congressional_record: CREC-2004-12-20-pt1-PgE2211
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| granule_id | date | congress | session | volume | issue | title | chamber | granule_class | sub_granule_class | page_start | page_end | speakers | bills | citation | full_text |
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| CREC-2004-12-20-pt1-PgE2211 | 2004-12-20 | 108 | 2 | CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 2845, INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 | HOUSE | EXTENSIONS | ALLOTHER | E2211 | E2211 | [{"name": "Eleanor Holmes Norton", "role": "speaking"}] | [{"congress": "108", "type": "S", "number": "2845"}, {"congress": "108", "type": "S", "number": "2845"}] | 150 Cong. Rec. E2211 | Congressional Record, Volume 150 Issue 140 (Monday, December 20, 2004) [Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 140 (Monday, December 20, 2004)] [Extensions of Remarks] [Page E2211] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] [[Page E2211]] CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 2845, INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 ______ speech of HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON of the district of columbia in the house of representatives Tuesday, December 7, 2004 Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I represent the people of the Nation's capital, perhaps the most conspicuous target for global terrorism in the world. I support S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. 1 could not afford to do otherwise. Nor can other Members, whatever their opinions of the considerable shortcomings of this bill. The controversy over S. 2845 and its many flaws have obscured the overriding reason for the bill in the first place. After an impressive, exhaustive investigation, the 9/11 Commission, which deserves the credit for the seminal document from which the bill derives, said that prevention of the 9/11 tragedy had been possible. ``There were specific points of vulnerability in the plot and opportunities to disrupt it,'' according to the 9/11 Commission Report (p. 8). Various intelligence agencies each had parts of vital information about the imminence of an attack, but they rarely communicated and never collaborated. S. 2845 goes directly at this tragic flaw through personnel and structural reform in two ways. First, the bill creates one overarching and fully accountable official, the director of national intelligence, with the budgetary and oversight authority to compel the communication and cooperation that was missing before 9/11. Second, the bill requires all information and intelligence to be funneled ultimately to a newly established national counterterrorism center instead of remaining scattered in 15 different intelligence agencies, as before 9/11. There are many other important provisions in the bill less expansive in scope but vital in content that recommend its passage. However, regrettably S. 2845 contains some provisions that do not belong in a bill with this mission, were not recommended by the 9/11 commission, and could not have passed independently. Of particular concern to me, however, are related problems that had nothing to do with 9/11, but also deeply involve intelligence and the judgment of public officials. Our country and our troops are virtually trapped in Iraq today because of an unprecedented invasion. The invasion of Iraq teaches the necessity of assuring that competing information not only reaches but influences the President and that cooperation, consolidation, and coordination do not result in dreaded ``groupthink'' or in disproportionate influence by the new director of national intelligence or any other official. I am not entirely convinced that S. 2845 builds in the necessary checks and balances to assure against reinforcing a President's predispositions. Time and experience inform the Congress. We must be prepared to make changes as they become necessary. Most disappointing was the weak civil liberties panel that is not in keeping with the concerns in the 9/11 Commission Report about the privacy issues raised by the new centralized intelligence network recommended by the 9/11 Commission. The panel has become a wolf watching the hen house. It has no subpoena power. The members will be totally beholden to the President, at whose pleasure they will serve. I have been in the Congress long enough to know that allowing an opportunity to pass while we wait for a more perfect bill often means no bill, no bill for years, or no bill until another crisis comes. This bill is already late, delayed by the Bush administration at every turn, but finally delivered at the hands of the 9/11 families and the Commission their energy brought into being. We must seize this opportunity and pass this bill. ____________________ |