{"database": "openregs", "table": "congressional_record", "rows": [["CREC-2004-12-20-pt1-PgE2211", "2004-12-20", 108, 2, null, null, "CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 2845, INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004", "HOUSE", "EXTENSIONS", "ALLOTHER", "E2211", "E2211", "[{\"name\": \"Eleanor Holmes Norton\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}]", "[{\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2845\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2845\"}]", "150 Cong. Rec. E2211", "Congressional Record, Volume 150 Issue 140 (Monday, December 20, 2004)\n\n[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 140 (Monday, December 20, 2004)]\n[Extensions of Remarks]\n[Page E2211]\nFrom the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]\n\n[[Page E2211]]\n    CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 2845, INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM\n                         PREVENTION ACT OF 2004\n\n                                 ______\n\n                               speech of\n\n                       HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON\n\n                      of the district of columbia\n\n                    in the house of representatives\n\n                       Tuesday, December 7, 2004\n\n  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I represent the people of the Nation's\ncapital, perhaps the most conspicuous target for global terrorism in\nthe world. I support S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of\n2004. 1 could not afford to do otherwise. Nor can other Members,\nwhatever their opinions of the considerable shortcomings of this bill.\nThe controversy over S. 2845 and its many flaws have obscured the\noverriding reason for the bill in the first place. After an impressive,\nexhaustive investigation, the 9/11 Commission, which deserves the\ncredit for the seminal document from which the bill derives, said that\nprevention of the 9/11 tragedy had been possible. ``There were specific\npoints of vulnerability in the plot and opportunities to disrupt it,''\naccording to the 9/11 Commission Report (p. 8). Various intelligence\nagencies each had parts of vital information about the imminence of an\nattack, but they rarely communicated and never collaborated.\n  S. 2845 goes directly at this tragic flaw through personnel and\nstructural reform in two ways. First, the bill creates one overarching\nand fully accountable official, the director of national intelligence,\nwith the budgetary and oversight authority to compel the communication\nand cooperation that was missing before 9/11. Second, the bill requires\nall information and intelligence to be funneled ultimately to a newly\nestablished national counterterrorism center instead of remaining\nscattered in 15 different intelligence agencies, as before 9/11.\n  There are many other important provisions in the bill less expansive\nin scope but vital in content that recommend its passage. However,\nregrettably S. 2845 contains some provisions that do not belong in a\nbill with this mission, were not recommended by the 9/11 commission,\nand could not have passed independently. Of particular concern to me,\nhowever, are related problems that had nothing to do with 9/11, but\nalso deeply involve intelligence and the judgment of public officials.\nOur country and our troops are virtually trapped in Iraq today because\nof an unprecedented invasion. The invasion of Iraq teaches the\nnecessity of assuring that competing information not only reaches but\ninfluences the President and that cooperation, consolidation, and\ncoordination do not result in dreaded ``groupthink'' or in\ndisproportionate influence by the new director of national intelligence\nor any other official. I am not entirely convinced that S. 2845 builds\nin the necessary checks and balances to assure against reinforcing a\nPresident's predispositions. Time and experience inform the Congress.\nWe must be prepared to make changes as they become necessary.\n\n  Most disappointing was the weak civil liberties panel that is not in\nkeeping with the concerns in the 9/11 Commission Report about the\nprivacy issues raised by the new centralized intelligence network\nrecommended by the 9/11 Commission. The panel has become a wolf\nwatching the hen house. It has no subpoena power. The members will be\ntotally beholden to the President, at whose pleasure they will serve.\n  I have been in the Congress long enough to know that allowing an\nopportunity to pass while we wait for a more perfect bill often means\nno bill, no bill for years, or no bill until another crisis comes. This\nbill is already late, delayed by the Bush administration at every turn,\nbut finally delivered at the hands of the 9/11 families and the\nCommission their energy brought into being. We must seize this\nopportunity and pass this bill.\n\n                          ____________________"]], "columns": ["granule_id", "date", "congress", "session", "volume", "issue", "title", "chamber", "granule_class", "sub_granule_class", "page_start", "page_end", "speakers", "bills", "citation", "full_text"], "primary_keys": ["granule_id"], "primary_key_values": ["CREC-2004-12-20-pt1-PgE2211"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.5403750110417604, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}