{"database": "openregs", "table": "crs_reports", "rows": [["LSB11414", "Birthright Citizenship: Litigation Status Update", "2026-04-03T04:00:00Z", "2026-04-07T12:38:11Z", "Active", "Posts", "Hannah Solomon-Strauss, Juria L. Jones", null, "On April 1, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Trump v. Barbara regarding Executive Order 14160, \u201cProtecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship\u201d (E.O. 14160 or the E.O.), which purports to limit who may be recognized as having U.S. citizenship based on having been born in the United States. President Trump issued the E.O. on January 20, 2025. The E.O. sets forth the policy that, 30 days after the issuance of the order, a child born to a mother who is either \u201cunlawfully present in the United States\u201d or lawfully present in the United States on a temporary basis, and to a father who is \u201cnot a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of\u201d the child\u2019s birth, is not to be recognized as a United States citizen and shall not be issued any federal documentation, such as a passport or Social Security number. Plaintiffs in Barbara and other suits challenging the E.O. claim that the order is incompatible with the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and federal law, and cite long-standing Supreme Court precedent and historical practice as supporting their claim. The government contends that persons covered by the E.O. are not entitled to citizenship at birth under either the Fourteenth Amendment or governing statute, and that the executive branch is accordingly authorized to make such policy as in the E.O. \nThis Legal Sidebar provides a brief overview of E.O. 14160 and an update on where lawsuits challenging the E.O.\u2019s legality stand following the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., in which the Court partially stayed nationwide injunctions that would have prevented E.O. 14160 from taking effect. To date, the district and appellate courts that have considered the merits of the constitutional and statutory challenges to E.O. 14160 have determined\nthe parties that filed the suits have standing, which in some cases was not challenged by the government. In Barbara, the district court certified a class action and found that the individuals within the class have standing. The government concedes that these class members \u201cplainly have Article III standing\u201d;\nthe E.O. is unconstitutional as it violates the Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause; and \nthe E.O. is unlawful as it violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401(a)). \nThe Supreme Court granted certiorari in Barbara, where the parties agree that the plaintiffs have standing and the government does not challenge the district court\u2019s certification of a class action. As a result, the Court seems poised to rule on the validity of the E.O. The Supreme Court could either issue a ruling on the statutory question\u2014whether the INA authorizes the policy set forth in the E.O.\u2014or the Court could answer the constitutional question, of whether the E.O. is constitutional within the meaning of the Citizenship Clause. \nExecutive Order 14160\nThe first sentence of the Citizenship Clause reads: \u201cAll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.\u201d The E.O. purports to interpret the meaning of the Citizenship Clause\u2019s use of the phrase \u201csubject to the jurisdiction thereof\u201d when setting forth the Administration\u2019s policy on birthright citizenship.\nE.O. 14160 states: \u201cIt is the policy of the United States that no department or agency of the United States government shall issue documents recognizing United States citizenship, or accept documents issued by State, local, or other governments or authorities purporting to recognize United States citizenship, to persons\u201d whom the executive branch believes are not granted birthright citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment. The E.O. directs the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Commissioner of Social Security to \u201ctake all appropriate measures to ensure that the regulations and policies of their respective departments and agencies are consistent with this order.\u201d\nSpecifically, E.O. 14160 asserts that individuals born in the United States who are not \u201csubject to the jurisdiction thereof\u201d are excluded from the Citizenship Clause\u2019s grant of birthright citizenship. The E.O. further asserts that two categories of individuals covered by the order are not \u201csubject to the jurisdiction\u201d of the United States at birth and thus are not birthright citizens within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) a child whose mother was not lawfully present in the United States at the time of the child\u2019s birth, and whose father was not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident at the child\u2019s birth; and (2) a child whose mother was lawfully but temporarily in the United States when the child was born, and whose father was not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident at the child\u2019s birth. \nLitigation Prior to Trump v. Casa, Inc.\nShortly after the President issued E.O. 14160, several organizations, expectant mothers, states, and localities filed lawsuits in district courts throughout the United States challenging the E.O.\u2019s legality (see Table 1 below). In general, the plaintiffs alleged that the E.O. violates the Citizenship Clause. The plaintiffs also alleged the order violates the INA (8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401(a)) that, like the Citizenship Clause, provides that \u201ca person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof\u201d is a national and citizen of the United States at birth. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the courts to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and unlawful, and to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Administration from enforcing the E.O. In considering the requests for an injunction, the various lower courts determined the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and, in most cases, granted nationwide injunctions (sometimes called \u201cuniversal\u201d injunctions) halting the implementation of E.O. 14160. The courts that did not issue nationwide injunctions nevertheless issued injunctions applicable to the parties in each case, and, as a result, the government was barred from enforcing the E.O.\nThe government sought emergency relief\u2014a stay preventing the nationwide injunctions from taking effect\u2014in the Supreme Court. On June 27, 2025, the Court granted the federal government\u2019s application to partially stay the injunctions in Trump v. Casa, Inc., concluding that universal injunctions \u201clikely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to federal courts.\u201d The Court explained that its stay applied \u201conly to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue\u201d and directed the lower courts to move \u201cexpeditiously\u201d to ensure the injunctions complied with the Court\u2019s ruling. (For more on Casa, Inc.\u2019s effect on nationwide injunctions, see CRS Report R48600, Trump v. CASA, Inc. and Nationwide Injunctions During the Second Trump Administration, by Joanna R. Lampe (2025), and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11331, Trump v. CASA, Inc.: Supreme Court Limits Nationwide Injunctions.)\nLitigation Following Trump v. CASA, Inc.\nAfter the Court\u2019s decision in CASA, litigation over the legality of E.O. 14160 and plaintiffs\u2019 requests to enjoin application of the E.O. continued in the lower courts. The Supreme Court has held that to prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of \u201csuccess on the merits\u201d; (2) a likelihood that the plaintiff \u201cwould suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief\u201d; (3) \u201cthe balance of equities tips in [the plaintiff\u2019s] favor\u201d; and (4) \u201can injunction is in the public interest.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 primary argument to establish their likelihood of success on the merits is that the E.O. violates both the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the INA. \nThe plaintiffs argue that the plain text of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, confirms that all individuals born in the United States are citizens, subject only to very limited exceptions. The plaintiffs\u2019 arguments derived from the English common law rule of jus soli: the principle that individuals are citizens of the nation in which they are born. Plaintiffs argue, for example, that the Court recognized in Wong Kim Ark that, \u201cin the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution,\u201d only a limited subset of individuals are not \u201csubject to the jurisdiction\u201d of the United States for purposes of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, such as children born to diplomats serving in the United States. Plaintiffs also cite Wong Kim Ark to note that, in that case, the Supreme Court articulated further exceptions from birthright citizenship, based on the law as it stood at the time of the 1898 decision. Then, children born to Indian tribes\u2014together with children born on foreign ships, or to occupying armies\u2014were also excluded from the Citizenship Clause because they were thought to be born not \u201csubject to the jurisdiction\u201d of the United States. (Congress changed this by statute in 1924.) Other than these very limited exceptions, plaintiffs assert, children born in the United States are citizens at birth, regardless of their parents\u2019 alienage\u2014and therefore, the E.O. is unconstitutional. \nA number of plaintiffs also argue that the E.O. violates the INA. In 1940, Congress enacted the Nationality Act of 1940 and included a provision that mirrors the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Citizenship Clause. Plaintiffs point to legislative history that reveals that the statutory language was \u201ctaken of course from the [F]ourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.\u201d Plaintiffs note that Congress reenacted this language in 1952 as part of the INA (currently found at 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401(a)). The plaintiffs assert that this parallel language indicates Congress intended for the INA to be coterminous with\u2014that is, to codify in statute\u2014the Citizenship Clause as the Supreme Court interpreted it in Wong Kim Ark. \nIn response to these arguments, the government contends that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the parallel language in the INA, should be understood to reference an individual\u2019s domicile, rather than place of birth. The government claims that the individuals who would be subject to the E.O. are not entitled to birthright citizenship because \u201ccitizenship flows from lawful domicile,\u201d and children whose parents have no lawful residence in the United States must fall outside of the Citizenship Clause. The government also argues that the phrase \u201csubject to the jurisdiction thereof\u201d refers to \u201cpolitical jurisdiction\u201d and that \u201cpersons are only subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States if they owe primary allegiance to the United States,\u201d thus excluding individuals \u201cwho owe allegiance to a different sovereign.\u201d \nThe courts that have considered the merits of plaintiffs\u2019 claims have held in their favor, finding that the plaintiffs have a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional and statutory challenges. For example, in Barbara v. Trump, the district court determined that the E.O. likely \u201ccontradicts the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the century-old untouched precedent that interprets it.\u201d The Ninth Circuit in Washington v. Trump held that, \u201c[s]ince Wong Kim Ark, . . . the Judiciary, Congress, and the Executive Branch have consistently and uniformly protected the Citizenship Clause\u2019s explicit guarantee of birthright citizenship regardless of the immigration status of an individual\u2019s parents.\u201d\nTo date, reviewing courts have likewise concluded that the E.O. likely violates 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401. In Washington v. Trump, the Ninth Circuit explained that \u201ca statute adopting language from another source,\u201d as Section 1401 adopted the language of the Citizenship Clause, \u201cgenerally conveys the original source\u2019s well-settled meaning.\u201d Similarly, the First Circuit held that, unless otherwise defined, statutes should be interpreted \u201cas taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.\u201d The First Circuit explained that, according to Supreme Court precedent, \u201cin general, where Congress employs a term of art obviously transplanted from another legal source, it brings the old soil with it.\u201d The circuit court illustrated that principle by reference to United States v. Kozminski, in which the Supreme Court held, when construing a statute meant to give effect to the Thirteenth Amendment\u2019s prohibition on involuntary servitude that, \u201cin the absence of any contrary indications, [the Court gives] effect to congressional intent by construing [statutory terms] in a way consistent with the understanding of the [Constitution] that prevailed at the time of [the statute\u2019s] enactment.\u201d \nTrump v. Barbara at the Supreme Court\nAfter CASA, these cases were considered by district and appellate courts, and these courts once again issued injunctions. (For an accounting of some of these cases, see Table 1, below). The federal government sought review by the Supreme Court in two cases: Washington v. Trump and Barbara v. Trump. The government filed identical petitions in both cases, but in Barbara it sought a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment. This type of petition asks the Supreme Court to review a case still pending in a U.S. Court of Appeals before that court has had an opportunity to enter judgment. Under the Supreme Court\u2019s rules, a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment \u201cwill be granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination\u201d by the Supreme Court. On December 5, 2025, the Court granted the petition in Barbara on the question \u201cwhether the Executive Order complies on its face with the Citizenship Clause and with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401(a), which codifies that Clause.\u201d \nIn challenging the injunction against E.O. 14160, the government argues that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Citizenship Clause \u201cwas adopted to grant citizenship to freed slaves and their children\u2014not to the children of temporarily present aliens or illegal aliens.\u201d The government claims that the Clause only extends to children who are subject to the \u201cpolitical jurisdiction\u201d of the United States, which means these children \u201cowe direct and immediate allegiance\u201d to the United States and, therefore, \u201cmay claim its protection.\u201d The government contends that the view that birth within the United States confers citizenship is a misinterpretation of the Citizenship Clause and that E.O. 14160 \u201crestore[s] the Clause\u2019s original meaning.\u201d \nThe government maintains that the Citizenship Clause was originally understood to extend citizenship to children of citizens and to children of aliens who are considered to be permanently domicile in the United States. The government asserts that \u201ca domiciled alien owes allegiance to the country where he lives and may invoke its protection against other nations.\u201d The government further argues that plaintiffs\u2019 assertion that, under the Citizenship Clause, a person is \u201csubject to the jurisdiction\u201d of the United States if they are subject to U.S. law \u201cis plainly incorrect.\u201d\nLastly, the government argues that E.O. 14160 complies with Section 1401(a) and that plaintiffs have incorrectly asserted that the statute\u2019s meaning depends on what Congress believed the Citizenship Clause to mean at the time of enactment. The government contends that the statute\u2019s scope \u201cdepends on what the Citizenship Clause actually means, not what Congress thought it meant in 1940 or 1952.\u201d The plaintiffs continue to press the arguments made in the lower courts.\nOral argument in Barbara occurred on April 1, 2026. At argument, the focus of the government\u2019s case was its argument that the proper Fourteenth Amendment analysis hinges on \u201cdomicile\u201d and \u201cpolitical jurisdiction.\u201d The government argued that a parent\u2019s immigration status is a bright-line rule that would yield an administrable policy by which to determine each baby\u2019s birthright citizenship status. Both sides agreed that Wong Kim Ark controls this case, and neither asked for it to be overturned. The government argued that Wong Kim Ark also hinged on the plaintiff\u2019s \u201cdomicile\u201d and this Court should follow that precedent. By contrast, plaintiffs argued that the discussion of \u201cdomicile\u201d in Wong Kim Ark was dicta\u2014that is, not binding law\u2014and this Court should follow Wong Kim Ark\u2019s holding, where the Court articulated that nearly every child born on U.S. soil is a birthright citizen, subject to only very limited exceptions. Plaintiffs also argued that the government\u2019s focus on \u201cdomicile\u201d would be difficult to administer in reality, with some justices asking whether immigration paperwork would be required in delivery rooms. Plaintiffs argued that the Citizenship Clause has only limited exceptions, those \u201ccloaked with a fiction of extraterritoriality\u201d\u2014like the children of diplomats\u2014and otherwise is a universal grant of birthright citizenship. \nNotwithstanding the injunctions in place, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Social Security Administration, and the Department of Health and Human Services have issued guidance to implement the E.O. if it is eventually permitted to go into force. Additionally, since the E.O., a range of legislative proposals have been introduced in the 119th Congress to define the term \u201csubject to the jurisdiction thereof,\u201d including H.R. 2337, the PARENT Act of 2025; S. 304 and H.R. 569, the Birthright Citizenship Act of 2025; and S. 2274 and H.R. 4741, the Constitutional Citizenship Clarification Act of 2025. Congress may enact statutory provisions to clarify the meaning of the term \u201csubject to the jurisdiction thereof\u201d as used in Section 1401(a), but it may wish to await the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of the separate constitutional question regarding what that same term means as used in the Fourteenth Amendment. That decision, and how it impacts the Court\u2019s interpretation of Section 1401(a), may aid Congress in determining how it wishes to proceed. \nTable 1. Table of Selected Cases Challenging Executive Order (E.O.) 14160\nCase Name\nFederal District Court\nPost-CASA Relief Granted\nStatus (as of date of Legal Sidebar)\n\nBarbara v. Trump\nU.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire\nOn July 10, 2025, the district court provisionally certified a nationwide class, consisting of \u201call current and future persons who are born on or after February 20, 2025,\u201d and who would otherwise meet the categories set forth in the E.O.; the court granted a class-wide preliminary injunction, enjoining the administration from enforcing the E.O., after finding, among other things, that the plaintiffs will likely succeed in establishing the E.O. violates the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401(a).\nThe government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment with the Supreme Court, which was granted on December 5, 2025. Oral argument occurred on April 1, 2026.\n\nWashington v. Trump\nU.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington\nOn July 23, 2025, the Ninth Circuit held that the E.O. \u201cis invalid because it contradicts the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s grant of citizenship.\u201d The court also held that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits that the E.O. violates 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401a. The court affirmed the district court\u2019s grant of a nationwide injunction as \u201cnecessary to give the States complete relief on their claims.\u201d\nOn September 15, 2025, the Ninth Circuit issued the formal mandate, enjoining the Administration from enforcing the E.O.; the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Court on September 26, 2025. The matter remains pending before the Court. \n\nNew Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Trump\nU.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire\nThe district court granted a preliminary injunction on February 10, 2025; on October 3, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court\u2019s order granting the preliminary injunction (\u201clargely for the reasons set forth\u201d in the consolidated cases Doe v. Trump, No. 25-1169 and New Jersey v. Trump, No. 25-1170).\nThe First Circuit remanded the case for further consideration; mandate issued on November 25, 2025, enjoining the Administration from enforcing the E.O.\n\nDoe v. Trump\nU.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts\nThe district court consolidated this case with New Jersey v. Trump, and granted a preliminary injunction (in Doe, the injunction is \u201climited to the individuals and the members of the associations\u201d); on October 3, 2025, the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court\u2019s preliminary injunction.\nThe First Circuit remanded the case for further consideration; mandate issued on November 25, 2025, enjoining the Administration from enforcing the E.O. The government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court on January 30, 2026, that remains pending as of the date of this Legal Sidebar.\n\nNew Jersey v. Trump\nU.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts\nThe district court consolidated this case with Doe v. Trump, and granted a nationwide injunction, finding that a nationwide injunction was necessary to prevent state plaintiffs \u201cfrom suffering irreparable harm\u201d; on July 25, 2025, the district court declined to narrow the previously-granted injunction after the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in Trump v. CASA, Inc., finding that a \u201cnarrower option\u201d would not \u201cfeasibly and adequately protect the plaintiffs from the injuries they have shown they are likely to suffer\u201d; on October 3, 2025, the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court\u2019s grant of a preliminary injunction.\nThe First Circuit remanded the case for further consideration; mandate issued on November 25, 2025, enjoining the Administration from enforcing the E.O. The government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court on January 30, 2026, that remains pending as of the date of this Legal Sidebar.\n\nCASA, Inc. v. Trump\nU.S. District Court for the District of Maryland\nOn August 7, 2025, the district court granted class certification (i.e., \u201cany child who has been born or will be born in the United States after February 19, 2025\u201d and who would otherwise meet the categories set forth in the E.O.) and granted a class-wide preliminary injunction. The court found that plaintiffs \u201cwere extremely likely to succeed on their claim that the Executive Order violates the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d\nThe government filed an appeal of the district court\u2019s decision to the Fourth Circuit. On December 9, 2025, the court granted the government\u2019s motion to hold the case in abeyance pending a decision by the Supreme Court in Trump v. Barbara. \n\nSource: Congressional Research Service.\n\n", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11414/LSB11414.2.pdf", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11414.html"]], "columns": ["id", "title", "publish_date", "update_date", "status", "content_type", "authors", "topics", "summary", "pdf_url", "html_url"], "primary_keys": ["id"], "primary_key_values": ["LSB11414"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.4013060824945569, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}