US <1% U.S. Federal Natural Gas Revenue1 $1.4 billion 96% $ in millions NM $876 WY $270 CO $72 UT $57 ND $48 US $49 Western states account for most natural gas production and revenues on federal lands. Data are from 2024, the latest year of available data for all categories. Data from these four graphs are for natural gas from … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10049/IG10049.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10049.html |
| IF12902 | Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act (SAVE America Act) and Federal Voter Registration Policy and Law | 2026-02-24T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-26T16:38:10Z | Active | Resources | L. Paige Whitaker, Sarah J. Eckman, L. Paige Whitaker, R. Sam Garrett | Voting, Elections & Redistricting | This CRS In Focus provides an overview of existing voter registration policy and law in federal elections and discusses how the voter registration and voter identification (ID) provisions in certain recent legislation would affect the status quo. As discussed in the following sections, current federal law prohibits aliens from voting in federal elections and requires states to follow various registration requirements for federal elections. There is no existing federal voter ID requirement. Most recently as of this writing, the House passed (218-213) the Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act, also known as the SAVE America Act, as an amendment to S. 1383 on February 11, 2026. The legislation would, among other provisions, require documented proof of U.S. citizenship for registration, and specified voter ID to cast a ballot. Current Federal Law and the Voter Registration Process As explained below, current federal law addresses voter eligibility, as well as certain elements of voter registration and voter registration list maintenance for federal elections. States and territories are responsible for conducting and administering voter registration. States are primarily responsible for voter registration and election administration. Election jurisdictions (typically counties) rely on information from registrants and from state and federal sources to verify eligibility. Voter Eligibility and Voter Registration Verification for Federal Elections Section 611 of Title 18, U.S. Code, generally prohibits “any alien to vote” in an election for candidates for “the office of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner,” with limited exceptions, including if (1) each natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is or was a U.S. citizen (whether by birth or naturalization); (2) the alien permanently resided in the United States prior to a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12902/IF12902.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12902.html |
| IF12265 | China Primer: Human Rights | 2026-02-24T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-26T16:23:05Z | Active | Resources | Thomas Lum, Michael A. Weber, Caitlin Campbell | East Asia & Pacific | Overview The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China)’s party-state is an “authoritarian regime” that “has become increasingly repressive in recent years,” according to the nongovernmental human rights organization Freedom House. Some analysts argue China has moved in a totalitarian direction. The party-state is dominated by Xi Jinping, who became Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary in 2012 and began a norm-breaking third five-year term in 2022. Xi has attempted to enforce greater ideological and cultural conformity and tighter control over society, aided by digital technologies. PRC leaders long have asserted that human rights standards vary by country, that economic development is a key human right, and that a country’s human rights policies are an “internal affair.” Amid apparent deepening repression in China, U.S. policymakers have implemented measures intended to deter PRC human rights abuses, prevent U.S. complicity in such abuses, and/or hold perpetrators accountable. Since 2020, U.S. actions have focused, in particular, on responding to reports of mass detentions and forced labor of ethnic Uyghur and other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and elsewhere in China. The U.S. Department of State first assessed in January 2021 that PRC policies and practices in the XUAR constitute crimes against humanity and genocide, and reaffirmed this assessment most recently in its annual human rights reports covering 2024 (the department has not yet released human rights reports covering 2025). In the PRC’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), measures adopted by both central PRC and local HKSAR authorities have eroded Hong Kong residents’ civil rights and stifled the city’s civic culture and media. See CRS In Focus IF12070, China Primer: Hong Kong. Selected Human Rights Issues Under Xi’s leadership, China has further restricted and suppressed civil society, religious and ethnic minority groups, human rights defenders, speech, and media. The party-state has… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12265/IF12265.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12265.html |
| IF10256 | U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Economic Relations | 2026-02-24T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-27T10:38:14Z | Active | Resources | Karen M. Sutter | East Asia & Pacific | Taiwan is a top U.S. trade partner and a key link in global technology supply chains. Taiwan’s economy is highly dependent on global trade; exports account for about 70% of its gross domestic product (GDP). Taiwan’s policies are seeking to generate growth in emerging technologies and reduce its dependence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) by diversifying trade and investment. Central to these efforts are U.S. and Taiwan government actions to deepen commercial ties. Issues before Congress include the January 2026 U.S.-Taiwan tariff and investment deals and provisions for Taiwan to invest $500 billion in the United States, and bills aimed at preventing double taxation and promoting U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Taiwan. Also see CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF12481, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues; and CRS Infographic IG10073, Taiwan’s Role in Global Semiconductor Supply Chains. U.S.-Taiwan Commercial Ties Taiwan is the United States’ 5th-largest merchandise trading partner ($256.1 billion in total goods trade), 9th-largest export market ($54.7 billion), and 5th-largest source of imports ($201.4 billion), according to 2025 U.S. data (and when the European Union is considered as one trading partner). Taiwan’s trade deficit with the United States was $146.7 billion in 2025. U.S. agricultural exports to Taiwan in 2025 were $4.3 billion. In 2024, U.S. service exports to Taiwan were $13.7 billion, and Taiwan’s services exports to the United States were $13.2 billion. Taiwan’s exports to the United States have been growing as firms have shifted some production and finished goods exports away from the PRC and with strong U.S. demand for semiconductors and electronics. Between 2018 and 2025, Taiwan’s goods exports to the United States grew by 341% while U.S. exports to Taiwan grew by 75%. In 2025, Taiwan’s U.S. exports rose by 73% while U.S. exports to Taiwan rose by 29% over 2024 levels. (Figure 1.) Figure 1. U.S.–Taiwan Goods Trade 2001-2025 /… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10256/IF10256.35.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10256.html |
| R48861 | History of the Federal Communications Commission’s Spectrum Auction Authority: 1993-2025 | 2026-02-23T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-06T15:37:52Z | Active | Reports | Jill C. Gallagher, Patricia Moloney Figliola | Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Spectrum Policy, Telecommunications & Internet Policy | Radio spectrum (“spectrum”) is the continuum of frequencies used to provide wireless services, such as radio broadcasting, mobile communications, and satellite services. Certain frequency bands are allocated for specific services; this means that not all frequencies are available to all users and for all uses. Thus, spectrum is often described as a finite and valuable resource. In 1934, Congress created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and charged it with managing and allocating nonfederal use of spectrum. It grants licenses to nonfederal entities to use specific frequencies and sets terms and conditions to serve the public interest, avoid interference among users, and promote the most efficient use of spectrum. In 1993, Congress authorized the FCC to use competitive bidding (i.e., auctions) to grant licenses for rights to use specific frequencies for commercial wireless communications. That general spectrum auction authority was originally due to expire on September 30, 1998, but Congress extended it several times. In 2012, Congress granted a long-term (10-year) extension, as part of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), which was set to expire on September 30, 2022. Four additional extensions were made during the 117th Congress that allowed the FCC to conduct spectrum auction activities through March 9, 2023, when the FCC’s spectrum auction authority expired. Loss of spectrum auction authority meant that the FCC could not auction any new spectrum bands to meet existing and future demands for wireless communications, accommodate new technologies that often lead to economic growth, improve spectral efficiencies, or advance U.S. government priorities through spectrum allocation. Loss of spectrum auction authority also meant loss of proceeds from such auctions. During the approximately two years that the general auction authority remained lapsed, Congress debated a number of options to reinstate it, including stand-alone bills that would extend the FCC’s auction author… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48861/R48861.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48861.html |
| R48859 | Mexico: Background and Key Issues in U.S. Relations | 2026-02-23T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-26T09:37:57Z | Active | Reports | Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Clare Ribando Seelke | Latin America, Caribbean & Canada | Mexico, the 10th most populous country and 13th largest economy in the world, is bound to the United States by geography and deep economic, cultural, and historical ties. In addition to sharing a nearly 2,000-mile land border, Mexico was the top U.S. trade partner in goods in 2025 and the second-largest oil supplier, behind Canada. Drug cartels, six of which the Trump Administration has designated terrorist organizations, have endangered the lives of people, including U.S. citizens, in parts of Mexico. U.S.-Mexico ties and issues, including addressing the production and trafficking of fentanyl from Mexico, have prompted legislative activity and oversight interest in the 119th Congress. Mexico has undergone significant change under successive National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) presidencies. The party’s founder, former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024), concentrated power in the presidency and focused government efforts on raising wages and increasing social programs. Observers criticized López Obrador for trying to weaken autonomous institutions and the judiciary and for increasing military involvement in public security. In October 2024, President Claudia Sheinbaum took office for a six-year term. Sheinbaum, a former head of government of Mexico City (2018-2023), is Mexico’s first female president and a close ally of López Obrador. She has benefitted from MORENA and its allies’ two-thirds majorities in both chambers of the legislature seated in September 2024. In her first year, Sheinbaum shepherded 22 constitutional reforms through congress, many of which were proposed by López Obrador. Although President Sheinbaum has continued aspects of López Obrador’s policies, she has adopted a more aggressive public security policy and appears to have partially aligned her trade policy with that of the United States by backing legislation that imposed tariffs on imports from the People’s Republic of China and other countries with which Mexico does not have a free-trade agreement. Some observers are con… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48859/R48859.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48859.html |
| R48444 | The Reconciliation Process: Frequently Asked Questions | 2026-02-23T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-25T17:37:52Z | Active | Reports | Tori Gorman | When Congress adopts a budget resolution, it establishes budgetary goals for the years covered in the resolution. In some cases, it is necessary to change existing revenue, direct spending, or debt limit laws to achieve those goals. One method Congress may use to consider such legislation is through reconciliation—an expedited process made available under Section 310 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (the Budget Act). A distinctive feature of reconciliation is that debate time is limited in the Senate, which means cloture (and its requisite three-fifths majority vote) is not necessary to reach a vote on final passage. Reconciliation is a two-phase process. In the first phase, the House and Senate adopt a budget resolution containing reconciliation directives to one or more committees (also referred to as reconciliation instructions). There are three types of reconciliation directives: to change laws providing for spending, to change laws providing for revenues, and to change the public debt limit. In the second phase, the named committees respond with recommended changes in law within their jurisdictions consistent with their directives in the budget resolution. No more than one reconciliation bill may include provisions in response to each type of instruction in one budget resolution, for a maximum of three reconciliation bills. In practice, Congress has generally combined the reconciliation submissions from every committee into a single, omnibus reconciliation measure. Once a reconciliation bill is on a chamber’s calendar, the House and Senate consider it under the rules and expedited procedures enumerated in the Budget Act. Any differences between the House and Senate are resolved via conference committee or an exchange of amendments between the two chambers, or one chamber may adopt the reconciliation legislation of the other without any changes. The contents of a reconciliation bill are constrained by several rules, most notably Section 313 of the Budget Act, known as the Senate’s Byrd rule. This pr… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48444/R48444.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48444.html | |
| R47578 | The Federal Communications Commission’s Spectrum Auction Authority: History and Options for Reinstatement | 2026-02-23T05:00:00Z | 2026-03-04T11:09:05Z | Archived | Reports | Patricia Moloney Figliola, Jill C. Gallagher, Jill C. Gallagher | Telecommunications & Internet Policy | Radio spectrum (“spectrum”) is the continuum of frequencies used to provide wireless services, such as radio broadcasting, mobile communications, and satellite services. It is a finite and valuable resource. In 1934, Congress created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent agency, to manage and allocate nonfederal use of spectrum. It grants licenses to nonfederal entities to use specific frequencies and sets terms and conditions to serve the public interest, avoid interference among users, and promote the most efficient use of spectrum. In 1993, Congress authorized the FCC to use competitive bidding (i.e., auctions) to grant licenses for rights to use specific frequencies for commercial wireless communications. That general auction authority was originally due to expire on September 30, 1998, but Congress has extended it several times. The most recent long-term extension, granted as part of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), was set to expire on September 30, 2022. Four additional extensions were made during the 117th Congress that allowed the FCC to conduct spectrum auction activities through March 9, 2023, when the FCC’s spectrum auction authority expired. It has not been reinstated. Supporters of reinstating the FCC’s auction authority see auctions as an effective means to manage spectrum access and use. During the 117th Congress, three bills and one Senate Amendment (H.R. 7783, H.R. 7624, S. 4117, and S.Amdt. 6585) would have extended the FCC’s general auction authority, the FCC’s authority to auction specific bands, or a combination of both. None became law. These bills and the amendment, however, highlight different methods for addressing the FCC’s spectrum auction authority that the 118th Congress could consider if it seeks to reinstate the FCC’s general spectrum auction authority or its auction authority for specific bands. In the House of Representatives, Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers, chairwoman of the House Committee on Energy and Commer… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47578/R47578.10.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R47578.html |
| R47037 | Geographic Cost of Living Differences: In Brief | 2026-02-23T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-24T15:37:54Z | Active | Reports | Lida R. Weinstock, Lida R. Weinstock | U.S. Economy | Cost of living is generally important to the standard of living of individuals across the United States. Changes to cost of living over time measure how quickly prices increase in a given area compared to past prices in that same area. However, such measures (such as inflation measures for specific areas produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) do not express how cost of living differs from place to place. Geographic cost of living differences may be important for certain public policies, particularly when not accounting for these differences cause distortionary effects. The main publicly available source of data for geographic cost of living differences is the relative price parity index produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This series measures differences in cost of living between and within states compared to a national average price level index. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47037/R47037.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R47037.html |
| R45277 | Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) | 2026-02-23T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-24T16:37:55Z | Active | Reports | Ryan J. Rosso, Alice Y. Choi | Individual Tax, Private Health Insurance | A health savings account (HSA) is a tax-advantaged account that individuals can use to save and pay for unreimbursed medical expenses (e.g., deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, and services not covered by insurance). Although eligibility to contribute to an HSA is associated with enrollment in a high-deductible health plan (HDHP), an HSA is a trust/custodial account and is not health insurance. HSAs have several tax advantages: individual contributions are tax deductible unless made through a cafeteria plan; employer contributions and individual contributions made through a cafeteria plan are excluded from taxable income and from Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance taxes; account earnings are tax exempt; and withdrawals are not taxed if used for qualified medical expenses. Individuals may establish and contribute to an HSA for each month that they are covered under an HSA-qualified HDHP, or a bronze or catastrophic plan available through an individual exchange. Individuals also must not have disqualifying coverage, and cannot be claimed as a dependent on another person’s tax return. The account is tied to the individual and account holders retain access to their accounts (and can keep using HSA funds) if they change employers, insurers, or subsequently become ineligible to contribute to the HSA. To be considered an HSA-qualified HDHP, a health plan must meet several tests: it must have a deductible above a certain minimum threshold, it must limit total annual out-of-pocket expenditures for covered benefits to no more than a certain maximum threshold, and it can cover only preventive care services, certain insulin products, and telehealth and other remote care before the deductible is met. In 2026, HSA-qualified HDHPs must have a minimum deductible of $1,700 for self-only coverage and $3,400 for family coverage and an annual limit on out-of-pocket expenditures for covered benefits that does not exceed $8,500 and $17,000, respectively. These amounts are adjusted for inflation (rounded to the n… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45277/R45277.11.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R45277.html |
| LSB11398 | Supreme Court Rules Against Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) | 2026-02-23T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-25T11:52:48Z | Active | Posts | Christopher T. Zirpoli | Import Policy, Judicial Branch, Separation of Powers, Tariffs, U.S. Trade Policy, Jurisprudence, Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) | On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., two appeals concerning tariffs President Trump had imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that IEEPA does not give the President authority to impose tariffs. The Court thus affirmed a lower court decision that invalidated two sets of IEEPA tariffs: one set of tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) based on declared emergencies concerning illicit drugs, and another set of tariffs on most other U.S. imports based on a declared emergency concerning the U.S. trade deficit. Six other Justices wrote opinions in concurrence or dissent. This Legal Sidebar explains the context and background for the Supreme Court’s decision, the opinions of the Court and individual Justices, and potential ramifications of the Court’s decision for current and future U.S. tariff actions. Background on Tariff Authorities, IEEPA, and Lower Court Decisions Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to impose import tariffs and regulate foreign commerce. Congress, in turn, has enacted several laws authorizing the executive branch to impose tariffs in various circumstances. The executive branch has utilized some of these laws in recent administrations, imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum, automobiles and parts, and other products under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862) and tariffs on many imports from the PRC under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411), for example. IEEPA (50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706) gives the President extensive economic authorities to address certain emergencies declared under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651). IEEPA provides authority to “regulate” or “prohibit” imports of certain property, although it does not specifically authorize tariffs.… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11398/LSB11398.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11398.html |
| IF13025 | The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): FY2026 Appropriations | 2026-02-23T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-25T16:52:48Z | Active | Resources | Anna E. Normand, Anna E. Normand | Wildlife & Ecosystems, Interior & Environment Appropriations, Earth Sciences & Natural Hazards, Water Resource Management | Background The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI) provides scientific information to support the management of water, energy, mineral, biological, and land resources and to help communities prepare for natural hazards. The USGS also collects long-term data to understand and report on the Earth’s geologic and ecosystem processes, using satellite imagery, mapping, and ground-based instruments. The USGS is not a regulatory agency and does not manage federal lands. Congress created the USGS in 1879 in the USGS Organic Act (43 U.S.C. §31). The USGS Organic Act defined the initial scope of the USGS: [The Director of the USGS] shall have the direction of the United States Geological Survey, and the classification of the public lands and examination of the geological structure, mineral resources, and products of the national domain. Since then, Congress has expanded the USGS’s statutory authority to “such examinations outside the national domain where determined by the Secretary [of the Interior] to be in the national interest.” Under this authority and additional congressional direction, the USGS now also conducts activities related to water resources, ecosystems, and natural hazards. The USGS conducts scientific activities under interdisciplinary mission areas, and each mission area has its own budget line (Table 1). The USGS also has budget lines for Science Support (administrative activities and information) and Facilities. Congress typically appropriates funds for the USGS under its Surveys, Investigations, and Research Account in annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations acts. FY2026 Appropriations P.L. 119-74 appropriated $1.420 billion to the USGS for FY2026 under Division C (Figure 1). This FY2026 annual appropriation was $528.9 million above President Trump’s FY2026 budget request of $891.6 million and $29.8 million below the regular FY2025 enacted level of $1.450 billion. As described in the accompanying explanatory statement, P.L. 119-74 generally fun… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13025/IF13025.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13025.html |
| IF13017 | President Trump’s April 2025 Executive Order on American Seafood Competitiveness: Considerations for U.S. Fisheries | 2026-02-23T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-24T16:07:55Z | Active | Resources | Anthony R. Marshak | Wildlife & Ecosystems, Oceans & Fisheries, Agricultural Trade & Food Aid | Introduction On April 17, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14276, “Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness,” which required multiple federal agency actions related to U.S. fisheries science and management, the seafood trade, and commercial fishing in marine national monuments (MNMs). President Trump directed the Secretary of Commerce (hereinafter the Secretary), whose authorities include administration of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), as amended, to address U.S. seafood trade practices, including the U.S. seafood supply chain and seafood imports, and the regulation of domestic and foreign fishing in U.S. waters. The Department of Commerce includes the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), which is the primary federal agency responsible for the regulation and management of U.S. fisheries and seafood. Congress, through its enactment of MSA and other living marine resource (LMR)-related statutes, has regularly shown interest in U.S. fisheries and seafood production, including their sustainable management and economic contributions. Executive Order 14276 E.O. 14276 builds on elements of E.O. 13921, “Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and Economic Growth,” issued on May 7, 2020, which included directives related to U.S. fisheries, international seafood trade, aquaculture production, and combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. E.O. 14276 identifies most American fish stocks as healthy and having “viable markets.” NMFS noted in its 2023 Report to Congress on the Status of U.S. Fisheries, the most recent such report, that 94% of the U.S. stocks and stock complexes for which overfishing status was known at the time were not subject to overfishing. Similarly, data in the report indicated that 82% of stocks and stock complexes for which overfished status was known at the time were not classified as overfished. Additionally, the report noted that nearly 30% of U.S. fish sto… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13017/IF13017.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13017.html |
| R48860 | FY2026 Defense Budget: Funding for Selected Weapon Systems | 2026-02-20T05:00:00Z | 2026-02-24T14:52:47Z | Active | Reports | Daniel M. Gettinger | Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces, Defense Authorization, Defense Budgets & Appropriations | The second Trump Administration’s Department of Defense (DOD) budget request for FY2026 included $848.3 billion in discretionary funding and $113.3 billion in mandatory funding (DOD is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025). Of the discretionary funding portion, the Administration requested a combined total of $295.3 billion in procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding, including proposed amounts for various weapon systems of congressional interest. By way of background, in its FY2026 budget request, DOD included two types of funding: mandatory funding that DOD assumed Congress would provide in an FY2025 reconciliation law (later enacted as P.L. 119-21) and discretionary funding that DOD requested for Congress to authorize and appropriate for FY2026 as part of a base budget (i.e., recurring costs to staff, train, and equip the armed forces). For FY2026, to varying degrees, DOD proposed allocating both mandatory and discretionary funding for programs, projects, and activities associated with weapon systems procurement and RDT&E. DOD has described its FY2026 budget request as making “generational investments” in Administration priorities, including in air and missile defense, the Air Force’s F-47 next-generation fighter aircraft, and shipbuilding. Relative to amounts Congress authorized and appropriated for FY2025, DOD’s FY2026 request also proposed increasing funding for certain hypersonic weapons programs and space-based systems. At the same time, DOD’s FY2026 request proposed reducing funding for other weapon systems, such as certain ground systems, the Navy’s F/A-XX next-generation fighter, and the Air Force’s E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning aircraft—changes that could lead to program delays or cancellation. During consideration of proposals for a National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (NDAA; later enacted as P.L. 119-60) and a Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026 (later enacted a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48860/R48860.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48860.html |
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