{"database": "openregs", "table": "crs_reports", "rows": [["LSB11419", "Election Law and the Supreme Court in 2026: Pending Cases on Redistricting, Campaign Finance, and Mail-In Ballots", "2026-04-15T04:00:00Z", "2026-04-16T10:53:27Z", "Active", "Posts", "L. Paige Whitaker", null, "As the November 2026 congressional elections approach, three cases addressing various aspects of election law are pending at the U.S. Supreme Court. In Louisiana v. Callais, the Court is considering the constitutionality of a state creating a second majority-minority congressional district to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended (VRA). In National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the Court is evaluating the constitutionality of the federal limits on coordinated political party expenditures. In Watson v. Republican National Committee (RNC), the Court is considering whether the federal laws establishing Election Day preempt a state law that permits the counting of mail-in ballots that are cast by Election Day but received afterward. The Court is expected to issue rulings in these cases by the end of June or early July. Depending on the timing and the contours of the Court\u2019s rulings, these cases could affect the 2026 congressional elections or future federal elections. These cases may also be of interest to Congress because they each involve federal statutes. Within the bounds of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress has the authority to amend the federal statutes underlying each of the three pending cases. This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of these three pending election law cases, listed alphabetically by case name, and briefly addresses considerations for Congress.\nLouisiana v. Callais: Redistricting and the Voting Rights Act\nIn Louisiana v. Callais, the Supreme Court is considering whether a state\u2019s \u201cintentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district\u201d to comply with Section 2 of the VRA violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Callais is the latest, and possibly most consequential, in a line of recent Supreme Court cases that has involved Section 2.  \nAlthough the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, Congress enacted the VRA to achieve its goal of bringing \u201can end to the denial of the right to vote based on race.\u201d Section 2 of the VRA prohibits discriminatory voting practices or procedures, including those alleged to diminish or weaken minority voting power, known as minority vote dilution. The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2, under certain circumstances, to require the creation of one or more majority-minority districts in a redistricting map. A majority-minority district is one in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority. The Court has determined that the creation of such districts can avoid minority vote dilution by helping ensure that racial or language minority groups are not submerged into the majority and thereby denied an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice. In recent years, the Court has considered whether societal changes have resulted in some of the VRA\u2019s remedial measures no longer withstanding constitutional scrutiny because they do not reflect \u201ccurrent conditions,\u201d with some Justices similarly suggesting that the principle may apply to Section 2.\nCase Overview\nThe dispute in Louisiana began when the state legislature redrew its congressional map following the 2020 census and created one majority-minority district out of the six congressional districts apportioned to the state. Voters in the state and civil rights organizations sued in federal district court, arguing that Section 2 required the creation of two majority-minority districts. Following litigation, the Louisiana legislature redrew the congressional redistricting map, creating a second majority-minority district. \nIn another federal district court, self-described \u201cnon-Black voters\u201d in the state sued, arguing that the newly redrawn map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. After determining that considerations of race predominated in drawing the second majority-minority district, a divided three-judge federal district court panel applied a strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review, requiring the creation of the district to be \u201cnarrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.\u201d Assuming without deciding that compliance with Section 2 was a compelling interest for the creation of a second majority-minority district, the district court determined that such compliance would be \u201cnarrowly tailored\u201d if it comported with the three preconditions articulated by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles: (1) \u201cthe minority group must be sufficiently large and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district\u201d; (2) \u201cthe minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive\u201d; and (3) the minority group must be able to prove that the majority group \u201cvotes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority\u2019s preferred candidate.\u201d The district court further explained that Supreme Court case law indicates that an aspect of the first Gingles precondition\u2014that a district be \u201creasonably configured\u201d\u2014requires adherence to traditional redistricting criteria, such as being reasonably compact and contiguous. In this case, the district court determined that the challenged majority-minority district did not meet the first Gingles precondition because, in view of the \u201cthe State\u2019s Black population [being] dispersed,\u201d the legislature created the district \u201cas a bizarre\u2019 250-mile-long slash-shaped district that functions as a majority-minority district only because it severs and absorbs majority-minority neighborhoods from cities and parishes all the way from Baton Rouge to Shreveport.\u201d Therefore, the district court held that the map was \u201can impermissible racial gerrymander\u201d in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined the State from using the map for any election. The Supreme Court stayed the decision pending an appeal.\nThe State of Louisiana appealed to the Supreme Court under a provision of federal law permitting direct appeals from district court three-judge panels. In November 2024, the Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated Louisiana v. Callais with the related case, Robinson v. Callais. Oral argument took place on March 24, 2025. On June 27, 2025, the Court ordered the consolidated cases to be reargued and subsequently directed the parties to file briefs addressing the question of \u201c[w]hether the State\u2019s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.\u201d The Court heard reargument in the case on October 15, 2025.\nAlthough the State of Louisiana defended the constitutionality of the second majority-minority district during the March 2025 Supreme Court argument, on reargument, the State maintains that all \u201crace-based redistricting\u201d is unconstitutional because it violates key principles of equal protection and fails a strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review. \u201cRace-based redistricting\u201d violates the command of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that \u201cthe government may never use race as a stereotype\u2019\u201d because the three Gingles preconditions amount to \u201cgovernment-mandated stereotyping,\u201d the State asserts. In that vein, the State emphasizes how Section 2\u2019s requirement of \u201crace-based redistricting\u201d is not time-limited even though the Supreme Court has held that any departure from the equal treatment of racial and ethnic groups \u201cmust be a temporary matter.\u201d Under a strict scrutiny standard of review, the State argues that Section 2 is not a sufficient \u201ccompelling interest\u201d because, among other reasons, (1) Section 2 is different from \u201cthe limited contexts\u201d where the Court has sanctioned \u201crace-based action,\u201d (2) it has a \u201cframework\u201d that is \u201ctoo amorphous,\u201d and (3) it exceeds the power provided to Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment. According to the State, Congress\u2019s authority to legislate under the Fifteenth Amendment requires \u201ca congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented . . . and the means adopted to that end,\u201d but when last amending Section 2 in 1982, Congress failed to identify the requisite \u201chistory and pattern of actual constitutional violations.\u201d Similarly, the challengers of the second majority-minority district argue that Section 2 cannot pass \u201ccongruence and proportionality review\u201d because, among other reasons, the law \u201cseverely burdens\u201d voters and states, and Congress failed to show how the burdens are justified by current conditions. Even assuming that Section 2 could be a constitutional remedy, the challengers maintain that the second majority-minority district fails a strict scrutiny standard of review because absent \u201cevidence of specific, current, intentional discrimination,\u201d reliance on Section 2 is not a compelling interest.\nDefending its constitutionality, the supporters of the second majority-minority district who initiated the litigation seeking its creation argue that by prohibiting state actions that have a discriminatory result, and not requiring a \u201csubjective\u201d discriminatory intent, Section 2 \u201cis an appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment,\u201d as the Supreme Court stated in Allen v. Milligan in 2023. Further, the supporters contend that the \u201climited scope\u201d of Section 2 ensures that when a state remedies a violation of the law, the state\u2019s interest \u201cis sufficiently compelling to withstand constitutional scrutiny.\u201d For example, they underscore how both the text of Section 2 and its application under the three Gingles preconditions create \u201cadditional constraints that limit the use of race for remedial purposes.\u201d As to whether the remedies required under Section 2 are time-limited, the supporters proffer that the law contains a \u201cbuilt-in focus on current conditions\u201d that avoids the need for an expiration date and that Section 2-required majority-minority districts have \u201ca natural end point,\u201d lasting only until a new census is conducted.\nConsiderations for Congress \nDepending on how the Court rules, the decision in Louisiana v. Callais could affect whether or to what degree states can create majority-minority districts in congressional and state redistricting maps going forward. If the Court issues its decision this term, it appears unlikely that most states would have time to redistrict for the 2026 congressional elections, in which primary elections have already begun. In that vein, the Court could delay implementation of the ruling based on \u201cgeneral equitable principles,\u201d taking into account the proximity of the election and the complexities inherent in the administration of state election laws. In response to a ruling in Callais, within the bounds of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress could choose to amend Section 2 of the VRA or pass other legislation establishing standards for congressional redistricting, though a ruling that Section 2 is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied to redistricting maps in the absence of evidence of intentional discrimination, would restrict legislative options that permit the consideration of race in redistricting decisions.\nNRSC v. FEC: Campaign Finance\nIn NRSC v. FEC, the Court is evaluating whether the First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits a federal limit on coordinated political party expenditures. A provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), codified at 52 U.S.C. \u00a7 30116(d), and the relevant FEC regulations, promulgated at 11 C.F.R. \u00a7 109.37, governing political party expenditures that are coordinated with a federal candidate, are known as the \u201ccoordinated party expenditure limits.\u201d Coordinated party expenditures are expenditures made by political parties in coordination with (i.e., with input from) federal candidates. Such expenditures mostly fund campaign advertising (i.e., party coordinated communications). In a 2001 decision, FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (known as Colorado II to distinguish it from a similarly named case on party expenditures decided earlier), the Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of the coordinated party expenditure limits. According to the Court in Colorado II, coordinated party expenditures have \u201cno significant functional difference\u201d from contributions made by a party directly to a candidate, and the Court had earlier held that contribution limits are generally constitutional. \nCase Overview\nIn NRSC v. FEC, the challengers\u2014the senatorial and congressional committees of the Republican Party, along with then-Senator JD Vance and former Representative Steve Chabot (as federal office candidates)\u2014sued the FEC, arguing that the coordinated party expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. The challengers also argued that the Supreme Court\u2019s 2001 ruling in Colorado II is no longer binding because of subsequent Supreme Court precedent, exemptions to the limits that Congress added in 2014, and \u201cthe rise of unlimited spending by political action committees.\u201d The en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) upheld the limits, determining that the Colorado II decision was binding precedent. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit characterized the holding in Colorado II as \u201cquestionable,\u201d emphasizing that the Supreme Court\u2019s recent campaign finance decisions have applied a different approach when evaluating the constitutionality of such laws. \nThe challengers appealed the Sixth Circuit ruling, and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on December 9, 2025. The question presented to the Supreme Court is: \u201cWhether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. \u00a7 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with party coordinated communications\u2019 as defined in 11 C.F.R. \u00a7 109.37.\u201d \nAfter prevailing in its defense of the coordinated party expenditure limits in the Sixth Circuit, the federal government in a \u201crare\u201d occurrence has changed its position and now argues before the Supreme Court that the limits are unconstitutional. In view of the federal government\u2019s decision to no longer defend the constitutionality of the limits, the Supreme Court has appointed an amicus curiae to brief and argue the case in support of the Sixth Circuit ruling. As a threshold matter, the amicus argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits in the case because it is moot as a result of the federal government\u2019s decision to no longer defend the law. That is, according to the amicus, the challengers no longer face potential enforcement of the limits because the government now maintains that the limits are unconstitutional. On the merits, the amicus contends that the limits should be upheld because, as the Supreme Court held in Colorado II, they are \u201cclosely drawn\u201d to serve a \u201csufficiently important\u201d governmental interest of avoiding quid pro quo corruption by preventing donors from circumventing FECA\u2019s contribution limits to candidates. Further, the amicus argues that Colorado II is binding precedent and overruling that decision \u201cwould massively destabilize campaign-finance law\u201d by jeopardizing the constitutionality of other key provisions of FECA and unsettling the Court\u2019s campaign finance jurisprudence. \nIn response, the federal government disputes the assertion that by changing its position the case has been rendered moot, because the challengers still \u201cface a credible threat\u201d that the limits could be enforced against them. On the merits, the federal government maintains that although the Supreme Court in Colorado II upheld the limits, subsequent \u201clegal, statutory, and factual developments have so undermined it that it is no longer good law.\u201d For instance, the government observes that while the Court in Colorado II determined that Congress can constitutionally limit campaign funds to lessen \u201cundue influence,\u201d subsequent Court rulings have held that Congress may seek only to ameliorate quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. \nConsiderations for Congress\nThe Court\u2019s ruling in NRSC could be consequential for the system of federal campaign finance during the 2026 congressional midterm elections or for future elections, depending on when the Court\u2019s ruling takes effect. For example, one media report predicts that if the coordinated party expenditure limits are overturned, parties could \u201cpour unlimited amounts into ads in competitive races across the country, making it easier for campaigns to benefit from that spending.\u201d As the media report explained, coordinated party expenditures are often used to buy television advertising, which is less expensive when bought in concert with a candidate\u2019s campaign, so if the limits are eliminated, political parties \u201cwould dramatically accelerate their purchase of ad time.\u201d  \nAs a case of constitutional interpretation, a Supreme Court ruling in NRSC may provide guidance regarding the constitutional parameters of any campaign finance legislation that Congress might choose to enact. If the Court rules that the limits are unconstitutional, lawmakers disagreeing with that outcome would be limited to seeking a constitutional amendment to overturn the effects of the decision, as some Members of Congress introduced in response to the Supreme Court\u2019s 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. FEC. \nWatson v. RNC: Mail-In Ballots\nIn Watson v. RNC, the Supreme Court is considering whether federal laws that establish Election Day preempt a state law that permits the counting of mail-in ballots that are cast by Election Day but received within a period of time afterward. Federal statutes, codified at 2 U.S.C. \u00a7 7, 2 U.S.C. \u00a7 1, and 3 U.S.C. \u00a7 1 (hereafter \u201cthe Election Day federal laws\u201d), establish the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in certain years as the day of election for federal offices. Similar to some other state laws, Mississippi law permits mail-in ballots to be counted by election officials if they are received within five days after Election Day.\nCase Overview\nDuring the COVID-19 pandemic, Mississippi changed its election laws to permit the counting of mail-in ballots \u201cpostmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election.\u201d In 2024, Mississippi amended the law to apply to mail-in ballots transmitted by, in addition to the U.S. Postal Service, common carriers. In response, the Republican National Committee (RNC), the Mississippi Republican Party, and others (hereafter \u201cthe challengers\u201d) filed suit against the Mississippi Secretary of State and other state officials (hereafter \u201cState of Mississippi\u201d) in federal district court, arguing that the Election Day federal laws preempt the state law by establishing \u201ca uniform day\u201d for electing Members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. The district court granted the State of Mississippi\u2019s motion for summary judgment in July 2024 and the challengers appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit). \nIn October 2024, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit unanimously determined that with enactment of the Election Day federal laws, Congress established \u201ca singular day for the election\u201d of Congress and the appointment of presidential electors. Based on the text of those federal laws, court precedent, and historical practice, the court concluded that Election Day is when \u201cballots must be both cast by voters and received by state officials.\u201d Therefore, the court held that by allowing ballots to be counted if received up to five days after Election Day, the Mississippi law was preempted by the Election Day federal laws. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment and remanded.\nThe State of Mississippi appealed the Fifth Circuit ruling, and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on March 23, 2026. The question presented to the Supreme Court \u201cis whether the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day.\u201d  \nBefore the Supreme Court, the challengers focus on the text of the Election Day federal laws, maintaining that contemporary dictionaries define the term \u201celection\u201d to mean the process \u201cof selecting officers\u201d that concludes when the state receives a ballot, not when a voter casts a ballot. Further, the challengers emphasize how historical practices in the United States support their position because, dating back to the Civil War, states have not counted ballots that were received after Election Day. The challengers also rely on the Supreme Court\u2019s 1997 ruling in Foster v. Love, holding that Louisiana\u2019s open primary laws, which allowed for the election of a candidate before Election Day, were preempted by the Election Day federal laws. According to the challengers, Foster stands for the proposition that an \u201celection must be concluded\u2019 and consummated\u2019 on election day through a final selection.\u2019\u201d\nIn response, the State of Mississippi argues that an \u201celection\u201d is when there has been a \u201cconclusive choice of an officer\u201d and that choice is concluded when voters cast their ballots. As Mississippi law requires that choice to occur by Election Day, the State concludes that its law comports with the Election Day federal laws. Similarly, the State counters that history confirms that the Election Day federal laws were enacted to address the challenges arising from states holding elections on various days and not because there was a problem with the date when ballots were received. In addition, the State contends that Mississippi\u2019s law comports with the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in Foster in that \u201cthe conclusive choice of an officer\u201d takes place by Election Day, because \u201call voters must cast ballots by election day, so the voters\u2019 combine[ ]\u2019 with officials\u2019 on that day to take the actions\u2019 meant to make a final selection of an officeholder.\u2019\u201d\nConsiderations for Congress\nIf the Supreme Court decides that the Election Day federal laws preempt the Mississippi law that permits the counting of mail-in ballots received after Election Day, similar laws in other states could likely also be held preempted. As a result, in federal elections, states would be permitted to count only those mail-in ballots received by Election Day. Although a preemption ruling in the case would affect only federal election ballots, at least one scholar has predicted that states, as a matter of administrative practicality, would likely decide to count ballots for state and federal elections under the same rules.\nWhether the Election Day federal laws preempt certain state mail-in ballot laws involves a question of statutory interpretation. Therefore, Congress could decide to either maintain the Supreme Court\u2019s interpretation of the laws in Watson v. RNC or amend the laws to either permit or prohibit states from counting mail-in ballots that are received after Election Day. The Election Day federal laws for House and Senate elections were enacted under Article I, Section 4, clause 1 of the Constitution, known as the Elections Clause, which confers upon the states the initial and principal authority to establish \u201c[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,\u201d but provides Congress with the authority \u201cat any time by Law [to] make or alter such [laws].\u201d The Election Day federal law for the appointment of presidential and vice-presidential electors was enacted under Article II, Section 1, clause 4 of the Constitution, which provides that Congress \u201cmay determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.\u201d", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11419/LSB11419.2.pdf", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11419.html"]], "columns": ["id", "title", "publish_date", "update_date", "status", "content_type", "authors", "topics", "summary", "pdf_url", "html_url"], "primary_keys": ["id"], "primary_key_values": ["LSB11419"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.5496980156749487, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}