crs_reports: RL33487

Congressional Research Service reports with summaries, authors, and topic classifications.

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RL33487 Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy 2026-02-26T05:00:00Z 2026-02-28T16:52:55Z Active Reports Christopher M. Blanchard Middle East & North Africa, Europe, Russia & Eurasia Since the December 2024 collapse of the government of Bashar Al Asad, Syrians have pursued political and economic opportunities created by the end of the country’s 12-year civil war. Internal tensions and external pressures pose obstacles to the country’s transition. Transitional President Ahmed Al Sharaa led a group long designated by the U.S. government as a foreign terrorist organization and still designated as a specially designated global terrorist entity. He has renounced former ties to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State and met with President Donald Trump in the White House in November 2025. Interim authorities have outlined a five-year transitional constitutional framework after limited consultation with Syrian citizens. Indirect elections were held in October 2025 for a transitional legislative assembly; elections were not held in some areas of eastern Syria, which were then under the control of ethnic Kurdish-led forces, and areas southeast of the capital, Damascus, which remain under the control of members of the Druze religious minority. Turkish forces remain in parts of the north, while Israeli forces have moved into formerly demilitarized areas between Syria and Israel and into some Syrian territory near the frontier. Sectarian violence involving government forces, their backers, and members of minority communities has marred the transition, highlighting the interim government’s limited capacity to ensure security and impose discipline on its forces. In this context, some observers have expressed skepticism about the transitional government’s commitments to inclusivity and the protection of all members of Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic fabric. Others have warned that domestic and foreign opponents of the transitional government may be exploiting communal tensions to advance their own agendas, and that fragmentation in Syria would threaten regional security. The Trump Administration has outlined a policy of robust but conditional support for Syria’s transitional government, pairing endorsement of its leaders’ calls for the maintenance of Syria’s unity and territorial integrity with insistence that they adopt a protective and inclusive approach toward all Syrian communities. The United States is supporting dialogue between the government and Kurdish forces and political figures that controlled areas of the northeast until government forces advanced in and reasserted control in January 2026. Some U.S. military forces remain deployed in northeast Syria, but U.S. forces withdrew from an outpost in southern Syria in February 2026 and unnamed U.S. officials told press outlets on February 18 that preparations for a full withdrawal of U.S. forces are underway and may be complete within two months. U.S. forces transferred more than 5,700 Islamic State prisoners formerly secured by U.S. partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to neighboring Iraq following the Syrian government’s 2026 advance. The United States and European Union have extended broad sanctions relief to the interim government in a bid to encourage investment and prevent economic collapse and humanitarian pressures from derailing the transition. Announced changes to U.S. and international sanctions on Syria have created possibilities for more robust investment, trade, and economic growth, but Syrians are grappling with the negative effects of decades of misrule and sanctions amid the strife and destructive consequences of a decade-plus-long civil war. Governance and security arrangements in northeast and southern Syria remain a central dilemma for transitional leaders and the minority communities in these areas. Neighboring countries, including Turkey and Israel, have security concerns about these regions and are acting inside Syria in pursuit of their preferred outcomes. Turkey opposes Syrian Kurds’ aspirations for autonomy or decentralization, citing links between Kurdish elements of the SDF and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The PKK announced in early 2025 that it would dissolve and disarm. January 2026 SDF-government agreements set terms for the integration of some SDF fighters into special brigades. Israel has struck military targets across Syria since December 2024 to neutralize Syrian capabilities, enforce its desire to see Syria’s three southern governorates remain a demilitarized zone, and in what it describes as a bid to protect the Syrian Druze minority community. Israel-Turkey tensions over Syria raise continuing risks of confrontation. In Congress, many Members welcomed the fall of the Asad government and the setbacks it created for Iran and Russia. Members have debated U.S. policy toward the Syrian government, with some advocating for the elimination of remaining U.S. sanctions on Syria and others expressing concern about the intentions and actions of Syria’s transitional leaders and advising a more gradual and conditional approach. President Donald Trump has acted to remove many Asad-era sanctions on Syria using authorities delegated to the President by Congress; President Trump also has revised other Syria-related sanctions mechanisms to preserve his ability to impose new sanctions based on future developments in Syria. Congress repealed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act and has authorized funding for the continued provision of military assistance to U.S. partners, though the future of the U.S. military presence is uncertain. Legislative questions for Congress include whether and on what terms to authorize and appropriate funds for U.S. assistance and security operations in Syria; whether and to what extent to rescind, revise, or reenact laws providing for Syria-related sanctions; and how best to influence executive branch policies and shape the decisions of Syrian authorities, and U.S. partners and adversaries. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33487/RL33487.183.pdf https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/HTML/RL33487.html

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