id,title,publish_date,update_date,status,content_type,authors,topics,summary,pdf_url,html_url
R48072,Kenya: Current Issues and U.S. Relations,2026-03-06T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T06:38:01Z,Active,Reports,Lauren Ploch Blanchard,Sub-Saharan Africa,"Longstanding U.S. ties with Kenya have deepened over the past decade, as successive U.S. administrations have viewed the country as a strategic partner in Africa. Former President Joe Biden hosted Kenya’s President William Ruto for a state visit in 2024, and he designated Kenya as the United States’ first Major Non-NATO Ally in Sub-Saharan Africa, a designation that conveys defense trade and security cooperation benefits. Ruto was the first African leader to be invited by a U.S. president for a state visit since 2008. The Trump Administration has similarly appeared to value the bilateral relationship with Kenya, describing the country as one of the United States’ strongest partners in the region.
Kenya became an important U.S. counterterrorism partner in Africa in the aftermath of Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2011, the country launched military operations in neighboring Somalia against the regional Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Shabaab, and subsequently joined the UN-authorized African Union stabilization mission there. Al Shabaab launched attacks against soft targets frequented by foreigners, including U.S. citizens, in Kenya’s capital, raising the group’s international profile. In 2020, Al Shabaab killed a U.S. servicemember and two U.S. contactors in an attack on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan base used by the U.S. military near the Somali border. Al Shabaab, which U.S. officials now describe as Al Qaeda’s largest and wealthiest affiliate, continues to pose a threat in Kenya and the broader region, and Kenya hosts an expanding U.S. military presence at Manda Bay that supports regional counterterrorism efforts.
The 2024 state visit highlighted Kenya’s importance to the United States not only as a diplomatic and security partner in East Africa, but as an African counterpart on shared global priorities. Kenya participated in Operation Prosperity Guardian, a maritime taskforce launched by the United States in response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and it has been one of the only African members of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Kenya’s 2024 deployment, with U.S. support, to lead the Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti, further elevated U.S.-Kenya ties, despite outstanding questions about the country’s human rights trajectory. 
Kenya is often characterized as a comparatively stable and democratic anchor state in a troubled region. Political unrest has threatened its stability several times, however, most recently in 2024, when a protest movement led by young Kenyans and a violent state response spurred a political crisis. Facing a heavy debt burden and the threat of default, President Ruto tried to raise taxes that year, which fanned public anger amid rising costs of living. When legislators passed the tax bill while tens of thousands were in the streets protesting, some demonstrators stormed the parliament. Dozens were killed in the police response to the protests, and over a thousand people were arrested. The nationwide protests highlighted public frustration not only with economic hardships, but with public sector corruption and a perceived lack of accountability. The public display of discontent was an unprecedented challenge for the government, and Ruto ultimately reversed the tax bill, reshuffled his cabinet, and brought several opposition politicians into his government to defuse tensions. Scores of government critics were abducted or killed in the aftermath of the protests, and a series of forcible extraditions of foreign dissidents from Kenya prompted accusations that the government was enabling transnational repression. Ruto has faced calls for his ouster and allegations, including from former allies, of corruption, but his alliance with elements of the opposition co-opted some of his most vocal critics. With the opposition divided, President Ruto is, by some accounts, favored to win re-election in 2027.
Kenya hosts one of the largest U.S. embassies in Africa, routinely receives senior U.S. officials for visits, and is a frequent destination for congressional travel. It has been a leading beneficiary of tariff benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; P.L. 106-200, as amended), which Congress has extended through the end of 2026. Under the first Trump Administration, the United States and Kenya launched negotiations on a free trade agreement—it would have been the first in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Biden Administration did not continue those talks, instead launching a Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP). Kenya, which has faced a 10% tariff under President Trump’s tariff policy, has engaged the Trump Administration in talks aimed at reaching a new bilateral trade arrangement.
The Trump Administration has maintained a warm relationship with Kenya, despite the tariff issue. Administration officials have described the country as a “longstanding American ally” and emphasized U.S. appreciation for Kenya’s deployment to Haiti and leadership on regional peace and security issues. The country, which has regularly ranked among the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid globally, has been affected by the Administration’s foreign aid cuts, which have spurred congressional debate and legal action. In late 2025, Kenya became the first country to sign a bilateral agreement with the Trump Administration on global health cooperation. Under the five-year deal, which faces a court challenge in Kenya, the country is expected to gradually assume greater financial responsibility as U.S. assistance for health programs in the country declines.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48072/R48072.17.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48072.html
IN12665,U.S. Military Operations Against Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Programs,2026-03-06T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:53:57Z,Active,Posts,"Paul K. Kerr, Daniel M. Gettinger","Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons, Iran, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Middle East & North Africa, Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces, Aviation, Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation","On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran. The same day, President Donald J. Trump listed among the operation’s objectives preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, destroying Iran’s missiles, and “[razing] their missile industry to the ground.” Some Members of Congress have questioned the U.S. military operations in Iran given President Trump’s previous comments that, as a result of the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli strikes, “Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.” Other Members have supported the President’s action, citing Iran’s efforts to reconstitute its nuclear program and its ballistic missile capabilities.
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Drone Programs 
Iran has developed ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and space-launch vehicles, as well as drones (i.e., unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS). Iran’s ballistic missile inventory has included short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, the largest of which have an estimated range of approximately 2,000 kilometers (1,864 miles), according to a 2020 U.S. government estimate. Iran has also mass-produced the Shahed-136, a long-range one-way attack drone, and has provided these drones to Russia for use in its war in Ukraine. The 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment stated, “Iran has fielded a large quantity of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as [UAS] that can strike throughout the region and continues efforts to improve their accuracy, lethality, and reliability.” 
Since February 28, U.S. and Israeli aircraft have targeted bases and equipment associated with Iran’s ballistic missile program, including missiles Iran may have stored in underground facilities. The effect of the strikes on Iran’s inventory of ballistic missiles and production capacity is unclear. Following the Israeli and U.S. attacks, Iran has reportedly conducted ballistic missile and drone strikes on U.S. and partner military and civilian sites in several countries. 
The size of Iran’s ballistic missile inventory is uncertain. A 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency report described the inventory as “substantial.” In 2022, then-U.S. Central Command Commander General Kenneth McKenzie testified Iran had an inventory of “over 3,000 ballistic missiles of various types.” A 2026 article reported Iran’s inventory at more than 2,000 medium-range ballistic missiles.
Israeli and U.S. officials have stated varying estimates of Iran’s ballistic missile production capacity. On March 1, the Israeli military estimated Iran was producing “dozens of ballistic missiles per month.” On March 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Iran had been producing “over 100” such missiles a month. U.S. officials reportedly said, prior to June 2025, Iran was producing 50 missiles per month. 
Iran’s ballistic missiles were also the target of Israeli airstrikes during the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli operation. Iran may have made efforts to rebuild its missile inventory. An October 2025 media report, citing European intelligence sources, stated Iran accepted shipments of chemical precursors for solid rocket motor propellant. In November 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned entities and individuals associated with the “procurement of ballistic missile propellant ingredients” on behalf of Iran. 
Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran for decades has maintained a uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment can produce both low-enriched uranium, which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Tehran asserts its enrichment program is only meant to produce fuel for peaceful nuclear applications.
Whether the U.S.-Israeli strikes since February 28 have affected Iran’s nuclear facilities is unclear. On March 4, based on analysis of satellite imagery, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported “no damage to facilities containing nuclear material in Iran,” but some damage “at entrances” to Iran’s largest enrichment facility. The IAEA, which implements safeguards on Iran’s nuclear facilities because the government is a state party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, withdrew inspectors from Iran in June 2025 after U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, including those associated with Tehran’s enrichment program.
The extent to which those strikes impacted Iran’s enrichment program is unclear. The IAEA has not been able to inspect the attacked Iranian nuclear facilities. U.S. government reports have provided differing assessments of the June strikes’ impacts. According to the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, the strikes “significantly degraded” Iran’s nuclear program, while the 2026 National Defense Strategy stated the strikes “obliterated” the program.” 
The U.S. intelligence community has for years assessed that Iran could have the capability to produce nuclear weapons at some point, but also that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and had not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. U.S. intelligence has also consistently assessed that Tehran has not reauthorized the development of nuclear weapons.
Constraints imposed on Iran’s nuclear program required by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action addressed concerns about the speed with which Iran could produce sufficient amount of fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Under these constraints, Tehran would have needed one year to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. In May 2025, the Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that Iran then would have needed “probably less than one week” to produce that amount of fissile material. In November 2025, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said Iran was not enriching uranium. On March 2, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano stated the agency had no evidence of “a structured [Iranian] program to manufacture nuclear weapons.”
Considerations for Congress
Congress may consider assessing the status and scope of existing reporting requirements on Iran, including of Section 1245 of P.L. 111-84 (10 U.S.C. §113 note), which directed the Secretary of Defense (who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025) to submit to Congress an “annual report on the military power of Iran.” Congress has modified this requirement, including by directing the Secretary to provide additional information about Iran’s nuclear and drone programs (P.L. 119-60, §1222(b)(4)). Congress may consult that report to determine whether or not it should include additional information. Congress may consider directing the Pentagon to publish an unclassified, public version of the report. Members could ask questions concerning the above topics during threat assessment hearings.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12665/IN12665.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12665.html
IF13174,The Stablecoin Yield Debate,2026-03-06T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:54:20Z,Active,Resources,"Paul Tierno, Marc Labonte",,"In July 2025, Congress passed the GENIUS Act (P.L. 119-27) establishing a regulatory framework for payment stablecoins. These digital assets use the same technology as cryptocurrencies but are backed by assets and their value, unlike that of cryptocurrencies, is intended to be stable against the dollar. Among the requirements established in GENIUS is a restriction on stablecoin issuers paying interest or yield or rewards (hereinafter, yield) to stablecoin holders. Crypto exchanges’ and banks’ opposing views on the yield restrictions has reportedly stalled crypto market structure legislation in the Senate. 
The GENIUS Yield Restriction
Section 4 of GENIUS states that “[n]o permitted payment stablecoin issuer ... shall pay the holder of any payment stablecoin any form of interest or yield (whether in cash, tokens, or other consideration) solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention of such payment stablecoin.” 
While this appears to create a blanket prohibition on interest, the restriction may not apply to the current market practice for issuing and holding stablecoins involving exchanges (the “three-party model” shown in Figure 1). Most stablecoin issuers—those companies that create stablecoins, and to whom most of GENIUS applies—only sell stablecoins to exchanges and larger market participants. Much retail use of stablecoins currently occurs through an intermediary—usually a cryptocurrency exchange. The exchange holds the stablecoin in custody—on the blockchain—on behalf of the retail investor; the issuer passes interest on reserves to the exchange, which it uses to pay the investor yield. GENIUS does not explicitly prevent exchanges from paying rewards on stablecoins held on their exchange (which can be structured to be effectively equivalent to yield)—and many do. According to a regulatory filing, Circle, the issuer of the USDC stablecoin (the second largest stablecoin), pays a portion of the interest it earns on its reserves to Coinbase, the largest U.S.-based crypto exchange, proportionate to the stablecoins held on that platform. Also, some issuers reportedly pay exchanges a marketing budget to use at their discretion, which can presumably be passed on to holders of specific stablecoins. Therefore, while the issuer may not be paying the holder directly, they are supplying the funding that is simply passed through the exchange. 
The GENIUS Act did not define the term “holder,” so it remains to be seen whether the yield ban will be applied to the intermediary that bought and custodies the coin or the investor that owns the coin in the three-party model. Should rulemaking or a future court case define the term holder to include an exchange (as some have argued) or find the status quo in violation of the yield ban, this could limit issuers’ ability to pay yield. If the prohibition is deemed to not apply to the three-party model, Congress could consider a blanket ban on yield to close this perceived “loophole.” However, exchanges also pay investors yield to lend out their holdings, for example. This type of yield could potentially be caught up in a blanket ban. Although this arrangement also raises policy issues, it has not been the focus of legislative proposals.    
Figure 1. Two Ways Stablecoin Yield Can Be Paid
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Source: CRS
An issuer could also provide stablecoins directly to retail customers. This “two-party model” in Figure 1 may be more likely in situations where issuers—such as banks, who are explicitly permitted to issue stablecoins by GENIUS—already have an infrastructure for retail users. In this situation, the issuer is prohibited from paying interest. (Alternatively, banks might decide to create a consortium, such as a clearinghouse, to manage settlement that reproduces a three-party model eligible to pay interest.) The current restriction on yield would presumably apply when a customer self-custodies the stablecoin. 
Stablecoins and Deposits
Payment stablecoins are intended to facilitate retail payments, but they can also potentially be held as relatively liquid and nonvolatile assets to store wealth. That makes them a potential substitute for bank deposits that could reduce banks’ deposit base as the stablecoin market grows. According to one model, demand for stablecoins would rise significantly with yield, increasing their appeal as a store of value. Prevailing interest rates will affect the relevance of yield and the growth of the stablecoin market. 
The banking industry claims the ability to pay interest on stablecoins could result in a significant drain of bank deposits. Research from a Treasury Department advisory council identified U.S. transactional deposits (a $6.6 trillion market) as “at risk” from stablecoins (with around $281 billion outstanding in March 2026). Citigroup research estimates stablecoins outstanding will grow to $0.5-3.7 trillion by 2030, displacing bank deposits equal to $182-908 billion. Banks favor the strict prohibition on paying interest on stablecoins and have argued to close the “loophole” in GENIUS. The crypto industry views bank opposition to yield as anticompetitive behavior by an entrenched incumbent—bank deposits may pay interest—to thwart entry by a potential competitor. Banks argue that stablecoins could benefit from regulatory arbitrage, since issuers are subject to less complex, costly, and far-reaching regulatory requirements than banks. However, issuers are permitted to engage in far more limited activities than banks and play a more limited role in the financial system. 
Deposits and stablecoins are not perfect substitutes, however. Some uses of stablecoins, such as illicit activity, foreign remittances, and a store of wealth for foreigners, are not likely to cause substitution with U.S. deposits. Tokenized deposits and tokenized money market funds may serve as better blockchain substitutes than stablecoins.
Were consumers to substitute stablecoins for deposits on a large scale, it might have negative implications for the cost and supply of credit to U.S. businesses and consumers since banks rely on deposits as a stable and inexpensive way to fund their loans and other activities. By contrast, GENIUS Act limitations on permissible reserves prohibit stablecoin issuers from financing private credit. One study estimated stablecoins could reduce bank lending by $65 billion to $1.26 trillion. The effect on credit would occur even if customers shifted to bank-issued stablecoins, as the lending prohibition would still apply.
The effect of stablecoin adoption on bank funding is not clear cut, however. Even if stablecoins do not directly provide credit, funds are fungible across financial markets. For example, stablecoin issuers are allowed to hold reserves in the form of bank deposits. If issuers held 100% of their reserves in deposits, there would be no decrease in the overall deposit base when consumers shifted from deposits to stablecoins, just a shift in who held deposits—although the share that is insured and the distribution of deposits across banks would likely change. (The share of reserves held as bank deposits currently vary significantly by issuer, from less than 2% to 100%, but may increase due to GENIUS limitations on permissible reserves.) Even some other permissible types of stablecoin reserves, such as repo funding, can be accessed by banks (although less attractive than deposits). Banks could respond to competition from stablecoins (indirectly) paying yield by raising the interest rates that they pay to depositors. This would benefit depositors and could prevent an erosion of the deposit base, but would still raise banks’ cost of funding, with negative implications for the cost of bank credit. 
Overall, there are costs and benefits to prohibiting stablecoin yield. It makes stablecoin investors immediately worse off, as the money that would be paid out to them is instead retained (likely as profit) by the issuer. However, if depositors shift to stablecoins, their savings are no longer federally insured up to the insurance limit—a risk exposure that some consumers may not be aware they are bearing. In addition, stablecoins also potentially pose systemic risk, which would presumably increase as their use in payments increases. Stablecoins are inherently prone to run risk because of their fixed value. Since stablecoins do not have federal guarantees or Federal Reserve discount window access, policymakers might be tempted to provide ad hoc government bailouts—as they did to prevent money market fund runs in 2008 and 2020—to restore financial stability following a run. A belief that stablecoins will be bailed out may lead to a greater migration from deposits to stablecoins. By banning yield, the stablecoin market will grow more slowly and bank funding will be more stable, potentially limiting improvements to retail payments as well as reducing systemic risk. The GENIUS Act included provisions to protect consumers and mitigate systemic risk, but those provisions do not entirely eliminate those risks, and the effectiveness of stablecoin regulation—notably, state regulation—is untested.
Congressional Developments
Restrictions on yield were omitted, added, and then weakened as the GENIUS Act moved through the legislative process. Following bank opposition to the enacted version’s perceived “loophole,” a Senate Banking Committee’s crypto market structure draft in January included a provision strengthening the restriction. This provision would have prohibited exchanges from paying yield on holdings—effectively altering the status quo preserved in GENIUS—but permitted them to pay rewards on transactions using stablecoins. On January 14, Coinbase  pulled support for the bill in part over the provision, furthering the appearance that the two industries’ views are irreconcilable. On the same day, a scheduled markup of the draft was indefinitely postponed, and the status of the legislation remains unclear, as further negotiations have not yielded a compromise. (The House-passed market-structure bill, H.R. 3633, does not have a stablecoin yield provision.)
The relationship between crypto and traditional finance is one of the key policy issues in the ongoing market structure legislative debate. The disagreement over yield may prove to be a bellwether for how that debate will evolve, with Congress repeatedly asked to resolve frictions between new and existing industry participants, with consequences for how markets evolve and are regulated. Such conflicts are a timeless theme in financial regulation—for example, the yield debate has parallels to bank opposition to money market funds as a substitute for deposits in the 1970s.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13174/IF13174.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13174.html
IF13173,Federal Management of Tribal Trust Funds: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress,2026-03-06T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:53:58Z,Active,Resources,Mariel J. Murray,,"Congress has enacted various laws to fulfill the federal trust responsibility, a legal obligation under which the United States—through treaties, acts of Congress, and court decisions—“has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust” toward federally recognized Tribes (Tribes) and individual tribal members. Over the years, this relationship has been interpreted to include a fiduciary duty to manage tribal trust assets. Tribal trust assets include lands, natural resources, funds, and other assets held in trust for Tribes and individual tribal members. Congress delegated performance of the fiduciary duty to manage tribal and individual trust funds primarily to the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Department of the Treasury. 
Tribal Trust Funds
Tribal trust funds, the federal management of which began in the 1800s, comprise four main sources of funding:
Treaty Payments. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the federal government entered into many treaties with Tribes, whereby Tribes often ceded their homelands in exchange for compensation. In 1820, the federal government adopted a policy of holding treaty payments in trust unless and until it distributed the funds. In 1837, Congress codified this policy and required the Secretary of the Interior to deposit these treaty payments into “special accounts” (i.e., tribal trust fund accounts) in the Treasury. 
Investment Income. Since 1837, Congress has required tribal trust funds to be invested in specific ways to generate interest income. 
Revenue from Tribal Lands. Since 1883, Congress has required the deposit in tribal trust funds of revenue from the lease and sale of products from the approximately 56 million acres of tribal trust lands as well as restricted fee lands, where the Tribe owns the land but the land may not be alienated or encumbered (e.g., sold, gifted, leased) without federal approval.
Judgment Funds. These funds are awarded pursuant to a judgment or legal settlement, such as those reached before the former Indian Claims Commission.
Individual Indian Money Accounts
In 1887, the General Allotment Act (24 Stat. 388) extended the federal fiduciary duty to individual tribal members. Pursuant to that act, the government divided tribal lands into individual parcels of 40 acres to 160 acres (trust or restricted fee allotments). Similarly, the 1906 Alaska Native Allotment Act permitted individual Alaska Natives to acquire up to 160 acres of land. Individual trust fund accounts (Individual Indian Money [IIM] accounts) were to be set up for every tribal member with an allotment. Like tribal trust fund accounts, these accounts receive investment income. There are now four main types of IIM accounts:
Land-based accounts contain revenues from the lease and sale of products from allotments.
Special deposit accounts are temporary accounts that hold funds that could not be immediately credited to the IIM account holder.
Judgment accounts contain funds from tribal distributions of litigation awards and settlements. 
Per capita accounts contain revenue the Tribe earned on its activities that is divided among tribal members as a per capita payment.
Federal Mismanagement of Tribal Trust Funds and IIM Accounts
Throughout the 20th century, DOI’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Department of the Treasury attempted to carry out fiduciary duties in managing tribal trust funds and IIM accounts. For example, BIA was responsible for depositing funds and keeping accurate financial records. Treasury held and invested funds at DOI’s direction and provided accounting and financial management services. Concerns were raised periodically about federal mismanagement, including BIA’s accounting systems.
Congress became concerned with federal mismanagement of tribal trust funds and IIM accounts in the late 1980s and began holding oversight hearings. Around the same time, DOI’s Office of Inspector General, the Office of Management and Budget, and others reported BIA mismanagement of these funds and accounts and proposed reforms. In 1992, Congress summarized its findings in a report criticizing DOI for being slow to implement reforms.
In 1994, Congress enacted the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act (Reform Act). The act required the Secretary of the Interior to properly discharge federal trust responsibilities, delineating those responsibilities as including (1) providing adequate accounting for trust fund balances, receipts, and disbursements; (2) providing periodic account statements; (3) providing “adequate staffing, supervision, and training” for trust fund management; and (4) establishing “consistent, written policies and procedures for trust fund management.” The Reform Act also established the Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians (OST) within DOI to improve tribal trust asset accountability and management. The Reform Act directed OST to submit a strategic plan outlining reforms and, once the reforms were implemented, to propose terminating the office.
Meanwhile, DOI continued to be sued for mismanaging accounts. For instance, in 1996, a class of 300,000 IIM account holders sued DOI and Treasury, claiming they had failed to collect and disburse trust land revenues. In 2010, Congress settled this case, Cobell v. Salazar. 
The Bureau of Trust Funds Administration
Following the Reform Act and Cobell settlement, DOI began to make changes to funds administration. In 1996, DOI formally established OST. In 1997, DOI submitted to Congress a strategic plan for trust reform, which included clearing probate backlogs, improving records management, planning the workforce, and establishing internal controls. Among other actions, in the early 2000s, DOI issued a set of principles to guide trust asset management, and OST began to use the Trust Funds Accounting System, an automated accounting and investment data system. In 2013, the Secretarial Commission on Indian Trust Administration and Reform (Commission) submitted a report to Congress.
In 2020, DOI established the Bureau of Trust Funds Administration (BTFA) to take over OST functions. DOI asserted that this change would ensure continuity of operations when OST closed (per the Reform Act). From FY2021 to FY2023, many in Congress expressed skepticism that this change aligned with the Reform Act and continued to fund OST. In FY2024, Congress accepted DOI’s change and funded BTFA.
As of 2026, BTFA manages more than $8.8 billion, of which approximately $7.2 billion is held in 4,300 tribal trust fund accounts and approximately $1.6 billion is held in 411,000 IIM accounts. 
Selected Issues for Congress
Federal Management and Coordination. Since BTFA is relatively new, and given the concerns expressed about a history of mismanagement, Congress may wish to conduct oversight of the agency. Congress also may evaluate whether six other DOI bureaus that provide trust-related administration (e.g., managing oil and gas revenues) are fulfilling their duties. In 2013, the Commission recommended that DOI create a customer service call center for all trust administration agencies and that Congress establish an “Indian Trust Administration Commission” within DOI to improve coordination and mitigate tribal concerns about conflicting bureau priorities. The Indian Trust Asset Reform Act of 2016 authorized DOI to establish an Under Secretary for Indian Affairs to help with coordination. In 2023, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that DOI clarify OST/BTFA and BIA roles and responsibilities, but this has not yet been completed. 
Nonfederal Management. Whether the federal government or a nonfederal entity should manage tribal trust funds is a recurring issue. Congress has increasingly supported tribal self-determination—that is, a Tribe’s ability to manage its own affairs—and could expand that policy to tribal trust fund administration. For example, the Reform Act allowed Tribes to submit a plan to DOI to directly manage tribal funds held in trust. Alternatively, Congress could transfer some or all responsibility for tribal trust fund or IIM account management to private entities, such as commercial banks. The Commission has urged consideration of whether privatization would deliver “efficient provision of trust services; fairness in providing those services to all eligible constituents; ... and improved quality of life for trust beneficiaries.”
Individual Customer Service. Whether BTFA adequately services individual tribal members with IIM accounts is another issue. In recent years, BTFA has tried to improve customer service. For example, per a 2021 executive order, BTFA committed to providing online account access by 2025; as of 2026, account holders still lack online account access and must call the Trust Beneficiary Call Center or contact BTFA field staff. 
This lack of online access can delay service to IIM account holders and lead to high demands on BTFA staff. In 2025, BTFA estimated that field staff respond to 150,000 beneficiary calls and in-person contacts annually, an average of 500 beneficiary interactions per workday. Furthermore, DOI has reported that staffing and workload issues “continue to be challenges” as the demand for beneficiary services increases. For this reason, in 2023, GAO recommended that DOI develop a strategic workforce plan. BTFA has not yet completed this plan. 
Funding. Whether and how much to fund DOI’s trust administration agencies is a perennial issue. Congress provided about $100 million to BTFA in FY2024 and maintained that funding level in FY2025 and FY2026. The Reform Act required the Special Trustee to develop a consolidated Trust Management program budget for all trust administration agencies for each fiscal year, but it is unclear whether this program budget was developed. Tribal leaders have asked for an independent entity to evaluate the adequacy of the federal budget for trust management.
Fractionation. Congress may continue to debate fractionation and associated federal costs. Individual tribal interests in allotments are often split, or fractionated, over generations as allotments divide among heirs. Fractionated interests make it difficult for owners to manage, use, or transfer land. BTFA also faces difficulties investing and distributing funds to thousands of fractional interest owners who often are receiving small amounts. The value of these accounts may be less than the cost of their administration. Reducing fractionation may decrease BTFA’s administrative costs and enable closure of some accounts. At the same time, limiting fractionation may impair tribal members’ ability to receive interests in allotments.
Congress has used different strategies to address these issues. For example, the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 established rules to limit fractionation during the probate process for allotments whose owner dies intestate (i.e., without a will). Additionally, appropriations laws for several years have stated that DOI is not required to provide a quarterly performance statement for IIM accounts that have not had activity for at least 15 months and hold $15 or less. GAO and others also have suggested alternatives, such as charging maintenance fees or liquidating small accounts, much like commercial banks.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13173/IF13173.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13173.html
IF13172,Iranian Kurds and Possible Support,2026-03-06T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T06:23:58Z,Active,Resources,"Jim Zanotti, Clayton Thomas, Christopher M. Blanchard","Iran, Middle East & North Africa, Security Assistance, Security Cooperation & Arms Exports","Following U.S. and Israeli military operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran that commenced on February 28, 2026, press reports citing unnamed sources have stated that the Trump Administration may be considering possible efforts to provide material support to Iranian Kurdish groups to further weaken Iran’s regime. President Donald Trump has said he would embrace action by Iranian Kurds, but the Administration to date has not confirmed any U.S. support. Any such U.S. or Israeli support for Iranian Kurds, if confirmed, could form part of a broader campaign to decentralize and/or systemically change Iran’s political structure. A number of Iranian Kurdish groups actively oppose the Iranian regime, including some based in the neighboring Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Iranian state repression and economic marginalization appear to have prevented Iranian Kurds from mounting serious resistance to the Islamic Republic to date. Congress may seek clarity from Administration officials about any possible efforts, and evaluate potential plans, costs, benefits, and outcomes. 
Reportedly, U.S. and Israeli strikes have targeted Iranian military and intelligence facilities in Kurdish areas of northwest Iran (known in Kurdish as Rojhelat). Apparent Iranian attacks have struck some locations associated with Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the KRI. Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government and the national government of Iraq have both issued statements denying their involvement with or support of any potential cross-border incursion by KRI-based Iranian Kurds. 
Figure 1. Kurds in the Middle East
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Source: CRS, based on open source material from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Washington Post.
Attempts to weaken or overthrow a foreign government via support to a geographically peripheral group that differs ethnically or religiously from the regime’s leading figures may find points of comparison and contrast with: 
Afghanistan and the 2001 defeat of the Sunni Islamist, ethnic Pashtun-dominated Taliban regime by the Northern Alliance (led mainly by a Sunni-Shia mix of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras), with U.S. and allied air and special operations forces support. The Taliban returned to power in 2021 after an insurgency.
Syria and efforts after 2011 by the United States and other Western countries, Turkey, and Arab Gulf states to support various groups in Syria, whether against Bashar Al Asad’s Alawite-led regime or against the Islamic State (IS, alt. ISIS) organization. A Turkey-backed Syrian Sunni Islamist group deposed Asad in 2024, and has clashed since 2025 with Kurds who were U.S. anti-IS partners, as well as Alawites and Druze.
Unseating or irreversibly weakening the Islamic Republic could prove to be a formidable task. The Islamic Republic has survived external and internal challenges for 47 years. It has had access to the proceeds of vast hydrocarbon resources; it developed and frequently used a repressive apparatus; its security personnel have demonstrated acumen for advanced technology and cybersecurity; and the regime has dispersed institutional strength and patronage throughout Iran’s large and diverse geography and population (see Figure 2) via political, economic, military, and religious networks. Moreover, popular support for Iran’s territorial cohesion and opposition to ethnic separatism appears to extend beyond regime supporters. 
Figure 2. Iran: “Ethnoreligious Distribution”
/
Source: U.S. government map 788033AI (G00987), October 2009. 
The outcome of any possible efforts to work with Iranian Kurdish groups could depend on several factors, including (1) the groups’ capabilities, cohesion, and abilities to gain support within Iran; (2) the type of assistance, training, or direct military support provided, including with ground operations, continuing airstrikes, or establishing “no-fly zones”; (3) regime forces’ ability to maintain control in urban centers and beyond; and (4) whether an uprising by Iranian Kurds (often estimated at close to 10% of Iran’s population of over 90 million) on Iran’s mountainous western periphery would foster or dampen opposition to the regime in key Iranian cities dominated by Shia Persians and Azeris. Around 60% of Iran’s Kurds are reportedly Sunni.
Since the early 20th century, Iranians have resisted several efforts by outside powers (including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) to dictate or influence domestic leadership and governance. Key Iranian actors may weigh the widespread domestic political and socioeconomic grievances against the regime (apparent in 2025-2026 nationwide protests) alongside concerns that an armed uprising could foment instability similar to that in some other regional states over the past two decades. Some may also oppose the prospect that minorities backed by foreign actors could play an outsized role in shaping their country’s future.
Kurds in Iran and Elsewhere: Some Historical Context for U.S. Relations
1920s-1930s
Separatist efforts by Iranian Kurdish tribes after World War I thwarted by Reza Shah Pahlavi, who sought to disarm Kurdish groups and suppress Kurdish identity (and whose son was the Shah overthrown in 1979).

1946
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) established 11-month Mahabad Republic under Soviet protection after World War II, until Iranian government forces regained control of the area.

1960s-1970s
Israel, Iran, and the United States supported Iraqi Kurdish rebels against Iraqi government forces until a 1975 Iran-Iraq agreement, beginning a longtime association between Israel and Kurds in the region.

1979-1984
Iranian Kurdish groups sporadically controlled parts of western Iran amid fighting with the new Islamic Republic; government forces eventually prevailed.

1991
Iraqi forces killed thousands in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq after U.S. officials encouraged uprisings in the wake of the Gulf War; U.S. military operations and “no-fly zones” later stopped Iraqi forces from regaining control of these areas, leading to de facto autonomy and, later, a federal arrangement after 2003.

1997
United States designated the Turkish-origin Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, which also has a presence in Syria, Iraq, and Iran) as a foreign terrorist organization.

2014
United States began assisting Iraqi and Syrian Kurds to counter the Islamic State organization; Turkey opposed U.S. assistance for PKK-linked Syrian Kurds.

2023
Iraq agreed with Iran to close bases of Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraq near the border area, although various groups reportedly remain in the KRI.

2025
PKK announced its dissolution amid negotiations with Turkey, pending future implementation.

2026
Regime forces in post-Asad Syria compelled an end to Syrian Kurds’ rule over much of northeast Syria, effectively ending their anti-IS efforts with U.S. forces.

Iranian Kurdish Groups
Since February 2026, in the aftermath of a government crackdown on nationwide protests in Iran, the following Iranian Kurdish groups have joined a Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, with a stated aim to work with other opposition groups to overthrow the Islamic Republic. 
Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). Founded in 2004, the PJAK (designated in 2009 by the Treasury Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for being a PKK offshoot) reportedly has been active against Islamic Republic forces, perhaps accounting for some 70% of the Kurdish attacks on the Iranian regime since 2014.
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI). Formed in 1945, the socialist-oriented PDKI has helped lead past insurgencies in Iran, and it may have already carried out attacks against Iran’s regime in March 2026.
Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). The PAK, founded in 1991, fought alongside Iraqi Kurdish forces against the Islamic State, and reportedly attacked Iranian security forces in early 2026 amid anti-government protests.
Khabat Organization. Formed in 1980, Khabat also fought the Islamic State.
Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan and Komala – Reform Faction. Two of the three main branches of the socialist Komala Party, which was founded in 1969.
One source posits that KRI-based Iranian Kurdish factions, taken together, have around 2,500 fighters. Another asserts that the groups may have sent hundreds into Iran in recent weeks.
Issues for Congress
Strategy and political-military plans, authorizations, and appropriations. Members may seek information, conduct fact-finding, and consult with the Administration on U.S. goals and plans. They may assess how possible support for or partnership with Kurdish groups might affect U.S. interests and regional security. Members may examine questions related to (1) protecting any U.S. or partner forces; (2) formulating logistical and supply arrangements; (3) considering the effects on U.S. partners in Iraq and Turkey; (4) coordinating with other Iranian substate actors who may have differing views on mobilizing minorities in Iran; (5) preparing for tactics (including insurgency) that may be employed by regime elements; and (6) avoiding, preventing, or responding to human rights violations. 
Congress could mandate, permit, condition, or prohibit U.S. military or intelligence support, as well as equipment and funding for—and vetting and training of—partner forces. Tools available to Congress include authorizations of military force, and authorizations and appropriations of aid.
Effects on regional actors. Possible efforts to partner with Iranian Kurds could result in prolonged U.S.-Israel-Iran military action in KRI areas with potential security, political, and economic consequences for Iraq. Potential U.S.-Israel support for the PJAK, owing to its PKK ties, could have implications for Turkey and Syria. Iranian retaliation would have implications for Arab Gulf states.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13172/IF13172.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13172.html
IF12976,1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty: Issues in the 119th Congress,2026-03-06T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:54:08Z,Active,Resources,"Nicole T. Carter, Elena H. Humphreys, Charles V. Stern, Nicole T. Carter","Water Quality, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, Water Resource Management","A water treaty from 1944—the Treaty on Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 Water Treaty)—between the United States and Mexico and other binational agreements guide how the two governments share flows of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers. The 1944 Water Treaty states that the countries agree to give preferential attention to solving all border sanitation problems (e.g., flows of raw sewage and industrial wastewater in the Tijuana River Valley [TRV]). The binational International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), which was established in 1944 pursuant to the treaty and administers agreements on river flows and sanitation issues, is the principal venue for addressing related disputes between the United States and Mexico. The IBWC develops rules and proposed decisions, called minutes, on treaty execution and interpretation. Congressional considerations during the 119th Congress may include executive branch actions on U.S.-Mexico water matters and their role and effect on U.S.-Mexico cooperation, congressional responses to these actions and actions by Mexico, and forthcoming recommendations on addressing water management and sanitation issues.
Rio Grande
The 1944 Water Treaty addresses the Rio Grande basin below Fort Quitman, TX. Among other things, it establishes that the United States has a right to flows from tributaries that feed the Rio Grande in the United States and one-third of specified Mexican tributaries flows, which must average at least 0.35 million acre-feet (MAF) per year, measured in five-year cycles (1.75 MAF total). It also provides for the construction of international storage dams on the Rio Grande. Among other infrastructure, IBWC operates two international Rio Grande dams and their reservoirs. On multiple occasions since 1994, Mexico has not met its Rio Grande delivery obligations for a cycle. As of late October 2025, at the end of the previous five-year cycle, Mexico had delivered 0.88 MAF, according to IBWC. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75, Division F, Section 7045(h)(1)), conditioned some funds provided therein on the Secretary of State certifying Mexico’s delivery of Rio Grande water “owed” to the United States, as prescribed in the Treaty. In February 2026, the U.S. Department of State announced that Mexico had committed to make annual deliveries of at least 0.35 MAF and to develop a plan to address the 2020-2025 cycle’s shortfall. 
Mexico not meeting five-year cycle delivery requirements, and the consequences for the Texas economy, has led some U.S. stakeholders to support mechanisms to achieve more reliable and predictable water deliveries. Although Mexico’s internal water management influences deliveries, stakeholders have identified various other factors that may contribute to delivery shortfalls under recent cycles, including drought conditions in portions of Mexico’s Rio Grande Basin and weather and climate patterns. In 2022, the U.S. section of the IBWC commissioned a study on the challenges to improving reliability and predictability of water deliveries and stakeholders’ proposed solutions, resulting in the December 2022 white paper—The Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Water Deliveries Under the 1944 Treaty: A Compendium of Ideas. It identified the following among proposals for expanding water supplies: salinity improvements and desalination; conservation (e.g., canal lining, aqueduct construction); and “storage projects, both small and large, in Texas and in Mexico.” 
Colorado River
U.S. delivery of Colorado River basin waters to Mexico is part of a broader allocation of basin waters pursuant to the Colorado River Compact, a seven-state agreement signed in 1923 that apportioned 7.5 MAF annually to both the Upper and Lower Colorado River basins in the United States and delineates how additional waters are to be sent to Mexico pursuant to a subsequent treaty. In the 1944 Water Treaty, the United States agreed to deliver to Mexico 1.5 MAF of Colorado River water per year, plus an additional 0.2 MAF when a surplus is declared. During drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U.S. consumptive uses. The 1.5 MAF obligation is generally split equally between Upper and Lower Basins. 
The United States typically has met its Colorado River delivery requirements to Mexico pursuant to the 1944 Treaty. Colorado River average flows have decreased significantly since 2000. During this time, the two countries have negotiated multiple minutes (e.g., Minute 319 in 2012, Minute 323 in 2017) that, among other things, reduced deliveries to Mexico under specified conditions and increased Mexico’s ability to conserve and store water in U.S. reservoirs. Recent negotiations over future water curtailments in U.S. basin states have included speculation on the potential for similar changes for Mexico, although no new minutes have been announced.
Since 1972 (Minute 240), deliveries of a portion of Mexico’s Colorado River water have been provided to the Mexican city of Tijuana through U.S. diversions at Parker Dam, through Southern California and across the international border near San Diego. These diversions, typically account for a small portion of Mexico’s total Colorado River apportionment (averaging 1,678 acre-feet per year from 2020 to 2024). They have been regularly extended over five-year increments and currently are authorized through 2027 (Minute 327). The deliveries must be requested by Mexico and approved annually by the United States. In March 2025, the United States denied Mexico’s delivery request for the first time in the treaty’s history. A State Department post explaining the denial cited “continued shortfalls in [Mexico’s] water deliveries,” under the 1944 Water Treaty. 
Tijuana River Valley
In addition to Tijuana’s water supply and the Colorado River, U.S.-Mexico bilateral cooperation has involved efforts to address transboundary pollution in the TRV. Raw sewage and industrial wastewater entering the United States via the Tijuana River, San Antonio de los Buenos Creek, and cross-border tributaries have caused health, economic, environmental, and recreational problems in Southern California. The IBWC has acted under at least 10 minutes to address TRV sanitation. For example, under Minute 283, agreed to in 1990, IBWC constructed the South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant (SBIWTP) in San Ysidro, CA, which treats Mexican wastewater on the U.S. side of the border. Both countries support SBIWTP’s operation and maintenance (O&M). 
In 2022’s Minute 328, Mexico agreed to provide $144 million and the United States $330 million to support projects to address TRV transboundary pollution. These projects include expanding the SBIWTP’s capacity; rehabilitating pumping plants, pump stations, and collectors and pipelines in Mexico; and constructing a new wastewater treatment plant (WTP) in Mexico. Minute 328’s expansion of the SBIWTP is supported by $300 million provided by P.L. 116-113 to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that was transferred to IBWC by Section 7069 of P.L. 117-328. The U.S. contribution to other Minute 328 projects has been supported by EPA appropriations. Minute 328 states that a future minute will identify each country’s O&M contributions. 
Some recent appropriations for the IBWC have focused on addressing transboundary pollution in the TRV. (Appropriations for IBWC are included in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs [SFOPS] appropriations measure.) P.L. 118-47 provided $156.1 million in FY2024 appropriations for IBWC’s Construction account, which the explanatory statement directs “to address urgent water management and water quality improvement programs of the ... [U.S. IBWC], including the rehabilitation and expansion” of SBIWTP. For FY2025, P.L. 118-158 provided $250 million in supplemental appropriations to IBWC, which some identified as being for “emergency water infrastructure repairs and to address sewage contaminating United States communities.” (For FY2026, P.L. 119-75 provides $78 million for IBWC’s Construction account, although no amount is specifically identified for TRV in the law or in the explanatory statement. P.L. 119-75 also dedicated $12.5 million from IBWC’s salaries and expenses account to O&M of the pipeline that conveys wastewater from Nogales, Mexico, to the Nogales International WTP in Arizona, as authorized by P.L. 118-31, Section 5602(b)(3).) 
In July 2025, Mexico’s Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources and EPA entered into an agreement that identifies timeframes to “initiate” or “facilitate completion” of TRV projects, including some from Minute 328, and identified that a future minute would be finalized by the end of 2025. Agreed to on December 15, 2025, Minute 333 outlines that the U.S. and Mexico intend to form a work group to assess the feasibility of certain projects and to develop scopes of work for projects to address various aspects of TRV water management. It also requires Mexico to construct a new WTP in Tijuana, among other actions. Minute 333 contains other commitments intended improve binational information sharing (e.g., notification protocol for discharges of wastewater in the Tijuana River). Minute 333 directs the creation of a binational O&M work group to develop strategies to maintain sanitation infrastructure, such as the creation of an O&M account at the North American Development Bank. In addition, it states that EPA indicated that its funding to initiate new projects in Tijuana, other than those identified in the July agreement and Minute 328, is contingent on confirmation that certain projects are on schedule for completion.
Congressional Considerations
Congressional deliberations on activities to fund in future appropriations may be shaped by a report that Congress requested in the explanatory text accompanying IBWC’s FY2026 appropriations. The text called for IBWC to report recommendations for improving water “storage, water movement, and deliveries in the regions affected by the 1944 Treaty,” including “the feasibility of constructing the third international reservoir.” The extent to which Mexico meets the annual Rio Grande delivery commitments it made in February 2026 and makes scheduled progress on TRV projects may inform congressional appropriations and oversight on these matters. This may include oversight on executive branch TRV actions, such as decisions to condition funding on Mexico’s progress on certain TRV projects, and responses to work group recommendations. 
Congress may consider related legislation; for example, S. 3120 and H.R. 6386 would link Rio Grande deliveries to consideration of certain Colorado River delivery requests by Mexico. Until recently, actions in the Rio Grande, Colorado River, and TRV largely had been addressed as independent issues in the context of binational water cooperation. Congress may assess the risks and benefits of connecting actions and negotiations across two or three river basins (e.g., the effect of denying Colorado River diversion requests based on Rio Grande deliveries on binational water cooperation in Colorado River Basin). Congress and executive branch policymakers also may weigh interest by some House and Senate Members in including or addressing the 1944 Water Treaty during the review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.
Additional Resources
For background on the Colorado River, see CRS Report R45546, Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocations, Drought, and the Federal Role. For more on the trade agreement review, see CRS Report R48787, USMCA Joint Review: Process and Role of Congress.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12976/IF12976.6.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12976.html
IF11548,Assisting and Evacuating U.S. Citizens Abroad During International Crises,2026-03-06T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:54:28Z,Active,Resources,Cory R. Gill,Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools,"Congress has mandated that the U.S. Department of State (DOS; the Department) provide consular services to American citizens around the world. Such services include disseminating information regarding any major disaster or incident abroad affecting the safety of U.S. citizens and, when their lives are endangered by such crises, facilitating their safe and efficient evacuation. DOS scaled up consular assistance to U.S. citizens across the Middle East after the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran on February 28, 2026. Members of Congress are conducting oversight of DOS’s consular response and in some cases have expressed criticism of the timeliness and extent of DOS consular assistance. Some press reports have described factors that are complicating DOS’s work in this area, including airport and airspace closures and flight cancellations throughout the region, along with Iranian attacks targeting U.S. overseas posts in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.   
Travel Information and the STEP Program
Section 43 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-885; 22 U.S.C. §2715; the BAA) requires DOS to share information on any major disaster or incident overseas affecting the health and safety of U.S. citizens. DOS carries out this responsibility through the Consular Information Program (CIP), which includes a range of products intended to inform U.S. citizens worldwide of potential threats to their health or safety and the availability of consular services (see Table 1). 
DOS disseminates CIP products through several means, including the Bureau of Consular Affairs’ website for U.S. citizens traveling abroad (http://travel.state.gov) and the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP). STEP is a digital service through which U.S. citizens traveling or living abroad can provide their contact information to receive CIP products applicable to any countries they select. While STEP helps overseas posts locate U.S. citizens in an emergency, U.S. citizens are not required to enroll, and DOS generally does not have the means to determine the precise number of U.S. citizens in a foreign country. CIP products are further disseminated through the websites of relevant overseas posts, DOS’s social media accounts, and systems of U.S. citizen volunteers, or “wardens,” who pass information to other U.S. citizens. 
DOS had issued varying travel guidance for different Middle East countries prior to February 28 and has issued several CIP products following the onset of U.S. military operations against Iran. For example, after combat operations began on February 28, DOS released a Worldwide Caution advising U.S. citizens in the Middle East to exercise increased caution and follow security guidance issued by the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. The Worldwide Caution added that U.S. citizens “may experience travel disruptions due to periodic airspace closures.” That same day, U.S. embassies across the Middle East began issuing Security Alerts providing guidance to U.S. citizens. Some Members of Congress and other stakeholders criticized the timeliness and clarity of DOS’s initial response, arguing that the Department should have begun communicating with U.S. citizens in the region about the evolving security situation there, including by urging them to register with STEP, prior to the start of U.S. military operations. Comments attributed to Administration officials have noted that DOS has long maintained guidance urging U.S. citizens to refrain from traveling to some but not all countries in the Middle East. 
Table 1. Selected Consular Information Program (CIP) Products
Product
Description

Worldwide Caution
DOS’s Worldwide Caution, published on travel.state.gov, is updated to provide U.S. citizens information on universal travel risks.

Travel Advisory
Travel Advisories are issued for every country and include guidance regarding country-specific security concerns. Each Travel Advisory is designated at an overall Level ranging from Level 1 (Exercise Normal Precautions) to Level 4 (Do Not Travel).  

Alerts (including Security Alerts)
Overseas posts create alerts to notify U.S. citizens within their jurisdiction of relevant safety and security information, often in response to significant events. Depending on the nature of the risk outlined in the Alert, DOS may label it a Security Alert, Demonstration Alert, Weather Alert, or Health Alert.

Source: U.S Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. 
Overseas Evacuations
Section 103 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399; 22 U.S.C. §4802) requires DOS to “develop and implement policies and programs to provide for the safe and efficient evacuation of...private United States citizens when their lives are endangered.” In addition, Section 4 of the BAA (22 U.S.C. §2671) authorizes expenditures for the evacuation of “private United States citizens or third-country nationals, on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent practicable.” Private U.S. citizens thus generally have been responsible for a portion of the cost for their evacuation. The BAA limits the scope of repayment to “a reasonable commercial air fare immediately prior to the events giving rise to the evacuation.”
In practice, when DOS has recommended that private U.S. citizens leave a country, it has advised them to evacuate using existing commercial transportation options whenever possible. This policy was reflected in a Security Alert the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, issued on February 28, which said that “[DOS] urges U.S. citizens to depart Lebanon now while commercial options remain available” and later in a region-wide security update issued March 2. When commercial travel options have not been available, DOS in some cases has arranged charter flights or facilitated other travel options. 
Some Members of Congress and other observers have expressed concern that DOS failed to promptly offer sufficient travel assistance to U.S. citizens after U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran began, noting that immediate airport closures and flight cancellations quickly constrained the availability of commercial travel options. On March 3, DOS announced that it was facilitating charter flights from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Jordan for U.S. citizens. DOS also said that commercial aviation options remained available in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Egypt, adding that it was helping U.S. citizens book commercial flights to depart those countries. For U.S. citizens in countries such as Israel that lacked commercial aviation availability, DOS indicated that it was facilitating other forms of travel, including ground transportation. On March 6, DOS said that a 24/7 Task Force it established to provide consular services in the region had helped over 13,000 Americans, including through offering security guidance and travel assistance. 
Funding
DOS’s Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA), which administers the CIP and facilitates overseas evacuations, is funded through the Consular and Border Security Programs (CBSP) account. Congress has not funded this account through annual appropriations. Instead, Congress has authorized CA to collect and deposit consular fees (fees charged for consular services, including the adjudication of U.S. passport and visa applications) into CBSP, which CA has expended for consular services and other programs. 
Congress separately has funded DOS’s overseas evacuation flights through the Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service (EDCS) account, also known as the “K Fund.” DOS has been able to further fund emergency evacuations using transfer authorities provided by Congress. For example, Congress in recent DOS appropriations laws authorized DOS to transfer and merge funds appropriated to the Diplomatic Programs; Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance; and EDCS accounts for evacuations. 
Issues Facing Congress
As Congress continues to conduct oversight of DOS’s provision of consular assistance to U.S. citizens in the Middle East, it may consider the following issues.
Statutory Reimbursement Requirement. DOS has said that it intends to “waive any statutory requirement for American citizens to reimburse the government for travel expenses” related to their evacuation from the Middle East. Section 4 of the BAA, which prescribes the requirement that private U.S. citizens reimburse DOS for evacuation assistance, does not include explicit waiver authority. However, it does provide that U.S. citizens reimburse DOS only “to the maximum extent practicable.” Congress could consider legislation to amend or strike the BAA reimbursement requirement or similar provisions, or leave such provisions unchanged. H.R. 270, introduced in January 2025, would authorize the Secretary of State, when providing repatriation loans to U.S. citizens, “to waive costs of activities relating to [their] evacuation when their lives are endangered by war or acts of terrorism” (this measure does not directly address the crisis evacuation loans DOS often provides under such circumstances). A bill introduced in the 117th Congress (H.R. 8807) sought to strike the reimbursement requirement altogether. Other bills introduced in past Congresses aimed to waive the reimbursement requirement for specific contingencies. For example, H.R. 5102 and H.R. 6754 (both introduced in the 117th Congress) sought to waive the reimbursement requirement for prescribed periods with respect to evacuations from Afghanistan and Ukraine, respectively.
Evacuation Planning and Funding Availability. As of March 6, DOS estimated that “nearly 24,000” American citizens (not all of whom required evacuation assistance from DOS) had safely returned to the United States from the Middle East since February 28. However, one press report estimated that up to 1 million U.S. citizens may reside in the region. If conflict in the Middle East continues, Congress may confer with DOS regarding the details of its planning and funding availability to facilitate large numbers of evacuations. Congress may also consider whether or not to increase funding for the EDCS account, including in a potential future supplemental appropriations measure, or provide additional transfer authorities to DOS. 
Timeliness and Extent of Consular Support. Some Members of Congress and other observers have noted concerns about the timeliness and extent of DOS consular support to U.S. citizens in the Middle East. Members may seek to engage with DOS and/or conduct outreach to constituents who experienced difficulties evacuating from the Middle East to gather details to inform oversight efforts and legislation. Such legislation could seek to change elements of the process through which DOS provides consular assistance during overseas crises. For example, future legislation could stipulate triggers, potentially including a DOS-ordered departure of embassy staff from a country, that would require DOS to subsequently issue guidance urging U.S. citizens to depart the country and/or offer evacuation assistance. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11548/IF11548.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11548.html
R48877,U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Background and Issues for Congress,2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T21:23:15Z,Active,Reports,Daniel J. Longo,"Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons, East Asia & Pacific, Security Assistance, Security Cooperation & Arms Exports, South Korea, Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation","In the wake of the Korean War (1950-53), the United States and South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) forged an alliance that remains one of the United States’ most significant military arrangements in Asia. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty that took effect in 1954, the United States and South Korea committed to defend each other against armed attack. Today, about 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea. The alliance has traditionally focused on perceived threats from North Korea (officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK), which have changed as North Korea has developed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile capabilities. South Korea is included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” also known as extended deterrence. 
Over the last few decades, the United States and South Korea have taken steps to reform the alliance. These steps unfolded as South Korea emerged as a wealthier country due to its rapid economic growth. For example, in 1991, bilateral negotiations led South Korea to begin defraying the cost of hosting U.S. troops. Both sides also are preparing a change in operational control in the event of war, moving from the existing structure of U.S. and South Korean soldiers operating under a binational command led by a U.S. general, to a binational command led by an ROK general with a U.S. deputy. Since 2022, the allies have upgraded their consultations over the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, partly to respond to growing calls within South Korea for the acquisition of an independent nuclear weapons capability. South Korea also has helped bolster trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan, particularly since a trilateral summit at Camp David in 2023.
The U.S.-ROK alliance may have reached an inflection point, some observers say, as the administrations of Donald Trump and Lee Jae Myung seek to further “modernize” the alliance. Amid rapidly changing threats by the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and North Korea, Presidents Trump and Lee appear ready for South Korea to take a more active role in the alliance and to broaden the alliance’s mission. President Lee has stated an intention for South Korea to acquire nuclear submarines, which President Trump says he supports. South Korea potentially could employ such submarines to counter North Korea and possibly China, though the wisdom of deploying ROK military assets against China is debated among ROK policymakers and experts. In addition, in November 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth reporetedly stated that U.S. forces in South Korea could be used for a “regional contingency,” which may include a China-Taiwan conflict.
Historically, Congress has supported the U.S.-ROK alliance on a broad, bipartisan basis. Through legislation, oversight, and other tools, Congress may direct and influence the executive branch’s handling of the alliance. For instance, Members insert provisions related to South Korea and North Korea into the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In addition, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees generally hold hearings the first quarter each year on U.S. military activities in the Indo-Pacific that include the commander of U.S. Forces Korea. During these hearings, Members may raise questions about U.S.-ROK joint war planning, the evolution of perceived regional threats, and other alliance issues.
As the U.S.-ROK alliance potentially enters a new period, Congress may face several key issues related to its legislative, oversight, and appropriations roles that could affect how the United States and South Korea navigate decisions, including: 
Should the United States alter its force presence in South Korea, and if so, how? What impact would increasing, reducing, or maintaining the U.S. force presence in South Korea have on U.S. national security interests, South Korea’s security, and regional and global security? 
What might an alliance response look like in potential contingencies involving China, including around Taiwan or the South China Sea? What role, if any, would U.S. forces in South Korea potentially play in these scenarios? 
Should the United States promote U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation, and if so, to what extent? 
In what ways do U.S.-ROK alliance planners incorporate the North Korean nuclear threat into policymaking, relative to other concerns such as China? Should the United States and South Korea adjust combined military exercises and other aspects of the alliance’s posture to complement outreach to North Korea? If so, to what extent?
Should Congress approve the Trump and Lee governments’ plans for South Korea to acquire U.S. nuclear-powered submarine technology and U.S. approval to enrich and reprocess nuclear fuel?",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48877/R48877.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48877.html
R48876,The U.S. Automotive Industry: Selected Issues,2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T06:37:58Z,Active,Reports,Naseeb A. Souweidane,Highways & Highway Vehicles,"According to industry estimates, the U.S. automotive manufacturing industry accounts for 4.8% of gross domestic product and employs 10.1 million people through direct and indirect jobs. The federal government has supported this industry through various policies, with Congress passing laws on industry issues such as trade and financial assistance, vehicle powertrain development, vehicle safety, domestic labor, and vehicle costs. There are a variety of policy issues and considerations for Congress related to the industry.
Domestic market dynamics. From 1970 to 2024, the automotive industry underwent several changes as automotive manufacturers and suppliers from foreign countries entered the domestic market, new entrants with specialized product offerings emerged, and some traditional U.S. automotive manufacturers and suppliers changed ownership. Additionally, automotive manufacturers and suppliers both rely on international markets for sourcing and selling products, which has cultivated a dynamic environment. Both Congress and the executive branch have created policies—such as trade agreements, financial assistance programs, tariffs, and incentives for manufacturers—to support the viability of the automotive industry and, at points, foster integrated supply chains. 
Electrification. Electrified vehicles—including electric, hybrid, and fuel cell vehicles—differ from vehicles with internal combustion engines. The automotive industry has developed and introduced electrified powertrains in vehicles, with plug-in hybrid vehicles first becoming commercially available in 2010. The development of vehicles with electrified powertrains was spurred by a variety of factors, including consumer demand, technological advances, environmental concerns, and federal incentives and regulations. Though domestic demand and production of this type of vehicle slowed in 2025, electrified powertrain development continues to change product planning in the industry. These changes may affect investments, labor, and vehicle prices. The federal government has introduced policies to influence powertrain development by offering various incentives and, recently, by repealing programs that the Trump Administration and some Members of Congress consider burdensome on the industry and consumers. 
Vehicle safety. Vehicle safety remains a focus of Congress and federal regulators, as automotive vehicle-related fatalities are a leading cause of death. Automotive manufacturers have developed and incorporated safety technologies (e.g., seat belts, airbags, and advanced driver assistance systems) to promote vehicle safety. The federal government has standardized some of these safety technologies through regulations. Additionally, vehicle size has influenced vehicle safety, as some research indicates that heavier vehicles may improve passenger safety within that vehicle but increase traffic-related fatalities of passengers in other vehicles, pedestrians, and bicyclists. Federal laws and regulations may influence automotive manufacturers’ decisions to produce heavier vehicles.
Domestic labor in the automotive industry. The automotive industry is a major employer in the United States, accounting for a sizeable proportion of the domestic manufacturing sector. Recent changes in the industry, such as a shift in concentration from the Midwest to other regions of the United States, the entrance of foreign automotive manufacturers into the market, and the introduction of new vehicle technologies, have caused fluctuations in domestic employment. Various federal programs and policies have affected the domestic labor base, including those created by Congress to incentivize domestic production of vehicles and components, provide financial assistance to automotive manufacturers, and set federal labor standards.
Vehicle costs. Both consumers and automotive manufacturers have been affected by increases in the costs of vehicles and their accompanying parts. Several factors may influence rising vehicle costs, including vehicles becoming more technologically integrated, automotive manufacturers altering their product plans and portfolios, inflation across the supply chain, and changes in vehicle financing. Several federal policies affect costs for manufacturers and consumers. Policymakers typically have considered a policy’s influence on vehicle costs when analyzing its net impact (e.g., potential increase in lives saved, improvements to fuel economy, strengthening of the domestic labor force, or limiting of vehicle emissions). For example, policies such as safety standards, fuel economy regulations, tariffs, and emissions standards may increase vehicle costs. Additionally, Congress has explored several policies, such as financial assistance programs, manufacturing incentives, and consumer tax credits, that have sought to mitigate the high costs faced by the automotive industry and consumers.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48876/R48876.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48876.html
R48873,The Prohibitions on Private Inurement & Benefit by Tax-Exempt Organizations and Intermediate Sanctions,2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:54:22Z,Active,Reports,Justin C. Chung,"Nonprofits & Tax-Exempt Organizations, Excise & Other Taxes, Excise Tax, Internal Revenue Service (IRS)","The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) contains certain restrictions designed to ensure tax-exempt organizations serve public, not private, interests and cannot be used for personal gain. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), (4). These restrictions derive from statutory text in the I.R.C. and have antecedents in common law rules on charity. Id. Among these restrictions are two prohibitions: (1) the prohibition on private inurement, and (2) the prohibition on private benefit. Id. These two prohibitions are distinct requirements derived from different statutory language, yet they overlap substantially in interpretation and enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Id. Violation of either prohibition is grounds for revocation of an organization’s tax-exempt status. Treasury Regulations § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2), (d)(1)(ii).
In addition to the prohibitions, the I.R.C. contains excise taxes on certain transactions that can result in personal gain. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4941, 4958, 4960. These excise taxes provide intermediate sanctions short of revocation of the tax exemption. This report discusses three types of excise taxes that differ in who is taxed, which transactions are taxed, how the tax is calculated, and the types of organizations subject to the tax. Application of the excise taxes to § 501(c)(3) organizations can depend on classification of the organization as (1) either a public charity or private foundation and (2) either a supporting organization or supported organization. Id. §§ 4941, 4958.
Focusing on the two most common types of tax-exempt organizations, §§ 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations, this report explains the prohibitions on private inurement and benefit, how they differ, and how they overlap. This report also explains when and how excise taxes might apply in lieu of or in addition to revocation. It also describes related proposals that Congress has considered to modify the excise taxes, including to (1) expand the types of individuals upon whom the taxes are imposed, (2) expand the types of organizations subject to the taxes, (3) redefine the transactions subject to the taxes, (4) impose the taxes on organizations, and (5) restrict certain defenses against the taxes.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48873/R48873.9.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48873.html
R47676,Disaster Relief Fund State of Play: In Brief,2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T14:52:54Z,Active,Reports,William L. Painter,Homeland Security Appropriations,"The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is one of the most-tracked single accounts funded by Congress each year. It is the primary source of funding for the federal government’s domestic general disaster relief programs. 
Frequently, the annual and supplemental appropriations the DRF receives exceed the annually requested level. Even so, at the beginning of each fiscal year since 2023, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has projected that the unobligated balance available to pay the costs associated with major disaster declarations would be inadequate.
Disaster Relief Fund, DRF, DRF shortfall, DRF deficit
Immediate Needs Funding 
INF
FY2023, FY2024, FY2025
Disaster Supplemental
(As an In Brief, the Summary is suppressed.)
 ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47676/R47676.19.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R47676.html
R46259,"Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests",2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:53:58Z,Active,Reports,Kristin Archick,"Europe, Russia & Eurasia","Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). Often referred to as “the Troubles,” the conflict has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland. At its core, the conflict has reflected a struggle between the different national, cultural, and religious identities of Northern Ireland’s two dominant communities: unionists, or Protestants who largely define themselves as British and support Northern Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK, and nationalists, or Catholics who consider themselves Irish and may favor a united Ireland.
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process. U.S. development aid provided through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) has sought to encourage economic development and reconciliation. Congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, human rights, and addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed dealing with the past). Some Members have expressed interest in how Brexit—the UK’s withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland.
The Peace Agreement: Progress to Date and Ongoing Challenges
In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement. The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.
Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, implementing the peace agreement proved challenging. In 2007, the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however, and Brexit and other contentious issues have hindered the functioning of Northern Ireland’s government. Assembly elections took place in May 2022, but the DUP blocked the work of the Assembly and prevented the formation of a new Executive to protest the post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland, which the DUP and other unionists viewed as dividing Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK and threatening the UK’s constitutional integrity. In January 2024, the DUP accepted a package of measures proposed by the UK government to address Brexit-related concerns and ended its boycott on Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions, paving the way for the devolved government to be reestablished in February 2024. Other issues facing Northern Ireland in its search for peace and reconciliation include reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the past, addressing lingering concerns about paramilitary and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development.
Brexit and Northern Ireland
Since 1998, as security checkpoints were dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU single market and customs union, the land border on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared, helping to promote peace and a dynamic cross-border economy. To retain this open border while respecting the rules of the EU single market and customs union, the UK and the EU agreed to post-Brexit trade and customs arrangements for Northern Ireland (initially contained in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to the UK’s withdrawal agreement with the EU). Implementation of the post-Brexit arrangements—which began in January 2021—led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK and exacerbated political and societal tensions in Northern Ireland. The subsequent 2023 Windsor Framework agreed between the UK and the EU and the aforementioned 2024 UK-DUP agreement sought to address DUP concerns about the post-Brexit arrangements and reduce tensions. Brexit also has renewed debate about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status and has prompted calls from Sinn Fein and others for a border poll, or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join Ireland.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46259/R46259.17.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R46259.html
R44593,Introduction to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T06:38:09Z,Active,Reports,"Diane P. Horn, Baird Webel","Flooding, National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), Earth Sciences & Natural Hazards, Public Health Emergency Preparedness & Response, Disaster Risk Financing, Federal Disasters & Assistance","The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA; 42 U.S.C. §§4001 et seq.) and was most recently reauthorized to September 30, 2026, through a series of short-term reauthorizations. The general purpose of the NFIP is both to offer primary flood insurance to properties with significant flood risk, and to reduce flood risk through the adoption of floodplain management standards. Communities volunteer to participate in the NFIP in order to have access to federal flood insurance, and in return are required to adopt minimum standards.
The NFIP is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its subcomponent the Federal Insurance Directorate. FEMA manages a Risk Mapping, Assessment and Planning (Risk MAP) process to produce Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). Depicted on FIRMs are Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs), which are areas exposed to a 1% or greater risk of annual flooding. FIRMs vary in age across the country, and are updated on a prioritized basis. The Risk MAP process provides extensive outreach and appeal opportunities for communities. Updating a community’s FIRMs can take three to five years or more. Participating communities must adopt a flood map and enact minimum floodplain standards to regulate development in the SFHA. FEMA encourages communities to enhance their floodplain standards by offering reduced premium rates through the Community Rating System (CRS). FEMA also manages a Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant program using NFIP revenues to further reduce comprehensive flood risk. Participating communities that fail to adopt FIRMs or maintain minimum floodplain standards can be put on probation or suspended from the NFIP. In communities that do not participate in the NFIP, or have been suspended, individuals cannot purchase NFIP insurance. Individuals in these communities also face challenges receiving federal disaster assistance in flood hazard areas. 
NFIP insurance uses one of three types of Standard Flood Insurance Policies (SFIPs). SFIPs have maximum coverage limits set by law. Any federal entity that makes, guarantees, or purchases mortgages must, by law, require property owners in the SFHA to purchase flood insurance, generally through the NFIP. In moderate risk areas, community members may purchase Preferred Risk Policies (PRPs) that offer less costly insurance. The day-to-day sale, servicing, and claims processing of NFIP policies are conducted by private industry partners. Most policies are serviced by companies that are reimbursed through the Write Your Own (WYO) Program. 
The premium rate for most NFIP policies is intended to reflect the true flood risk. However, Congress has directed FEMA to subsidize flood insurance for properties built before the community’s first FIRM (i.e., the pre-FIRM subsidy). In addition, FEMA “grandfathers” properties at their rate from past FIRMs to updated FIRMs through a cross-subsidy. These subsidies are being phased out under FEMA’s new rating approach, known as Risk Rating 2.0.
Congress has provided appropriations to the NFIP for some of the cost of Risk MAP. Congress also authorizes the use of premium revenues for other NFIP costs, including administration, salaries, and other expenses. NFIP premiums also include other charges, such as a Federal Policy Fee, a Reserve Fund assessment, and a surcharge to help fund the NFIP. In October 2017, Congress cancelled $16 billion of NFIP debt, making it possible for the program to pay claims for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The NFIP borrowed an additional $2 billion in February 2025 and currently owes $22.525 billion to the U.S. Treasury, leaving $7.9 billion in borrowing authority from a $30.425 billion limit in law. This debt is serviced by the NFIP and interest is paid through premium revenues. 
After September 30, 2026, key authorities of the NFIP, such as the authority to issue new insurance contracts, will expire if they are not reauthorized by Congress.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44593/R44593.72.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R44593.html
R44389,Statutory Framework for Congressional Management of DOD General and Flag Officers,2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T07:23:09Z,Active,Reports,"Sofia Plagakis, Barbara Salazar Torreon, Michael J. Vassalotti","Military Personnel, Compensation & Health Care","In the exercise of its constitutional responsibilities to shape and oversee the U.S. Armed Forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws that govern foundational aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. Some of these laws are directed specifically at the most senior military officers, known as general and flag officers (GFOs). Congress periodically reviews these laws and considers amending them. Areas of congressional interest have included duties and grades of certain GFO positions, the number of GFOs, the proportion of GFOs to the total force, and compensation levels of GFOs.
Congress and the executive branch have used statutory authority to specify the grade and duties of certain GFO positions and affect the number of GFOs. As of September 30, 2026, there were 848 active-duty GFOs subject to statutory caps, 9 less than the maximum of 857 authorized by law. The current number is lower for the post-Cold War era and substantially lower than the number of GFOs in the 1960s-1980s, when the Armed Forces were much larger in size than they are today. The GFO corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. In 1965, GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force, while in 2024, they made up about one-fifteenth of one percent (0.067%) of the total force, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs has increased by 40%. 
Some argue that this increased proportion of GFOs is excessive and contributes to more bureaucratic decisionmaking processes. Others counter that the increased proportion is linked to the military’s emphasis on joint and coalition operations; core organizational requirements; management, budgeting, and program requirements; and the employment of automated, highly lethal, and destructive weapons systems that may require fewer personnel coupled with more discernment in employment of those weapons. 
Compensation for GFOs varies based on pay grade and years of service. Regular military compensation (RMC) includes basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and the federal tax advantage associated with allowances, which are exempt from federal income tax. In 2026, the lowest-ranking GFOs may expect to make about $272,802 per year in RMC, while the highest-ranking GFOs may expect to make about $296,539 per year. 
This report provides an overview of Congress’s framework for managing active-duty GFOs in the U.S. Armed Forces—including duties, statutory controls, authorizations, compensation, and historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, except in cases in which they serve on active duty in a manner that counts against the statutory active-duty caps on GFOs. The report includes issues for congressional consideration in the exercise of its authority and responsibilities.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44389/R44389.18.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R44389.html
R42769,Federal Grants-in-Aid Administration: A Primer,2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T08:37:59Z,Active,Reports,"Natalie Keegan, Adam G. Levin",Federalism,"The federal government administers a wide range of programs providing grants-in-aid (or simply “grants”) to nonfederal entities such as state, local, territorial and tribal governments, non-profit organizations, and individuals. These programs aim to advance federal policy goals that have generally been authorized by Congress. 
While federal grants have a long history, they have experienced dramatic growth over the past century, both in total grant award amounts and the number of programs. As of FY2025, there were at least 1,183 funded federal grant programs. In constant FY2017 dollars, federal outlays for grants to state and local governments grew from $17.7 billion in FY1940 to $882.8 billion in FY2024.
Due to the broad range of policy objectives, grant program authorizing statutes, grant recipients, and agency-level administrative procedures, there is wide variation across and within federal agencies in the administration of federal grant programs. This variation can make it difficult for Congress to compare program performance, both within and among federal agencies, and to exercise its oversight of federal agencies. 
This report is designed to assist Congress in its oversight of federal grant programs by:
discussing federal grants in the context of other federal financial assistance;
describing the different types of federal grants;
outlining the various authorities governing federal grants;
reviewing the entities involved in federal grant administration; 
documenting the typical life cycle of a federal grant award; and 
analyzing selected considerations for Congress, discussing challenges tracking federal grant awards, oversight of federal grant subawards, and Congress’s role in federal grant management and administration.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R42769/R42769.6.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R42769.html
IF12125,Section 301 and China: The U.S.-China Phase One Trade Deal,2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T06:22:55Z,Active,Resources,Karen M. Sutter,"East Asia & Pacific, Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations, Trade Agreements","On January 15, 2020, then-President Donald J. Trump signed a trade agreement with then-Vice Premier Liu He of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). The agreement sought to resolve some long-standing complaints by U.S. government and businesses asserting that China was engaging in unfair trade, investment, and technology practices, which the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) had investigated and identified under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2411). The deal is called the Phase One agreement because it was to be the first of subsequent agreements to address U.S. concerns. It appeared to have been difficult for USTR to secure commitments from the PRC in some areas, and some experts assessed that PRC negotiators pushed most issues identified by the USTR related to PRC industrial policies (e.g., state subsidies, technology transfer requirements, and IP theft) for future talks. In October 2025, USTR initiated an investigation of China’s implementation of the Phase One deal.
China and Section 301 Context
In August 2017, the USTR invoked Section 301 in an effort to address PRC industrial policies. These PRC policies’ stated objective is to seek PRC global commercial and technology leadership through trade, investment, and technology practices, which the USTR assessed to be discriminatory. The decision to invoke Section 301 followed 15 years of efforts by the U.S. government and U.S. industry to resolve concerns about PRC industrial practices, which PRC officials were mostly unwilling to acknowledge and address. These views were also informed by PRC intensification of such practices. Particular areas of concern included new Made in China 2025 industrial policies, increased reports of PRC corporate espionage, tightened control by the PRC government of information and data controls, and increased economic coercion and forced technology transfer requirements by PRC authorities. U.S. stakeholders assessed that China was deploying a web of mutually reinforcing government policies that favored PRC firms and pressured or incentivized some foreign firms to transfer trade secrets, intellectual property (IP), and technology to PRC entities in order to operate and expand in China. Also of concern to U.S. stakeholders was a sharp increase in PRC firms’ acquisition of foreign firms in strategic sectors (e.g., aerospace and semiconductors), often using state funds.
While the USTR had prevailed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in several dispute cases or elements of cases against China, some experts assessed that most PRC practices at issue were systemic and pervasive such that they could not be resolved through the WTO’s case-by-case dispute settlement approach. Some U.S. concerns (particularly regarding PRC investment restrictions and subsidies) fell in gray areas of WTO rules or outside the WTO’s purview. Prior experience in seeking to address PRC industrial policies in key sectors (e.g., steel, solar panels, and telecom equipment) led U.S. officials to seek trade countermeasures to address PRC industrial policies in their early stages. They sought to target sectors supported by Made in China 2025, such as electric vehicles (EVs), before PRC firms entered a significant production or export phase. USTR reasoned that trade remedies, such as antidumping measures, were reactive and applied so late in a product cycle that they would do little to prevent China from securing a dominant global market position, particularly given the broad scope and potential global effects of China’s policies.
Section 301 Findings and Actions
In 2018, as part of its investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2411), the USTR concluded that China engaged in forced technology transfer, cyber-enabled theft of U.S. IP and trade secrets, discriminatory and nonmarket licensing practices, and state-funded strategic acquisitions of U.S. assets. Section 301 allows for a range of countermeasures and requires the USTR to negotiate with a country of concern in an effort to resolve issues. For countermeasures, the USTR imposed four rounds of tariffs at a rate that ranged from 7.5% to 25% on about $370 billion worth of U.S. imports from China. The PRC countered with tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. trade. Both sides have granted some exceptions, but most tariffs remain in effect. The Departments of Commerce and the Treasury did not use other authorities under their purview, such as restricting services trade and investment. The USTR also reached agreement with the PRC on some issues under Phase One (text box).
Phase One Agreement: Select Provisions
The Agreement includes PRC commitments in these areas: 
IP. Defines “confidential business information” as trade secrets subject to protection, and defines “misappropriation” to include electronic intrusions and unauthorized disclosure, including by government officials and third-parties. The burden of proof shifts to the accused party if a rights holder shows that the accused party had access or an opportunity to obtain a trade secret; the information used by the accused party is materially the same as that of the rights holder; evidence that a trade secret has been or risks being disclosed; or other evidence of misappropriation. Requires pharmaceutical patent extensions in the event of unreasonable delays in PRC grants of patents.
Technology Transfer. Prohibits forced technology transfer, an activity the PRC government had denied undertaking. Requires that firms operate freely without pressure to transfer technology. Transfer or licensing of technology should be on market terms that are voluntary and reflect mutual agreement. Prohibits the PRC government from requiring technology transfer in relation to acquisitions, joint ventures, or other transactions. Prohibits the PRC from requiring or pressuring (formally or informally) technology transfer, or the use or favoring of a particular technology. This prohibition includes conditions the PRC might impose through regulatory requirements and administrative approvals or licenses to operate in China or receive any advantages. 
Foreign investment and acquisitions: Prohibits PRC government support of outbound investment targeting foreign technology/capabilities prioritized in PRC industrial plans. 
Currency: Requires market-determined exchange rates, and transparency and reporting on currency practices.
Negotiations: Creates a Trade Framework Group, led by the USTR and a PRC Vice Premier, to meet every six months on unresolved IP and agricultural issues.
Dispute Resolution. Allows 90 days to resolve issues, after which if a resolution is not reached either side may take proportionate unspecified action.
See CRS In Focus IF11346, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. 
Other Phase One Commitments
Phase One also sought to address the U.S. trade deficit with China with a two-year purchasing deal. China agreed to purchase during 2020 and 2021 at least $200 billion of goods above a 2017 baseline amount of U.S. agriculture (+$32 billion), energy (+$52.4 billion), manufactured goods (+$77.7 billion), and services (+$37.9 billion). China fell short of its commitment by 60% for goods (and about 57% for goods and services), due in part to PRC efforts to diversify agriculture and energy suppliers and the COVID-19 pandemic. PRC efforts to hasten its exports by reclaiming shipping containers in U.S. ports before they could be reloaded by U.S. exporters may have impeded some U.S. exports to China during this period. (Figure 1).
Figure 1. PRC Phase One Purchases (2020 to 2021)
/
Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Notes: Excludes services commitments. Goods includes aircraft.
China also made some market access commitments in agriculture and financial services that were unrelated to USTR’s Section 301 concerns. Some saw that this focus, together with the purchasing deal, allowed the PRC to avoid addressing core U.S. Section 301 concerns about PRC industrial and technology practices. In agriculture, the PRC committed to expand U.S. access to China’s market in rice, beef, pork, and poultry, while leaving some technical issues to future talks. In financial services, China agreed to reduce some foreign equity limits, and licensed a few U.S. firms to operate in China. The PRC committed to review applications to operate in China from Mastercard, Visa, and American Express, but did not commit to licensing them to operate. China also still required foreign firms to joint venture with PRC firms in China’s credit card market, which is controlled by a state monopoly, China UnionPay.
Subsequent Section 301 Actions
In May 2024, USTR extended most 2018 tariffs and raised tariffs by an additional 25% to 100% on some goods (e.g., EVs/batteries, medical products, ship-to-shore cranes, semiconductors, solar cells, steel, and aluminum). In November 2025, USTR extended certain tariff exclusions for one year. In December 2025, USTR determined PRC policies and practices on mature-node chips and silicon carbide substrates/wafers to be “actionable” and deferred action by proposing an initial 0% tariff rate until June 2027. In January 2025, USTR also determined PRC practices to be “actionable” and proposed port equipment tariffs and fees for using PRC-built ships. China retaliated with similar measures. In November 2025, both sides halted such actions for one year. The U.S. government has also imposed tariffs on China under other authorities. See CRS In Focus IF12990, U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview; CRS In Focus IF12958, Section 301 and China: Mature-Node Semiconductors; CRS In Focus IF12666, Section 301 and China: Shipping and Shipbuilding Issues; and CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade Relations. 
Issues for Congress
As it debates options to counter persistent PRC statist economic practices that the USTR raised in 2018, Congress might assess the effectiveness of Section 301 to date as well as the terms of the Phase One deal and China’s implementation of such terms. Some Members have pressed for eliminating or reducing U.S. tariffs to provide relief for U.S. consumers and businesses. Other Members say tariffs should be sustained or raised to pressure China to modify practices of concern and to protect the U.S. market from subsidized PRC exports. Congress might consider
Given the limited commitments U.S. officials secured through Phase One, what might Congress expect or require in any subsequent talks with China? Does a focus on PRC talks take U.S. attention and resources away from efforts to use U.S. trade tools and take joint actions with other countries to counter PRC practices?
What actions might USTR take if it determines that China failed to implement provisions of the deal, such as those related to IP and technology transfer?
USTR has determined that PRC practices in maritime and shipbuilding and in semiconductors are actionable under Section 301 but has delayed implementation of remedies. USTR also proposed but never enacted tariffs on consumer electronics from China under Section 301. President Trump also exempted many of these products in his 2025 reciprocal tariff actions. What are the ramifications of these delayed actions and exemptions?  
Is Section 301 the appropriate tool to address problematic PRC practices in other sectors? If so, what areas should be a priority? What other tools might be created or deployed to counter PRC practices? 
What role have tariffs played in U.S. efforts to diversify trade away from China and counter PRC industrial policies? How might the Trump Administration’s tariffs on other trading partners affect such efforts?",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12125/IF12125.8.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12125.html
IF10316,Malaysia,2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:54:25Z,Active,Resources,Ben Dolven,"East Asia & Pacific, South & Southeast Asia","Overview
The Federation of Malaysia is a majority Muslim parliamentary democracy in Southeast Asia. It has an ethnically and religiously diverse population of 32.7 million, with an ethnic Malay majority and large ethnic Chinese and Indian minorities. Malaysia plays an active role in regional diplomacy and is a partner in numerous U.S. initiatives in Asia, including trade and security programs as well as efforts to combat terrorism and religious extremism. Malaysia is a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and served as ASEAN’s chair in 2025, when it mediated conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia. It sees itself as both a regional leader and a moderate voice within the Islamic world. 
Despite generally cooperative bilateral relations, some issues constrain closer U.S.-Malaysia ties, including Malaysian opposition to much of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Malaysia has been sharply critical of Israel’s approach to Gaza and the March 2026 U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, strongly condemning what the foreign ministry called “violations of international law and the UN Charter.” Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim maintains outreach to groups in the Middle East, including Hamas. At the same time, U.S. concerns over some Malaysian economic and human-rights policies also has limited some elements of bilateral ties.
Congress has overseen Malaysia policy, including trade negotiations in the 2000s and 2010s, as well as U.S.-Malaysia cooperation on security and counterterrorism issues. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about human rights issues in the country including Malaysia’s record in combatting human trafficking—Malaysia was listed on the Tier 2 Watchlist in the State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons report—and its treatment of refugees from Burma (Myanmar).
Democracy and Politics in Malaysia
Malaysia was led by a single governing coalition from its independence from the United Kingdom in 1957 until 2018. That coalition, known as the Barisan Nasional (BN), was led from 1973 by the United Malays Nasional Organisation (UMNO), a Malay-nationalist party. During its lengthy period in power, UMNO enacted a series of economic and social preferences for the majority bumiputera (ethnic Malays and indigenous peoples), and the party derived much of its appeal from issues of ethnic identity. Prime Minister Anwar was UMNO’s deputy chairman until 1998, when he broke with longtime UMNO leader Mahathir Mohamad. Anwar was later convicted and imprisoned for five years on charges many consider politically motivated, and he became an opposition leader upon his release.
Malaysia has undergone significant political upheaval since 2018, as national elections in 2018 and 2022 resulted in weak coalition governments marked by internal rivalries that have struggled to govern effectively. The current government is headed by Anwar. After another three years in prison in the 2010s, Anwar came to power in November 2022 following elections in which no party gained a clear majority of parliamentary seats. His political coalition, Pakatan Harapan (PH), joined its longtime rival, UNMO, to form a government, but the two groups remain deeply divided on many issues. Malaysia’s next general election is due to be held no later than February 2028.
Figure 1. Malaysia
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U.S.-Malaysia Relations
The relationship between the United States and Malaysia is complex. In the 1980s and 1990s, under former Prime Minister Mahathir, Malaysia was one of the leading voices behind the East Asia Economic Caucus and other “Asia-only” regional institutions that excluded the United States and other Western countries. Since the early 2010s, Malaysia generally has welcomed a broader U.S. role in the region. Bilateral ties were elevated to a “Comprehensive Partnership” in 2014. Malaysia’s political upheaval and changes in U.S. Indo-Pacific policy have led to uncertainties about the future of the relationship. Many observers argue that Malaysian sensitivities about aligning with the United States constrain the establishment of a deeper strategic relationship. 
U.S.-Malaysia security cooperation includes 14 recurring bilateral and multilateral military exercises, ship visits, and military education exchanges, as well as counterterrorism activities aimed at terrorist networks operating in Southeast Asia and maritime security activities in the South China Sea. The U.S. and Malaysian navies have cooperated as part of multilateral efforts to combat piracy near the Malacca Strait and off the Horn of Africa. Malaysia regularly sends military forces to participate in the United States’ Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.
Malaysia’s Economy
Malaysia is the United States’ 17th-largest trading partner and the United States is Malaysia’s third-largest trading partner after China and Singapore. Bilateral trade in goods was $88.5 billion in 2025, and the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Malaysia was $30.8 billion that year. Electrical machinery and equipment dominate bilateral trade flows in both directions. Malaysia plays an important role in consumer electronics supply chains, manufacturing parts and components that are exported and assembled elsewhere. It is an oil and natural gas producer; some of its reserves are located in disputed waters in the South China Sea.
U.S. trade-related concerns with Malaysia have included the Malaysian government’s discriminatory procurement policies, weak protection of intellectual property rights, and limited market access for key goods and services. Malaysia’s economy is divided along regional and ethnic lines; a wide-ranging economic program known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), originally introduced in 1971, attempts to address socioeconomic disparities by privileging bumiputera in government contracts, education, and government hiring.
Malaysia’s government has pursued a variety of trade agreements. Malaysia was a member of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from which the United States withdrew in 2017, and is one of 11 members of the renamed Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Malaysia also ratified the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2022. In July 2025, the United States and Malaysia announced an agreement in which the United States lowered tariffs on imports from Malaysia from 25% to 19%, and Malaysia agreed to purchase $150 billion of equipment from U.S. aerospace, semiconductor, and data service firms over a five-year period.
Patronage and corruption are a major part of Malaysia’s politics and economy. Former Prime Minister Najib Razak is serving a 15-year term for money laundering and abuse of power regarding his role in financial transfers from a sovereign wealth fund. In November 2024, Malaysian businessman Leonard “Fat Leonard” Francis was sentenced to 15 years in jail for his role in the largest corruption scandal in the U.S. Navy’s history. Some observers heralded Malaysia’s peaceful changes of government that resulted from the 2018 and 2022 elections, raising the prospects for political and economic reforms. However, the weakness of the resulting coalitions limited the government’s ability to make domestic reforms and constrained Malaysia from leading on many regional issues.
Malaysia’s External Relations
Malaysia has pursued active diplomacy on numerous regional and global issues, including efforts to promote moderate Islam and marginalize religious extremism. Malaysia has acted as a mediator in conflicts between Muslim separatist groups and the central government in both the Philippines and Thailand. Malaysia also is a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.
Malaysia generally has cordial relations with its neighbors and has promoted cooperation among the 11 ASEAN countries. Following the 2021 coup in Burma, Malaysian officials have been among Southeast Asia’s most outspoken critics of the Burmese military regime, arguing against including representatives of the military government in regional meetings and in favor of engaging with members of Burma’s National Unity Government (NUG) in exile. Approximately 150,000 members of Burma’s Rohingya minority are in Malaysia, although the nation has not signed the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol Regarding the Status of Refugees. 
Malaysia’s foreign policy priorities also have included  managing relations with Singapore, with which Malaysia has deep economic interdependency; combatting piracy in the Straits of Malacca along with Indonesia and Singapore; repelling Philippine armed groups that claim parts of Malaysian territory; and managing immigration and migrant labor communities from Burma, Indonesia, and elsewhere. During its 2025 chair of ASEAN, it coordinated efforts to pursue a cease-fire between fellow ASEAN members Thailand and Cambodia.
China-Malaysia Relations
Malaysia has long adopted careful hedging strategies to balance its relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) and the United States. It has assumed a relatively low profile in ASEAN’s quarrels with China over tensions in the South China Sea, pursuing a less confrontational diplomatic approach than the Philippines and Vietnam despite its own territorial disputes with China. Malaysia has prioritized the negotiation of a Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China to govern behavior in disputed waters. However, since the early 2010s, the Malaysian government has expressed alarm over China’s assertions and activity in disputed waters. PRC coast guard and other vessels have regularly harassed Malaysian energy exploration vessels in Malaysia’s declared exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 
Malaysia is part of some Chinese foreign investment projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Malaysian government announced in April 2019 that it would proceed with a renegotiated East Coast Rail Link investment, a partially PRC-financed rail project. Some PRC investments, including port modernization projects, the East Coast Rail Link, and employment-generating manufacturing investments, align with Malaysia’s own development goals.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10316/IF10316.19.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10316.html
IF10247,U.S.-Indonesia Relations,2026-03-05T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:54:10Z,Active,Resources,Ben Dolven,"South & Southeast Asia, East Asia & Pacific","Overview
With over 280 million citizens, Indonesia is the most populous country in Southeast Asia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, and the world’s third-largest democracy (after India and the United States). It has the world’s 16th-largest economy—the 7th-largest when ranked by purchasing power parity. The country straddles vital sea lanes and borders the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest trade routes, as well as the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Over the past 25 years, Indonesia has become a robust democracy, holding five direct presidential elections, each considered by international observers to have been largely free and fair. In the most recent, held in February 2024, Prabowo Subianto, a former defense minister who served as commander of the Indonesian military’s special forces in the 1990s, was elected to succeed President Joko Widodo. Prabowo took office in October 2024 and is to serve a five-year term. 
The U.S.-Indonesia relationship has broadened over the past two decades, with closer military and counterterrorism cooperation and a range of new educational, environmental, and energy programs. Congress has played a key role in guiding the relationship, including by restricting interactions with security services accused of rights abuses, promoting cooperation on issues such as maritime security and counterterrorism, and conducting oversight of assistance programs and Indonesia’s Millennium Challenge Compact, signed in 2023. (Some of the aid is in flux given the Trump Administration’s elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).)
Indonesia’s foreign policy is guided by its historical role as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and successive Indonesian governments have resisted aligning too closely with the United States or others, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Indonesia is an active member in regional diplomatic institutions including the G-20 and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Some 87% of Indonesians are Muslim, with the vast majority subscribing to moderate, syncretic forms of Sunni Islam. Religious diversity is enshrined in the constitution. Some observers express concern about growing political influence of conservative religious groups. Non-Sunni Muslims and other religious minorities have been targets of violence, and some conservative groups have organized mass demonstrations against non-Muslim politicians. Indonesia also has a history of violent extremism: several bombings in Jakarta and Bali targeted Westerners in the early 2000s, and smaller-scale attacks have occurred periodically. 
Political Background
On February 14, 2024, over 200 million Indonesians voted in presidential, parliamentary, and local elections—the world’s largest one-day democratic exercise—and selected Prabowo, the ex-son-in-law of the country’s former authoritarian President Suharto, as president. Prabowo is a former general who was removed from the military in 1998 for allegedly torturing political activists and who was implicated in 1999 violence in Timor-Leste (East Timor). A scion of a wealthy Indonesian family who spent much of his youth overseas, Prabowo campaigned on promises to continue Widodo’s economic policies, including prioritizing growth in underdeveloped regions and promoting the mining and processing of critical minerals important to clean-energy supply chains. He chose Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his vice president, and announced a cabinet that included members of nearly every political party in Parliament.
As president, Prabowo has implemented a range of controversial initiatives, some of which have spurred criticism of his administration. His government’s proposal to cut government subsidies for schools led to large street protests in early 2025. Some foreign policy observers criticized him for proposals that appeared to acknowledge China’s claims in the South China Sea for the first time. Prabowo has also acted to strengthen relations with the United States. Indonesia joined the Trump Administration’s Board of Peace, and has offered to mediate in the intensifying Middle East conflict.
Figure 1. Indonesia
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U.S. Engagement with Indonesia
Previous U.S. Administrations have engaged Indonesia across a wide range of issues, encouraging Indonesians to deepen their democratic institutions, promote religious tolerance and the rule of law, develop a more liberal trade and investment climate, combat terrorism, and engage on international issues such as maritime security and climate change. In 2023, the United States and Indonesia upgraded their bilateral “Strategic Partnership” to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” continuing minister-level dialogues intended to address maritime cooperation, defense cooperation, economic growth and development, energy cooperation, cooperation on global and regional issues, and people-to-people ties. Most U.S. assistance has supported health, environmental, and educational initiatives, although the status of individual programs is uncertain given the Trump Administration’s cuts to foreign assistance. Indonesia is part of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, which aims to strengthen Naval and Coast Guard capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the two countries finalized several agreements, including a $698 million MCC Compact supporting climate-conscious infrastructure development.
Security Cooperation
U.S.-Indonesia security cooperation has deepened over the past decade, with the two militaries conducting around 170 annual engagements, including on maritime security cooperation and combatting terrorism. The largest U.S.-Indonesia military exercise is the annual Super Garuda Shield, hosted by Indonesia, which included over 6,000 troops from 13 nations in 2025. 
This represents a sharp change from the late 1990s and early 2000s, when U.S. policies enacted in response to earlier human rights abuses by Indonesian forces severely limited bilateral engagements. In 1999, Congress suspended all International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs with Indonesia after its military, particularly the Kopassus special forces—headed at the time by Prabowo—and militia proxies killed over 1,000 people in Timor-Leste following Timor’s vote to pursue independence from Indonesia. Programs were restarted on a limited basis in 2002 and, from 2005 to 2010, the United States largely normalized military relations. 
Indonesia is increasingly involved in South China Sea tensions. Indonesian authorities periodically confront or warn off PRC fishing and law-enforcement vessels seen as encroaching on Indonesian waters. PRC coast guard vessels reportedly have harassed Indonesian energy exploration vessels in the South China Sea more frequently and have accompanied fleets of PRC fishing vessels into Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In April 2025, Prabowo broke from long-standing Indonesian policy by proposing joint development projects with the PRC in disputed areas.
Economic Issues
Over the past two decades, Indonesia’s economy has frequently posted growth of more than 5%-6% annually, buoyed in part by favorable demographics (66% of its population is of working age). The country is a large producer of natural gas and oil, as well as critical minerals including nickel. It is a major supplier of natural resources to Japan, South Korea, and China, and is the world’s leading exporter of palm oil. 
Indonesia is the 24th-largest U.S. trading partner, ranking below neighbors such as Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand. In 2025, bilateral goods trade totaled $45.8 billion and the bilateral goods trade deficit was $23.7 billion. Indonesia has imposed some policies criticized by foreign investors, including foreign ownership restrictions and local content requirements in some industries. In February 2026, the United States and Indonesia signed an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, under which Indonesia eliminated tariffs on nearly all imports from the United States and agreed to remove some nontariff barriers, and the United States cut tariff rates on Indonesian goods to 19%.
Militancy and Terrorism
Indonesia has had a long-running issue of domestic militancy, including religious and separatist movements. In 2018, Indonesia amended its 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law, lengthening periods for which suspects can be detained without charge and broadening police rights to prosecute those who join or recruit for militant groups. U.S.-Indonesia counterterrorism cooperation is close; the United States and Australia helped to create Indonesia’s elite counterterrorism unit, Densus-88, which has weakened militant groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Al Qaeda affiliate responsible for several bombings in the 2000s. The threat of terrorism in Indonesia remains present but many analysts argue that is has been diminished in the past decade.
Human Rights Issues
Most observers say Indonesia’s human rights protections have improved over the past 20 years, as the country’s democratic system has developed and a relatively robust civil society, including an active press, has flourished. Abuses still occur, including some by members of the military. Alleged abuses are particularly frequent in areas with simmering secessionist movements such as Papua. Islamist organizations have harassed and attacked minority religious groups, including Christians and other Islamic sects, such as the Shia and Ahmadiyya. In 2016, large demonstrations by Islamist groups opposed to Jakarta’s Christian governor raised concerns for many about religious intolerance. The State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons report listed Indonesia as a Tier 2 nation and reported it “does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.” 
Environmental Issues
The United States has conducted numerous environmental and clean-energy programs in Indonesia, which is among the world’s most biodiverse countries. In 2022, the United States, Japan, and Indonesia announced a Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), aimed at accelerating private investment in sustainable energy. In March 2025, however, the Trump Administration withdrew U.S. participation in the partnership. Indonesia has made some progress on issues such as deforestation, but its record of environmental protection is constrained by weak rule of law and poor land management. Because of deforestation, Indonesia is a major emitter of greenhouse gases—the world’s third- or fourth-largest when emissions from deforestation are considered. Illegal logging remains rampant. In the 1960s, forests covered 82% of Indonesia; today, they cover 49%. Analysts also cite overfishing as a concern.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10247/IF10247.58.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10247.html
R48872,Nippon Steel’s Acquisition of U.S. Steel: Potential Implications for the Industry,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T16:38:00Z,Active,Reports,Yong W. Kwon,Manufacturing Policy,"United States Steel Corporation (USS) is an iron and steel manufacturer that employs about 14,000 workers in the United States. It is one of two companies operating domestic facilities that produce both iron and steel on-site (integrated iron and steel mill). These domestic facilities can produce both new and high-quality grades of steel, which certain manufacturers (e.g., automotive companies) use in their products. Japanese firm Nippon Steel Corporation (Nippon Steel) finalized its acquisition of USS in June 2025, following approval of the transaction by President Trump. USS’s management under this new ownership may carry implications for domestic employment and the rate of innovation adoption in the industry. 
In recent years, USS has taken some actions that coincided with falling steel prices. For example, the company reduced output and shuttered some of its legacy facilities, which has led to layoffs of workers in Michigan and Illinois. In addition, the company made investments in new facilities (away from legacy iron and steelmaking facilities located in the Great Lakes region) that produce raw steel using scrap steel—a process that is less labor-intensive than making new steel from iron. 
After USS publicly announced its acquisition by Nippon Steel in December 2023, the parties sought two regulatory approvals from the U.S. government. First, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) began a review of the implications of Nippon Steel’s ownership of USS for U.S. national security. Second, the Department of Justice conducted a separate U.S. government inquiry on antitrust concerns. Workers employed by USS, a rival steelmaker of USS, some steel buyers, and some Members of Congress, responded to USS’s announcement by publicly raising concerns on how a successful acquisition or an alternative outcome may affect employment and the performance of steel and steel-using industries. 
In response to some of these stakeholder concerns, Nippon Steel made commitments to maintain existing USS facilities and add iron and steelmaking capacity in the United States. This plan may affect steel prices and operations at legacy integrated iron and steel mills if domestic steel demand does not keep up with the anticipated supply increase. Public policies that look to increase the demand for iron and steel in the domestic market carry potential costs and limitations. For example, laws requiring some public works projects to use domestically manufactured steel may more directly benefit scrap-based steelmakers that produce a dominant share of steel used in construction over operators of integrated iron and steel mills. 
Nippon Steel’s plans to maintain or restart assets at existing USS integrated iron and steel mills may affect the company’s ability to adopt innovations at these legacy facilities. Public investments supporting research and development or deployment of infrastructure for innovative iron and steelmaking processes may influence considerations. Existing production tax credits for metallurgical coal subsidize some legacy assets and technologies at integrated iron and steel mills. 
As a prerequisite to the acquisition, Nippon Steel and USS entered into a national security agreement with the U.S. government. The agreement terms include a “golden share” arrangement under which the U.S. government is to have certain rights with respect to USS, including those “relating to governance, domestic production and trade matters.” According to a news release from Nippon Steel, the agreement permits the President of the United States or a presidential designee to intervene in the management of USS under certain circumstances. Nippon Steel’s public statement on this agreement stated that the President of the United States has consent rights with respect to certain major decisions such as the transfer of jobs or production capacity outside of the United States or the closure of certain existing USS facilities. Congress may have the ability to engage in oversight of the executive branch’s enforcement of the national security agreement. The national security agreement is not available to the public. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48872/R48872.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48872.html
R45951,Apportionment and Redistricting Process for the U.S. House of Representatives,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T13:37:56Z,Active,Reports,Sarah J. Eckman,"Voting, Elections & Redistricting","The census, apportionment, and redistricting are interrelated activities that affect representation in the U.S. House of Representatives. Congressional apportionment (or reapportionment) is the process of dividing seats for the House among the 50 states following the decennial census. Redistricting refers to the process that follows, in which states create new congressional districts or redraw existing district boundaries to adjust for population changes and/or changes in the number of House seats for the state. At times, Congress has passed or considered legislation addressing apportionment and redistricting processes under its broad authority to make law affecting House elections under Article I, Section 4, of the U.S. Constitution. These processes are all rooted in provisions in Article I, Section 2 (as amended by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Seats for the House of Representatives are constitutionally required to be divided among the states, based on the population size of each state. To determine how many Representatives each state is entitled to, the Constitution requires the national population to be counted every 10 years, which is done through the census. The Constitution also limits the number of Representatives to no more than one for every 30,000 persons, provided that each state receives at least one Representative. Additional parameters for the census and for apportionment have been established through federal statutes, including timelines for these processes; the number of seats in the House; and the method by which House seats are divided among states. Congress began creating more permanent legislation by the early 20th century to provide recurring procedures for the census and apportionment, rather than passing measures each decade to address an upcoming reapportionment cycle. Federal law related to the census process is found in Title 13 of the U.S. Code, and two key statutes affecting apportionment today are the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929 and the Apportionment Act of 1941. 
April 1 of a year ending in “0” marks the decennial census date and the start of the apportionment population counting process; the Secretary of Commerce is to report the apportionment population of each state to the President by the end of that year. Within the first week of the first regular session of the next Congress, the President is to transmit a statement to the House relaying state population information and the number of Representatives each state is entitled to. For a discussion of recent changes to this timeline, see CRS Insight IN11360, Apportionment and Redistricting Following the 2020 Census. Each state receives one Representative, as constitutionally required, and the remaining seats are distributed using a mathematical approach known as the method of equal proportions, established by the Apportionment Act of 1941. Essentially, a ranked “priority list” is created indicating which states receive the 51st-435th House seats, based on a calculation involving each state’s population size and the number of additional seats a state has received. The U.S. apportionment population from the 2020 census was 331,108,434, reflecting a 7.1% increase since 2010, and 7 House seats were reapportioned among 13 states. 
After a census and apportionment are completed, state officials receive updated population information from the U.S. Census Bureau and the state’s allocation of House seats from the Clerk of the House. Single-member House districts are required by 2 U.S.C. §2c, and certain other redistricting standards, largely related to the composition of districts, have been established by federal statute and various legal decisions. Current federal parameters related to redistricting criteria generally address population equality and protections against discrimination for racial and language minority groups under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), as amended. Previous federal apportionment statutes have, at times, included other district criteria, such as geographic compactness or contiguity, and these standards have sometimes been referred to in U.S. Supreme Court cases, but they are not included in the current federal statutes that address the apportionment process. These redistricting principles and others, such as considering existing political boundaries, preserving communities of interest, and promoting political competition, have been commonly used across states, and many are reflected in state laws today.
The procedural elements of redistricting are generally governed by state laws, and state redistricting practices can vary regarding the methods used for drawing districts, timeline for redistricting, and which actors (e.g., elected officials, designated redistricting commissioners, and/or members of the public) are involved in the process. Mapmakers must often make trade-offs between one redistricting consideration and others, and making these trade-offs can add an additional challenge to an already complicated task of ensuring “fair” representation for district residents. Despite technological advances that make it easier to design districts with increasing geographic and demographic precision, the overall task of redistricting remains complex and, in many instances, can be controversial. A majority of states, for example, faced legal challenges to congressional district maps drawn following the 2010 census, and these legal challenges can take multiple years to resolve. A number of states are currently engaged in legal challenges related to the 2020 redistricting cycle.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45951/R45951.10.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R45951.html
LSB11401,The United States’ Prosecution of Nicolás Maduro Moros: United States v. Maduro,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T14:37:54Z,Active,Posts,Karen Sokol,"Cocaine, Drug Trafficking, Executive Branch, International Terrorism, Trafficking & Crime, Judicial Branch, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, Separation of Powers, Venezuela, International Law","Following the seizure of Nicolás Maduro Moros (Maduro) by U.S. armed forces in Caracas, Venezuela, on January 3, 2026, a superseding indictment charging him and other defendants with narco-terrorism, narcotics, and weapons offenses was unsealed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY). The January 2026 indictment supersedes an indictment filed against Maduro in the SDNY in March 2020. This Legal Sidebar describes the charges in the January 2026 indictment and analyzes potentially relevant precedent that may govern this case, including the judicial opinions arising out of the United States’ prosecution of Panama’s military leader Manuel Noriega for drug trafficking offenses in the 1990s. This Sidebar then discusses some considerations for Congress.
The Charges in the January 2026 Indictment
The January 2026 indictment names Maduro and five other defendants: Cilia Adela Flores de Maduro (Maduro’s wife), Diosdado Cabello Rondon and Ramon Rodriguez Chacin (current and former high-ranking Venezuelan government officials and politicians), Nicolás Ernesto Maduro Guerra (Maduro’s son), and Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores (identified in the indictment as the alleged leader of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) as designated by the State Department under 8 U.S.C. § 1189 in February 2025). The indictment charges Maduro, Rondon, and Chacin with narco-terrorism conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 960a, and all five defendants are charged with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States and weapons possession offenses.
The first count alleges narco-terrorism conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 960a, which prohibits engaging in certain drug trafficking offenses, or attempting or conspiring to do so, “knowing or intending to provide, directly or indirectly, anything of pecuniary value to any person or organization that has engaged or engages in terrorist activity ... or terrorism.” The indictment alleges that Maduro and the two Venezuelan government officials named as defendants conspired to distribute and possessed with intent to distribute cocaine to support TdA and other organizations designated as FTOs by the State Department under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
The second count is conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) (importing controlled substances in Schedule I or II or narcotic drugs in Schedule III, IV or V of the Controlled Substances Act); 959(a) (manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance for the purpose of unlawful importation); 959(c) (possession, manufacture, or distribution of a controlled substance by a person on board an aircraft); 960(a)(1) (knowing or intentional import or export of a controlled substance); 960(a)(3) (manufacture, possession with intent to distribute, or distribution of a controlled substance); 960(b)(1)(B) (certain unlawful acts involving threshold amounts of cocaine); and 963 (conspiracy). The specific acts that the indictment alleges the defendants took in furtherance of the narco-terrorism and drug trafficking conspiracies include providing drug traffickers with diplomatic passports, private planes under diplomatic cover, and armed military escorts.
The third count alleges that the defendants used and carried machineguns and destructive devices in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes that are prosecutable in a U.S. court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).
The fourth count also alleges that the defendants conspired to possess machineguns and destructive devices in furtherance of and in relation to the narcotics offenses alleged in counts one and two, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).
Relevant Historical Precedent
As this case progresses, there are a number of issues that may arise, including whether the indictment should be dismissed based on issues regarding immunity from prosecution or regarding the seizure and transfer of Maduro and his wife to the United States. The case against former military leader Manuel Noriega raised similar issues. The SDNY may consider the judicial opinions that arose out of Noriega’s case—which was heard in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Eleventh Circuit)—to be persuasive, but those opinions typically are not considered binding or controlling in other federal circuits such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit), which has appellate jurisdiction over the SDNY.
Head-of-state Immunity
Head-of-state immunity is a status-based immunity doctrine that prohibits criminal and civil cases against current heads of state in U.S. courts—that is, immunity applies only while the defendant is in office. Courts have often deferred to the executive branch to determine whether a defendant is a head of state, as the district and appellate courts did in the Noriega case. The district court concluded that Noriega had “never been recognized as Panama’s Head of State either under the Panamanian Constitution or by the United States,” and rejected Noriega’s claims that he was entitled to immunity as the de facto ruler of Panama. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding with deference to the executive branch that Noriega was not entitled to head-of-state immunity. The January 2026 indictment against Maduro states that he “was previously the President of Venezuela, and is now, having remained in power despite losses in recent elections, the de facto but illegitimate ruler of the country.”
Immunity for Official Acts
In contrast to head-of-state immunity, immunity for official acts is a conduct-based doctrine rather than a status-based one—meaning it may protect defendants from prosecution for past official acts even if they do not currently hold a head-of-state or other governmental office. In determining whether defendants are entitled to this type immunity, courts assess whether the “claims arise[] out of their official acts while in office,” or instead out of “private acts where the officer purports to act as an individual and not as an official.” In determining whether a current or former official is entitled to conduct-based immunity, courts may give some deference to the executive branch’s position. Unlike status-based head-of-state immunity, which precludes courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant entirely, this conduct-based immunity doctrine applies only to those acts deemed to be “official,” and the case may proceed with respect to any acts that a court determines to have been undertaken in a private capacity.
In rejecting an argument made by Noriega based on a doctrine similar to immunity for official acts, the district court explained that “[t]he inquiry is not whether Noriega used his official position to engage in the challenged acts, but whether those acts were taken on behalf of Noriega instead of Panama.” Additionally, courts have suggested that some criminal acts, “such as drug possession or fraud,” are not normally “attributable to the state” and therefore will be treated as private acts for which no immunity is available.
Challenges Regarding the Legality of the Seizure
Noriega argued that his seizure and transfer to the United States as part of the U.S. military invasion of Panama merited dismissal of the charges lodged against him because these actions violated international law and his right to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. With respect to international law, Noriega argued that his seizure violated various international treaties and principles of customary international law, including Article 2(4) of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, a Senate-approved treaty that prohibits the threat or use of force against the sovereign territory of another country without its consent, except in the limited circumstances of self-defense against an armed attack or U.N. Security Council authorization. To dismiss the case, the district court required Noriega to establish that the treaty in question was “self-executing in the sense that it confers individual rights upon citizens of the signatory nations” and that the terms of the treaty contain “a self-imposed limitation on the jurisdiction of the United States and hence on its courts.” 
A few months before U.S. armed forces invaded Panama and seized Noriega in December 1989, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued an opinion in June 1989 arguing that the President has “inherent” constitutional authority to undertake extraterritorial law enforcement activities without congressional authorization, even if those activities are contrary to the U.N. Charter or customary international law. (Although OLC opinions are legal arguments and not binding on courts or Congress, the executive branch has historically treated them as internally controlling.) In reaching this conclusion, the OLC pointed out that it did not interpret any statutes as prohibiting the President from conducting law enforcement activities in contravention of customary international law. Along similar lines, the OLC based its conclusion that the President had unilateral constitutional authority to undertake law enforcement actions in violation of the U.N. Charter on the OLC’s determination that this treaty is not self-executing, and accordingly Congress “must execute [it] before it can become a rule” enforceable in U.S. courts.
The district court in Noriega’s case did not address the issue regarding the President’s inherent constitutional authority and, instead, determined that the treaties in question did not create, either expressly or impliedly, an enforceable private right of action giving Noriega standing to challenge violations of such treaties. The court further reasoned that Noriega’s claim should be rejected because the court concluded that Supreme Court caselaw has held that “violations of international law alone do not deprive a court of jurisdiction over a defendant in the absence of specific treaty language to that effect.” As a result, the court explained that it was unnecessary to “reach the question of whether [international law] was violated by the United States military action in Panama.”
In a memorandum written on December 23, 2025, assessing the legality of the United States’ then-proposed military operation in Venezuela, the OLC relied on its 1989 opinion in arguing that it was “unnecessary to address the issue” of whether the planned operation would comply with international law because “[i]nternational law ... does not restrict the President as a matter of domestic law.” The OLC further argued that the President had inherent authority under Article II of the Constitution to conduct the military operation in the absence of congressional authorization in order to seize Maduro. (For further discussion of the President’s inherent authority under Article II of the Constitution and its potential implications for congressional authority, see CRS Report R48524, Congress and the Scope of the President’s Article II Foreign Policy Authorities, by Karen Sokol.)
The district court also rejected Noriega’s argument that his seizure by U.S. forces was so “shocking to the conscience” as to amount to a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process and thus required dismissal, a ruling upheld by the Eleventh Circuit on appeal. In upholding the district’s court’s conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit explained that under the Supreme Court’s Ker-Frisbie doctrine—which is named after two of the Court’s cases—the way in which a defendant was brought before a court does not impact the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant. In both cases, the Supreme Court held that “the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a forcible abduction.” 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Noriega’s argument that his seizure fell within an exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine recognized by the Second Circuit that permits defendants to defeat a court’s jurisdiction on grounds of a due process violation by establishing that their seizure involved not merely a “simply illegal” abduction, but rather “cruel, inhuman and outrageous treatment.” Without deciding whether it also recognized such an exception, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Noriega’s seizure did not meet that standard because he “has not alleged that the government mistreated him personally,” and “whatever harm Panamanian civilians suffered during the armed conflict that preceded Noriega’s arrest cannot support a due process claim.” 
The Eleventh Circuit also relied on Supreme Court caselaw in rejecting Noriega’s claim that he should not have been tried because his seizure violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Panama. In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that, because the United States’ extradition treaty with Mexico did not prohibit forcible abductions, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine governed, and the court had jurisdiction to try the defendant notwithstanding that he was forcibly abducted from Mexico by U.S. law enforcement officials. According to the Eleventh Circuit, Noriega similarly failed to “demonstrate, by reference to the express language of a treaty and/or the established practice thereunder, that the United States affirmatively agreed not to seize foreign nationals from the territory of its treaty partners,” and accordingly the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him was proper under the Ker-Frisbie rule.
In its December 2025 opinion on the prospective Venezuela military operation, the OLC also relied on the Supreme Court’s Ker-Frisbie doctrine in arguing that, even if the operation “were to exceed the President’s constitutional authority to order the use of force,” Maduro would not succeed in challenging his prosecution on those grounds. The federal district court in New York hearing Maduro’s case and, if there is an appeal, the Second Circuit, are not bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s reading of Supreme Court precedent or its analysis of Second Circuit cases regarding an exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 
Considerations for Congress
The court proceedings and any judicial opinions in United States v. Maduro may have implications for Congress’s legislative and oversight authorities. Accordingly, as it examines developments in the case, Congress may consider a variety of actions. 
For example, immunity as a head of state or for official acts, which may be asserted by current or former foreign government officials, is governed by federal common law—that is, judge-made—doctrines, under which courts often give some level of deference to the executive branch on the question of whether the official is entitled to immunity. That was also the case with the doctrine governing foreign state immunity in civil cases until 1976, when Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 160211). The FSIA provides courts with a statutorily-delineated set of legal standards to apply in determining whether a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in civil cases. Congress may consider whether to permit courts to continue applying federal common law to claims of immunity by current or former foreign officials or whether to codify legal standards for courts to apply in assessing such claims in civil or criminal cases.
Additionally, Congress may engage in oversight and consider how the executive branch is conducting extraterritorial law enforcement activities that result in a seizure. As discussed in its December 2025 opinion on the Venezuela military operation, the OLC maintained that the President had unilateral inherent constitutional authority to conduct the Venezuela operation using armed forces and to seize Maduro for law enforcement purposes, even if his seizure violates international law because “[i]nternational law ... does not restrict the President as a matter of domestic law ... when it comes to extraordinary rendition.” The OLC further argued that, even if the operation exceeded the President’s constitutional authority to order the use of force, that would not impact the ability of the United States to prosecute Maduro because the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts would nevertheless be proper under Supreme Court precedent. Congress may consider the implications these claims of authority may have for Congress’s own authority, and whether to seek further information from the executive branch regarding its position on the scope of the President’s Article II authority to conduct, without congressional authorization, military operations that it claims are in support of law enforcement.
In addition to oversight measures, Congress may consider legislation similar to what was introduced in the 110th Congress that would restrict the President’s authority to seize individuals abroad. There are also some treaties where the Senate has specified in its resolutions consenting to the President’s ratification that certain treaty provisions are not self-executing, and Congress has enacted legislation making aspects of treaties or customary international law enforceable by U.S. courts. While any legislation impacting courts’ jurisdiction may change any common-law rules made by courts, it would have to be consistent with any requirements that courts determine to be constitutionally based.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11401/LSB11401.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11401.html
IN11618,Congressional Redistricting Criteria and Considerations,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T17:38:13Z,Active,Posts,Sarah J. Eckman,"Voting, Elections & Redistricting","Congressional redistricting involves creating geographic boundaries for U.S. House districts within a state. Following each decennial census, House districts are first allocated among states through apportionment (or reapportionment), then allocated within states based upon each state’s redistricting process. 
The sections below describe selected federal and state redistricting criteria for congressional districts, followed by a brief discussion of recent related congressional proposals. This product does not provide a legal analysis; for discussion of redistricting law, see CRS Report R44199, Congressional Redistricting: Legal and Constitutional Issues, and CRS Report R44798, Congressional Redistricting Law: Background and Recent Court Rulings.
Selected Redistricting Criteria
Redistricting criteria commonly reflect a combination of state and federal statutes, judicial interpretations, and historical practices. They may be viewed as efforts to provide fair representation for residents and prevent arbitrary or discriminatory boundaries. Certain federal standards apply to House districts, related to population equality and minority protections, but other standards are largely determined by states. Redistricting processes can require, permit, or prohibit consideration of certain factors when drawing districts. Often, decisionmakers weigh trade-offs between criteria, and some states specify a priority order in which factors are considered. 
Population Equality
Federal standards address population equality among a state’s congressional districts. The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed population size variance among congressional districts within a state, or malapportionment. Under the “equality standard” or “one person, one vote” principle, the Court has found congressional districts within a state should be drawn to approximately equal population sizes. Across states, however, district population sizes can vary. 
Racial and Language Minority Protections
Another federal requirement comes from Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), as amended, which prohibits states or political subdivisions from imposing any voting qualification, practice, or procedure that results in denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. Under the VRA, states cannot draw district maps that have the effect of reducing, or diluting, minority voting strength. For further discussion of related legal issues, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11382, The Voting Rights Act of 1965 at 60 Years: Key Supreme Court Decisions Shaping the Law Today; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11297, Redistricting: A Circuit Court Split Over Whether the Voting Rights Act Permits Vote Dilution Claims By Multiple Minority Groups., and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11002, Allen v. Milligan: Supreme Court Holds That Alabama Redistricting Map Likely Violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Compactness and Contiguity
Compactness and contiguity are both related to a district’s shape. A compact district represents a geographically consolidated area. Twenty-nine states require compact congressional districts, but often, state laws do not specify precise measures of compactness. Typically, a compact district would tend to have fairly smooth boundaries or resemble a standard geometric shape; it might have an identifiable “center” reasonably equidistant from any of its boundaries. 
A district is generally thought to be contiguous if it is possible to travel between any two points in a district without crossing into a different district. For congressional districts, 33 states require contiguity. 
Political Subdivisions and Communities of Interest
Thirty states require consideration of existing political subdivisions (e.g., towns, cities, or counties). Often, it may not be possible to draw districts that are perfectly aligned with other political boundaries, given other redistricting standards, like population equality, that could take precedence.  
People within a community of interest generally share a background or characteristics that may be relevant to their legislative representation (e.g., a social, cultural, historical, racial, ethnic, partisan, or economic identity). Twenty states require preserving communities of interest. Sometimes, these communities are naturally preserved by following other criteria, such as compactness, or observing political subdivisions. 
Political Competition or Considering Existing District/Incumbent
Some states include measures prohibiting districts intended to unduly favor or disfavor a candidate or political party. Gerrymandering is a term often used for the process of drawing districts to benefit a particular party. Traditionally, redistricting has been viewed as an inherently political process, where authorities have used partisan considerations in determining boundaries. Generally, districts today may be drawn in a way that advantages certain candidates or parties, unless prohibited by state constitutional provisions or statutes. Some states expressly allow the use or consideration of party identification information in the redistricting process, whereas others prohibit it. Similarly, some states allow for practices to protect an incumbent or maintain an existing district’s “core,” whereas other states prohibit any practices that favor or disfavor an incumbent or candidate. 
Congress and Redistricting Criteria
Aside from requirements established under the VRA, current federal statute generally does not address redistricting standards. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Congress sometimes required states to follow certain redistricting criteria, as specified in decennial legislation that applied to a particular apportionment and redistricting cycle. Decennial apportionment acts between 1842 and 1911, for example, required districts of “contiguous territory”; acts between 1872 and 1911 required districts with “as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.” Given the limited role the federal government has played, overall, in redistricting processes, federalism concerns may arise in the context of certain congressional efforts regarding redistricting. 
Some recent congressional proposals would require that states utilize certain criteria (such as population equality, compactness, contiguity, or preservation of political subdivisions) when drawing congressional district boundaries. Bills from the 119th Congress to date that would require specific redistricting criteria include H.R. 4632, H.R. 5426, and H.R. 5449/S. 2885; proposals from the 118th Congress included H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, H.R. 2646/H.R. 3221, H.R. 7740, H.R. 7910, and S. 3750. Often, these district criteria provisions have been included alongside other redistricting measures, such as requiring states to use redistricting commissions or maintain certain standards of public input and transparency throughout the process.
The use of similar redistricting standards over time and across numerous states may indicate a sense among many lawmakers and members of the public that certain representational principles should be embedded in the redistricting process. Applying these principles in practice may not be straightforward, particularly since decisionmakers often must use multiple criteria when creating districts.
Mapmaking software can design districts with the highest levels of geographic and demographic precision, yet technology has not provided a definitive answer to the recurrent question of how districts ought to be drawn. Following the 2020 census, for example, a number of states faced legal challenges regarding congressional redistricting, indicating the persistence of differing perspectives on fairness, representational access, and how to balance competing redistricting criteria.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN11618/IN11618.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN11618.html
IN11053,Redistricting Commissions for Congressional Districts,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T17:08:00Z,Active,Posts,Sarah J. Eckman,,"Historically, state legislatures have determined congressional district boundaries, and this remains true in most states. The role of political actors in redistricting at times leads to concerns, by some, about conflicting incentives, if the process is used by incumbents to help boost their parties’ electoral gains. In recent Congresses, several bills have been introduced that could require states to use independent redistricting commissions for U.S. House redistricting; the House passed two such bills in previous Congresses, H.R. 1 (117th Congress) and H.R. 1 (116th Congress). 
Some states have adopted independent redistricting commissions, which are typically composed of members of the public and often described as bipartisan or nonpartisan, as an alternative method for congressional redistricting. Proponents believe such commissions can prevent opportunities for partisan gerrymandering and may create more competitive, representative districts. Others, however, have argued that the effect of redistricting methods on electoral competitiveness is overstated and the structure of many commissions can allow political considerations to remain. Some redistricting commissions, for example, may not prohibit certain political officials from membership.
For congressional districts, redistricting commissions had the primary responsibility for drawing district lines in 11 of the 44 states that were apportioned multiple U.S. House seats following the 2020 census, as shown in Figure 1. Several states (Colorado, Michigan, New York, and Virginia) adopted such commissions since the 2010 census. Other states have different types of commissions associated with congressional redistricting. Iowa, for example, convenes a temporary advisory committee and also uses a redistricting commission composed of nonpartisan legislative staff to draft maps, which then must be approved by the legislature. Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Utah have advisory commissions. In Connecticut, Indiana, and Ohio, a commission can serve as a backup redistricting method, if the state legislature is unable to agree upon a plan. A number of states also use commissions for state legislative redistricting. In 2025 and 2026, lawmakers in some states have engaged in subsequent, or mid-decade, congressional redistricting, and processes used for mid-decade redistricting may vary from those shown in Figure 1; detailed discussion of mid-decade redistricting is beyond the scope of this Insight, but more information is available in CRS In Focus IF13082, Mid-Decade Congressional Redistricting: Key Issues. 
Figure 1. State Redistricting Methods
/ 
Source: CRS compilation reflecting methods used during the initial congressional redistricting that followed the 2020 census, based on information from Ballotpedia, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and individual states. Graphic created by Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist.
Notes: Iowa has nonpartisan legislative staff create its redistricting maps but requires legislative approval to enact them. In New York, redistricting plans also require gubernatorial approval. Maryland’s advisory commission has historically been established by the governor for various redistricting cycles; Wisconsin’s governor also created an advisory commission for the 2020 redistricting cycle via executive order. In 2025 and 2026, lawmakers in some states have engaged in subsequent, or mid-decade, congressional redistricting; processes used for mid-decade redistricting may vary from those shown in Figure 1.
Recent Congressional Proposals
In the 119th Congress, several bills have been introduced to date containing provisions that would require states to use independent redistricting commissions, including H.R. 158, H.R. 5426, and H.R. 5449/S. 2885. Similar bills have been introduced in previous Congresses. Other proposals from previous Congresses have also addressed related topics, such as providing funding to states that engage in certain election practices, including using an independent redistricting commission. Some proposals that would require redistricting commissions have also included measures to provide for public input and transparency regarding the redistricting process. Other bills would not require states to use redistricting commissions, but have included provisions to include public participation in redistricting processes or public notice about district boundary changes, such as H.R. 5921 in the 119th Congress. In recent Congresses, resolutions that would have encouraged (but not required) states to alter their redistricting processes or adopt independent redistricting commissions have also been introduced, but none have been adopted.
Congressional bills that would require redistricting commissions vary in the degree of specificity used to prescribe commission composition, processes, and timelines. Some bills provide a few basic parameters that state redistricting commissions would be required to follow and largely allow states to determine commission features. Other bills provide more extensive requirements for independent redistricting commissions that would apply across states. Bills also may or may not authorize funding for states to use for redistricting commissions. Some provisions included in congressional bills are similar to practices used by certain states with independent redistricting commissions.
Considerations Related to Commission Features 
Congress may continue to allow states to establish their own congressional redistricting processes, or Congress may consider requiring or incentivizing states to adopt a particular congressional redistricting method or set of criteria. Among the 21 states that have commissions associated with congressional redistricting in some way, state practices vary in a number of aspects related to how the commissions operate, including details that may have implications for the degree of independence a commission has from other political actors or from public oversight. Some of these features, described below, may be of interest for Congress, if it is considering redistricting commission legislation.
Who Is Selected for the Commission and How?
Commission membership choices can affect how insulated the commission is from actual or perceived political influence. In many states, an individual serving on a redistricting commission cannot participate in certain specified political activities (e.g., serving as an elected official, political party official, or being a registered lobbyist) immediately prior to, during, or immediately following commission service. Often, majority and minority party legislative leaders are involved in selecting commissioners, who are chosen in equal numbers from the two major parties. Such bipartisan commission structures may seek to balance political or partisan interests, rather than remove them entirely from the process. States may also include nonpartisan commissioners, or have selection methods that do not involve party leaders.
Opportunities for Public Input and Transparency
Independent redistricting commissions can sometimes be structured in ways that may make them less publicly accountable than elected state legislatures. Ensuring transparency in redistricting commission activities, and providing opportunities for public input, is thought by some to help establish public trust in the process and in the legitimacy of commission-generated redistricting plans. Some states include requirements for a certain number of public meetings; publication of redistricting plan proposals under consideration; or the opportunity for public comments prior to the adoption of a final redistricting plan. 
Criteria for a Plan
States often require that redistricting plans meet certain criteria; for more information, see CRS Insight IN11618, Congressional Redistricting Criteria and Considerations. These criteria often include factors like ensuring that districts comply with federal election law; have roughly equal population sizes; are geographically contiguous and/or compact; are not designed to give advantage to a political party or incumbent; preserve municipal boundaries; or seek to maintain communities with shared historic, cultural, or economic interests. 
Approval or Modification of Redistricting Commission’s Plan
Once a redistricting commission has created a map of congressional districts, states vary in how such a plan may be enacted. In some states, the plan agreed upon by the commission automatically becomes the new redistricting map. Other states require approval of the commission’s plan by the state supreme court or legislature. States may also provide mechanisms by which the legislature can amend the commission’s plan or may authorize the courts to determine if changes are needed.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN11053/IN11053.7.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN11053.html
IG10076,U.S. Coal Production & Federal Lands,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T13:37:55Z,Active,Infographics,Lexie Ryan,"Federal Land Management, Natural Resources Policy, Fossil Energy, Energy Policy","/
U.S. Coal Production & Federal Lands
Almost half of coal production in the United States today occurs on federal lands. The Western coal region contains some of the top coal-producing states in the country. In 2024, coal generated$446.3 million in federal revenue, and oil and gas generated over 30 times that amount. Federal revenues are partly derived from royalties, the rates of which have recently changed.
Map
Federal estate
Coal-producing areas as designated by EIA 
Dotted lines roughly indicate region boundaries.
Onshore surface acres administered by the Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, and National Park Service.  Excludes lands administered by other federal agencies. 
Hawaii does not produce coal.
2024 Total U.S. Coal Production
Production on Nonfederal Lands 
Production on Federal Lands 
Federal Revenue from Coal 

2004-2024 
Coal production on federal lands and Federal revenue from coal
Federal Revenue from Oil and Gas

Data exclude “refuse recovery” and production and revenues from Native American lands. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. While production is the most significant driver of revenues, payments on new and nonproducing leases, fees, and more also contribute to revenues. Revenues may vary across states depending on these factors, different royalty rates, and more.  Revenues may come from nonproducing leases or reflect past production.
Sources:  Federal production and revenues from the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR). Total production from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Nonfederal production is the difference between ONRR and EIA production values. Map geography based on data from EIA, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, and ESRI.
Information as of March 4, 2026. Prepared by Lexie Ryan, Analyst in Energy Policy; Molly Cox, Geospatial Information Systems Analyst; and Amber Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10076/IG10076.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10076.html
IF13171,Rare Earth Elements and U.S. Supply Chains,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T12:07:53Z,Active,Resources,Linda R. Rowan,"Energy & Natural Resources, Rare Earth Elements (REEs)","Rare earth elements (REEs) have catalytic, magnetic, electrical, and luminescent properties vital for civilian and defense purposes. REEs may include 17 elements—scandium (atomic symbol Sc), yttrium (Y), and the 15 lanthanides—although some classifications exclude Sc. REEs typically are found together in nature (Sc is not found in nature with other REEs) and are not rare in the Earth’s crust. The U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS’s) 2025 Critical Minerals List (2025 CML) includes most REEs, except for promethium (Pm), because these elements are essential for the U.S. economy and security, have vulnerable U.S. supply chains, and are vital for products and services. Congress may consider the role of the federal government, international diplomacy and partnerships, and public-private partnerships in making U.S. REE supply chains more resilient to help promote a strong economy and national security.
Light to Heavy REEs
The 15 lanthanides—which have similar electron configuration and atomic size, making them essential for some applications—make up one row of the periodic table. They generally can be categorized as light to heavy REEs.
The light REEs (LREEs, with lower atomic numbers and atomic weights than the heavy REEs [HREEs]) include lanthanum (La), cerium (Ce), praseodymium (Pr), neodymium (Nd), Pm (rare and unstable), samarium (Sm), europium (Eu), and gadolinium (Gd). 
The HREEs include terbium (Tb), dysprosium (Dy), holmium (Ho), erbium (Er), thulium (Tm), ytterbium (Yb), and lutetium (Lu), plus Sc and Y. 
U.S. Applications 
Some U.S. REE applications, listed from greatest to least demand, include 
catalysts (primarily Nd, La, Ce and Pr; used in oil refineries, catalytic converters, fuel additives, chemical processing, air pollution controls); 
magnets (primarily Nd, Tb, Dy, Pr; used in electronics, vehicles, refrigeration, power generation, medical imaging) and metal alloys (primarily Nd, Y, La, Ce, Pr; used in batteries, fuel cells, steel, superalloys, aluminum/magnesium);
glass and polishing (primarily Nd, Gd, Er, Ho, La, Ce, Pr; used in polishing compounds, pigments and coatings, ultraviolet resistant glass, photo-optical glass, x-ray imaging);
phosphors (primarily Nd, Eu, Tb, Y, Er, Gd, Ce, Pr; used in phosphors-based displays, fluorescent lights, medical imaging, lasers, fiber optics); and
ceramics (primarily Nd, Y, Eu, Dy, Lu, Gd, La, Ce, Pr; used in capacitors, sensors, colorants, scintillators, refractories). 
Some U.S. REE defense applications include satellite communications, guidance systems, aircraft structures, fly-by-wire, and smart missiles (primarily Nd, Eu, Tb, Dy, Y, Lu, Sm, Pr, La).
Dominance of the People’s Republic of China
The People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) mines about 60% and processes and separates about 90% of global REEs. It also manufactures about 94% of REE-based magnets. China’s monopolistic role in the REE market has included subsidizing China’s REE industry, distorting REE prices, hindering fair competition, and restricting REE supplies. In 2023, the PRC banned the export of REE processing and refining technologies. In 2025, it announced export controls on Sm, Gd, Tb, Dy, Lu, Sc, and Y. 
China is the leading producer of Sc, Y, and the 14 lanthanides on the USGS 2025 CML. In 2025, the largest REE mine production was in China (270,000 metric tons [MT] of rare earth oxide equivalent [REO]), followed by the United States (51,000 MT total from two mines, one each in California and Georgia), Australia (29,000 MT), and Burma (22,000 MT). In 2025, the largest estimated reserves (i.e., the working inventory of mining companies’ supplies of an economically extractable mineral commodity) were in China (44 million MT), followed by Brazil (21 million MT), Australia (6.3 million MT), Russia (3.8 million MT), Vietnam (3.5 million MT), the United States (1.9 million MT), and Greenland (1.5 million MT). In 2025, the United States was 67% net import reliant for most REEs from China, Malaysia, Estonia, and Japan. It was 100% net import reliant for Sc from Japan and China and for Y from China, Germany, Austria, and the Republic of Korea. 
REE Resources 
Several Congresses and Administrations have directed the USGS to identify critical mineral resources, including REE resources, in the United States and other countries (e.g., Afghanistan) and to track global REE mine production and reserves to increase U.S. REE supply chains’ resilience. The USGS critical minerals update summarizes some related federal government activities from 2017 to 2025. 
The USGS defines a resource as a concentration of naturally occurring solid, liquid, or gaseous material in or on the Earth’s crust in such form and amount that economic extraction of a commodity from the concentration is currently or potentially feasible. Principal economic sources of REEs include the minerals bastnaesite, monazite, and loparite, as well as some surficial clay deposits. Other less conventional potential surficial economic sources may include heavy mineral sands, placer deposits, mine waste, and coal. The Department of Energy (DOE) plans to collaborate with the USGS to investigate some of these unconventional REE sources. 
REE minerals form in atypical geologic conditions and occur in uncommon minerals in unusual rock types, so potential resources occur in only a few places around the globe. REE minerals typically occur in small concentrations in rocks. A high-grade REE deposit is usually less than 10% by weight concentration. REE minerals may contain multiple REEs bound tightly together in the mineral’s crystal structure and may contain thorium and/or uranium; these characteristics may lead to technical challenges and higher costs to separate individual REEs, and to separate and dispose of any uranium or thorium. 
Congress established and appropriated funds in P.L. 117-58 for the USGS Earth Mapping Resources Initiative (Earth MRI) to identify critical mineral resources. In 2025, the USGS published some reports about domestic REE resources, including studies of REEs in some Mountain Pass, CA, deposits and coal deposits.
REE Mining and Processing
In 2010, the USGS published an overview of REE resources, potential domestic deposits, and information about exploration projects and mining. The USGS identified REE deposits in Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wyoming. In 2018, the USGS published an expanded, updated overview of domestic REE deposits and global REE advanced exploration and active mines. (See also a 2023 review of global REE projects.) According to the USGS, major active REE mines include Bayan Obo, Daluxiang, Maoniuping, Weishan, and south China clay deposits in China; bastnaesite in Mountain Pass, CA; heavy mineral sands in the southeastern United States; Mount Weld in Australia; Karnasurt Mountain in Russia; Buena Norte in Brazil; and Dong Pao Mine in Vietnam. The USGS identified some advanced REE exploration projects in Bear Lodge, WY; Bokan Mountain, AK; Elk Creek, NE; and Round Top, TX, in the United States, plus others in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Greenland, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, India, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, and Turkey. 
Because of the geologic characteristics described above, REE ore mineral extraction is more technically challenging and expensive than some other types of mineral extraction, such as copper mining and refining. Large amounts of non-ore material may need to be extracted to process the ore minerals. Mining of surficial deposits is less technically challenging and less expensive than mining the subsurface; however, most surficial deposits have comparatively lower concentrations of REEs than ore minerals, requiring more total material extraction to recover the same amount of REEs by weight. After extraction, the minerals must be further processed, often with complex chemical and physical treatments, to yield high-purity oxides of individual REEs (e.g., NdO). The mined material is often transported to other facilities away from the mine for processing, with additional land, energy, water, and infrastructure requirements plus transport costs. For metallurgical applications, such as magnets, the REOs are further processed and separated to high-purity metals (e.g., 99.9% Nd metal) and then combined into metal alloys (e.g., Nd-iron-boron based magnets). Because of mineralogic and technical challenges, only some REEs may be extracted or processed from REE minerals. For example, the Mountain Pass mine in California produced Eu, Ce, and La in the past due to higher demand for some applications and now produces Nd and Pr due to higher demand for magnets.
Initiatives for Resilient REE U.S. Supply Chains
Congress and the Trump Administration have directed the USGS, DOE, and other federal entities to advance and support research and development to identify REE resources and supply chain vulnerabilities, as well as to advance extraction, processing, separation, component development, product manufacturing, and recycling. The federal government is working with private companies and some other countries to secure resilient REE supply chains. In May 2025, MP Materials, which operates the Mountain Pass REE mine, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Saudi Arabian mining company Maaden to develop an REE supply chain in Saudi Arabia, during a U.S.-Saudi Arabia Investment Forum where President Trump secured a $600 billion Saudi Arabian investment in the energy, defense, and mining sectors. In 2024, the Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation” under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025, announced a goal to secure a complete mine-to-magnet REE supply chain by 2027. In July 2025, MP Materials established a public-private partnership with DOD where DOD will acquire $500 million in stock; extend a $150 million loan for HREE separation expansion; and commit to an REE price floor, offering direct payments to MP Materials if prices fall below $110 per kilogram of Nd-Pr. In January 2026, the Trump Administration announced further critical minerals and REEs initiatives that led to the formation of a critical mineral trade zone, investments in USA Rare Earth company, and a critical minerals ministerial. On February 2, 2026, the White House announced Project Vault, a $12 billion initiative to establish the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve. USA Rare Earth has indicated it may be a supplier of REEs to the stockpile and that the initiative will reduce U.S. reliance on REE supplies from China.
Congressional Considerations
Congress may consider whether federal efforts—such as the USGS’s Earth MRI, DOE’s Critical Materials Collaborative, DOD’s public-private partnerships, and the Export-Import Bank’s role in Project Vault—are sufficient to develop resilient U.S. REE supply chains. Legislation introduced in the 119th Congress may further support this aim. For example, H.R. 2969 and S. 1463 would allow the Secretary of the Interior to enter into MOUs with foreign countries for scientific and technical cooperation to map critical minerals and REEs. S. 429 would secure reliable critical minerals and REE supplies through trade and strategic partnerships. H.R. 7126 and S. 3659 would establish a U.S. strategic resilience reserve. H.R. 6696 and S. 2839 would establish a critical minerals security alliance. S. 2550 would provide for international cooperation for secure critical mineral supply chains.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13171/IF13171.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13171.html
IF13082,Mid-Decade Congressional Redistricting: Key Issues,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T17:38:15Z,Active,Resources,"L. Paige Whitaker, Sarah J. Eckman, L. Paige Whitaker","Voting, Elections & Redistricting","States typically begin their congressional redistricting processes following the decennial U.S. census and apportionment, at which point states with multiple House seats draw congressional district boundaries to account for population changes in the intervening decade. After redistricting plans are enacted, states may face legal challenges regarding elements of their plans; these lawsuits can continue for a number of years and result in courts approving subsequent modifications to states’ congressional district maps. Aside from these court-ordered redistricting efforts, states have not typically undergone significant redistricting efforts until after the next decennial census, though there are some recent and ongoing examples. 
In 2025 and 2026, lawmakers in a number of states (including California, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Utah) have redrawn their congressional district maps ahead of the 2030 Census; others have demonstrated an interest in doing so. This practice is often referred to as mid-decade redistricting. Mid-decade redistricting is prohibited by neither the U.S. Constitution nor federal law. 
Congressional Apportionment and Redistricting Background
Article I, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, as amended by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that representation in the House of Representatives is based on state population size, as determined by a national census conducted within each 10-year period. Dividing House seats among the 50 states is referred to as apportionment; determining where district boundaries exist within a state is referred to as redistricting. The Constitution does not specify how House seats are to be distributed within each state, but it does limit the number of Representatives to no more than one for every 30,000 persons, provided that each state receives at least one Representative.
States largely set, and can potentially revise, their own practices for redistricting, including its timing, and mid-decade redistricting may be permitted under current state constitutions or laws. Several states, including, for example, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, currently prohibit mid-decade redistricting for the state legislature, but do not have similar constitutional or statutory provisions addressing congressional mid-decade redistricting. In some states, mid-decade congressional redistricting is generally not considered as part of the regular redistricting process, but there may be special circumstances under which it can occur. Other states may have general prohibitions on mid-decade redistricting. New York, for example, currently has an explicit prohibition on mid-decade congressional redistricting unless modified pursuant to court order; state law in Tennessee specifies that “[congressional] districts may not be changed between apportionments.”
Congress has, at times, considered legislation on the timing and frequency of redistricting stemming from its authority under the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution in Article I, Section 4. The Elections Clause provides to the states the initial and principal authority to administer elections within their jurisdictions, but also provides Congress with the authority to “override” state laws to regulate federal elections.
In the 1800s and early 1900s, for example, Congress passed laws each decade specifically authorizing each census and apportionment, as well as related administrative details. These decennial bills sometimes included certain standards for congressional districts, such as population equality or geographic compactness. In 1967, Congress required that all Members be elected from single-member districts (2 U.S.C. §2c). Federal law related to the census process is found in Title 13 of the U.S. Code, and two key statutes affecting apportionment today are the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929 and the Apportionment Act of 1941.
Overview of Legal Framework for Congressional Redistricting
While state constitutions and laws govern most of the congressional redistricting process, congressional redistricting maps must comport with the U.S. Constitution and federal law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Since the 1960s, the Court has issued a series of rulings that have significantly shaped how congressional districts are drawn. In sum, congressional districts must comply with the constitutional standards of population equality and equal protection, and comply with statutory standards set forth in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).
Population Equality Standard
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to require that each congressional district within a state contain an approximately equal number of persons. In a 1964 ruling, Wesberry v. Sanders, the Court interpreted Article I, Section 2, which provides that Representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States,” to mean that “as nearly as is practicable[,] one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.” This requirement is sometimes called the “population equality standard” or the principle of one person, one vote.
Equal Protection Standard
Congressional redistricting maps must conform to standards of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the Supreme Court, if race is the predominant factor in the drawing of district lines above other traditional redistricting considerations—such as compactness and contiguity—then courts must apply a “strict scrutiny” standard of review. To withstand strict scrutiny in this context, the state must demonstrate that it had a compelling governmental interest in creating a majority-minority district and the redistricting plan was narrowly tailored to further that compelling interest. A “majority-minority” district is one in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority, and can be required under the VRA in certain instances, as discussed below. The Supreme Court is currently considering the case of Louisiana v. Callais, which may clarify when a “state’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.” A decision in this case is expected by the end of June.
Section 2 of the VRA
Congressional district boundaries in every state are required to comply with Section 2 of the VRA, which is codified at 52 U.S.C. §10301. Section 2 prohibits discriminatory voting procedures based on race, color, or membership in a language minority, including minority vote dilution. Minority vote dilution is the diminishing or weakening of minority voting power. Under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has determined that Section 2 may require the creation of one or more “majority-minority” districts in a redistricting map. The creation of such districts can avoid minority vote dilution by helping ensure that racial or language minority groups are not submerged into the majority and, thereby, denied an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice.
Prior Mid-Decade Redistricting Examples
Mid-decade congressional redistricting was not uncommon during the 19th century, but it rarely occurred during the 20th century. In both 1804 and 1808, New York drew new congressional district boundaries unrelated to any population shifts, which some scholars view as the first example of mid-decade congressional redistricting in the United States. One analysis found that at least one state redrew its congressional boundaries in every year between 1872 and 1896. Ohio drew congressional district boundaries seven times between 1878 and 1892, conducting five consecutive House elections under different district maps. Not all states engaged in such frequent redistricting; Connecticut, for example, kept the same congressional districts for 70 years, spanning 1841-1912. 
Since the 2000 census, there has been renewed mid-decade congressional redistricting activity by states. One widely known example of mid-decade redistricting occurred in Texas in 2003, when the state legislature redrew initial congressional boundaries that were adopted by a federal court in 2001. The Texas mid-decade redistricting resulted in a 2006 Supreme Court case, discussed below. Other states, including Colorado and Georgia, also engaged in additional attempts to redistrict following the 2000 census. After these developments, and as discussed below, some Members of Congress began introducing legislation related to mid-decade redistricting, generally proposing bills that would prohibit states from undergoing more than one redistricting following each decennial census.
Related Supreme Court Activity
In a 2006 decision, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the Supreme Court considered, among other things, whether the Texas legislature violated the population equality and equal protection standards by redistricting mid-decade for partisan purposes. In a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, determined that the claim that the legislature’s decision “to override a valid, court-drawn plan mid-decade” was unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering was insufficiently “suspect to give shape to a reliable standard” for ascertaining a constitutional violation. Writing separately, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Constitution and federal law do not prohibit mid-decade congressional redistricting.
Recent Congressional Proposals
Since the mid-2000s, approximately 70 bills have been introduced in Congress that would prohibit states from carrying out more than one congressional redistricting after each decennial census and apportionment. Ten such bills, H.R. 4358, H.R. 4632, H.R. 4889, H.R. 5426, H.R. 5449/S. 2885, H.R. 5837, H.R. 5879, H.R. 7167, and H.R. 7219, have been introduced in the 119th Congress to date, with some introduced by Members of each party. Similar legislation in previous Congresses has included the John Tanner Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act (112th-117th Congresses; introduced as the John Tanner and Jim Cooper Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act in the 118th Congress) and the Coretta Scott King Mid-Decade Redistricting Prohibition Act (113th-114th and 116th-118th Congresses). Some broader redistricting reform or election administration bills have also included prohibitions on mid-decade redistricting, including the Fair Representation Act (115th-119th Congresses), For the People Act (116th-117th Congresses), and Freedom to Vote Act (117th-118th Congresses). Bills like these may contain exceptions that would allow certain subsequent changes to congressional districts to be made without being considered violations of their general prohibitions. For example, many of these proposals would not consider court-ordered district modifications as mid-decade redistricting. Technical adjustments may also be permitted as another exception.
Although the aforementioned bills have sought to prohibit states from mid-decade congressional redistricting, there are also other ways in which federal legislation could affect states’ ability to redraw congressional boundaries. Congress could also require states to conduct mid-decade redistricting; one such bill, H.R. 4798, has been introduced in the 119th Congress to date. Legislation might regulate when or how often redistricting can occur, or specify reasons why or conditions under which a state could engage in a subsequent redistricting. Congress could, for example, consider legislation modifying the timeline for the decennial census and apportionment, or establish deadlines by which states must complete their redistricting processes.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13082/IF13082.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13082.html
IF11681,Defense Primer: LGM-35A Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T11:52:53Z,Active,Resources,Anya L. Fink,"Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation","The LGM-35A Sentinel is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system that is expected to replace the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM in the U.S. nuclear force structure. MMIII has served as the ground-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad—land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable bombers—since 1970. The Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under  Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, requested $4.1 billion for Sentinel research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) in FY2026. This request assumed $1.5 billion from FY2025 reconciliation legislation (P.L. 119-21), commonly referred to as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. The FY2025 reconciliation legislation included $2.5 billion for Sentinel “risk reduction activities.” The FY2026 budget request for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) included $649 million for the W87-1 nuclear warhead for the Sentinel. The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA P.L. 119-60) authorized $3.8 billion for Sentinel RDT&E and $649 million for the W87-1 warhead. 
What Is an ICBM? 
A U.S. ICBM can reach targets around the globe in approximately 30 minutes after launch. During the first three minutes, three solid fuel rocket motors power the missile’s flight. After the powered portion of flight, the missile follows a parabolic trajectory toward its target. The missile releases its warhead during the mid-course portion of its flight, and the warhead continues to the target. Once the President authorizes the launch of any U.S. ICBM, the missile cannot be recalled or destroyed in flight. The same is true for nuclear missiles launched from U.S. submarines. In contrast, U.S. bombers can return to their bases, without releasing their weapons, although their weapons also cannot be recalled after their release. 
The United States began deploying nuclear-armed ICBMs in 1959, and has maintained these systems “on alert,” or able to launch promptly, since that time. The Air Force deployed the Atlas between 1959 and 1965, the Minuteman beginning in the 1960s, and the Peacekeeper (or MX) between 1987 and 2005. The Air Force bases its ICBMs in hardened concrete silos, or launch facilities, located in North Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska. The United States has periodically considered alternative ICBM basing concepts to ensure survivability. 
The Transition from Minuteman III
The MMIII, which is currently deployed in a single-warhead configuration, but could carry up to three warheads, entered the force in 1970. The Air Force has replaced and updated many of the component systems on the missile—a process known as life-extension—several times over the past 50 years. The Air Force has stated that some of these components may face reliability concerns as they reach the end of their intended lifespans. After conducting an Analysis of Alternatives in 2014, the Air Force decided to replace MMIII with a new missile system (originally Ground Based Strategic Deterrent) that would serve through 2075. The Air Force argued that, when compared with a life-extended MMIII, the new ICBM would meet current and expected threats, maintain the industrial base, produce a modular weapon system, and reduce life cycle cost. The Air Force and Northrop Grumman, the Sentinel’s lead defense contractor, planned for the Sentinel to begin replacing MMIII in 2029. 
Program Status
The Air Force plans to procure 634 Sentinel missiles, plus an additional 25 missiles to support development and testing, to enable the deployment of 400 missiles. The Air Force also originally planned to modernize 450 silos and over 600 facilities (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Sentinel Deployment and Support Locations
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Source: Air Force Global Strike Command, 2023.
In January 2024, the Air Force informed Congress that the Sentinel program exceeded its initial cost projections, positing at least a 37% increase (from $118 million initial baseline cost to $162 million in 2020 dollars) in the cost per unit. This cost increase is known as a “critical” breach per the Nunn-McCurdy Act (Title 10 U.S. Code §§4371-4377), which requires DOD to certify that the program is essential to national security, has no cheaper alternatives, and cannot be terminated. It also mandates that DOD develop new cost estimates and program milestones and submit this information to Congress. Air Force officials have attributed cost increases to ground infrastructure updates. 
In July 2024, DOD announced completion of the Nunn-McCurdy review and that the program “met the statutory criteria to continue.” DOD officials said the review resulted in the rescindment of the Sentinel’s Milestone B approval, and that DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) estimated the cost of a “reasonably modified” Sentinel at $141 billion. Air Force officials have said that they are reexamining requirements and restructuring the program to make the ground segment “simpler” and “more affordable.” In December 2025, the Senate confirmed Air Force General Dale White as Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager (DRPM) to oversee several major Air Force acquisition programs, including the Sentinel.
In February 2026, the Air Force announced that it anticipates to “complete the [program] restructure and achieve a Milestone B decision by the end of 2026” and deliver an “initial capability targeted for the early 2030s.” The Air Force now plans to build new silos, instead of reusing old ones, a process that will reportedly require a supplementary environmental impact statement. The Army Corps of Engineers, rather than Northrop Grumman, will now reportedly manage some of the ground infrastructure updates. The Air Force said that it plans to conduct a pad launch in 2027. According to a February 2026 GAO report, the ICBM’s first flight test will now occur in March 2028.
Warheads
The Air Force plans to initially deploy the Sentinel with the W87-0 warhead currently on the MMIII. NNSA is developing the W87-1 warhead, which, according to NNSA, “is slated to deploy between FY2031 and FY2032.” NNSA announced the qualification of the first war reserve plutonium pit for the W87-1 in October 2024. Lockheed Martin is developing the Mk21A reentry vehicle for the W87-1. DOD and NNSA are also modernizing the arming and fuzing assembly for the MMIII and the Sentinel. 
Considerations for Congress
ICBM Force Necessity
Some analysts have argued that the United States reduce or eliminate its ICBMs because they increase the risk of accidental war, or because the invulnerability of ballistic missile submarines makes ICBMs “redundant.” Advocates of retaining ICBMs have argued that these missiles are the most “responsive” leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a Biden Administration review of U.S. nuclear policy, echoed past NPRs in stating that the three triad legs are “complementary,” with each one “offering unique attributes.”
MMIII Life-Extension
Some Members of Congress have questioned the need to fund and deploy new ICBMs; others have also suggested that the Air Force again consider MMIII life extension. They, along with other commentators, have argued that a delay or cancellation of Sentinel could ease financial and other pressures caused by the simultaneous recapitalization of all legs of the nuclear triad. In 2021, DOD commissioned an independent study on future ICBM options, which recommended an assessment of MMIII life-extension. However, the 2022 NPR endorsed Sentinel and said that any alternative “would increase risk and cost.” Air Force officials stated in January 2024 that they did not see a “viable” long-term MMIII life-extension, though they were “committed” to doing “everything [they] can to keep it in the field.” A September 2025 GAO study stated that the Air Force may operate the MMIII through 2050, though it faced parts obsolescence and other sustainment risks. 
Sentinel Costs and Schedule 
Some Members of Congress have been concerned about the costs and schedule delays associated with the Sentinel, the W87-1 warhead, and NNSA plutonium pit production. Section 1629 of the FY2025 NDAA (P.L. 118-159) imposed conditional requirements on the program to ensure oversight and opportunities for competition.
Risk of Sentinel Delays
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the risks associated with transition from the MMIII to the Sentinel. Since the FY2017 NDAA (§1667 of P.L. 114-328), Congress has required that the Air Force deploy no fewer than 400 on-alert ICBMs. Section 1632 of the FY2026 NDAA amended the U.S. Code to reaffirm this minimum requirement and also required that these ICBMs be deployed equally across “not fewer than 450” silos at F.E. Warren, Malmstrom, and Minot Air Force bases (Title 10 U.S. Code §9062). 
An Air Force official reportedly stated in January 2025 that MMIII and Sentinel operations would overlap for at least 15 years. A September 2025 GAO report assessed MMIII to Sentinel transition risks and recommended that the Air Force develop a transition risk management plan. Section 1641 of the FY2026 NDAA mandates an Air Force strategy to sustain the MMIII and maximize its end-of-life margin.
In Section 1650 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31), Congress directed the Air Force to “develop a plan to decrease the amount of time required to upload additional warheads to the [ICBM] force.” Section 1633 of the FY2025 NDAA limited the availability of certain DOD funds pending the submission of this plan to Congress. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States proposed considering such upload, within arms control limits, to field “the same number of warheads” “if the number of available [ICBMs] is reduced.” The Commission report also proposed that the Air Force consider deploying Sentinel with multiple warheads or with “some portion of the future ICBM force” in a road-mobile configuration to account for evolving nuclear threats to the United States from Russia and China. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11681/IF11681.25.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11681.html
IF11284,U.S.-China Trade Relations,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T06:53:10Z,Active,Resources,Karen M. Sutter,"Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations, Export Policy, Foreign Investment, East Asia & Pacific, U.S. Economy, U.S. Trade Policy","The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) is the second-largest global economy and has been a top U.S. trading partner since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. China is a major export market for U.S. aircraft, agriculture, semiconductor equipment/chips, gas turbines, and medical devices, and a top source of U.S. consumer goods and manufacturing inputs. At the same time, challenges that U.S. firms face from China include a lack of market access reciprocity, trade barriers in key areas, a strong PRC state role in commercial activity, and expanding industrial policies, export controls, and economic security and data rules. Trade issues raised by U.S. officials and executives since the 1990s have broadened into a U.S. government focus on strategic competition with the PRC. The executive branch and Congress have debated and adopted approaches, such as tariffs and restrictions on investment and market access, to counter PRC practices they say distort markets, hinder fair competition, and challenge U.S. economic leadership.
PRC Trade and Investment Terms
The PRC government controls or influences the purchase, financing, and price of top U.S. exports to China—aircraft, semiconductors, medical equipment, agriculture, and energy. It has sought to increase control of this trade and reduce its reliance on U.S. imports by diversifying trade with other countries and advancing industrial policies that exploit foreign commercial ties to develop PRC capabilities in top import sectors. For example, in aerospace, to meet PRC terms, some U.S. firms have partnered with and transferred advanced U.S. technology to PRC state firms to jointly develop a PRC single-aisle aircraft (C-919). The PRC government funds imports of U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment to support the development of China’s semiconductor industry. PRC policies have required firms to localize supply chains. PRC procurement rules in pharmaceuticals and medical devices have set fixed prices, which has increased cost pressures and encouraged firms in these sectors to produce in China.
The PRC has selectively opened its market and controlled foreign firms’ participation in ways that have capped the ability of such firms to compete. Foreign firms may initially fill PRC gaps with their products, services, and capabilities, but PRC plans set targets to displace such firms once China gains competencies. The PRC’s economic system integrates state and corporate interests, enabling the government to use trade tools (e.g., antidumping, antitrust, export controls market approvals, technical standards, and procurement) as well as economic coercion and IP theft to advantage PRC firms and economic goals. In strategic sectors, PRC policies have required foreign firms to set up joint ventures and transfer technology. The PRC government has supported some PRC firms in strategic areas, and funded overseas investment (including acquisitions of foreign firms) in priority areas—such as agriculture, biotechnology, critical minerals, and semiconductors—to gain capabilities, support PRC manufacturing, and expand in global markets.
Trade and Investment Trends
Goods: In 2025, China was the fourth-largest U.S. goods trading partner (with total trade at $414.7 billion), the fourth-largest U.S. export market ($106.3 billion), and the third-largest source of U.S. imports ($308.4 billion). 
U.S. exports to China fell 25.8.% over 2024, with drops in autos, beef, chemicals, natural gas, and soybeans.
U.S. imports from China fell 29.7% over 2024, with drops in electronics, toys, plastic articles, and furniture. (Overall U.S. imports increased 4.6% with a rise in imports of such items from Mexico, Taiwan, and others).
The U.S. trade deficit with China fell 32% ($93 billion) over 2024. China’s share of U.S. total imports was 9% (down from 13.4% in 2024). China’s share of U.S. total exports was 4.9% (down from 6.9% in 2024). (Figure 1.)
Services: In 2024, China accounted for 4.8% ($55 billion) of U.S. exports and 2.6% ($21.9 billion) of U.S. imports. (Figure 2.) Top U.S. exports to China are travel, technology and intellectual property (IP) licensing, and transport. 
Sales: In 2023, sales in China by majority U.S.-owned affiliates were $475.2 billion while U.S. sales by majority PRC-owned affiliates (incl. Hong Kong at $45 billion) were $153.1 billion. 
Investment: In 2024, the U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in China was $122.9 billion, and China’s FDI stock in the United States was $34.0 billion. (Figure 3.) In 2024, China accounted for 0.6% of total FDI stock in the United States; China accounted for 1.8% of U.S. FDI stock abroad. 
Investments in China by U.S. private equity (PE) funds fell from $140 billion in 2019 to under $1 billion in 2024. According to the Department of the Treasury, as of December 2025, U.S. investors held $359.1 billion in PRC (mainland China and Hong Kong) securities (a $79.2 billion increase over June 2025) while PRC holdings of U.S. securities were $1.8 trillion. The PRC was the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries ($951.3 billion) after Japan ($1.2 trillion). (This does not include PRC offshore holdings and proxy investments in U.S. Treasuries.)

Figure 1. U.S.-China Goods Trade (2001-2025)
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Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Figure 2. U.S.-China Services Trade (2001-2024) 
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Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Figure 3. U.S.-China FDI Position (2013-2024) 
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Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Key Issues Facing Congress 
Since 2017, U.S. national security policy has defined the PRC as a strategic competitor and U.S. economic policies have focused on reducing U.S. dependence on China. The Trump Administration’s national security strategy, issued in November 2025, does not name China as a competitor. It discusses “win[ning] the economic future” in Asia by rebalancing trade and countering “[p]redatory, state-directed subsidies and industrial strategies” and “[u]nfair trading practices” while “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” 
Tariffs: The executive branch’s use of tariffs as a tool to advance trade, foreign policy, and economic goals has prompted debates about congressional trade authorities and oversight over U.S. trade policy and the costs and benefits of using tariffs to address PRC practices of concern. Since spring 2025, U.S. and PRC officials have engaged in talks but have not reached a deal over tariffs related to the U.S. trade deficit and illicit fentanyl flows that President Trump imposed on China in February and March of 2025 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.). On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the President cannot use IEEPA to impose tariffs. President Trump lifted such tariffs and imposed a 10% global tariff for 150 days under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132). Tariffs that the United States has imposed on China since 2018 under other authorities remain in effect. In October 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) initiated a Section 301 investigation of China’s implementation of the 2020 U.S.-China Phase One deal. See CRS In Focus IF12990, U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview;  CRS In Focus IF12125, Section 301 and China: The U.S.-China Phase One Trade Deal; CRS In Focus IF12666, Section 301 and China: Shipping and Shipbuilding Issues; and CRS In Focus IF12958, Section 301 and China: Mature-Node Semiconductors.
In February 2026, the International Trade Commission (ITC)—acting under requirements in P.L. 119-74—opened an investigation to examine the impact of a revocation of China’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status on the U.S. economy. That same month, the ITC opened an investigation into PRC state support and pricing practices in biotechnology. H.R. 694/S. 206 would revoke PNTR tariff treatment for the PRC. See CRS In Focus IF12980, Permanent Normal Trade Relations and U.S.-China Tariffs. 
PRC Approaches. Since 2025, most PRC retaliation to U.S. tariffs has involved non-tariff actions as the PRC ran out of U.S. products to effectively tariff given the trade imbalance. The PRC has canceled orders, imposed market restrictions, and enacted export controls on U.S. production inputs. It expanded export controls to cover more trade and require disclosure about the end-use of PRC inputs, likely  increasing PRC visibility and leverage over U.S. firms. 
Negotiations: Such PRC actions appear to have fostered a dynamic in talks in which U.S. officials have sought to delay new PRC measures in exchange for concurrent delays in U.S. actions, potentially distracting from U.S. efforts to address systemic trade issues. The Trump Administration also delayed some trade actions in fall 2025 as part of its efforts to seek a trade deal and ahead of President Trump’s planned visit to China in late March 2026. For example, the Department of Commerce delayed for one year a rule to expand export controls to cover foreign affiliates of PRC firms on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Entity List. USTR also delayed imposing tariffs after finding PRC semiconductor and shipping policies actionable under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The PRC has offered to purchase items it typically buys but withheld during talks (e.g., aircraft, beef, and soybeans).
The Administration’s decision to allow Nvidia to export its H200 chips to the PRC (and set terms by which the U.S. government is to collect 25% of the sale’s proceeds) prompted debate in Congress in light of U.S. policies to restrict semiconductor trade with China. Former U.S. officials criticized negotiating national security decisions in exchange for trade concessions, saying that such actions contradict past U.S. practice. See CRS Report R48642, U.S. Export Controls and China: Advanced Semiconductors. 
Other Actions. PRC industrial policies are driving China’s overcapacity, exports, and overseas investment in sectors such as electric vehicles. To address concerns about data security and the PRC state’s ties to PRC firms, in 2025, the Commerce Department issued rules that restrict the use of PRC connected technology in vehicles. Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60) restrict some U.S. technology investment in China, codifying provisions in President Biden’s Executive Order 14105. President Trump announced in 2025 that TikTok’s U.S. operations are to be run by a joint venture majority-owned and -controlled by U.S. persons in which TikTok’s parent, ByteDance, and its affiliates have up to a 20% stake. P.L. 118-50 (Div. H and Div. I) restricts TikTok and other PRC-tied digital platforms in the U.S. market.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11284/IF11284.34.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11284.html
IF10951,"Problematic Substance Use in the Military: Prevention, Treatment, and Research Efforts",2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T13:37:55Z,Active,Resources,"Bryce H. P. Mendez, Bryce H. P. Mendez, Quadre Nichols","Military Personnel, Compensation & Health Care","In 1982, Congress enacted requirements for the Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, to “identify, treat, and rehabilitate members of the armed forces who are dependent on drugs or alcohol.” (10 U.S.C. §1090). Since then, Congress has held a sustained interest in understanding federal efforts and identifying options to address substance use and misuse, particularly among servicemembers. 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §912a) and DOD policy generally prohibit the possession, distribution, sale, or use of certain substances and the misuse of certain substances. In light of this prohibition, DOD operates programs focused on prevention, treatment, and research to address illicit drug use and misuse of alcohol, prescription drugs, and other substances. 
In April 2025, the Trump Administration published its Statement of Drug Policy Priorities, which outlines federal priorities and objectives to address “illicit drug use that plagues our Nation” and acknowledges “the complexity of substance use disorder and addiction.” These priorities, among others, seek to “Reduce the Number of Overdose Fatalities, with a Focus on Fentanyl,” “Prevent Drug Use Before It Starts,” “Provide Treatment That Leads to Long-Term Recovery,” and “Innovate in Research and Data to Support Drug Control Strategies.”  
Terminology
Problematic substance use. A DOD term that refers to “the use of any substance in a manner that puts the user at risk of failing in their responsibilities to mission or family and that is considered unlawful by regulation, policy or law.” (DOD Instruction 1010.04) 
Substance misuse. “A pattern of substance use marked by recurrent significant social, occupational, legal, or interpersonal adverse consequences.” (DOD Instruction 1010.04)
Substance use disorder. “A cluster of physiological, behavioral, and cognitive symptoms associated with the continued use of substances despite substance-related problems, distress, and/or impairment, such as impaired control and risky use.” (American Psychological Association) 

Problematic Substance Use Trends in the Military
According to the 2018 DOD Health-Related Behaviors Survey, 1.3% of active duty servicemembers reported the use of any illicit drugs (marijuana, synthetic cannabis or stimulants, inhalants to get high, or other illegal drugs) in the past year. Servicemembers also reported the following substance use behaviors within the past year: misusing prescription drugs (1.4%), using nonprescription cough or cold medicine to get high (0.4%), and using nonprescription anabolic steroids (0.2%). In addition, servicemembers reported binge drinking (34.0%) and heavy drinking (9.9%) in the past month.
The overall annual rates for new diagnoses (i.e., incidence rates) of alcohol or substance abuse disorders among active duty servicemembers have decreased from 2007 through 2024 (see Figure 1). The incidence rate for alcohol-related disorders decreased from 1,663 per 100,000 person-years in 2007 to 1,088 per 100,000 in 2024. The incidence rate for substance-related disorders decreased from 484 per 100,000 in 2013 to 200 per 100,000 in 2024. In 2022, DOD estimated that 2.1% of active duty servicemembers had a diagnosis of an alcohol or substance use-related disorder in the past year (i.e., prevalence estimate). Prevalence estimates ranged across the military services from 1.1% (Air Force) to 3.1% (Army) and were generally higher in males (2.2%) than females (1.6%).
Figure 1. Incidence Rates of Alcohol and Substance Abuse in Active Duty Servicemembers, 2007-2024
Figure is interactive in the HTML version of this report.
/
Source: CRS graphic based on analysis of Medical Surveillance Monthly Reports from March 2018, August 2021, December 2024, and December 2025.
Notes: Person-year is a measure of time a defined population is at risk for alcohol and substance abuse.
In 2024, DOD estimated that substance use disorders were among the primary reasons for medical encounters by active duty servicemembers, accounting for 2.7% of all outpatient visits and 15.5% of hospital bed days. In 2025, DOD reported that the number of fatal and nonfatal drug overdoses among servicemembers have “dropped by more than 40% from 2021 to 2023.” DOD also reported that between 2019 and 2023, the average fatal overdose rate among servicemembers was 4.4 per 100,000 and asserted that “nationally, that number is about 29.2.”
Problematic Substance Use and Military Readiness
Problematic substance use can create negative effects on military readiness. These effects can include impacts to servicemember health and deployability, cognitive functioning, and workplace safety. Extended absences or unplanned attrition can impact a unit’s mission by creating staffing and capability gaps, disrupting unit cohesion, reducing morale, and perpetuating mental health stigma.
DOD Problematic Substance Use Prevention, Compliance, and Disciplinary Policies
Table 1 lists selected aspects of DOD’s problematic substance use policies, which are implemented by various DOD components and military services. These policies focus on administrative and medical approaches to prevention, screening, treatment, compliance, and retention or separation procedures.
Table 1. Selected Aspects of DOD Problematic Substance Use Policies
Conduct substance use education and awareness activities
Implement a urinalysis drug and breath alcohol testing program
Conduct regular and systematic medical screening for at-risk problematic substance use and gambling disorders
Provide evidence-based substance use disorder services to eligible servicemembers
Return servicemembers to full duty following substance use disorder treatment, if feasible
Separate servicemembers who knowingly misuse drugs

Sources: CRS analysis of DOD Instruction 1010.01, “Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program,” 2025; DOD Instruction 1010.04, “Problematic Substance Use and Gambling Disorder,” 2025; and DOD Instruction 1010.16, “Technical Procedures for the Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program,” 2025.
Prevention Efforts
DOD policy mandates that servicemembers receive annual training and information on the “prevention, identification, and awareness of problematic substance use and gambling disorder risks to health, and military readiness.” Each military service operates an integrated primary prevention program that provides a range of education and training services for servicemembers, health care providers, and unit commanders. Prevention efforts also include the anonymous Drug Take Back program at “all military pharmacies in [the] United States,” active health surveillance for at-risk servicemembers, prescription drug monitoring program, naloxone distribution program, and annual screenings for problematic substance use behaviors. 
Treatment Options
Servicemembers may receive treatment for substance use disorders at certain military treatment facilities (MTFs) or through civilian health care providers participating in TRICARE. Federal statute (10 U.S.C. §1079(a)(12)) authorizes TRICARE to cover services or supplies unless determined “not medically or psychologically necessary.” These services may include inpatient care, intensive outpatient programs, office-based outpatient treatment, partial hospitalization programs, and residential programs. Evaluation and treatment for substance use or misuse can be self-initiated, or referred by a supervisor, co-worker, or family member. To reduce stigma when servicemembers voluntarily access mental health care and substance misuse treatment, DOD policy authorizes MTF health care providers to notify a member’s supervisor only when consent is provided or under a limited set of “exigent circumstances” (e.g., risks of self-harm, harm to others, or harm to mission; designated personnel, inpatient admission/discharge; command-directed evaluation; or other special circumstances). 
Medical Research Efforts
DOD has conducted medical research on the clinical aspects of substance use or misuse, its impact on military readiness, and its comorbidity with other health issues (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury). Congress has funded many of these research efforts through the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDMRP). Between FY2014 and FY2025, Congress appropriated a total of $40 million to DOD for “alcohol and substance abuse disorders” research under the CDMRP. These research projects have typically focused on new treatment targets, novel and repurposed medications, vaccines and other immunotherapies, drug-drug combinations, and approaches to counteract opioid-related overdose. For FY2026, Congress appropriated $4 million for CDMRP-funded research on “alcohol and substance abuse disorders.” DOD may also use other research funds appropriated to other accounts (e.g., Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the military departments) to conduct substance use disorder research.
Considerations for Congress
Congress may pursue several lines of inquiry in considering problematic substance use in the military and support congressional oversight of DOD programs and initiatives to prevent substance use and misuse.
Section 724 of P.L. 118-31 required DOD to provide an annual report (for five years after enactment) to the House and Senate armed services committees on the number of annual overdoses (including demographic and utilization data) among members of the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force. Do these reports adequately support congressional oversight efforts on problematic substance use in the military?
In 2020 and 2024, the DOD Inspector General identified MTF staffing shortages as a contributor, among other factors, to beneficiary challenges with accessing mental health care. How has DOD addressed these staffing shortages? 
The UCMJ and DOD policy mandate disciplinary actions, including separation from military service, for servicemembers who knowingly misuse certain substances. Should the military services offer servicemembers more or less opportunities to obtain treatment prior to initiating disciplinary action?
What mental health or care coordination services, if any, does DOD offer to servicemembers–and those transitioning to civilian life–with problematic substance use?",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10951/IF10951.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10951.html
IF10349,Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs Funding for FY2026,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T15:07:55Z,Active,Resources,"Bryce H. P. Mendez, Bryce H. P. Mendez","Military Personnel, Compensation & Health Care, Veterans & Military Health Care, Defense Appropriations, Defense Budgets & Appropriations","Members of Congress are frequently lobbied to add funding to annual defense appropriation legislation for certain medical research programs on a wide variety of diseases and topics. In addressing annual appropriations bills, Members frequently seek information on enacted levels for such funding under the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDMRP).
CDMRP Administration and Funding
The CDMRP is a Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, program that receives congressional appropriations explicitly for biomedical research in specific, congressionally identified health matters. As such, it has not been part of the President’s budget request for DOD. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), with oversight from the Defense Health Agency, administers the CDMRP and is responsible for awarding and managing competitive grants.
Congress typically inserts CDMRP funding as Undistributed Medical Research in the Defense Health Program’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DHP RDT&E) account in the annual DOD appropriation. Congressional documents accompanying the annual defense appropriation act (i.e., conference report or explanatory statement) typically identify the specific research areas for a given fiscal year. 
Division A, Title VI, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75), inserted $1.27 billion into the RDT&E account for CDMRP. This amount comprises 51% of the overall DHP RDT&E, as reflected in Figure 1. Biomedical research conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or other military research agencies is not included in this account. 
Table 1 lists the FY2026 CDMRP funding amounts for specific medical research areas. 
CDMRP Funding Requests
Members may request funding for medical research during the annual defense appropriations process. The appropriations committees typically send Members a memorandum with instructions for submitting requests. Both House and Senate committee reports may specify funding associated with certain research. An exchange of amendments between the houses (or a conference committee) typically resolves any differences between the committee reports.
The medical research programs funded under the CDMRP are not static. Funding may be provided for conditions not funded in previous years. For example, funding for tick-borne disease research was provided in FY2016-FY2020, but no associated funds were provided in FY2015.
Figure 1. Total DHP RDT&E Appropriation, FY2026
/
Source: CRS analysis of Division A, Title VI, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75).
Program Announcements and Awards
USAMRDC issues periodic program announcements to alert researchers of CDMRP grant opportunities. The program announcements include detailed descriptions of funding mechanisms, evaluation criteria, submission requirements, and deadlines. Program announcements are listed on the Grants.gov website. The CDMRP website (https://cdmrp.health.mil) also lists program announcements, information on awarded grants and other resources such as related publications, brochures about individual research programs, and annual reports.
Peer Reviewed Cancer Research Program
Peer Reviewed Cancer Research Program (PRCRP) funding supports grants for medical research on various cancers and related treatments. For FY2026, Congress appropriated $165 million for the PRCRP, separate from other CDMRP funding for breast, glioblastoma, kidney, lung, melanoma, ovarian, pancreatic, prostate, and rare cancers. Table 2 lists 20 cancers and treatments eligible for FY2026 PRCRP funding.
Peer Reviewed Medical Research Program 
The program with the highest annual funding level under the CDMRP is generally the Peer Reviewed Medical Research Program (PRMRP). For FY2026, Congress appropriated $370 million for the PRMRP. PRMRP funding supports grants for medical research on a number of conditions or treatment modalities that are of “clear scientific merit and direct relevance to military health.” Congress specifies an annual list of eligible conditions or treatments that typically includes a few changes from year to year as medical research priorities shift. Table 3 lists 52 conditions or treatments eligible for FY2026 PRMRP funding.
Table 1. CDMRP Funding, FY2026
(in millions of dollars)
Program Title
FY2026

Alcohol and Substance Abuse Disorders
$4.0

Alzheimer’s
$15.0

Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis
$40.0

Arthritis
$10.0

Autism
$8.0

Bone Marrow Failure
$7.5

Breast Cancer
$145.0

Combat Readiness-Medical
$5.0

Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy
$12.5

Epilepsy
$12.0

Hearing Restoration
$5.0

Joint Warfighter Medical
$10.0

Kidney Cancer
$15.0

Lung Cancer
$20.0

Lupus
$10.0

Melanoma
$40.0

Military Burn
$10.0

Multiple Sclerosis
$15.0

Neurofibromatosis
$25.0

Ovarian Cancer
$50.0

Pancreatic Cancer
$20.0

Parkinson’s
$16.0

Peer-reviewed Cancer
$165.0

Peer-reviewed Medical
$370.0

Peer-reviewed Orthopedic
$20.0

Prostate Cancer
$75.0

Rare Cancers
$17.5

Reconstructive Transplant
$12.0

Spinal Cord
$33.0

Tickborne Disease
$7.0

Toxic Exposures
$15.0

Traumatic Brain Injury/Psychological Health
$40.5

Tuberous Sclerosis Complex
$10.0

Vision
$10.0

TOTAL
$1,270.0

Source: Explanatory Statement (pp. H1569-H1570) accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75).
Table 2. PRCRP-Eligible Cancer Topics, FY2026
Bladder Cancer
Mesothelioma

Blood Cancers
Metastatic Cancers

Brain Cancer
Myeloma

Colorectal Cancer
Neuroblastoma

Endometrial Cancer
Neuroendocrine Tumors

Esophageal Cancer
Pediatric, Adolescent, and Young Adult Cancers

Germ Cell Cancers
Pediatric Brain Tumors

Glioblastoma
Sarcoma

Liver Cancer
Stomach Cancer

Lymphoma
Thyroid Cancer

Source: Explanatory Statement (p. H1571) accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75). 
Table 3. PRMRP-Eligible Conditions, FY2026
Angelman Syndrome
Intranasal Ketamine Anesthetics

Burn Pit Exposure
Maternal Mental Health

Celiac Disease
Mitochondrial Disease

Congenital Cytomegalovirus
Musculoskeletal Health

Dystonia
Myotonic Dystrophy

Eating Disorders
Pancreatitis

Eczema
Peripheral Neuropathy

Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome
Polycystic Kidney Disease

Endometriosis
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

Fibrous Dysplasia
Prader-Willi Syndrome

Food Allergies
Proteomics

Fragile X
Pulmonary Fibrosis

Frontotemporal Degeneration
Respiratory Health

Gambling Addiction
Rett Syndrome

Hepatitis B
Sarcoidosis

Hereditary and Acquired Ataxias
Scleroderma

Hermansky-Pudlack Syndrome
Sickle Cell Disease

Hydrocephalus
Sleep Disorders

Hypoxia
Spinal Muscular Atrophy

Hypertropic Dyschromia
Suicide Prevention

Inflammatory Bowel Disease
Tuberculosis

Interstitial Cystitis
Von Hippel-Lindau Disease

Accelerated Aging Processes Associated with Military Service
Infertility Associated with Military Aviators/Aviation Personnel

Brain Injury Impact on Cardiac Health
Myalgic Encephalomyelitis / Chronic Fatigue Syndrome

Facioscapulohumeral Muscular Dystrophy
Orthotics and Prosthetics Outcomes

Hereditary Hemorrhagic Telangiectasia


Pediatric Acute-Onset Neuropsychiatric Syndrome (PANS) & Pediatric Autoimmune Neuropsychiatric Disorder Associated with Streptococcus (PANDAS)

Source: Explanatory Statement (p. H1571) accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10349/IF10349.19.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10349.html
IF10250,The Philippines,2026-03-04T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T13:10:39Z,Active,Resources,"Ben Dolven, William Piekos",East Asia & Pacific,"Overview and Recent Developments
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines maintain a relationship that includes a bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, close people-to-people ties, and many shared strategic and economic interests. The United States administered the Philippines as a colonial territory (1898-1946) after 300 years of Spanish rule. Over 4 million people in the United States identify as Filipino alone or in combination, and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs operates its only office outside of the United States in Manila, serving thousands of veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces. The United States is the Philippines’ third-largest trading partner, after China and Japan, and its largest export market.
The Philippines has long played an important role in U.S. Asia policy as a security and counterterrorism partner. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) commits the two countries to help defend each other against external armed attack. Tensions between the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) over maritime claims in the South China Sea are a potential flashpoint. Trump Administration officials have reaffirmed the “ironclad” U.S. commitment to the Philippines, including by supporting the Philippines’ military modernization, deploying advanced missile systems in combined exercises, and initiating a new bilateral task force to deter PRC coercion in the South China Sea. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2026 (P.L. 119-60), Congress authorized up to $2.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and up to $1 billion in loans for military sales for the Philippines.
In July 2025, Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. visited the United States, meeting with President Donald Trump and the U.S. secretaries of defense and state. In addition to reaffirming the importance of the alliance, the two sides announced that the United States would provide over $60 million in new foreign assistance to support energy, maritime, and economic growth programs. In September 2025, the United States announced $250 million in foreign assistance to the Philippines to improve health systems, disease detection and response, and maternal and child health services.
Congress has provided oversight, policy direction, and funding to shape U.S. ties with the Philippines, which is located in the “first island chain” in the Pacific and could play a key role in a regional conflict. Members also have sought to shape U.S. policy on human rights and counter-terrorism in the Philippines, as well as security cooperation related to the South China Sea and other contingencies.
Philippines Politics
In 2022, Filipinos elected Marcos Jr. as president and Sara Duterte-Carpio as vice president. Marcos’s father, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., ruled the country from 1965 to 1986, including through martial law from 1972 until he was ousted by the 1986 People Power Revolution. Sara Duterte is the daughter of former President Rodrigo Duterte (in office 2016-2022). The Philippine constitution limits both the president and vice president, who are elected on separate tickets, to one six-year term. The Philippines held midterm elections in May 2025, in which Marcos-aligned candidates fared poorly compared to pre-election polling. Prior to the election, in March 2025, Rodrigo Duterte was extradited to the International Criminal Court to face charges of crimes against humanity for his anti-drug war; he was formally charged in September.
The U.S.-Philippines Alliance
The MDT undergirds security cooperation between the two countries, and the Philippines generally has been a staunch supporter of an active U.S. presence in the region. In 1992—in the face of vocal Philippine opposition to U.S. military bases and during a period of relative peace and stability following the fall of the Soviet Union—the U.S. military withdrew from the two bases it had operated since the Philippine-American War (1899-1902). In 1998, the two countries signed a Visiting Forces Agreement. In 2014, with increasing tensions in the South China Sea, the U.S. and Philippine governments signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), allowing the rotational presence of U.S. military forces, aircraft, and ships at five locations in the Philippines; in February 2023, the two countries agreed to increase the number of Philippine military bases open to U.S. forces to nine. 
Figure 1. The Philippines at a Glance
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In May 2023, the two allies established new Bilateral Defense Guidelines, which aim to help modernize Philippine defense capabilities, deepen interoperability, enhance bilateral planning and information-sharing, and combat transnational and nonconventional threats. The guidelines appear to reinforce treaty obligations, stating that an armed attack “anywhere in the South China Sea,” on either party’s “armed forces—which includes both nations’ Coast Guards—aircraft, or public vessels, would invoke mutual defense commitments” under the MDT.
The Philippines has been one of the largest recipients of U.S. military assistance in the East Asia-Pacific region, including FMF and assistance under the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative. U.S. military and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) personnel conduct regular joint military exercises and maritime patrols, collaborate on counterterrorism, and carry out humanitarian activities. In 2025, over 14,000 primarily U.S. and AFP soldiers participated in the Balikatan annual bilateral exercise in the Philippines. Small contingents of Australian and Japanese troops also joined. The exercises included the deployment of the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) in the Luzon Strait near Taiwan. The Philippines has announced its intention to purchase a U.S. Typhon missile system, spurring China to warn that the Philippines is sparking a regional “arms race.”
The Marcos administration has strengthened security relations with U.S. allies and partners, including Australia, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Vietnam, and India. In April 2024, a U.S.-Japan-Philippines summit was held in Washington, DC, to promote trilateral cooperation in multiple areas, including security, infrastructure investment in the Philippines, and joint technology development. The Philippines signed a reciprocal access agreement with Japan in July 2024 and a status of visiting forces agreement with New Zealand in April 2025.
South China Sea
Tensions between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea have risen over the past two decades, particularly since 2012 when the PRC seized de facto control of a disputed reef known as Scarborough Shoal. China has enlarged disputed features in the Spratly archipelago, including within the Philippines’ claimed exclusive economic zone (which the Philippines refers to as the West Philippine Sea), placed military assets on these features, and interfered with Philippine commercial and military activity. Since 2019, PRC vessels have regularly congregated near Philippine-occupied land features and harassed Philippine fishing, coast guard, and other vessels.
Since 2023, China Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels have escalated their interference with Philippine boats attempting to conduct resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands chain. The Philippines posts a cadre of marines on a now-derelict Philippine Navy ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, which it grounded on the shoal in 1999. After several incidents during attempts to resupply the Sierra Madre, in July 2024, the two sides agreed to deescalate tensions around Second Thomas Shoal and allow for the vessel’s resupply. In 2025, tensions around Scarborough Shoal resulted in a collision between two PRC vessels that were harassing a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship. 
In 2013, the Philippine government sought arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against aspects of China’s claims and behavior in the South China Sea. In 2016, an UNCLOS tribunal concluded, among other findings, that China’s maritime claims based on “historical rights” have no basis in international law, and that China had violated Philippine rights in the South China Sea. China did not participate in the proceedings and declared the verdict “null and void,” claiming the tribunal had no legal standing in the case. 
Human Rights Concerns
Human rights challenges in the Philippines include extrajudicial killings carried out by the military and police, lack of protections for press freedom and the safety of journalists, a weak judicial system, and corruption. The State Department, in a 2023 report updated pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2023 (P.L. 117-328, Section 7019(e)), indicated the AFP “has made progress on human rights,” although “some AFP personnel, particularly those acting outside the chain of command, commit human rights abuses and violations.” Observers also have noted ongoing restrictions and harassment of journalists.
As a consequence of former President Duterte’s war on illegal drugs—which resulted in an estimated 6,000-30,000 extrajudicial killings—Congress suspended counternarcotics assistance to the Philippines in 2016, except for demand reduction, maritime law enforcement, or transnational interdiction. Some human rights groups allege that extrajudicial killings related to anti-drug operations have continued under Marcos, though at a lesser rate. 
Separatist and Terrorist Movements 
The Philippines government has long battled Muslim armed separatist and terrorist groups on the southern island of Mindanao and in the Sulu archipelago. The U.S. military has provided noncombat support for counterterrorism efforts in the southern Philippines since 2002, including against the Abu Sayyaf Group, which the United States designated a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1997. In 2018, the State Department added ISIS-Philippines (renamed ISIS-East Asia in 2020) to the FTO list. The AFP has restricted terrorist groups’ ability to operate, though various groups remain an ongoing, if diminished, threat.
Congressional Interests 
Some Members of the 118th and 119th Congresses have introduced bills intended to support the U.S.-Philippine alliance, Philippine security, and bilateral ties, including the United States-Philippines Partnership Act of 2024 (S. 4703), Filipino Veterans Fairness Act of 2025 (H.R. 6013), and Filipino Veterans Family Reunification Act of 2025 (H.R. 1053; S. 461). Congress approved National Security Investment Programs funding and FMF in FY2026 Department of State appropriations legislation (Division F of P.L. 119-75), and an increase for the Philippines within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s International Security Cooperation Programs in FY2026 Department of Defense appropriations (Division A of P.L. 119-75).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10250/IF10250.69.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10250.html
R48732,ROAD to Housing Act of 2025,2026-03-03T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T14:37:57Z,Active,Reports,"Katie Jones, Henry G. Watson, Maggie McCarty, Libby Perl, Darryl E. Getter","Homeownership & Housing Finance, Homelessness, Housing-Related Assistance to Communities & Tribes, Public & Assisted Housing","The Renewing Opportunity in the American Dream to Housing Act of 2025 (S. 2651, also known as the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025) was introduced and reported to the Senate on August 1, 2025. The bill contains eight titles comprised of 40 sections, which address several housing policy topics.
The ROAD to Housing Act of 2025 was incorporated into Division I of a Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (S. 2296) by S.Amdt. 3901 to S.Amdt. 3748. On October 9, 2025, this amended version of the National Defense Authorization Act was passed by the Senate. The text of the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025 in S. 2296, as amended, differs in several respects from the text of S. 2651; these differences are noted in the section summaries in this report. 
Most of the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025 sections contained in S. 2296 are similar to previously introduced stand-alone bills; CRS notes similar or identical stand-alone bills from the 117th, 118th, and 119th Congresses at the end of each section’s summary. If similar bills were introduced over multiple Congresses, only the most recent introduction is noted. 
On March 2, 2026, the Senate invoked cloture on H.R. 6644, the House-passed Housing for the 21st Century Act. A substitute amendment was then introduced in the Senate; it included many provisions of the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025. (For more information on H.R. 6644, see CRS Report R48849, Housing for the 21st Century Act.) This report does not include a discussion of the substitute amendment introduced on March 2, 2026.
Major Components of the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025
Title I contains one section regarding changes to housing counseling requirements. 
Title II contains 13 sections predominantly concerning housing supply. The sections in Title II would seek to incentivize changes in local governments’ zoning and land use policies, authorize new housing construction and rehabilitation grant programs, modify the Community Reinvestment Act, and reduce federal environmental review requirements, among other provisions.
Title III contains four sections concerning manufactured and modular housing. The sections in Title III would amend the statutory definition of a “manufactured home,” direct a study of modular building codes, adjust home loan insurance programs, and authorize a competitive grant program for activities in support of manufactured home communities, among other provisions.
Title IV contains five sections: three related to homeownership and two related to federal rental assistance. Title IV would direct studies on barriers to small mortgage lending and change appraisal requirements. Title IV would also expand an existing savings plan for tenants receiving rental assistance and modify inspection requirements for the Housing Choice Voucher program, among other provisions.
Title V contains six sections which authorize, reauthorize, or otherwise reform existing programs: the Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery, the HOME Investment Partnerships program, the Rural Housing Service, the Moving to Work demonstration, the Continuum of Care program, and Emergency Solutions Grants.
Title VI contains three sections related to veterans and housing. Title VI would add disclosures about VA-guaranteed loans to conventional and FHA-insured loan applications, and would change the way in which income eligibility is determined for a veterans homelessness assistance program.
Title VII contains five sections, four related to congressional oversight and one related to appraisals. The sections in this title would require regular testimony from several federal housing officials, increase reporting requirements to Congress, and establish a new Inspector General. Title VII would also provide recourse for unsupported appraisal reports, addressing concerns regarding biased or discriminatory home appraisals.
Title VIII contains three sections requiring data sharing, interagency cooperation, and a study of work requirements in federal rental assistance programs.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48732/R48732.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48732.html
R47240,Navigating the Appropriations Status Table,2026-03-03T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T17:38:06Z,Active,Reports,"Carol Wilson, Ben Leubsdorf, Ben Leubsdorf, Justin Murray, Carol Wilson",Budget & Appropriations Procedure,"The CRS Appropriations Status Table is an online tool for tracking legislation that provides annual funding for federal programs, projects, and activities. It displays the status of regular appropriations bills, continuing resolutions, supplemental appropriations measures, and budget resolutions. This report describes how to access and navigate information presented on the Appropriations Status Table. A companion video is available on CRS.gov.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47240/R47240.9.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R47240.html
R45003,Muslim Holidays: Fact Sheet,2026-03-03T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T11:37:52Z,Active,Reports,Maya V. Thomas,,"Islam is one of the three major Abrahamic faiths, alongside Judaism and Christianity. According to the 2020 U.S. Religion Census, the number of followers of Islam in the United States has risen to 4.5 million. Muslims annually observe two major holidays: Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. This fact sheet describes the two holidays’ significance and American Muslims’ observance of them and addresses the ways the holidays have been recognized by elected officials. The fact sheet also briefly describes two other widely celebrated Muslim holidays.
This fact sheet is designed to assist congressional offices with work related to Islamic holidays. It contains sample speeches and remarks from the Congressional Record, presidential proclamations and remarks, and selected historical and cultural resources. This is part of a series of Congressional Research Service fact sheets on religious holidays in the United States.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45003/R45003.16.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R45003.html
R41364,Capital Gains Tax Options: Behavioral Responses and Revenues,2026-03-03T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T12:53:13Z,Active,Reports,Jane G. Gravelle,,"Compared with most other tax provisions, the potential revenue gain scored for an increase in capital gains taxes is strongly affected by behavioral responses assumed by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the Department of the Treasury. As an illustration, the Obama Administration estimated in February 2010 that allowing the 2003 tax cuts enacted in the George W. Bush Administration for capital gains to expire would have raised $16 billion of revenue in FY2019. Yet, based on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections in January 2010, the effective capital gains tax was 13.3% in 2008 and would have increased to 17.9% in 2019; applying the differential in these rates to the realizations in 2019 would have produced a revenue difference of $40 billion. Although some of this differential could arise from different forecasts, assumptions about behavioral responses are the main reason for the reduction in projected revenues.
Because these behavioral responses limit the potential revenue scored from a tax increase on capital gains and because of concerns some have raised that most income of very high-income individuals is in the form of capital gains (whether accrued or realized), proposals have been advanced to tax capital gains currently (as accrued) by marking to market publicly traded securities and imposing a look-back tax on difficult-to-value assets. Such a change could face a number of difficulties; thus it is important to understand the evidence of the behavioral responses. The analysis in this report suggests the Department of the Treasury’s projections and those of the JCT, absent a change in their realizations response, may understate revenue gains from increasing capital gains tax rates.
Realizations responses in revenue projections by the revenue-estimating agencies (Joint Committee on Taxation and Treasury) were publicly discussed at the end of the 1980s, in the midst of a contentious debate. The larger the absolute value of the elasticity (the percentage change in realizations divided by the percentage change in taxes), the smaller the revenue gain; with elasticities larger than one in absolute value, a loss would occur. Estimated elasticities in the literature prior to 1990 ranged from 0.3 to almost 3.8, leaving limited guidance for revenue-estimating agencies. JCT used an elasticity of 0.76, whereas Treasury used an elasticity of one.
At the time, concerns were raised that there were serious problems with this evidence. Perhaps the most significant concern was that larger results from studies of individuals reflected a timing or transitory response (high-income taxpayers with variable income chose to realize gains when tax rates were temporarily low). This transitory response is not appropriate for assessing a permanent change.
Data analysis and studies since that time suggest the permanent elasticity is considerably lower than it appeared in 1990. The surge in realizations in 1986 as a capital gains tax rate increase was preannounced provided compelling evidence of the importance of a transitory response. A 2025 CRS analysis of the limits of realizations (which cannot exceed accruals in the long run) suggested a maximum long-run (or permanent) capital gains elasticity is between 0.29 to 0.45 in absolute value (elasticities are negative), with an estimate at the midpoint of positive transaction costs of 0.34. At a 0.34 elasticity, the revenue-maximizing tax rate would be 65%. This estimate for the capital gains elasticity assumes that in the absence of taxes and transactions costs all gains would be realized every year. This assumption is likely high, as there are numerous reasons aside from taxes and trading costs that would cause individuals to retain assets. If instead it is assumed that 80% of gains would be realized, the maximum elasticity ranges from 0.22 to-0.16 for positive transactions costs, with an estimate at the midpoint of positive transactions costs of 0.19. Several new econometric studies, using new techniques to isolate the permanent response, suggested elasticities of around 0.5 or less. Other recent studies suggested larger responses. The JCT appears to maintain its original assumption, and Treasury’s response has been reduced to be similar to JCT’s; both appear to exceed the realizations limit. 
CRS simulations indicate an increase in capital gains tax rates of five percentage points would have raised $69 billion on a static basis for 2025, about $55 billion using the 0.34 elasticity and $44 billion using the 0.19 elasticity. The JCT estimates likely would be around $20 billion, reflecting a 0.68 elasticity. Taxing gains on an accrual basis would eliminate this response in the long run and gain additional revenues on currently unrealized gains.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R41364/R41364.14.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R41364.html
IG10046,Middle East Natural Gas,2026-03-03T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T07:55:44Z,Active,Infographics,Michael Ratner,"Middle East, Middle East & North Africa, Natural Gas, International Energy Issues","/
Middle East Natural Gas

As natural gas becomes a more global commodity, transporting it by ship in liquefied form (LNG) is considered essential for its continued development as a global fuel. The Middle East is a pivotal gas supplier because of its location between the European and Asian markets, and because it accounts for almost a quarter of world LNG supplies. The region also has three waterway transport bottlenecks, which given the regional conflicts have made LNG shipping in the region more risky.

Sanctions have prevented Iran from internationalLNG exports.
South Pars/North Dome World’s largest natural gasfield. Jointly owned by Iranand Qatar.
Gas pipelines, liquefaction / export facilities, Regasification / import facilities, gas storage, gas fields, operating as of 11/30/2023
Gas Reserves, Gas Production, Gas Consumption, Gas Exports (pipeline and LNG)
Middle East global, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, Oman, and Other Middle East
All data from 2024. Gas Reserves = Proven gas reserves. TCM = Trillion cubic meters. BCM = Billion cubic meters. UAE = United Arab Emirates. ME = Middle East.
Member of Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). The GECF is an intergovernmental organization that gathers and disseminates information and data on the gas sector for its members. It has been referred to in the press as “gas-OPEC,” as it has similarities to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for oil.

Information prepared by Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy; Calvin DeSouza, Geospatial Information Systems Analyst; and Amber Wilhelm, Visual Information Specialist on March 3, 2026.
Sources:  1. S&P Global, “Commodity Midstream Essentials Gold Worldwide” (accessed November 30, 2023).  2.  IHS (2019).  3.  U.S. Energy  Information Administration (EIA), “World Oil Transit Chokepoint,” June 25, 2024. Map geography: U.S. Department of State. Gas reserves, production, consumption, and exports are from CEDIGAZ, an industry subscription database..",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10046/IG10046.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10046.html
IF13162,U.S. International Food Assistance Primer,2026-03-03T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T15:22:59Z,Active,Resources,"Emily M. McCabe, Rhoda Margesson, Benjamin Tsui","Foreign Assistance, Agricultural Trade & Food Aid, International Food Aid","Global food insecurity generally refers to varying degrees of hunger and malnutrition among populations worldwide stemming from a lack of regular access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food. In 2026, an estimated 318 million people globally will face acute hunger. The drivers of food insecurity are often interrelated, far reaching, and lasting. They may include conflict and forced displacement, natural disasters and effects of climate change, economic downturns and high prices, and public health events. 
Congress has authorized and appropriated funds for international food assistance for over 70 years. In FY2024 (latest data available) such assistance totaled nearly $5.5 billion. The United States has provided international food assistance for a range of reasons, including to respond to global humanitarian crises, support international development, and serve strategic interests, such as promoting political stability and strengthening agricultural markets. In addition, the purchase of U.S.-sourced commodities (e.g., beans, corn, vegetable oils, wheat) and absorption of food surpluses through in-kind food assistance programs have directly benefitted U.S. agriculture. Many U.S.-funded international food assistance programs are implemented through partners, including multilateral entities, such as the UN World Food Program (WFP), and bilateral contracts with nongovernmental organizations. The Administration’s decision to shutter the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as of July 1, 2025, shifted the implementation of U.S. international food assistance to different Department of State (State) bureaus and potentially other agencies. These structural changes may affect the delivery of international emergency food assistance, potentially reduce program scope and funding, and impact program efficiency and effectiveness.  
Food Assistance Programs 
USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have historically administered U.S. international food assistance programs. Statutory authorities for international food programs are found in the Food for Peace Act (FFPA, 7 U.S.C. §§1691 et seq.) and related agriculture legislation, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, 22 U.S.C. §§2151 et seq.), and the Global Food Security Act of 2016 (GFSA, 22 U.S.C. §§9301 et seq.). The House and Senate Agriculture Committees have jurisdiction over programs authorized by the FFPA and related agriculture legislation, while the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees have jurisdiction over programs authorized by the FAA and GFSA. Key programs are described below.
Farm Bill-Authorized Programs
International food assistance programs authorized by the FFPA and related agriculture legislation are generally amended and reauthorized by periodic farm bills, most recently by the 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334). Subsequent legislation has extended the authorizations through FY2026. These programs are usually funded by Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Acts (Agriculture appropriations) or from USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation’s (CCC’s) borrowing authority. Most of these programs require the use of U.S.-sourced commodities and are subject to cargo preference laws.
Food for Peace Title II Grants (FFP, 7 U.S.C. §§1721 et seq.). Under FFP, the U.S. government provides U.S.-sourced commodities to food-insecure populations overseas via qualifying implementing partners. Historically, USAID administered FFP and allocated the majority of FFP funding for emergency food assistance, with a required minimum of $365 million made available each year for nonemergency assistance. FFP derives its authority from Title II of the FFPA and receives funding from Agriculture appropriations acts. For FY2026, Congress appropriated $1.2 billion for FFP. According to USDA, it currently administers FFP. 
Farmer-to-Farmer Program (F2F, 7 U.S.C. §1737). F2F is to fund short-term technical assistance from U.S. volunteers to farmers, agribusinesses, and other agricultural institutions in developing and transitional countries. Minimum funding for F2F is to be the greater of $15 million or 0.6% of funds appropriated for FFP programs. Although not a food-distribution program, F2F derives its authority under FFPA Title V. The program does not appear to be active and was previously administered by USAID. 
McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Nutrition Program (McGovern-Dole, 7 U.S.C. §1736o–1). The USDA-administered McGovern-Dole program is to advance food security, nutrition, and education for children—especially girls—by providing mostly U.S.-sourced commodities for school meals in priority countries. McGovern-Dole has received funding from Agriculture appropriations, and up to 10% of annual funding may be used for local and regional procurement (LRP) rather than procuring U.S.-origin commodities. For FY2026, Congress appropriated $240 million for McGovern-Dole. 
Food for Progress (FFPr, 7 U.S.C. §1736o). The USDA-administered FFPr is to sell U.S. commodities, usually in aid-recipient countries’ local markets, and is to use the proceeds to fund agricultural development projects. FFPr has received mandatory funding by CCC financing or discretionary funding under FFPA Title I. The program is required to annually provide a minimum of 400,000 metric tons (MT) of U.S. commodities but is also restricted from paying more than $40 million annually for freight costs. In FY2025, USDA procured 460,000 MT of U.S. commodities, valued at $148 million, for FFPr.
Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT, 7 U.S.C. §1736f–1). BEHT is a commodity and/or monetary reserve maintained by USDA that may be released if FFP funding for emergency food situations is deemed inadequate. In 2022, for example, $282 million was released to procure U.S. commodities in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. BEHT funds may be replenished from funds available to FFPA programs or directly by appropriations. 
FAA/GFSA-Authorized Programs
International food assistance programs authorized by the FAA and GFSA have been amended and reauthorized by periodic GFSA reauthorization acts, most recently in December 2022 as part of P.L. 117-263. These programs have been funded through State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Acts. They employ market-based food assistance—such as LRP, food vouchers and cash transfers for food—along with selected nonfood assistance in emergency and nonemergency settings.
Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP, 22 U.S.C. §2292(c)). EFSP provides global food assistance to vulnerable populations using market-based approaches. Though its general authority under the FAA was used as early as FY2010, EFSP was authorized in the GFSA in 2016; Congress authorized appropriations of up to $1.8 billion annually through FY2028. USAID previously administered EFSP with funding through the SFOPS International Disaster Assistance account; for FY2024, it programmed $2.9 billion.
Community Development Fund (CDF, 22 U.S.C. §§2151a et seq.). CDF has funded, either solely or in conjunction with FFP nonemergency funds, development programs aimed at addressing the root causes of food insecurity. Deriving its authority from the FAA, CDF receives funding through the SFOPS Development Assistance account, and the funding may count toward the FFP $365 million nonemergency requirement. USAID previously administered CDF; for FY2024, $80 million was programmed.
Feed the Future (FtF, 22 U.S.C. §§9301 et seq.). FtF is a development initiative to provide food security and agricultural resources in selected “focus” countries. Congress authorized FtF programs under the GFSA; the current authorization of appropriations is $1.2 billion annually through FY2028. Congress has directed funds for FtF programs in annual SFOPS Acts under the heading “food security and agricultural development”; for FY2026, Congress designated not less than $720 million for FtF. Currently, State’s Office of Global Food Security (GFS) is responsible for active FtF projects.
Recent Developments
While USDA continues to administer its food assistance programs, it reportedly has cancelled some projects. State now appears to lead the provision of most U.S. foreign assistance, having assumed certain former USAID functions. Some announcements suggest that certain food security programs are being administered by GFS, which had previously led U.S. diplomatic engagement on food security. Emergency food programs are reportedly being administered by State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, but some experts suggest the Administration’s newly proposed Bureau of Disaster and Humanitarian Response could take over this role. In the FY2026 National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs (NSRP, formerly SFOPS) Appropriations Act (P.L. 119-75), Congress appropriated $5.4 billion in international humanitarian assistance but, in keeping with past practice, did not specify funding for international emergency food programs. As part of its FY2026 budget request, the Administration called for eliminating international food assistance programs that provide U.S.-origin commodities: FFP, McGovern-Dole, and FFPr. For FY2026, Congress provided appropriations for these programs (Division B; P.L. 119-37). 
Issues for Congress
Congress may consider amending, reauthorizing, or deauthorizing international food assistance programs in a potential farm bill and/or stand-alone legislation, and adjusting funding levels and oversight requirements. 
Program Administration. With USAID’s closure, questions remain about which international food assistance programs are being administered by State or other agencies; what interagency agreements are in place and whether these align with authorities; whether there is administrative capacity (e.g., staffing and expertise to meet program objectives); and the scope of global food assistance disruptions. Congress may consider whether to amend the existing statute referencing the role of USAID or support, or seek to alter the Administration’s plans for international food aid programs. In the 119th Congress, for example, H.R. 1207/S. 525 and H.R. 7567 (§§3101 et seq.) would legislate a move of USAID FFPA functions to USDA.
Funding and Allocation. Outlays for international food assistance have fluctuated since FY2010, when EFSP was established, but have trended upward as global food insecurity increased. EFSP has grown from comprising approximately 10% of international food assistance outlays in FY2010—the first year in which it was used—to 56% in FY2023, while FFP has provided approximately $2 billion per year (in nominal dollars). Congress may debate overall funding for these programs. Considerations may include the balance of funding between commodity-based and market-based programming and support for U.S. agriculture. Congress may also consider the Administration’s recent realized and proposed program and budget cuts as it determines funding levels to meet congressional priorities or address the current structure of international food assistance. 
U.S. Foreign Policy. More broadly, Congress may examine the role of international food assistance in U.S. foreign policy, the focus of which could include cost sharing with other donor countries, bilateral relationships with recipient countries, food assistance-implementation strategies, global food insecurity levels and impacts, and U.S. leadership in global food security fora. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13162/IF13162.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13162.html
IF12094,The Army’s XM-30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (Formerly the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle [OMFV]),2026-03-03T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T11:22:51Z,Active,Resources,"Ebrima M'Bai, Andrew Feickert","Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces","Background
The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is being designed to replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) (see Figure 1 for a notional example). Optionally manned means the OMFV is to have the capability to conduct remotely controlled operations while a crew is not in the vehicle. The M-2 Bradley, which has been in service since 1981, transports infantry on the battlefield, provides fire support to dismounted troops, and can destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defensive systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley—the Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program—were cancelled for programmatic and cost-associated reasons.
Figure 1. Notional Example—OMFV 
/
Source: U.S. Naval Institute (USNI), https://news.usni.org/2021/12/30/report-to-congress-on-armys-optionally-manned-fighting-vehicle-to-congress-on-armys-optionally-manned-fighting-vehicle, accessed April 18, 2022.
Note: This is a notional example; the Army’s OMFV selected for production may differ from this example.
OMFV Redesignated XM-30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle
On June 26, 2023, upon the completion of the initial digital design phase, the Army redesignated the OMFV as the XM-30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle.
Role of the XM-30
According to the 2024 Department of Defense (DOD) FY 2025 Program Acquisition Costs by Weapons Systems
The XM-30 Combat Vehicle (previously OMFV), as part of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), will replace the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle to provide the capabilities required to defeat a future near-peer competitor’s force. The XM-30 is an optionally manned platform that maneuvers soldiers to a point of positional advantage to engage in close combat and deliver decisive lethality during the execution of combined arms maneuver. It is designed to operate with and may operate without a crew and soldiers under armor based on the commander’s decision. It delivers decisive lethality during the execution of combined arms maneuver while also controlling maneuver robotics and semi-autonomous systems
XM-30 Acquisition Approach
The XM-30 is currently a Middle Tier Acquisition Rapid Prototyping (MTA-RP) program. The XM-30 is to be the Army’s first ground combat vehicle designed using state-of-the-art digital engineering tools and techniques. It is to be designed from the onset as a Modular Open Systems Architected (MOSA) platform based on an Army-defined and -owned open standard. As technology and software evolve, MOSA could potentially facilitate rapid XM-30 modernization at a reduced cost. The open architecture of the XM-30 could also offer more opportunities for industry competition and innovations as the XM-30 is upgraded.
The Army is conducting a five-phase acquisition approach to design, prototype, test, and produce the XM-30: 
Phase 1 consists of Market Research and Requirement Development.
Phase 2, the Concept Design Phase, includes modeling, simulation, and analysis (MS&A) to inform requirements and support initial design activities. 
Phase 3, the Detailed Design Phase, includes detailed design activities to mature XM-30 designs and concludes with a Critical Design Review (CDR). A CDR is a technical review to ensure the initial product baseline is established. Successful completion of CDR provides the technical basis for proceeding into fabrication, integration, development, test, and evaluation of a system.
Phase 4, the Prototype Build and Test Phase, verifies prototype performance against performance specifications. Late in this phase, a Limited User Test (LUT) is to be conducted. 
Phase 5, the Production and Fielding Phase, is to result in a single Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract for production, testing, and initial fielding.  
Program Activities
Phase 2 Contracts Awarded
The Army announced the award of five firm-fixed price contracts for XM-30 Phase 2 Concept Design Phase using full and open competitive procedures on July 23, 2021. The contracts were awarded to Point Blank Enterprises, Inc. (Miami Lakes, FL); Oshkosh Defense, LLC (Oshkosh, WI); BAE Systems Land and Armaments L.P. (Sterling Heights, MI); General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. (Sterling Heights, MI); and American Rheinmetall Vehicles, LLC (Sterling Heights, MI). The total award value for all five contracts was approximately $299.4 million. During this phase, competing firms were asked to develop digital designs. On November 1, 2022, it was reported that all five firms had submitted their XM-30 digital designs prior to the November 1 deadline. All five proposals reportedly were hybrid electric vehicles.
Phase 3 and 4 Contracts Awarded
On June 26, 2023, the Army announced
[t]he award of two firm-fixed price contracts for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle [XM-30] Phase 3 and 4 Detailed Design and Prototype Build and Testing phases, using full and open competitive procedures. The contracts were awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems Inc. (Sterling Heights, MI) and American Rheinmetall Vehicles LLC (Sterling Heights, MI). The total award value for both contracts is approximately $1.6 billion.
FY2025 Program Update
According to the Department of Defense (DOD) FY 2025 Program Acquisition Costs by Weapons Systems
The Army anticipates transitioning from an MTA-RP to a Major Capability Acquisition Pathway at Milestone B in the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 and plans to enter Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in the 1st quarter FY 2028 with a Full Rate Production (FRP) decision slated for FY 2030.
FY2026 Program Update
According to the Department of Defense (DOD) FY 2026 Program Acquisition Costs by Weapons Systems
The XM30 is an MTA-RP program. Milestone B was approved in June 2025, and Milestone C is targeted for first quarter FY 2028. The Army Transformation Initiative will accelerate this program. [In FY2026 the Army] continues to fund prototype vehicle designs from Preliminary Design Review (PDR) through CDR in preparation for both physical prototype builds and tests.
XM-30 Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
Reportedly, General Dynamics Land Systems and American Rheinmetall Vehicles completed their PDR in August 2024 and, after a critical design review, development of physical prototypes was planned to begin. According to Defense News
Prototypes will take 18 to 20 months to construct after the critical design reviews wrap up. Once prototypes are delivered, the Army will move into a test and evaluation phase with both competitors before deciding on a winner in FY2027. The first vehicles are expected to be fielded in FY2029.
Milestone B Decision 
In June 2025, the U.S. Army reportedly approved Milestone B for the XM-30 program, advancing it into the engineering manufacturing development phase after both competitors completed critical design reviews. However, in February 2026, Army leadership reportedly opted not to sign documentation finalizing the Milestone B decision to avoid locking the service into a specific design or a slow acquisition path, effectively pausing formal program transition and prompting a reevaluation of the program’s approach.
XM-30 Milestone B Pause and a New Request for Information (RFI)
According to the February 2026 report, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Randy George, and the Secretary of the Army, Dan Driscoll, decided not to sign off on the Milestone B decision “to leave the door open to a major reworking of the XM-30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle program.” Reportedly, regarding the pause, an Army spokesman stated
We are actively assessing multiple, competing designs for the XM-30 to foster a truly competitive environment We continue to look for partners who can deliver cutting-edge solutions now, not decades from now. This is a deliberate and necessary step to ensure we assess and select the best approach to deliver a world class vehicle today and into the future.
A February 18, 2026, Request for Information (RFI) for Ground Combat Vehicle Production, while not specifically mentioning replacing the XM-30 or Bradley, seeks “information from industry partners to explore innovative solutions for the rapid design, production, and delivery of ground combat vehicles.” It was reportedly suggested such an action by Army leadership could serve to put pressure on the current XM-30 developers to accelerate the program and also open the program to existing fighting vehicle designs.
Potential Oversight Issue for Congress
The Viability of the XM-30 Program
Should the Army decide to end the current XM-30 effort at Milestone B, any new effort would reportedly be the seventh attempt to replace the Bradley since the 1980s. This arguably raises several questions: After about four decades of attempts, can the Army decide upon and field a suitable Bradley IFV replacement? Furthermore, what are the ramifications for the armored fighting vehicle defense industrial base going forward if successive Bradley replacement efforts have ended at the prototype phase or earlier? Could this discourage vendors from current and future U.S. Army IFV development altogether? Given the Army’s past attempts to replace the Bradley and the apparent uncertainty of the program’s way forward, Congress might decide to examine the viability of the XM-30 program.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12094/IF12094.19.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12094.html
IF11573,USDA’s Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology,2026-03-03T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T07:54:40Z,Active,Resources,Eleni G. Bickell,Agricultural Technology & Research,"The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulates certain organisms developed using genetic engineering (GE) under its authority to prevent the introduction and dissemination of plant pests. In May 2020, USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) finalized the “Sustainable, Ecological, Consistent, Uniform, Responsible, Efficient (SECURE)” rule, which revised 7 C.F.R. Part 340. The rule was fully implemented in October 2021. In December 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California prospectively vacated the SECURE rule. Following the court’s decision, APHIS announced that it would reestablish regulatory and nonregulatory processes under the pre-2020 biotechnology regulations at 7 C.F.R. Part 340 (2019). 
As of 2026, USDA biotechnology oversight operates under these earlier regulations while APHIS evaluates potential regulatory revisions. In the Spring 2025 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (Unified Agenda), APHIS listed an anticipated interim final rule, “Regaining Lost Efficiencies for Products of Biotechnology.” The listing indicates that USDA intends to alter regulatory processes following the vacatur of the SECURE rule, with publication projected for 2026. 
This In Focus describes USDA’s statutory authority over agricultural biotechnology, the evolution of its implementing regulations, and the current regulations following the vacatur of the 2020 SECURE rule. It also outlines how USDA’s role fits within the broader Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology and highlights issues that may be of interest to Congress as agencies evaluate regulatory changes.
The Coordinated Framework of the Regulation of Biotechnology
The federal government’s 1986 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework) describes how USDA, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulate biotechnology products under existing statutes. Rather than acting upon a single biotechnology statute, the framework relies on agencies’ preexisting legal authorities. Under the Coordinated Framework, USDA regulates certain biotechnology products for plant health risks; EPA regulates pesticides (including plant-incorporated protectants, PIPs); and FDA oversees food and feed safety. A central principle of the Coordinated Framework is that products are regulated based on their characteristics and potential risks rather than the processes used to develop them. Depending on their intended use and characteristics, more than one agency may have jurisdiction.
USDA’s Authority Under the Plant Protection Act
USDA’s regulation of agricultural biotechnology occurs primarily through APHIS under the Plant Protection Act (PPA; 7 U.S.C. §§7701 et seq.). The PPA authorizes USDA to regulate the importation, interstate movement, and environmental release of organisms that are plant pests or if there is reason to believe they are plant pests. 
Under APHIS biotechnology regulations at 7 C.F.R. Part 340 (2019), a “regulated article” includes organisms altered or produced through GE that (1) contain genetic material derived from a plant pest or (2) are determined by APHIS to be a plant pest or likely to pose a plant-pest risk. Plant-pest risk refers to the potential for injury, damage, or disease to plants or plant products.
Pre-2020 Biotechnology Regulations (Currently in Effect)
APHIS is using the biotechnology regulations that were in place prior to May 2020 (i.e., pre-2020 biotechnology regulations). The sections below outline the main elements of that framework.
“Am I Regulated?” Process
Under the pre-2020 biotechnology regulations, developers may submit an inquiry through APHIS’s “Am I Regulated?” (AIR) process to determine whether an organism meets the definition of a regulated article. If APHIS determines that the organism is not a regulated article, the organism is not subject to regulation under 7 C.F.R. Part 340.
Permits and Notifications
If an organism is a regulated article, APHIS oversight applies to its importation, interstate movement, and environmental release. Such activities require either a permit or, in certain cases, a notification process if qualified. Permits and notifications are intended to ensure confinement and oversight of regulated articles during field testing and movement.
Petitions for Nonregulated Status
Developers of regulated articles may petition APHIS for a determination of nonregulated status. In evaluating a petition, APHIS assesses whether the “organism is unlikely to pose a greater plant pest risk relative to its comparator.” If APHIS determines that the organism is not a plant pest, it must grant nonregulated status and lacks authority under the PPA to continue regulating the organism.
APHIS publishes notices in the Federal Register to solicit public comment on petitions and makes its determinations publicly available.
USDA’s Previous SECURE Rule (2020-2024)
In contrast, USDA’s SECURE rule did not require APHIS to assess the risk of every new GE plant variety. Rather than requiring a case-by-case review of all GE plants, the rule established exemptions and a new review process based on APHIS’s assessment of plant-pest risk. (Figure 1). Certain GE plants were exempt from regulation if APHIS determined they could have been developed through conventional breeding and were unlikely to pose increased plant-pest risk. Developers could request written confirmation that a plant was not subject to regulation. For nonexempt plants, the rule established a Regulatory Status Review (RSR) process involving a risk-based screening approach to determine whether a plant required continued oversight. The SECURE rule also retained permitting requirements for organisms that did not qualify for exemptions or were determined to pose plausible plant-pest risks. 
Figure 1. The Vacated SECURE Rule Process
/
Source: Figure created by CRS.
Anticipated Regulatory Revisions (2026)
USDA reviews each new transformation event through a petition process and may conduct separate reviews for products that are also regulated by other federal agencies, such as EPA. In the Unified Agenda, APHIS listed an anticipated interim final rule titled “Regaining Lost Efficiencies for Products of Biotechnology” (RIN 0579-AE84), indicating that USDA intends to alter regulatory processes following the vacatur of the SECURE rule. According to APHIS, the anticipated rule would consider exemptions or simplified procedures for certain low-risk plants and microorganisms, including some commonly used in laboratory development. It would also address permitting requirements, such as movement and shipping requirements, the use of multiyear permits, whether prior regulatory determinations could apply to similar future transformation events, and ways to reduce review where another federal agency regulates the product. APHIS discussed the anticipated rule at the Biotechnology Regulatory Services Annual Meeting in February 2026. The rule has not been published, and specific regulatory details are not available. 
Why Did Regulations Change in 2020?
USDA’s SECURE rule was issued in the context of broader debates about how federal biotechnology oversight should adapt to scientific advances. Since the Coordinated Framework was established in 1986, biotechnology techniques have evolved (e.g., newer genome-editing methods, such as CRISPR/Cas9). These developments prompted debate over whether certain genome-edited plants should be regulated in the same manner as earlier transgenic organisms. Genome editing techniques that developed after the Coordinated Framework was established have prompted differing views on whether newer products warrant the same regulatory treatment as earlier GE organisms. 
Both the Trump Administration in 2019 and the Biden Administration in 2022 directed federal agencies to modernize biotechnology regulation. Executive Order 13874 (2019) and Executive Order 14081 (2022) emphasized regulatory efficiency, coordination, and clarity while maintaining safety standards. In turn, some agencies updated their approaches. EPA revised its oversight of certain PIPs, exempting certain lowrisk PIPs from registration and tolerance requirements and establishing a notification process for transparency, with additional exemptions anticipated as biotechnology advances. FDA continues to operate a voluntary consultation process for foods derived from GE plants and reaffirmed this approach in updated guidance issued in February 2024.
Reactions to USDA’s SECURE Rule
Stakeholder reaction to the SECURE rule was mixed. Some consumer and public interest organizations argued the rule narrowed federal oversight: the Center for Science in the Public Interest stated that “a majority of GE and gene-edited plants now will escape any oversight.” The National Feed and Grain Association stated that the rule “takes an overly broad approach that does not deliver adequate transparency and could contribute to future trade disruptions,” and the National Corn Growers Association welcomed the revisions but anticipated further streamlining. USDA reported that the revised process expedited certain reviews, averaging approximately 41 days, with small and medium-sized enterprises comprising a substantial share of applicants. Some stakeholders contended that self-determined exemptions could reduce oversight compared with the prior regulations. 
Potential Congressional Interest
Congress has received recommendations identifying biotechnology as an area of strategic importance for U.S. economic competitiveness, food security, and national security from multiple sources, including executive branch initiatives and reports from the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB). These sources have highlighted the role of regulatory clarity and predictability in supporting innovation while maintaining public trust and effective oversight. 
Congress may consider overseeing USDA’s implementation of the pre-2020 biotechnology regulations following the vacatur of the SECURE rule and monitoring the agency’s anticipated rulemaking. In doing so, Congress may consider how regulatory uncertainties may affect the development, review, and commercialization of biotechnology products and the efficiency and extent of interagency coordination among USDA, EPA, and FDA. Congress may clarify, amend, or reaffirm USDA’s role with respect to newer biotechnology techniques and the sufficiency of agricultural biotechnology oversight under current statutes and regulations.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11573/IF11573.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11573.html
RL33865,Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T11:52:46Z,Active,Reports,"Paul K. Kerr, Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Anya L. Fink, Mary Beth D. Nikitin","Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation","Arms control and nonproliferation are two of the policy tools that the United States has used to implement its national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many others see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. 
The United States and the Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate-range and long-range weapons. Since then, a series of progressive U.S.-Russian agreements reduced both sides’ nuclear warhead stockpiles and delivery vehicles. U.S.-Russian arms control cooperation has sharply deteriorated in recent years, as has Russian compliance with long-standing arms control commitments. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the further deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations in 2022, the prospect for new arms control negotiations and bilateral strategic risk reduction measures is uncertain, at least in the short- to medium-term. Nevertheless, the United States has sought to engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to reduce the risk of conflict involving the employment of nuclear weapons and promote other strategic stability measures. 
The United States is a prominent actor in an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries, or nuclear “nonproliferation.” This regime includes formal treaties, international organizations that monitor compliance, and export control arrangements. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) serves as the cornerstone of this regime, with all but four states participating in it. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors nuclear energy programs to make sure they remain peaceful, and helps countries develop and access the benefits of nuclear science. Other measures, such as sanctions, interdiction efforts, and informal cooperative endeavors, also seek to slow or stop the spread of nuclear materials and the means to produce nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery.
The international community has adopted a number of agreements that address nonnuclear weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions prohibit both types of weapons. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that countries could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The United States and international partners have also worked to prevent terrorist access or use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, known collectively as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33865/RL33865.68.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/HTML/RL33865.html
R46963,SBA Disaster Loan Interest Rates: Overview and Policy Options,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T16:52:55Z,Active,Reports,"Bruce R. Lindsay, Darryl E. Getter, Anthony A. Cilluffo",Federal Disasters & Assistance,"The Small Business Administration (SBA) is authorized to provide low-interest, long-term disaster loans, either on a direct basis or in partnership with private lenders, to eligible individuals, businesses, and nonprofit organizations to help them repair, rebuild, and recover from uninsured, underinsured, or otherwise uncompensated economic losses after a declared disaster. The SBA has relied exclusively on direct disaster loans since the early 1980s.
In designing the disaster loan program, setting the interest rates charged on SBA disaster loans involves weighing competing policy tradeoffs. Lower interest rates reduce the cost of borrowing for disaster survivors, but increase the cost for SBA (and ultimately taxpayers). Higher interest rates reduce the cost to SBA for providing assistance—allowing it to assist more disaster survivors for a given amount of program appropriations—but increase the costs for participating survivors and risk making the program too expensive for some potential participants. Over time, interest rate policies for the disaster loan program have changed as different Congresses and SBA leaders have weighed these competing policy priorities differently.
Congress provides appropriations for SBA disaster loan administrative expenses and disaster loan credit subsidies (the amount necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative expenses). As a direct lending program, the SBA deposits disaster loan payments, including interest, into the SBA Disaster Loan Financing Account. These payments are used to repay the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) for the funds that SBA borrows from Treasury to make disaster loans.
The SBA’s disaster loan credit subsidy rate (the net present value of cash flows to and from the program, including loan payments, prepayments, interest subsidies, defaults, and recoveries) determines the amount of appropriations necessary to cover the program’s non-administrative expenses. The loan credit subsidy rate is the program’s non-administrative cost divided by the amount disbursed, which is expressed as a percentage of the amount disbursed. For example, in FY2026, the SBA disaster loan program’s loan credit subsidy rate was 18.75%. This means that for each $1 appropriated for SBA disaster loan credit subsidies the SBA can provide about $5.33 in disaster loans.
The SBA disaster loan program’s loan credit subsidy rate tends to be higher than other SBA loan programs because (1) its default rate tends to be higher than other SBA loan programs, (2) unlike most other SBA loan programs, the SBA is not authorized to charge disaster loan borrowers fees to help pay for expenses, and (3) disaster loan interest rates are determined by statutory formulas that underprice the risk associated with these loans. As a result, Congress provides appropriations for SBA disaster loan credit subsidies that otherwise could have been provided, at least in part, by borrower fees and higher interest rates. 
The SBA’s disaster loan interest rate formulas provide distinct limits for borrowers unable to secure credit elsewhere and for borrowers able to secure credit elsewhere. In recent years, some Members of Congress have argued that disaster loan interest rates should be lowered, or eliminated altogether, to provide greater relief for disaster victims. Some have also questioned whether SBA has the discretionary authority to lower disaster loan interest rates without legislative action. Others worry about the revenue that would be lost by doing so, and that additional appropriations may have to be provided to keep the program whole. Some Members of Congress are reluctant to provide that additional funding, given the size of the federal government’s debt and annual deficits. 
This report opens with an overview of the SBA Disaster Loan Program’s financing, followed by the history of SBA disaster loan interest rate policy and the statutory formulas that determine these rates. It also provides a more general overview of the SBA Disaster Loan Program and summarizes congressional debates over the extent to which the cost of these loans should be borne by borrowers or taxpayers. This report concludes with an assessment of various legislative options currently under consideration and the extent to which the SBA can administratively adjust disaster loan interest rates.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46963/R46963.7.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R46963.html
R45160,"Federal Election Commission: Membership and Policymaking Quorum, In Brief",2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-03T13:53:02Z,Active,Reports,R. Sam Garrett,"Voting, Elections & Redistricting","The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is the nation’s civil campaign finance regulator. The agency ensures that campaign fundraising and spending is publicly reported; that those covered by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and by commission regulations comply and have access to guidance; and that publicly financed presidential campaigns receive funding. 
As of this writing, two of six FEC commissioners remain in office. Four commission vacancies, one of which has been disputed, occurred during 2025. Initial developments left only three commissioners remaining in office, thus precluding a policymaking quorum of at least four votes, through September 2025. Due to a resignation, a fourth commissioner departed the agency effective October 3, 2025, leaving two commissioners remaining in office. FECA requires at least four agreeing votes from commissioners to take various policymaking, regulatory, and enforcement actions. The quorum loss that began in 2025 marked the fourth in the FEC’s history. The first lasted six months in 2008. The second lasted for approximately nine months and spanned parts of 2019 and 2020. The third lasted for approximately six months during the second half of 2020.
FEC commissioners are presidential appointees who are subject to Senate advice and consent. Commissioners may remain in office in holdover status beyond the end of their six-year statutory terms. On February 11, 2026, President Trump sent two FEC nominations to the Senate. If both nominees were confirmed and no other vacancies occurred, the commission’s policymaking quorum would be restored.
This CRS report briefly explains the kinds of actions that FECA precludes when a quorum is not possible because fewer than four FEC members are in office. Among other powers, without a quorum, the commission cannot hold hearings, issue rules, or enforce campaign finance law and regulation. Campaign finance law and regulation remain in effect and may be enforced once a quorum is restored. (An FEC quorum loss does not affect Department of Justice criminal enforcement.) Agency operations continue with remaining commissioners and staff.
This report will be updated in the event of substantial changes in the Federal Election Commission’s policymaking quorum or the status of commission nominations.

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45160/R45160.25.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R45160.html
IN12664,Executive Office for Immigration Review Immigration Judge Staffing Issues,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T12:22:50Z,Active,Posts,Holly Straut-Eppsteiner,,"Immigration judge (IJ) staffing at the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR; immigration courts) has long been insufficient to adjudicate its pending caseload and keep up with the receipt of new immigration cases, particularly removal proceedings, contributing to large backlogs in the immigration court system. These backlogs have been exacerbated by record-high case receipts in recent years.
IJs, career employees within the executive branch, are attorneys appointed by the Attorney General. IJ hiring is largely contingent on congressional appropriations. EOIR had steadily increased IJ hiring and grown its IJ corps (i.e., total number of IJs on staff) in recent years (Figure 1). In FY2023, EOIR hired 133 IJs, its largest annual number of hires. The IJ corps reached a high of 735 at the end of FY2024. 
Since FY2025, the IJ corps has declined, with substantially higher than typical levels of departures. Reportedly, some IJs have left EOIR under options for early retirement or deferred resignation while others have been fired. CRS estimates that 115 IJs separated from EOIR in FY2025, the highest annual number of separations since at least 2011 (see Figure 1 note for estimation methodology). In the first quarter of FY2026, 88 IJs departed EOIR. EOIR has continued to hire IJs (14 in FY2025 and 11 FY2026 Q1), but not at a level to restore its staffing to the previous level.
By the end of FY2025, the IJ corps had declined to 634. At the end of the first quarter of FY2026, EOIR had 557 IJs on staff, down nearly one quarter (178 IJs) from the peak staffing level in FY2024. This number does not include temporary IJs (discussed below). The FY2025 reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21), appropriated $3.33 billion to DOJ for several purposes, including to hire IJs and support staff. The law authorizes EOIR for a staffing level of “not more than 800” IJs, effective November 1, 2028.
Figure 1. Immigration Judges: Hired, Departed, and Total on Board, FY2011-FY2026 Q1
/
Source: EOIR analysis of “Immigration Judge (IJ) Hiring,” Adjudication Statistics, January 2026.
Notes: Figure does not include temporary IJs. CRS imputed departures as the sum of the number of IJs on board at the end of the previous fiscal year and hires in the given fiscal year minus the IJs on board at the end of the given fiscal year.
Under the current Trump Administration, EOIR has focused on hiring temporary IJs as a mechanism for reducing the backlog and widening the pool of potential applicants. In August 2025, EOIR published a final rule, “Designation of Temporary Immigration Judges.” The rule amended 8 C.F.R. §1003.10(e), which, under a 2014 interim final rule (IFR), authorized the EOIR Director to hire as temporary IJs former IJs, former members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (EOIR’s appellate body), current or retired EOIR administrative law judges, administrative law judges from other executive branch agencies, and DOJ attorneys with 10 years of experience in immigration law, for renewable six-month terms. The 2014 IFR stated that hiring temporary IJs would “increase the number of matters EOIR could bring to a final disposition” by assigning temporary judges to “a discrete category of cases, such as motions and bond proceedings, freeing up permanent immigration judge time to adjudicate more complicated removal cases,” but noted that the rule would not “limit the assignment of temporary immigration judges in the type of cases they may adjudicate.”
As amended by the August 2025 rule, 8 C.F.R. §1003.10(e) now authorizes the Director to designate “any attorney” to serve as a temporary immigration judge for six-month renewable terms. In a response to comments on the proposed version of the rule, EOIR stated that the 2014 criteria for temporary IJs “were too narrow and impeded the Department’s ability to use the [temporary immigration judge] authority to the extent needed. Rather than adopt different benchmarks by regulation, the Department has decided to adopt the same approach that it has long taken for permanent IJs—that is, require by regulation that they be attorneys but leave the specific criteria to internal policy.” The rule also stated, “The Department does not view its authority to appoint TIJs as a substitute for hiring to fill permanent IJ positions and continues to recruit candidates to fill permanent IJ positions.” 
Since then, EOIR has relied on hiring military attorneys as temporary IJs, as authorized by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). EOIR requested DOD detail up to 600 lawyers to serve as temporary IJs. In October 2025, EOIR announced it had appointed 25 temporary IJs assigned to 19 courts; in February 2026, EOIR announced it had appointed an additional 27 temporary IJs assigned to 18 immigration courts. EOIR’s change in criteria for temporary IJs and hiring military lawyers has been condemned by some stakeholders, including over concerns that such temporary judges may lack necessary immigration expertise. In contrast to that criticism, EOIR states in the rule, “Immigration law experience is not always a strong predictor of success as an IJ, and EOIR has hired individuals from other Federal agencies and Department components without prior immigration experience who have become successful and exemplary IJs.” It remains unclear how the departure of permanent IJs and addition of temporary IJs will impact the backlog.
In the 119th Congress, Members have introduced the Temporary Immigration Judge Integrity Act in the House and the Senate (H.R. 6497 and S. 3326). The measures would codify in statute the Attorney General’s authority to hire temporary IJs under the 2014 eligibility requirements and implement certain training requirements.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12664/IN12664.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12664.html
IN11693,The Budget Resolution and the Senate’s Automatic Discharge Process,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-03T15:08:01Z,Active,Posts,"James V. Saturno, Megan S. Lynch",Budget & Appropriations Procedure,"The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (the Budget Act) provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget that establishes an agreement between the House and Senate on budgetary levels for the upcoming fiscal year (and at least four additional years). The budget resolution assists Congress in developing federal budget policy, and its adoption allows Congress to trigger the budget reconciliation process.
Consideration of the budget resolution is guided by the Budget Act and Senate rules and precedents. Section 300 of the Budget Act includes a timetable specifying dates by which Congress is to complete certain budgetary actions. Under this timetable, the Senate Budget Committee is directed to report a budget resolution (pertaining to the upcoming fiscal year beginning October 1) by April 1, and Congress is directed to complete action on a budget resolution by April 15.
Since 1983, the Senate has interpreted this timetable in a manner that affects how budget resolutions are referred to committee and placed on the Senate’s Calendar of Business. If the Senate Budget Committee has not reported a budget resolution by April 1, it is automatically discharged from the consideration of any budget resolution that has been previously referred to it, as well as any budget resolution that is subsequently introduced. Once the committee has been discharged from the consideration of a budget resolution, it is placed on the Calendar.
For example, on March 29, 2012, a budget resolution for FY2013 (S.Con.Res. 37) was introduced and referred to the Senate Budget Committee. Once April 1, 2012, passed without the Senate Budget Committee reporting a budget resolution, the committee was automatically discharged from consideration of S.Con.Res. 37, and the resolution was placed on the Calendar of Business. Similarly, on April 26, 2012, another budget resolution for FY2013 (S.Con.Res. 42) was introduced. Because April 1 had already passed, the resolution was referred to the Senate Budget Committee, the committee was immediately discharged, and the resolution was placed on the Calendar. 
A 2021 memo attributed to the Senate Parliamentarian and linked in a press report stated that the automatic discharge process is a “creation of the Office of the Parliamentarian” intended to “provide an incentive for committee compliance with the law and to provide a remedy when compliance with and through the mandatory processes of the [Budget Act] have not been met.” Generally, initial Senate consideration of a budget resolution has been on a budget resolution reported by the Senate Budget Committee. In some years, however, initial Senate consideration has been on a budget resolution placed on the Calendar under the automatic discharge process. For example, budget resolutions considered and adopted by the Senate for FY1991, FY2002, FY2017, FY2021, and FY2022 were placed on the Calendar under the automatic discharge procedure.
In the Senate, a budget resolution is privileged, meaning that the motion to proceed to its consideration is not debatable and the resolution does not have to lie over a day before being called up on the floor. Once a budget resolution has been placed on the Calendar of Business (either because the Senate Budget Committee has reported it or because the committee has been discharged from consideration), a Senator may make a non-debatable motion to proceed to its consideration. For example, on August 9, 2021, Senate Budget Committee Chair Sanders introduced S.Con.Res. 14, a budget resolution for FY2022. Under the Budget Act’s timetable, the Senate Budget Committee would have been expected to report a FY2022 budget resolution by April 1, 2021. Because the Senate Budget Committee had not reported a budget resolution for FY2022, the Senate Budget Committee was immediately discharged from consideration of S.Con.Res. 14, and the resolution was placed on the Calendar. The next day, Majority Leader Schumer offered a non-debatable motion to proceed to S.Con.Res. 14 that was then adopted by the Senate (50-49).  
After the Senate has agreed to a motion to proceed to the consideration of a budget resolution, under Section 305(b)(1), debate—including all amendments and debatable motions and appeals—is limited to 50 hours equally divided and controlled between the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. Section 305(b)(2) further specifies that debate on any amendment to the budget resolution is limited to two hours equally divided and controlled, and debate on any amendment to an amendment, debatable motion, or appeal is limited to one hour equally divided and controlled. Under Section 305(b)(5), a motion to further limit debate is not debatable. Section 305(b)(2) also requires that all amendments offered to a budget resolution must be germane. After the 50 hours has elapsed, Senators may continue to offer amendments and make other motions or appeals but without further debate. This period is often referred to as a “vote-arama.”
Section 304 of the Budget Act provides that Congress may revise or reaffirm the budget resolution for the fiscal year most recently agreed to. The memo attributed to the Senate Parliamentarian referred to above stated that such a revised budget resolution would not be eligible for the automatic discharge process. A revised budget resolution is an optional procedure, and there is no comparable deadline established under Sections 300 or 304 of the Budget Act for it to be reported from committee. Accordingly, any revised budget resolution would have to be reported by the Budget Committee or discharged under regular Budget Committee and Senate rules, including those rules in force under the recent “powersharing” agreement. Because the Senate has not considered a revised budget resolution under Section 304 since the 1983 precedent that allows a non-debatable motion to proceed to be made to consider a budget resolution, it is not clear that the precedent would then be applicable. One additional difference for the consideration of a revised budget resolution is that Section 305(b)(1) limits debate to 15 hours.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN11693/IN11693.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN11693.html
IF13170,The House Consensus Calendar: Principal Features,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T14:54:03Z,Active,Resources,Jane A. Hudiburg,,"Establishment in House Rules
First established in the 116th Congress (2019-2020), the Consensus Calendar provides an alternative route to the floor for certain unreported House bills and resolutions that have accumulated at least 290 cosponsors. Clause 7 of House Rule XV delineates the Calendar’s principal features. Pursuant to the rule, the Speaker is to designate, and the House is to consider, at least one measure listed on the Consensus Calendar during each week that the House is in session. This provision does not apply “before March 1 of an odd-numbered year and after September 30 of an even-numbered year.” 
Unreported Measures
To be placed on the Consensus Calendar, a measure must have been referred to at least one House committee but not reported by the committee of primary jurisdiction. Rule XV does not specify a minimum time period that a measure must remain unreported before the process of placement on the Consensus Calendar may begin. 
A measure is considered reported when the chair, as directed by committee vote, files the written committee report with the Clerk. If the primary committee of jurisdiction reports a measure after the Calendar motion is filed but before the measure is placed on the Consensus Calendar, the motion is deemed withdrawn. Similarly, if the primary committee reports the measure after it has been placed on the Calendar, the measure is removed from the Calendar. Thus, a primary committee may report a bill either to prevent its placement on the Calendar or, if already placed there, to secure its removal. 
290-Cosponsor Threshold
The Consensus Calendar is reserved for unreported measures that enjoy broad support. To demonstrate that support, the rule requires a House bill or resolution to have at least 290 cosponsors before its sponsor may file a motion to place the measure on the Consensus Calendar. All cosponsorships count toward the threshold regardless of whether the cosponsor subsequently resigns, dies, or otherwise leaves office after cosponsoring the measure. However, a cosponsor may request on the House floor to be removed as a cosponsor, in which case the total number of cosponsorships is adjusted accordingly.
Cosponsors Accumulated
Any Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner seeking to cosponsor a measure signs a cosponsorship form provided by the sponsor’s office. While the House is in session, the sponsor files the signed forms through the hopper on the House floor or electronically via the eHopper. The bill clerk then records each additional cosponsor and updates the total number of cosponsors. This information is made publicly available in the Congress.gov database. 
Cosponsors Verified
The bill clerk maintains the most current list of cosponsors, which may reflect changes not yet displayed in Congress.gov. Accordingly, Members or their staff are advised to contact the bill clerk directly to verify the number of cosponsors. The Clerk of the House is also to confirm the number of cosponsors before processing a submitted Consensus Calendar motion.
Written Motion Filed
Motions to place a measure on the Consensus Calendar are in order once the measure has accumulated at least 290 cosponsors and remains unreported by the committee of primary jurisdiction. When both conditions are satisfied, the measure’s sponsor may submit to the Clerk a written motion requesting placement of the measure on the Consensus Calendar. 
The sponsoring Member may file the motion on any day the House meets. While the House is in session, the Member obtains a Calendar motion form from the tally clerk at the rostrum, records the measure’s number on the form, signs it, and submits it to the tally clerk.
Motion Placed in Custody of Clerk
Following submittal, the motion is placed in the custody of the Clerk. Pursuant to the rule, the Clerk is to maintain a list of all Consensus Calendar motions and make the list publicly available in electronic form. In addition, each motion is printed in the Congressional Record in a section designated for that purpose. The Clerk’s website, clerk.house.gov, maintains the list of properly filed motions under the “legislation information” tab, including links to each motion’s notice in the Congressional Record and to the associated measure’s entry in Congress.gov. 
25-Legislative-Day Waiting Period
After a motion is filed with the Clerk, the measure must maintain at least 290 cosponsors for a cumulative period of 25 legislative days. A legislative day, as distinct from a calendar day, begins when the House convenes following an adjournment and ends when the House next adjourns. In most instances, a 25-legislative-day period is equal to 25 calendar days on which the House is in session.
Counting of Legislative Days
The first legislative day that follows the filing of the motion with the Clerk is Day 1 of the required waiting period. Any legislative day in which the measure has at least 290 cosponsors counts toward fulfilling the requirement even if the measure experiences a temporary drop below the threshold due to cosponsorship withdrawals. In such cases, the legislative day count resumes once a sufficient number of additional cosponsors are accrued. 
The Office of the Clerk tracks legislative days for Consensus Calendar purposes and may be contacted by Members or staff to verify the count for any measure subject to a Calendar motion. Once the cumulative 25-legislative-day requirement is satisfied, the measure is assigned to the Consensus Calendar. 
Legislative Days That Do Not Count for Purposes of the Consensus Calendar
District Work Periods
Clause 13 of House Rule I authorizes the Speaker to designate “district work periods” during which time the House is not expected to conduct legislative business. Among its provisions, clause 13 specifies that each day of a designated district work period “shall not constitute” a legislative day for purposes of clause 7 of Rule XV. Accordingly, such days do not count toward the 25-legislative-day waiting period.
Special Rules
Special rules reported from the Rules Committee and adopted by the House may alter the count of legislative days for Consensus Calendar purposes. These rules may state, “Each day during the period addressed by section ___ of this resolution shall not constitute a legislative day for purposes of clause 7 of Rule XV.”
Motions Considered as Withdrawn Prior to Completion of Waiting Period
As noted, a Calendar motion is considered withdrawn if the committee of primary jurisdiction reports the measure before completion of the 25-legislative-day period. In addition, if an unreported measure is considered on the House floor, it becomes ineligible for placement on the Calendar. 
Assignment to Calendar
Once a measure satisfies the waiting period, the Clerk places it on the Consensus Calendar. It remains on the Calendar, even if its number of cosponsors later falls below 290, until it is considered by the House. If it is reported by the committee of primary jurisdiction prior to its consideration, it is removed from the Calendar. 
The Calendar lists each assigned measure, including the motion number, date entered, filing Member, bill number, committee of jurisdiction, and Calendar number. It is published in the Calendars of the United States House of Representatives and History of Legislation, which is updated on each legislative day and made available through govinfo.gov and Congress.gov.
Speaker’s Designation for Consideration
During each week that the House convenes, the Speaker is to designate, and the House is to consider, at least one measure listed on the Consensus Calendar. This provision does not apply “before March 1 of an odd-numbered year and after September 30 of an even-numbered year.” A bill that reaches the Calendar after September 30 in the second session of a Congress may still be considered on the House floor but not pursuant to clause 7 of Rule XV.
The Speaker’s designation is announced from the chair and is printed in the Congressional Record under a CONSENSUS CALENDAR heading, stating
The Chair announces the Speaker’s designation, pursuant to clause 7(a)(1) of rule XV, of H.R. ___ as the measure on the Consensus Calendar to be considered this week.
Consideration of Measures
Measures listed on the Consensus Calendar are considered on the floor under the same procedures applicable to other legislation. Accordingly, a designated measure may be considered under suspension of the rules, pursuant to a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules, or by unanimous consent.
Special Rules Waiving Consideration 
Special rules may waive the requirement that the Speaker designate a Consensus Calendar measure for consideration. Such rules may specify that clause 7(a)(1) of Rule XV—“At least once during any week in which the House convenes, the House shall consider a measure on the Consensus Calendar as designated by the Speaker”—shall not apply during a specified period or with respect to a particular measure. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13170/IF13170.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13170.html
IF12759,The HIPAA Privacy Rule: Overview and Issues,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T07:55:44Z,Active,Resources,Amanda K. Sarata,Health Care Delivery,"The final HIPAA Privacy Rule (the Rule) was first issued in December 2000, and a final modified rule was issued in August of 2002, pursuant to authority in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA, P.L. 104-191). HIPAA was enacted to improve the availability and continuity of health insurance coverage; promote long-term care insurance and the use of health savings accounts; and combat waste, fraud, and abuse, particularly in Medicare and Medicaid. HIPAA also included a series of requirements under the subtitle “Administrative Simplification” to improve the efficiency of, and decrease costs within, the health care system by supporting a transition to standardized electronic administrative and financial transactions. Among these requirements, the law directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary to promulgate privacy standards should legislation addressing privacy of personal health information not be enacted within a specified timeframe. The HIPAA Privacy Rule established for the first time a set of federal standards for the protection of personal health information. 
As part of Administrative Simplification [42 U.S.C. §§1320d et seq.], HIPAA required promulgation of both privacy and security standards in recognition of the increased risk to health data posed by promoting electronic data use and exchange within the health care system. More than a decade later, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH, P.L. 111-5) incentivized the move away from paper patient records to electronic patient records, building on the earlier shift to standard electronic financial and administrative transactions. These shifts—both on the administrative and patient care side—were considered by many to be a necessary precursor to broader health care reform efforts that culminated in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended). Privacy (and security) of personal health data was to some extent a second-order policy priority in service of broader reform of the health care system. 
The Privacy Rule applies to specific entities—covered entities and their business associates—and to certain health information, termed protected health information (PHI). The requirements of the Rule primarily address (1) the use and disclosure of PHI, (2) individual rights with respect to PHI, and (3) administrative requirements (e.g., workforce training, data safeguards). The Rule is interpreted and enforced by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) within HHS.   
Entities Subject to the Privacy Rule
The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to three specific types of entities, referred to as “covered entities.” These include (1) health care clearinghouses, (2) health plans, and (3) health care providers who carry out HIPAA-covered electronic transactions. Health care clearinghouses may serve as intermediaries between plans and providers and often convert standard to nonstandard data (and vice versa) in that role. In addition, pursuant to authority in the HITECH Act, the Privacy Rule governs business associates’—entities that perform certain work on behalf of covered entities—use and disclosure of protected health information (PHI). Business associates must enter into contractual arrangements (“business associate agreements”) in order to perform certain work on behalf of covered entities that requires disclosure and use of PHI (e.g., claims processing, data analysis, utilization review). A covered entity may be a business associate for another covered entity; for example, health care clearinghouses are often acting as a business associate working on behalf of health plans and health care providers. Finally, the Rule establishes hybrid entities, which are single legal entities that perform both covered and noncovered functions. If a covered entity elects to establish hybrid entity status, the Rule’s requirements apply only to the component carrying out covered functions, and PHI may not be shared between the components except as permitted by the Rule (as it would be permitted to be disclosed to a noncovered entity, generally).
Information Protected by the Privacy Rule 
PHI is individually identifiable health information (IIHI) that is transmitted by electronic media, maintained in electronic media, or transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. IIHI is defined as health information that identifies an individual and that is created, maintained, or received by a covered entity or an employer that “relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual.” PHI includes a wide range of information, including among other information demographic data (e.g., name, social security number), medical test results and diagnoses, medical treatment, and family health history. 
The Privacy Rule does not apply to deidentified PHI, with the Rule specifying two acceptable methods for deidentification: (1) expert determination and (2) safe harbor. To meet the first standard, an expert in “statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering information not individually identifiable” must determine and document that there is a very small risk that the information could be used to identify an individual who is the subject of the information. For the safe harbor method, the data must be stripped of 18 specific identifiers (e.g., name, email address) listed in the Rule.
Requirements in the Privacy Rule are generally the same for all PHI; that is, the Rule does not apply heightened protections for subsets of health information that may be considered to be more sensitive (e.g., genetic information). One exception to this is psychotherapy notes, which are subject to heightened requirements for individual written authorization prior to disclosure (but are also stored separately from the designated record set, making operationalizing these requirements easier). A since-vacated 2024 final rule had modified requirements around certain permissible disclosures for “PHI that is potentially related to reproductive health care” to require the requester’s attestation that the disclosure or use would not be for a prohibited purpose. Relevant disclosures had included those for judicial and administrative proceedings and law enforcement purposes, among others. The final rule had noted, however, that “the Department did not propose, and is not finalizing, a newly defined subset of PHI.”
Privacy Rule Requirements
The Privacy Rule includes requirements that broadly address the use and disclosure of PHI and that govern administrative actions to protect PHI, as well as individual rights pertaining to an individual’s own PHI.
Use and Disclosure. The Rule generally prohibits using or disclosing PHI except as the Rule expressly permits or requires. For all uses or disclosures of PHI that are not otherwise permitted or required by the Rule, covered entities and business associates must obtain a patient’s valid authorization. The Rule specifies two circumstances when a disclosure of PHI by covered entities is required: (1) to the individual at their request and (2) to the HHS Secretary for purposes of investigation of compliance with, or a possible violation of, the Rule.
In terms of permitted uses and disclosures, the Rule establishes categories of disclosures that may be made without authorization or upon patient permission short of authorization (i.e., opportunity to object or to agree). In general, the Rule permits covered entities to, between and among themselves, use or disclose PHI for the purposes of (1) treatment, (2) payment, and (3) other routine health care operations without patient authorization and with few restrictions. This foundational category of permissive disclosure was established to facilitate normal operations within the health care system while limiting broader disclosure of PHI—if a doctor needs to speak with another doctor about a patient’s treatment, or if a health plan needs information about care administered in order to provide payment, for example. In these cases, the Rule permits, but does not require, covered entities to obtain consent from patients. In addition, the Rule, under certain circumstances (e.g., disclosures to family members and friends involved with the patient’s care) permits disclosure of PHI without authorization but requires the individual to have the opportunity to first object or agree to the disclosure. 
The Rule also generally permits disclosure of PHI, without authorization or the opportunity to agree or object, for 12 public interest or national priority purposes that are not directly connected to the treatment of the individual (e.g., public health activities, health oversight activities, judicial and administrative proceedings, law enforcement purposes, research purposes, specialized government functions). In addition, the Rule permits covered entities to disclose or use PHI pursuant to requirements in other law. These disclosures are generally made to entities that are not HIPAA-regulated, and in these cases, the disclosed PHI would no longer be subject to the Rule.
Individual Access Rights. The Rule gives individuals certain rights of access with respect to their PHI. These include the right to inspect and amend their information, receive an accounting of disclosures, and the right to review and obtain a copy of PHI in the designated record set.
Administrative Requirements. The Rule requires covered entities to have physical, administrative, and technical safeguards to protect PHI from unauthorized access, use, or disclosure, and to meet workforce training requirements, as well as requirements for complaint handling, sanctions, and mitigation of harm subsequent to a violation of the Rule.   
HIPAA Privacy Rule Enforcement 
OCR administers and primarily enforces the Privacy Rule. HIPAA established, and the HITECH Act amended, civil monetary penalties for failure to comply with the Administrative Simplification standards, including the privacy and security standards. It also created criminal penalties for certain instances involving the wrongful acquisition or disclosure of IIHI in violation of the standards. OCR refers such cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for criminal prosecution. The HITECH Act also added an audit authority requiring the HHS Secretary to conduct periodic audits of covered entities to ensure compliance. 
Issues for Consideration
Congress and other stakeholders are considering many issues that touch on the Privacy Rule, including the following:
How does the Privacy Rule, in conjunction with the Common Rule (45 C.F.R. Part 46), apply to secondary research with health data used to develop and train artificial intelligence (AI) applications? Are current requirements appropriate?
More digital health data are unprotected by the Privacy Rule because of, for example, subsequent data flow to third parties or data generation by wearables and other non-HIPAA-regulated entities. Does this data ecosystem raise considerations around the scope of the Privacy Rule (e.g., the definition of covered entity)?
Some have suggested the Rule’s list of individual identifiers is outdated and may leave de-identified PHI subject to reidentification. Should this list be updated to reflect modern identifiers?
How does the Privacy Rule fit into the context of recent efforts to make more digital health technology available with less oversight, and to allow for the freer exchange of generated data?",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12759/IF12759.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12759.html
IF12744,Patent Law: An Introduction and Issues for Congress,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-03T14:38:08Z,Active,Resources,Kevin J. Hickey,Intellectual Property,"Patents, a form of intellectual property, give their owners certain exclusive rights in new and useful inventions. To encourage innovation, the Constitution gives Congress the power to grant patents to inventors for a limited time. Patents have been a part of federal law ever since Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790. 
Patents play a critical role in many industries, such as pharmaceuticals and computer technologies. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) estimated in a 2022 study that utility patent-intensive industries contributed $4.4 trillion to the U.S. GDP and directly employed 18.2 million people in 2019. In light of patents’ effect on innovation and technological competitiveness, Congress often considers amendments to patent law. This In Focus provides an overview of patent law and highlights potential areas of congressional interest. (For more detail, see CRS Report R46525, Patent Law: A Handbook for Congress.) 
Patent Prosecution
To obtain a patent, an inventor must file a patent application with USPTO. The patent applicant must describe the claimed invention in detail through words and drawings in a written specification. The application must also propose written patent claims, which define the legal scope of the claimed invention.
The patent application process is called patent examination or patent prosecution. During prosecution, a USPTO patent examiner determines whether the application and claimed invention meet the legal requirements for patentability discussed below. If so, USPTO issues (i.e., grants) the patent. In FY2025, USPTO received over 600,000 utility patent applications and issued nearly 350,000 patents.
Patentability Requirements 
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter and Utility
Section 101 of the Patent Act allows patents on any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Congress thus sought to ensure that almost anything made by humans may be patented if it meets the other patentability requirements. For example, new inventions in fields ranging from chemistry and computers to agriculture and manufacturing are all potentially patent-eligible.
Section 101 also requires an invention to be useful to be patented. The standard for the utility requirement is low, requiring only that the claimed invention have some benefit to the public that is not so vague as to be meaningless. 
Novelty and Nonobviousness
Perhaps the most fundamental patentability requirement is that the claimed invention must be novel (i.e., new). Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, USPTO will not issue a patent if it finds that the claimed invention was anticipated by (i.e.,  disclosed in) any earlier invention already known in the “prior art” (e.g., an earlier patent, product, or publication). USPTO therefore denies a patent if the claimed invention had already been patented, publicly described, publicly used, or on sale before the patent application was filed.
Even if a claimed invention is novel because it is not identically disclosed in the prior art, the invention must also be nonobvious to be patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. USPTO and courts consider many factors in determining whether an invention is obvious from the perspective of a person with ordinary skill in the relevant field. For example, an invention may be obvious if it merely combines already known elements in a predictable way.
Disclosure-Related Patentability Requirements
The Patent Act also contains several requirements relating to the disclosures in the patent application. For example, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the application must enable the invention by describing it with enough detail to teach a person of ordinary skill in the field how to make and use it. The enablement requirement ensures that the public can use the patented technology after the patent expires. In addition, a patent’s claims, which define the patent holder’s legal rights, must be sufficiently definite (i.e., clear and well-defined) to inform others in the field what is covered by the patent, and what is not.
Patent Term and Rights
A valid U.S. patent gives the patent holder a temporary monopoly on the invention in the United States, in exchange for disclosing it to the public. (USPTO publishes both granted patents and patent applications.) This means that the patent holder has the exclusive right to practice the invention in the United States until the patent expires. Any other person who makes, uses, sells, or imports the invention without permission from the patent holder is said to infringe the patent and may be liable for various legal remedies if the patent holder sues them in court.
A patent’s term begins on the date that the patent application is granted and ends 20 years after the date that the underlying patent application was filed with USPTO. Because patent examination typically takes a little more than 2 years, an average effective patent term is about 17 or 18 years. The Patent Act allows for extensions of a patent’s term based on delays in patent examination or in obtaining regulatory approval for patented drugs and medical devices.
Ownership of a patent initially vests with the inventor or inventors, as a general rule. Like other personal property, patents may be transferred or assigned to others. For example, employment contracts may require employees to assign patent rights in inventions created while on the job to their employer. Patent owners may also permit others to practice the invention through a contract called a license. In return, the licensee may have to pay a lump sum of money or a continuing royalty to the patent holder.
Patent Enforcement
Patents are not self-enforcing. To obtain relief from infringement, the patent holder must generally sue alleged infringers in court. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent lawsuits. In addition, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) conducts administrative proceedings that may bar infringing goods from being imported into the United States. A single specialized court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), hears all patent appeals from the ITC and federal district courts across the country.
Persons accused of patent infringement may defend on several grounds. First, the accused infringer may claim noninfringement: that is, that their activities fall outside the scope of the patent claims. Second, the accused infringer may argue that the patent is invalid: that is, that USPTO should not have issued the patent because the invention does not actually meet one or more of the legal requirements for patentability. Third, the accused infringer may argue that the patent is unenforceable based on inequitable or illegal activities of the patent holder, such as obtaining the patent through fraud on USPTO.
Issues for Congress
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
As explained above, the statutory scope of patent-eligible subject matter (i.e., the types of inventions that may be patented) is broad. Yet federal courts have long held that three general types of discoveries may not be patented: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. These judicially created exceptions preclude patenting basic tools of scientific work, such as a mathematical equation or scientific law, even if newly discovered.
A series of Supreme Court decisions in the 2010s narrowed patent-eligible subject matter by broadening the scope of these judicially created exceptions. The Court’s decisions established a new judicial test for patent eligibility called the Alice/Mayo framework. As a result, fewer inventions are now patentable, particularly in computer software, business methods, and biotechnology. Some stakeholders contend that the Court’s decisions have increased uncertainty as to what is patentable and undercut innovation and investment. Others argue that the decisions foster innovation by preventing monopolies on basic research tools and fundamental concepts. For more detail, see CRS Report R45918, Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Reform: Background and Issues for Congress.
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board
In 2011, Congress created the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), a USPTO tribunal that hears challenges to already-issued patents through administrative procedures such as inter partes review (IPR). Through an IPR, any person other than the patent holder can petition PTAB to review the validity of an already-issued patent based on a lack of novelty or nonobviousness. If PTAB hears the IPR and agrees with the petitioner, USPTO cancels the invalid patent claims. In effect, IPR makes it easier, faster, and less expensive to challenge a patent’s validity, compared with making the same arguments in court. For more detail, see CRS Report R48016, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Inter Partes Review.
While some stakeholders argue that PTAB offers an efficient means to invalidate low-quality patents, others contend that its proceedings are unfair to patent holders and undermine certainty in patent rights. Some Members of Congress have proposed reforms to PTAB (see, e.g., S. 1553 or H.R. 5811), while the USPTO has made various regulatory changes in recent years that restricted or expanded access to IPR. For example, beginning in March 2025, USPTO leadership has taken several actions that have restricted the availability of IPR by expanding the circumstances in which USPTO will exercise its discretion to decline to institute (i.e., hear) an IPR proceeding. 
Federally Funded Inventions and “March-in” Rights
Special rules apply to patented inventions made using federal funding. In 1980, Congress established a uniform federal patent policy to promote the commercialization of inventions made with federal support through the Bayh-Dole Act (P.L. 96-517). Under Bayh-Dole, federal contractors or grantees generally retain the patent rights on inventions made with federal support. In exchange, the contractor or grantee provides the federal funding agency with a license to use the patented invention for government purposes without paying a royalty. The agency also retains the authority to grant compulsory licenses to third parties in some cases, known as march-in rights.
No federal agency has ever exercised march-in rights. Some stakeholders argue that agencies should use march-in rights to lower prices on patented inventions such as prescription drugs made with federal support. Others argue that using march-in to lower prices conflicts with the statute and would harm innovation. Various proposed regulatory changes in 2021 and 2023 that would have clarified the role (if any) that pricing should play in march-in determinations were abandoned after generating controversy. For more detail, see CRS In Focus IF12582, Pricing and March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act.
Patents and Artificial Intelligence
Recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI) raise novel patent law questions. Limitations on patent-eligible subject matter may prevent certain AI innovations from being patented, if USPTO or a court finds that they seek to claim an abstract idea. Another emerging issue concerns inventorship for inventions created by or with AI. The Federal Circuit has held that an invention made “autonomously” by AI alone is not patentable because it lacks any human inventor. For AI-assisted inventions, 2025 guidance from the USPTO emphasizes that the ordinary legal rules for inventorship apply when a human inventor uses AI as a tool in the inventive process. For more detail, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11251, Artificial Intelligence and Patent Law. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12744/IF12744.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12744.html
IF12150,Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-03T15:23:00Z,Active,Resources,Andrew S. Bowen,"Europe, Russia & Eurasia, National & Military Intelligence","Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have defended and repelled Russian advances, despite ongoing disadvantages in personnel and a smaller defense industry. The UAF has demonstrated flexibility over the course of the conflict as well as an ability to integrate Western security assistance. Nevertheless, the UAF continues to face obstacles, including personnel and equipment losses. 
From FY2022 to FY2024, Congress enacted five supplemental appropriations measures to provide assistance to Ukraine. The UAF’s evolving condition and performance may be of interest to the 119th Congress as Members weigh the impact of U.S. support for the UAF and potentially consider any further assistance to Ukraine or conduct oversight of U.S. policies toward Ukraine and Russia.
Personnel
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF has suffered high levels of casualties (data on Ukrainian casualties are sparse, but one estimate places UAF killed as high as 140,000), lowering force quality. In addition, desertion and draft evasion pose continued challenges to the UAF’s ability to sustain operations. In January 2026, Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov estimated that 200,000 soldiers were absent without official leave (AWOL) and 2 million men were avoiding draft notices.
After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led forces in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (known as “the Donbas”). In 2022, Ukraine was able to quickly mobilize these veterans and other volunteers into new volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve without the need for lengthy training. This arguably contributed to UAF effectiveness, since Ukraine did not have a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.
Many initial volunteers have been killed or wounded since 2022. Reportedly, the average Ukrainian soldier is over 40 years old, and some recruits have health or substance abuse issues. Ukraine passed legislation in April 2024 to address some recruitment issues. However, the government continues to reject some calls to lower the conscription age from 25 to 18, a policy that would likely meet with public opposition. 
In February 2025, the UAF implemented a new option for volunteers between the ages of 18 and 24 to sign one-year contracts in return for higher wages, a signing bonus, exemption from mobilization for 12 months, and other social benefits. While this option initially drew some interest, the UAF has struggled to recruit and retain younger recruits, and reports indicate recruitment officials have sometimes turned to more coercive methods. 
Training
To replace losses, recruiting and training new personnel remain key tasks. The UAF faces a dilemma in seeking to adequately train new recruits amid demands to provide immediate reinforcements. Ukrainian officials have instituted new training standards, including centralized training centers and an increase in basic training to 1.5 months (up from one month). Despite improvements, most training for new recruits happens in their respective units. This arguably contributes to differing levels of capability across the UAF, as some more elite units prioritize training and provide quality instructors.
Additionally, the UAF reportedly struggles to train officers for staff positions to assist commanders in managing and coordinating operations. A lack of trained staff officers has, in some cases, led to higher-level command staff coordinating and managing tactical operations. The UAF has announced organizational changes (such as organizing brigades under the command of a corps) to streamline management and coordination. 
Equipment
The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet-era or Russian equipment and has sustained significant equipment losses during the course of the war. The UAF has exhibited resilience in the face of such losses, in part due to Western security assistance and concerted UAF maintenance efforts. The diversity of systems, continued losses, and varied supply, however, undermine UAF standardization.
Ukrainian officials assert Western security assistance remains critical for supporting UAF operations. Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and Russian equipment (especially artillery and ammunition) and relies on security assistance for a variety of key systems, such as air defense and medium-range strike capabilities. Low supplies of artillery systems and ammunition have forced the UAF to adapt to other systems such as drones.
Alongside Western security assistance, Ukraine’s domestic defense industry has increased production and continues to innovate. Ukraine currently produces a wide range of systems, including drones (tactical and long-range strike), missiles, artillery systems, radar and electronic warfare, ammunition, and armored vehicles. Ukrainian officials maintain that a robust and capable domestic defense industry is essential to Ukraine’s long-term security and for reducing the country’s reliance on security assistance. According to one Ukrainian estimate, as much as 76% of the weapons and equipment the UAF needs is now produced domestically. 
Ukraine’s defense industry still faces multiple challenges, including accusations of corruption and fraud, labor shortages, and Russian strikes. Additionally, Ukraine’s defense industry has excess capacity but not enough government funding to contract production. In response, Ukraine has sought alternative funding mechanisms—including foreign donors, joint production agreements, foreign investment, and potential exports.   
U.S. and Western Security Assistance
Since the start of Russia’s 2022 war, the United States has committed more than $66 billion, the EU over $70 billion, and the UK over $17 billion (among other donors) in security assistance to Ukraine. This support is coordinated by NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), currently led by a U.S. three-star general. Simultaneously, Western officials have repeatedly voiced concerns over potential escalation of the conflict, defense industrial production capacity challenges, and the availability of funding to sustain security assistance.
Training
The United States and other allies have provided training and advice to the UAF since before Russia’s 2022 invasion. Most training efforts focus on employing Western security assistance, basic infantry skills and unit-level development, and combined arms operations. Currently, the UK (Operation Interflex), the European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine (EUMAM), and the United States (the Joint Multinational Training Group—Ukraine) conduct a variety of training programs for the UAF. 
Equipment
The UAF continues to request a wide range of equipment from the United States and other Western countries, especially advanced weapons such as air defense systems and ammunition, anti-drone capabilities, and fighter support. At the tactical level, the UAF has identified protected mobility (e.g., armored vehicles), counterbattery radars, artillery, and fire support among its needs. Frontline UAF soldiers and commanders have also reportedly expressed concern about the availability of basic supplies.
The focus of Western security assistance appears to have shifted from donations of existing equipment to financing procurement and investment. In 2024, Ukraine and Denmark reached an agreement (the so-called “Danish Model”) to finance equipment purchases from Ukraine’s domestic defense industry. Additionally, in 2025, NATO and the United States created the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), through which allies contribute funds to purchase “critical defence equipment” from the United States. 
Current Military Outlook
The UAF continues to demonstrate high levels of tactical flexibility and capability in the face of Russian quantitative advantages in personnel, equipment, drones, and air support. The UAF continues to hamper Russian efforts and has thus far stymied any new large-scale Russian breakthrough in Ukraine’s Donbas region.
Fighting remains attritional and positional, with the UAF primarily focused on defending the “fortress belt” of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, which anchor UAF defenses in the Donbas region. According to U.S. officials, Russia captured 1,865 square miles of Ukrainian territory in 2025, but “nowhere on the front did this equate to more than 60 miles of penetration or any territory of operational significance.” The UAF leadership has been criticized for its strategy of refusing to withdraw from positions, even risking potential encirclement, and for continuing to launch offensives.
Ukraine’s strategy appears to be centered on limiting Russian territorial advances and imposing more casualties than Russia is able to replace. In January 2026, Ukrainian defense minister Fedorov said a strategic goal was “to kill 50,000 Russians per month.” While some reports indicate the UAF has at times succeeded in imposing more casualties than Russia can replace, other observers express skepticism about this strategy given the UAF’s own losses. Some observers argue for a greater emphasis on targeting Russian logistics and command centers, but the UAF lacks sufficient medium-range strike capabilities.  
Another component of UAF strategy has been to undermine Russia’s ability to economically sustain its war by targeting Russian oil production and export facilities. 
While the UAF seeks to adopt NATO-style (mission command) principles of command, it also exhibits traits of Soviet-style (centralized, top-down) command. Some observers have criticized the UAF command for poor communication and micromanagement. To improve coordination and maximize resources, the UAF has implemented reforms by establishing corps that control a set number of brigades and are responsible for particular sections of the front line. Some UAF officials report improved coordination, but the process is ongoing; reports indicate some corps are better resourced with personnel and equipment than others.
Recruiting, training, rotating, and retaining troops remain challenges for the UAF. The UAF faces severe infantry shortages and is seeking to recruit more personnel. Most frontline UAF and TDF brigades are understrength and receive ad hoc rotation from the front line. With a porous front line, Russian forces are seeking to identify, bypass, and exploit weak UAF positions.
The UAF relies on a core of professional units to fill gaps in the front line and counter Russian advances. Some observers and UAF officers argue these professional units get priority for personnel and equipment at the expense of other units. Losses and exhaustion also continue to degrade these units’ capabilities, as they appear increasingly called to various positions across the front line. Some observers suggest that overreliance on select units, combined with personnel losses, has contributed to Russian advances.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12150/IF12150.16.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12150.html
IF12014,Social Security Retirement Earnings Test Overview,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T17:37:50Z,Active,Resources,Zhe Li,,"Background
Social Security is a work-related, federal insurance program that provides monthly cash benefits to workers and their eligible family members in the event of a worker’s retirement, disability, or death. Social Security retirement benefits received between age 62 and the full retirement age (FRA)—which falls between 65 and 67, depending on year of birth—are generally subject to an actuarial reduction for early retirement and may also be reduced by the Retirement Earnings Test (RET) if the beneficiary has earnings that exceed an annual threshold. (The RET does not apply to Social Security disability beneficiaries.)
The Social Security Administration’s Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) estimated that about 520,000 beneficiaries below FRA (or about 11% of all beneficiaries below FRA) would have had their benefits reduced or completely withheld due to the RET in 2019.
How Does the RET Work? 
Under the RET, a beneficiary who is below FRA and will not attain FRA during the calendar year is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for every $2 of earnings above an annual exempt amount ($24,480 in 2026). During the calendar year in which a beneficiary attains FRA, he or she is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for every $3 of earnings above a higher threshold ($65,160 in 2026). Both thresholds are typically increased annually with growth in the national average wage.
If a beneficiary is affected by the RET, his or her monthly Social Security benefit may be temporarily reduced in part or in full, depending on the total applicable reduction.
The RET in Conjunction with Early Retirement Reduction
When a worker elects to claim Social Security benefits before FRA, his or her monthly benefits are subject to a permanent actuarial reduction. In the initial benefit computation, retirement benefits are reduced for early retirement by a fraction of the worker’s basic benefit for each month of entitlement before FRA. The RET is applied to monthly benefits only after they have been reduced by the early retirement actuarial adjustment. Both the permanent reduction for early retirement and the temporary RET reduction are applied to beneficiaries below FRA.
Restoration of RET-Withheld Benefits Upon Attaining FRA
At FRA, beneficiaries begin to recoup the benefits that were lost due to the RET. An affected beneficiary’s monthly benefit is recomputed, and the dollar amount of the monthly benefit is increased based on the number of months subject to the RET when he or she attains FRA. (Monthly benefits may also increase due to additional earnings.) This automatic benefit recomputation at FRA effectively adjusts (lessens) the actuarial reduction for early retirement.
Table 1 shows a hypothetical beneficiary who was affected by the RET. The beneficiary is assumed to have an FRA of 67 and claim benefits at age 64. His or her monthly benefit would be $2,000 after applying the actuarial reduction for early retirement (a $500 reduction per month). The person is assumed to work (earning about $56,480 per year) while receiving Social Security benefits from ages 64 to 66, and his or her benefits would be withheld by the RET for eight months per year for three years (see table note d). When the beneficiary attains FRA, the benefit would be recomputed, and the beneficiary would receive $2,333 per month (or $333 more per month) for his or her remaining lifetime. 
Table 1. Hypothetical Example of a Social Security Beneficiary Affected by the RET (FRA = 67)
Description
Benefits and Adjustments

Social Security monthly benefits before actuarial reduction for early retirement (for entitlement at FRA)
$2,500

Benefit reduction for early retirement


Percentage of actuarial reduction in initial benefits for entitlement at age 64 (5/9 of 1% per month for 36 months)
20%a

Monthly benefits after actuarial reduction for early retirement 
$2,000b

Temporary benefit reduction due to RET


RET charges per year (ages 64-66)b
$16,000c

Months per year for benefits withheld due to RET 
8 monthsd

Total months in three years for RET charges
24 months

Benefit recomputation at FRA


Percentage given back to beneficiary for those RET-impacted months (5/9 of 1% per month for 24 months)
13.33%e

The new effective actuarial reduction for early retirement
6.67%f

The new permanent monthly Social Security benefit
$2,333g

Source: CRS. 
Notes: The annual adjustments for cost of living and RET exempt amounts, and the potential increase in monthly benefits due to additional earnings, are not shown.
This amount is calculated as 5/9% X 36 = 20%.
This is calculated as $2,500 X (1-20%) = $2,000.
In 2026, for a Social Security beneficiary below FRA throughout the year, earnings of $56,480 would result in a RET charge of ($56,480-$24,480) ÷ 2 = $16,000.
The entire monthly benefit of $2,000 from Jan to Aug would be withheld due to the RET charge ($2,000 X 8 = $16,000).
This amount is calculated as 5/9% X 24 = 13.33%.
This amount is calculated as 20% - 13.33% = 6.67%.
This is calculated as $2,500 X (1-6.67%) = $2,333. Benefit amounts are rounded down to the next lowest dollar.
The RET and Life Expectancy
Typically, the RET reduction before FRA would be recouped gradually through a higher Social Security annual benefit over a certain number of years after FRA. The RET is actuarially fair (on average) in its readjustment of benefits at FRA. That is, over the course of the average person’s lifespan, after reaching FRA the beneficiary can expect to receive all benefits withheld due to the RET.
Beneficiaries, however, may have a life expectancy that differs from the average. Workers with shorter-than-average lifespans may feel that the recovery of benefits initially reduced under the RET is incomplete (e.g., certain lower-income workers and minorities with shorter life expectancies). Conversely, for those who live longer than average, the recomputation may result in higher lifetime benefits that more than offset the initial benefit reductions under the RET. 
Selected Impacts of Eliminating the RET for All Beneficiaries
On Labor Supply Decisions
In 2000, P.L. 106-182, the most recent legislative RET change, eliminated the RET for beneficiaries beginning with the month they attain FRA. Research based on the change in 2000 suggests that the elimination of the RET for all beneficiaries (including those below FRA) may affect workers’ labor supply decisions in several ways:
Early retirees who were working and having earnings below the RET annual thresholds may choose to work more hours.
Early retirees whose Social Security benefits were partially withheld by the RET would see an increase in their Social Security monthly benefits. Their behavioral change is ambiguous depending on the value each beneficiary places on either (1) increasing his or her work with the increased Social Security benefits or (2) decreasing his or her work (e.g., enjoying more leisure) due to the increased benefits.
Early retirees whose Social Security benefits were fully withheld by the RET (resulting in no monthly benefit payment) may reduce work hours due to substantially increased income from receiving Social Security benefits that were previously withheld in their entirety.
A small group of early retirees who were not working may choose to go back to work.
Because of these mixed effects, research has not drawn a clear conclusion on the overall impact of eliminating the RET for all beneficiaries on aggregate labor supply.
On Social Security Claiming Behavior and Poverty
Because the RET applies to persons who are younger than FRA, studies suggest that it may discourage persons below the FRA from claiming benefits early. Some workers perceive the RET as a “tax” on benefits received before FRA, even though the recomputation of benefits at FRA allows the worker to recoup benefits withheld under the RET. Numerous studies have found evidence that the RET affects Social Security claiming decisions and suggest that a complete elimination of the RET would lead to significant early benefit claiming before FRA. 
Another consideration for policymakers is the effect of the RET repeal on poverty rates. If more people claim at age 62 because of the elimination of the RET, then more people would become subject to the permanent actuarial reduction in benefits for early claiming. Without the RET, this permanent reduction would no longer be lessened after FRA unless there are additional years of earnings that would increase benefits, although the permanent percentage reduction for early claiming would still apply. This permanent benefit reduction, cemented further without a later RET readjustment, may be a cause for poverty concerns later in a beneficiary’s life.
On Social Security Program Solvency
Elimination of the RET for those below their FRAs would have an unclear effect on Social Security revenue from payroll taxes and would have two opposing impacts on the financial outlook for the Social Security program: 
An immediate increase in program costs would occur as a result of two populations receiving increased benefits: (1) those who had benefits withheld due to the RET would now receive no reduction and, therefore, their benefits would increase, and (2) some of those who were previously not receiving benefits and were planning to start entitlement later could elect to receive benefits sooner than they otherwise would under current law.
A decrease in program costs would stem primarily from the increased incidence of beneficiaries becoming subject to the actuarial reduction in benefits for early retirement.
OCACT estimates that the permanent reduction in monthly benefit levels would, on average, more than offset the value of additional benefit payments from earlier claiming over the long run, resulting in some net savings to the program (1% decrease in the program’s long-term funding shortfall based on the 2025 trustees report). 
Additional Information
CRS Report R41242, Social Security Retirement Earnings Test: How Earnings Affect Benefits. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12014/IF12014.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12014.html
IF11200,Gold Star Designation: An Overview,2026-03-02T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T16:37:56Z,Active,Resources,"Carly A. Miller, Barbara Salazar Torreon, Carly A. Miller","Military Personnel, Compensation & Health Care","Background
During the years of U.S. participation in World War I (WWI, 1917-1918), an informal practice developed where some families would display service banners adorned with blue stars in the windows of their homes to signify participation in the armed forces. Each blue star symbolized a family member serving in the war. When a servicemember was killed or died, it became customary for families to replace the blue star with a gold star. 
In a separate but related practice, President Woodrow Wilson expressed support in May 1918 for a recommendation made by the Women’s Committee of the Council for National Defense that American women should wear a black band on the upper left arm, affixed with a gold star to signify the loss of a family member during the war. 
In October 1942, Congress enacted P.L. 77-750 “to authorize the Secretary of War to approve a standard design for a service flag and a service lapel button.”
Current policy by the Department of Defense (DOD), which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, regarding display of the gold star on the Service Flag is contained in DOD Instruction (DODI) 1348.36, Gold Star Lapel Button, Service Flag, and Service Lapel Button. The policy remains essentially unchanged, stating: “If the Service member symbolized is killed or dies from causes other than dishonorable, the star representing that individual will have a gold star of smaller size superimposed on it, so that the blue forms a border.” 
Gold Star Lapel Button 
In 1947, Congress enacted P.L.80-306, requiring the “Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy” to provide Gold Star Lapel Buttons (GSLB) “for widows, parents, and next of kin of members of the armed forces who lost their lives” in the U.S. armed services during World War II (WWII). The GSLB has a gold star mounted on a purple surface surrounded by laurel leaves. See Figure 1. GLSB eligibility has evolved over time. Current criteria are outlined under 10 U.S.C. §1126(a): “A lapel button, to be known as the gold star lapel button, shall be designed, as approved by the Secretary of Defense, to identify next of kin of members of the armed forces—(1) who lost their lives during World War I, World War II, or during any subsequent period of armed hostilities in which the United States was engaged before July 1, 1958; (2) who lost or lose their lives after June 30, 1958—(A) while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States; (B) while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or (C) while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict in which the United States is not a belligerent party against an opposing armed force; or (3) who lost or lose their lives after March 28, 1973, as a result of—(A) an international terrorist attack against the United States or a foreign nation friendly to the United States, recognized as such an attack by the Secretary of Defense; or (B) military operations while serving outside the United States (including the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States) as part of a peacekeeping force.” 
Under 10 U.S.C. §1126(d)(1), “The term “next of kin” means individuals standing in such relationship to members of the Armed Forces described in subsection (a) as the Secretaries concerned shall jointly specify in regulations for purposes of this section.” Section 3.3 of DODI 1348.36 details who may wear the GSLB.
Families of servicemembers who died in circumstances other than those listed under 10 U.S.C. §1126(a) may not be eligible for the Gold Star Lapel Button. However, they may be eligible to display a gold star on the Service Flag and may qualify for the Next of Kin Lapel Button. (For more information, see DODI 1348.36 in Sections 4.1-4.3.)
Next of Kin Lapel Button
Approved in 1973, the Next of Kin Lapel Button (also referred to as the Next of Kin Pin) is provided to the families of servicemembers who lost their lives while serving on active duty or while serving in a drill status as a member of the National Guard or Reserves in circumstance other than killed in action. The Next of Kin Lapel Button is gold, with a star within a circle of sprigs of oak. According to DOD’s Casualty, Mortuary Affairs, and Military Funeral Honors Programs Content Guide, the star denotes honorable service and the oak sprigs symbolize the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. 
Figure 1. Gold Star Lapel Button (left) and Next of Kin Lapel Button (right)
/
Source: Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors (TAPS) at https://www.taps.org/articles/15-2/goldstarpins
Military Death Benefits
After the death of a servicemember on active duty, the respective military department assigns a casualty assistance officer to assist any surviving spouse, child(ren), or other designated beneficiaries, with all eligible benefits and entitlements. These generally include the following:
$100,000 tax-exempt, lump sum, DOD death gratuity paid to designated beneficiaries. 
Burial assistance including the disposition of remains and travel to the burial site for the servicemember’s immediate family. 
Any unpaid pay and allowances at the time of death.
Residence in government housing or payment of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for up to a year. 
Access to commissaries and exchanges. 
TRICARE benefits. 
Up to $500,000 non-taxable Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (SGLI) payments (distributed as a lump sum or in 36 equal monthly payments).
One or more survivor benefit annuities (DOD Survivor Benefit Plan, Social Security and/or the Department of Veterans Affairs Dependency and Indemnity Compensation).
Each benefit described above has unique eligibility criteria. Survivors may qualify for a benefit based on their unique circumstances. For additional guidance on survivor benefits, see DOD’s Support for Survivors Guide and the Benefits Finder. Separately, DOD also provides eligible surviving family members with authorized access to online survivor benefits reports, which guide survivors through benefits eligibility. For additional information on selected benefits, see also VA Benefits for Veterans’ Spouses, Dependents, and Survivors site and CRS Report R45325, Military Survivor Benefit Plan: Background and Issues for Congress. 
Selected Legislation
Congress has enacted several laws related to the Gold Star designation and Gold Star families.
Gold Star Mothers and Widows Pilgrimage. To enable the mothers and widows of deceased American servicemembers interred in European cemeteries to make a pilgrimage to these cemeteries. Mar. 2, 1929, P.L. 70-952, 45 Stat. 1508.
Gold Star Mother’s Day. To designate the last Sunday in September as “Gold Star Mother’s Day,” and for other purposes. June 23, 1936, Pub. Res. 74-123, 49 Stat. 1895. 
Service Flag and Lapel Button. To authorize the Secretary of War to approve a standard design for a service flag and a lapel button. Oct. 17, 1942, P.L. 77-750, 56 Stat. 796.
GSLB and WWII. To provide appropriate lapel buttons for widows, parents, and next of kin of members of the Armed Forces who lost their lives in the U.S. armed services in WWII. Aug. 1, 1947, P.L. 80-306, 61 Stat. 710.
GSLB and Subsequent Conflicts. To provide appropriate lapel buttons for widows, parents, and next of kin members of the Armed Forces who lost or lose their lives in the armed services of the United States during World War II or during any subsequent war or period of armed hostilities. Aug. 21, 1951, P.L.82-121, 66 Stat. 195. 
GSLB and the Cold War. To amend Title 10, U.S. Code, to provide gold star lapel buttons for the next of kin of members of the Armed Forces who lost or lose their lives in war or as a result of cold war incidents. Aug. 11, 1966, P.L. 89-534, 80 Stat. 345.
Gold Star Wives, Inc. To incorporate the Gold Star Wives of America. Dec. 4, 1980, P.L. 96-497, 94 Stat. 2595.
American Gold Star Mothers, Inc. To recognize the organization known as the American Gold Star Mothers, Incorporated. June 12, 1984, P.L. 98-314, 98 Stat. 237. 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY1994, Section 1143. Award of gold star lapel buttons to survivors of servicemembers killed by terrorist acts. Nov. 30, 1993, P.L. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1757.
NDAA for FY2006, Section 562. Policy and Procedures on Casualty Assistance to Survivors of Military Decedents. Jan. 6, 2006, P.L. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3267, as amended by P.L. 109-364, Div. A, Title V, §566, Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2223.
NDAA for FY2013, Section 2859. Establishment of a commemorative work to Gold Star Mothers. Jan. 2, 2013, P.L. 112-239, 126 Stat. 2164. 
NDAA for FY2014, Section 633. Improved assistance for Gold Star spouses and other dependents. Dec. 26, 2013, P.L. 113-66, 127 Stat. 786.
Gold Star Fathers Act of 2015. To amend chapter 21 of Title 5, U.S. Code, to provide that fathers of certain permanently disabled or deceased veterans shall be included with mothers of such veterans as preference eligibles for treatment in the civil service. Oct. 7, 2015, P.L. 114-62, 129 Stat. 547.
Gold Star Families Voices Act. To amend the Veterans’ Oral History Project Act to allow the collection of video and audio recordings of biographical histories by immediate family members of the Armed Forces who died as a result of their service during a period of war. Nov. 28, 2016, P.L. 114-246, 130 Stat. 995.
NDAA for FY2020, Section 581. Modification of authorities on eligibility for and replacement of gold star
lapel buttons. Dec. 20, 2019, P.L. 116-92, 133 Stat. 1411.
NDAA for FY2021, Sections 624 and 625. Expansion of assistance for Gold Star spouses and other dependents (Sec. 624). Gold Star Families Parks Pass (Sec. 625). Jan. 1, 2021, P.L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3677. 
NDAA for FY2022, Sections 626(c) and 1061. Establishment of certain definitions (Sec. 626(c)). Inclusion of support services for Gold Star families in quadrennial quality of life review (Sec. 1061). P.L. 117-81, Dec. 27, 2021; 135 Stat. 1775 and 135 Stat. 1909. 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Section 114. Green and Gold Congressional Aide Program. P.L. 117-103, Mar. 15, 2022, 136 Stat. 511. 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Section 642. Waiver of special use permit application fee for veterans’ special events. P.L. 117-328, Dec. 29, 2022, 136 Stat. 5612. 
Relevant Statutes
Title 10 U.S. Code §1126 – Gold star lapel button: eligibility and distribution.
Title 10 U.S. Code §1475 – Death gratuity: death of members on active duty or inactive duty training.
Title 36 U.S. Code Ch. 211 – American Gold Star Mothers, Inc.
Title 36 U.S. Code Ch. 805 – Gold Star Wives of America, Inc.

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11200/IF11200.9.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11200.html
IN12662,U.S. and Israeli Military Operations Against Iran: Issues for Congress,2026-03-01T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T12:53:18Z,Active,Posts,"Clayton Thomas, Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp, Jim Zanotti",,"On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched military operations against targets in Iran. The United States and Iran had been engaged in talks over Iran’s nuclear program, amid broader U.S. concerns over Iran’s missile arsenal, terrorism, and support to armed groups. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed Iranian citizens directly in their public remarks, encouraging Iranians to use any opportunities created by the strikes to overthrow the Islamic Republic government, which has ruled Iran since 1979. International reactions have varied, with Russia and China condemning U.S. and Israeli actions, and some European and Arab governments denouncing Iran’s counterattacks.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior Iranian security leaders have been killed. Iranian officials have announced transitional leadership and continue retaliatory missile and drone attacks on Israel, bases in the region hosting U.S. forces, and targets in Arab Gulf countries and adjacent waters. As of March 1, civilians reportedly had been killed in Iran, Israel, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Syria, and some U.S. servicemembers had been killed or wounded. The State Department has advised U.S. citizens worldwide to exercise caution and “follow the guidance in the latest [embassy] security alerts.” Strikes by Iran have damaged airports and ports in the region, and regional airspace closures have caused global disruptions. Apparent Iranian strikes on ships near the Strait of Hormuz highlight threats to that critical chokepoint for transnational shipments of oil and natural gas. 
Developments in the conflict and global responses present Congress with short- and long-term policy questions across several domains. 
U.S. Objectives and Plans
President Trump has stated a range of U.S. objectives and options since the start of the operations. On February 28, the President said “our objective is to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime.” He reiterated long-standing U.S. insistence that Iran “can never have a nuclear weapon,” and said that U.S. strikes on Iran seek “to destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground”; “to annihilate their navy”; and, “to ensure that the regime’s terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world.” President Trump encouraged the Iranian people to “take over” their government in the wake of U.S. operations, telling members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, armed forces, and police that they should disarm in order to be “treated fairly with total immunity.” In a March 1 interview, the President said that he has agreed to engage remaining Iranian leaders in talks, and he declined to answer a question about possible U.S. support for a popular uprising in Iran. 
The Future of Iran and the Middle East Region
The death of Iran’s Supreme Leader and U.S. and Israeli statements encouraging regime change imply fundamental questions about Iran’s future governance and stability. Following Khamenei’s death, Iranian officials named an interim governing council consisting of President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary head Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, and Guardian Council member Ayatollah Alireza Arafi. In January 2026, Iranian authorities killed thousands of protestors, demonstrating a willingness to use violence to maintain power. Reports from Iran indicate that the regime has both supporters and opponents within the country’s diverse population of 90 million people. To date, an organized, effective Iran-based opposition movement does not appear to have coalesced, but disruption to the regime’s instruments of control could create opportunities for such a movement. Any post-Khamenei leaders in Iran will face considerable challenges in governing the country after decades of authoritarian rule, ongoing corruption, international sanctions, and conflict.
Congress, the President, War Powers, and Oversight
The 119th Congress has debated the President’s authority to use force in Iran. The Administration consulted with some congressional leaders prior to the strikes and reportedly notified some ahead of initiating U.S. operations. The War Powers Resolution (WPR), among other measures, requires the President to inform Congress of certain deployments abroad and the “introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities,” providing expedited procedures for congressional consideration of authorization or disapproval of such presidential action. Members may consider war powers resolutions in the House (H.Con.Res. 38) and Senate (S.J.Res. 104) to direct the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities against Iran unless a declaration of war or authorization to use military force has been enacted. In June 2025, the Senate rejected a discharge motion for a similar resolution (S.J.Res. 59). 
Outlook
Congress may examine U.S. objectives and assess the Administration’s priorities, including how the United States could respond to Iranian concessions or intransigence and the extent of U.S. alignment with Israel and other partners. Congress may seek information from the Administration and conduct its own fact-finding about plans to secure materials, equipment, and personnel from Iran’s nuclear, missile, and drone programs if state authority there is interrupted or changes. Congress also may assess what may come next in Iran, including possibilities of revolution or a weakened but reconstituted Islamic Republic. 
Current operations mark the fifth U.S. military engagement with Iran since the Iran-backed militant group Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023: U.S. forces defended Israel during Israel’s three conflicts with Iran in April 2024, November 2024, and June 2025, and U.S. forces separately struck Iranian nuclear sites in June 2025. In preparation for the current “Operation Epic Fury,” additional U.S. air and naval assets deployed to the Middle East. The nature and pace of U.S. operations to date suggests that Congress could conduct its own examination of the amounts of munitions and air and missile defense assets that U.S. and partner forces may be expending. Congress may assess related implications for U.S. and partner stockpiles and global readiness, including through combatant command posture assessments and Administration appropriations requests. 
U.S. military deployments in the Middle East and support to partner governments have sought to deter Iran and assure regional and global actors that Iranian threats could be met with decisive force. Fundamental change to Iran’s government could reduce, increase, or obviate the need for some such deployments and change considerations around some U.S. support to regional partners. Iran’s attacks on Arab Gulf countries may also deepen its isolation. Prolonged U.S. and partner confrontation with Iran, lasting disruptions to Gulf energy flows, commerce, or travel, or Iran’s descent into internal crisis could generate calls or continued, reduced, or expanded U.S. attention and resources.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12662/IN12662.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12662.html
R48874,Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2026 State of Play,2026-02-28T05:00:00Z,2026-03-07T05:54:21Z,Active,Reports,William L. Painter,Homeland Security Appropriations,"FY2026 marks the 23rd annual appropriations cycle with a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations measure. In six of the first seven years of its existence, the annual appropriations measure for DHS was enacted within a month of the beginning of the fiscal year it covered. Since FY2010, however, no annual DHS appropriations measure has been enacted within the first two months of its fiscal year, and twice DHS received its annual appropriations within the first fiscal quarter. Lapses in annual appropriations for the department lasting more than a week have occurred four times in that period.
This report is a quick reference for tracking the “state of play” for DHS appropriations from the end of the August 2025 district work period until the resolution of the annual appropriations measure. It will be updated as events warrant. 
DHS appropriations 2026
Latest DHS appropriations
DHS appropriations 2026 supplemental
Homeland Security appropriations lapse 2026
DHS continuing resolution anomaly 2026
(This is an “In Brief” style report, and as such, should have its summary and TOC suppressed.)",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48874/R48874.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48874.html
R48875,U.S.-Australia Relations: Background and Issues for Congress,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T13:23:01Z,Active,Reports,Jared G. Tupuola,,"The Commonwealth of Australia is a long-standing diplomatic, economic, and security partner of the United States with joint military cooperation dating back as early as World War I. Throughout the 20th century, U.S.-Australian relations advanced with Australia becoming a major non-NATO U.S. ally through the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) alliance of 1951. In the past decade, Australia has grown increasingly aligned with the United States over shared concerns of a militarily and economically capable People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). The U.S.-Australia defense partnership is multi-faceted and includes bilateral and multilateral engagement to advance what the United States and its allies refer to as a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the allies adopted a new element of U.S.-Australia defense cooperation with the Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership, or AUKUS. Under AUKUS, the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) are to help procure nuclear-powered propulsion technology for Australia and cooperatively develop advanced defense capabilities. Other shared foreign policy and security initiatives include the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with India and Japan, and the Five Eyes Intelligence Grouping with Canada, the UK, and New Zealand.
Since re-assuming office for his second term in January 2025, President Donald Trump has pursued foreign policies that have strained U.S.-Australian bilateral relations, particularly the imposition of tariffs on Australia as part of U.S. global tariffs despite having a bilateral free trade agreement (which entered into force in 2005), and having a trade surplus with Australia. In June 2025, the Trump Administration announced it would conduct a review of AUKUS to ensure that the partnership aligns with an “America First foreign policy.” While the Australian government has expressed confidence in the U.S. commitment to AUKUS, there are rising voices in Australia calling into question U.S. reliability as a security partner and advocating for greater strategic autonomy.
In Australia, the Labor government under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was re-elected in May 2025 in a landslide victory. Prime Minister Albanese faces several major issues that were accentuated during his campaign, such as the high-cost of living and housing prices for Australians as well as foreign policy and environmental sustainability concerns. Domestic economic concerns around U.S. tariffs and the Labor Party’s climate priorities may put the United States and Australia at odds over some issues, while shared geopolitical perspectives on China’s rising influence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the Pacific Islands, and supply-chain security, may foster continued and expanded collaboration.
Congressional interest in shaping the U.S.-Australia bilateral relationship has been instrumental in advancing key developments in the U.S.-Australia alliance. Some Members have introduced legislation and resolutions and otherwise advocated for policies that advance U.S.-Australia bilateral cooperation, including through Congressional Member Organizations, such the Friends of Australia Caucus and the AUKUS Working Group. In the 119th Congress, Members may consider issues related to authorizing or overseeing AUKUS and related military technology transfers, supporting alliance commitments, funding and supporting strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and setting and overseeing policies related to trade, tariffs, and economic security. Relatedly, Congress may consider how the Trump Administration’s policies impact broader U.S.-Australia relations.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48875/R48875.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48875.html
R48868,Separation of Powers and NATO Withdrawal,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-03-03T16:08:02Z,Active,Reports,Karen Sokol,"North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Europe, Russia & Eurasia, Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools, International Law, Separation of Powers","In 2023, Congress enacted a law that prohibits the President from “suspend[ing], terminat[ing], denounc[ing], or withdraw[ing] the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty”—which established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—without the advice and consent of the Senate or an act of Congress. See Section 1250A of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 118-31. This provision emerged against the backdrop of debates concerning the United States’ policy toward NATO and whether the President possesses the power to withdraw the United States from treaties without receiving the legislative branch’s approval. 
Prior to Section 1250A’s enactment, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) published an opinion in 2020 concluding that the President has exclusive power over treaty withdrawal and that Congress is constitutionally prohibited from intruding upon this power. In contrast to the OLC’s legal position, which neither courts nor Congress are bound to consider as authoritative, Section 1250A’s sponsors stated that the legislation “ensures that no President can unilaterally dissolve our bond to this invaluable alliance without Senate approval.” If the President decided to unilaterally withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty, irrespective of Section 1250A, there are at least two ways in which the statute might affect a court’s analysis of any challenge to the President’s action. First, the statute may influence a court’s decision on whether to hear such a challenge at all, and second, the statute could affect the court’s evaluation of the President’s action in the event it decides to hear a case. 
With respect to whether a court would hear a challenge, two doctrines are relevant: the political question doctrine and standing. Historically, courts have generally left the issue of the constitutional distribution of treaty-withdrawal power to the political branches, concluding that challenges to unilateral treaty withdrawal by the President present a nonjusticiable political question. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979). More recent Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that courts may be less likely to dismiss a challenge to a President’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty in violation of Section 1250A on political question grounds. In a case involving another question of separation of foreign policy powers, the Court held that, where a President acts contrary to a statute on the ground that it interferes with the President’s Article II authority, the constitutional question is one properly resolved by the judiciary rather than left to the political branches. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012).
Another issue is who would have standing to bring a legal challenge to an alleged violation of Section 1250A. This doctrine may present greater hurdles than the political question doctrine, as it would ultimately depend on whether the plaintiff is able to allege that they suffered an injury that meets the standards the Supreme Court has established—i.e., that the injury is unique to them rather than shared by the general population, is sufficiently tied to the alleged violation, and is redressable by a court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992). In the past, courts have often found that plaintiffs, including Members of Congress, fail to meet one or more of these requirements in cases involving foreign policy issues, including that of treaty withdrawal. See, e.g., Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2002).
In the event that a court were to hear a challenge to a President’s unilateral withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty, it may likely apply the well-established framework for analyzing separation of powers issues derived from Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). If a court were to determine that a President’s withdrawal was contrary to a congressional prohibition, it may conclude that the action could be upheld only if the President has exclusive authority, a claim that the Youngstown framework instructs courts to “scrutinize[] with caution.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry 576 U.S. 1, 10 (2015). In assessing whether such authority exists, a court might draw on the Constitution’s text and structure as well as other relevant judicial precedent. Courts also often consider the historical practice of the political branches in separation of powers cases. See id. at 23. During the 19th century, the political branches often treated the treaty withdrawal power as a shared one in which both Congress and the President played a role. In the 20th century, the executive branch increasingly asserted independent authority to withdraw from treaties, and Congress periodically regulated U.S. participation in treaties. The executive branch does not appear to have asserted a claim of exclusive presidential authority until the 2020 OLC opinion, and Section 1250A appears to be the first statutory prohibition of unilateral presidential withdrawal from a treaty. Ultimately, given the absence of directly controlling judicial precedent, in a case challenging a Section 1250A violation, both parties would be able to present arguments in support of their positions.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48868/R48868.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48868.html
R48866,Toward Commercial Fusion Energy: Considerations for Congress,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T13:31:23Z,Active,Reports,Todd Kuiken,,"While there has been considerable U.S. public and private investment in developing fusion energy, scientific and technological hurdles remain for commercial viability. Congress may have an interest in U.S. strategic positioning in regard to fusion energy technology as countries around the world, including China, are competing to be the first to achieve commercialized fusion energy. 
Nuclear fusion is a process in which the nuclei of two lightweight atoms join, or fuse, to form a heavier nucleus, releasing energy. Achieving fusion requires three conditions: (1) heating a small quantity of fuel above its ignition point, (2) maintaining the reaction long enough for the release of fusion energy to exceed the energy input, and (3) converting the energy released to a useful form of energy (e.g., electricity). As of the date of this report, just one project claims to have successfully achieved the first condition and partially achieved the second. Once all three are achieved, electricity generated by a fusion reaction would then need to be integrated into the electric grid, which may introduce additional engineering and technical challenges. Different designs and technologies are being explored to achieve commercial fusion energy. 
Federally funded fusion energy research and development (R&D) is primarily supported by the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Office of Science through its Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) program. In FY2025, the FES program budget was $790 million. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), from FY2020 to FY2023, about 70% of FES’s budget supported three projects, including two DOE user facilities and an international fusion project called ITER, formerly the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, which accounted for about 30% of the total FES budget. DOE also supports fusion energy research directed toward weapons activities and improved stewardship of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. This latter work includes inertial confinement, an approach used in the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at the DOE Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to initiate fusion reactions. In 2022, NIF became the first facility to achieve “ignition,” when the energy released by the fusion reaction is greater than the energy directly expended to create the reaction, an event that has increased interest in inertial confinement designs for future power plants. In 2024, DOE released its Fusion Energy Strategy, which focuses on three pillars: (1) resolving the scientific and technological gaps to a fusion pilot plant, (2) paving the way for commercial fusion deployment, and (3) cultivating and expanding partnerships. As part of the strategy, DOE developed a science and technology roadmap composed of targeted actions and metric-driven milestones to guide DOE investments in order to support a competitive U.S. fusion energy industry.
The number of private fusion companies has increased significantly in the past few years. According to a recent survey of private fusion companies, they raised $2.2 billion in private funding in 2025, with total private investment reaching nearly $9 billion between 2021 and 2025. The survey also shows that a majority of these companies believe there will be a commercially viable fusion plant by 2035, with some responding that it will be before 2030. However, the timing of commercial fusion energy may be difficult to predict. 
Congress may have a continued interest in shaping the broader U.S. fusion R&D strategy to achieve commercially viable fusion energy. Congress may consider whether current federal funding levels, R&D priorities, supply chains, workforce pipelines, levels of international collaboration, and public engagement programs are appropriate to achieve the first commercial fusion power plant and establish a fusion energy industry in the United States. Congress may also choose to investigate the strategic positioning of the United States as it relates to China and other countries, such as Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, all of which have strategies to develop fusion energy. 
 ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48866/R48866.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48866.html
R48849,Housing for the 21st Century Act,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T15:52:56Z,Active,Reports,"Katie Jones, Maggie McCarty, Henry G. Watson, Andrew P. Scott, Darryl E. Getter",,"The Housing for the 21st Century Act (H.R. 6644) was passed by the House on February 9, 2026. The bill contains six titles comprising 38 sections, which address several housing policy topics as well as several banking topics. According to the committee report accompanying the reported version of the bill (H.Rept. 119-457), its purpose is “to make it easier to build and afford housing, including modernizing outdated government programs, lowering costs by removing unnecessary federal requirements, and increasing local flexibility over housing decisions.” 
The version of the bill passed by the House differs from the version reported by the House Committee on Financial Services in several ways. Among other things, the engrossed version adds a new Title VI, “Strengthening Community Banks’ Role in Housing.” Title VI contains 13 sections: 12 sections incorporate the text of banking-related bills that had previously been reported by the Financial Services Committee, and 1 provides budgetary savings.
Most of the sections in the Housing for the 21st Century Act are similar to previously introduced stand-alone bills. Additionally, many of the provisions in the Housing for the 21st Century Act are similar to provisions included in the Renewing Opportunity in the American Dream to Housing Act of 2025 (S. 2651; also known as the ROAD to Housing Act); some sections are substantially identical, some have similarities but are notably different, and some are present in one bill and not the other. This includes the banking provisions and savings provision contained in Title VI of the Housing for the 21st Century Act, which have no corresponding provisions in the ROAD to Housing Act. Table A-1 provides a comparison of provisions from the Housing for the 21st Century Act to those in the ROAD to Housing Act.
Major Components of the Housing for the 21st Century Act
Title I contains seven sections concerning housing supply and housing development regulations. Several national indicators suggest that housing supply may be relatively low compared to demand, which can be a contributing factor to decreasing housing affordability. The sections in Title I would seek to publish land use policy guidelines and best practices, including for single-stair reform; establish a grant program for home building pattern books; adjust and streamline certain environmental review processes; adjust Federal Housing Administration (FHA) multifamily loan limits; and require a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of workforce housing.
Title II contains five sections, four of which would make reforms to existing federal housing programs: the HOME Investment Partnerships program, the Community Development Block Grant, the Section 504 rural housing home repair program, and the Housing Choice Voucher program. A fifth section proposes a new competitive grant program to assist planning and implementation activities associated with affordable housing.
Title III contains three sections concerning the definition of “manufactured homes,” small-dollar mortgages, and an increased cap on bank investments to promote the public welfare.
Title IV contains eight sections, which propose to exclude veterans disability compensation when determining income for eligibility for certain U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs, add a disclosure about potential eligibility for Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)-guaranteed loans to the Uniform Residential Loan Application for mortgages, increase interagency coordination on housing programs, create a new pilot program within the Family Self-Sufficiency program, make changes to HUD’s housing counseling program, create a new eviction helpline grant program, create a new temperature sensor pilot program in public and assisted housing, and require GAO studies on housing for elderly/disabled persons, housing near superfund sites, and residential heirs property.
Title V contains two sections concerning congressional oversight of federal housing officials and Public Housing Agencies.
Title VI contains 13 sections, which propose to modify the classification of custodial and reciprocal deposits for certain banking institutions; modify examination and other requirements for certain banking institutions; modify processes regarding failed and insolvent banks; modify and review processes regarding new, rural, and small banking institutions; and provide budgetary savings by reducing the aggregate amount of surplus funds of the Federal Reserve banks.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48849/R48849.6.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48849.html
R43419,NASA Appropriations and Authorizations: At a Glance,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T07:54:53Z,Active,Reports,Rachel Lindbergh,"Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations, R&D Programs & Policies, Space Policy","Congressional deliberations about the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) often focus on the availability of funding. This product provides data on past and current NASA appropriations, as well as the President’s FY2026 budget request and congressional action on FY2026 appropriations and authorizations of appropriations.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA budget NASA appropriations NASA authorization NASA reauthorization NASA funding NASA congressional budget justification NASA budget request NASA operating plan NASA Commerce-Justice-Science NASA CJS
2021 FY2021 NASA appropriations H.R. 7667 H.R. 7617 P.L. 116-260 
2022 FY2022 NASA appropriations H.R. 4505 P.L. 117-43 P.L. 117-103 
2023 FY2023 NASA appropriations H.R. 8256 S. 4664 P.L. 117-328 
2024 FY2024 NASA appropriations H.R. 5893 S. 2321 P.L. 118-42 
2025 FY2025 NASA appropriations H.R. 9026 authorization H.R. 8958 S. 4795 S.Rept. 118-198 P.L. 119-4 P.L. 119-21 
2026 FY2026 NASA appropriations authorization reauthorization S. 2354 S.Rept. 119-44 H.R. 5342 H.Rept. 119-272 P.L. 119-74 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R43419/R43419.123.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R43419.html
LSB11400,Does Federal Law Preempt Negligent Selection Claims Against Freight Brokers?,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T17:07:54Z,Active,Posts,Bryan L. Adkins,,"In the trucking industry, freight brokers serve as intermediaries that match clients who have cargo to ship with trucking companies that provide trucks and drivers to complete the shipment. When a truck crash involves a trucking company selected by a freight broker, injured parties sometimes sue the broker under state tort law on the legal theory that the broker acted negligently in selecting a company that the broker knew, or should have known, had inadequate safety practices. A provision in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preempts certain state laws related to a freight broker’s services, however, and federal appellate courts have disagreed over whether the provision preempts negligent selection claims. The Supreme Court is scheduled to consider the issue this term in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC. This Legal Sidebar provides background on the relevant legal framework and circuit split, discusses the Montgomery case, and addresses considerations for Congress. 
Background
Under federal law, trucking companies providing interstate transportation of property generally must register as a motor carrier with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and comply with FMCSA safety regulations. Motor carriers that violate FMCSA safety regulations may face civil or criminal penalties. The FMCSA also may revoke a motor carrier’s operating authority if the agency determines the motor carrier has unsatisfactory safety practices or has engaged in a pattern or practice of violating FMCSA rules or concealing non-compliance. Brokers who sell or arrange interstate transportation of property by motor carriers also must register with the FMCSA. Whereas the FMCSA has promulgated extensive safety regulations for motor carriers transporting cargo interstate, the FMCSA’s regulation of freight brokers that sell and arrange such transportation generally focuses on the financial aspects of the broker’s services.
A personal injury or wrongful death lawsuit arising from a truck crash may result in a damages award totaling millions of dollars. While federal regulations require registered motor carriers to maintain at least $750,000 in accident liability insurance (with higher amounts required for motor carriers that ship hazardous materials), many motor carriers are small businesses and may not be able to pay large damage awards that exceed their insurance coverage. In addition to suing motor carriers and truck drivers, parties injured in truck crashes sometimes seek to recover damages from freight brokers under state tort law. Although the particular cause of action against the broker may vary depending on the factual circumstances and differences in state law, negligently selecting a contractor is recognized as a tort in most states. Legal claims alleging that a broker acted negligently in selecting an unsafe motor carrier are often labeled as negligent selection or negligent hiring claims, and courts sometimes use the terms “negligent selection” and “negligent hiring” interchangeably.
Federal Preemption Principles
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI, clause 2) provides the basis for the doctrine of federal preemption, under which “state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law” are invalidated. Federal law can preempt state law in multiple ways. Federal law may impliedly preempt state law, but Congress also may enact legislation with language expressly preempting state law, as it did in § 14501(c). The Supreme Court has emphasized that Congress’s intent is the “ultimate touchstone” of a statute’s preemptive effect. In evaluating Congress’s preemptive intent, courts look primarily to the statutory text.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)
Enacted as part of a series of legislative efforts to deregulate the trucking industry, § 14501(c)(1) specifies in part that:
[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.
This provision preempts state laws related to a broker’s services with respect to transporting property, but the subsection also includes express exclusions from preemption for certain state laws. Among other exceptions, § 14501(c)(2)(A) states in relevant part that the preemption provision in § 14501(c)(1) “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” The Supreme Court has explained that Congress’s “clear purpose” in enacting the safety exception was “to ensure that [§ 14501(c)(1)’s] preemption of States’ economic authority over motor carriers of property . . . not restrict’ the preexisting and traditional state police power over safety.”
Circuit Split
All four federal circuit courts of appeals that have considered the issue as of this writing have agreed that state-law claims against freight brokers for negligently selecting a motor carrier are “related to” a broker’s services “with respect to the transportation of property” and thus fall within the scope of § 14501(c)(1)’s preemption clause. The courts have split over whether § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s safety exception shields such claims from preemption, however. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits (Seventh Circuit and Eleventh Circuit, respectively) have held that claims against freight brokers for negligently selecting a motor carrier do not fall within the meaning of the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” in § 14501(c)(2)(A) and therefore do not qualify for the exception. In contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits (Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit, respectively) have held that such state-law claims are encompassed by the “with respect to motor vehicles” phrase and exempted from preemption under § 14501(c)(2)(A). 
Seventh Circuit
In Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that § 14501(c) preempted a state-law negligent-hiring claim against a freight broker that had selected a motor carrier whose driver was involved in a fatal truck crash. The spouse of a motorcyclist killed in the crash had sued the freight broker and the motor carrier, alleging that the broker acted negligently by selecting “an unsafe company with a history of hours of service and unsafe driving violations” as a motor carrier. In addressing preemption under § 14501(c), the Ye court concluded that the negligence claim “related to” the “service of . . . [a] broker . . . with respect to the transportation of property” for purposes of § 14501(c)(1). In the Seventh Circuit’s view, the negligence claim against the broker “[struck] at the core of . . . broker services by challenging the adequacy of care the company took” in selecting the motor carrier to provide transportation. The court explained that permitting such negligent hiring claims would change how brokers conduct their services, including by “incurring new costs to evaluate motor carriers” and “hir[ing] different motor carriers than they would have otherwise hired without the state negligence standards.” 
After determining that the claim fell within § 14501(c)(1)’s preemption clause, the Ye court further held that § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s safety exception did not save the claim from preemption, because the claim was not within a state’s safety regulatory authority “with respect to motor vehicles.” According to the court, a state safety law is not “with respect to motor vehicles” for purposes of the safety exception unless it has a “direct link” to motor vehicle safety, and the link between the freight broker’s services and truck safety was too attenuated. The court reasoned in part that Congress’s decision to expressly reference brokers in § 14501(c)(1), while omitting any reference to brokers in the safety exception under § 14501(c)(2)(A), suggested that Congress did not intend for the exception to apply to brokers. The court also found it relevant that a separate provision preempting state laws related to brokers’ intrastate services did not include a safety exception. The court found further support for its narrower reading of the safety exception in the broader statutory context of how Congress regulates motor vehicle safety, such as that federal regulation of motor vehicle safety focuses on “vehicle ownership, operation, and maintenance,” while federal regulation of freight brokers focuses on “the financial aspects of broker services, not safety.” 
Eleventh Circuit
In Aspen American Insurance Company v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit addressed § 14501(c) in the context of a negligent selection claim brought under state law against a freight broker that allegedly dispatched a client’s shipment to a thief posing as a motor carrier. While not involving a truck crash, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the negligent selection claim was “genuinely responsive to safety concerns” and thus within the “safety regulatory authority of a state” for purposes of § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s safety exception. Like the Seventh Circuit, however, the court determined that the state safety standard was not “with respect to motor vehicles” and therefore not saved from preemption under the safety exception. 
Focusing on the statute’s text and surrounding context, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the limiting phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” as confining the safety exception to laws with a “direct connection” to motor vehicles. The court reasoned in part that any legal claim that relates to a freight broker’s services for purposes of § 14501(c)(1) would necessarily have at least some indirect connection to motor vehicles, and that the limiting phrase would therefore have “no meaningful operative effect” if interpreted to cover laws with only an indirect connection to motor vehicles. After examining the statutory definitions of “broker,” “motor carrier,” and “motor vehicle,” the Court ultimately concluded that claims against brokers are “one step removed” from motor vehicles and therefore not covered by the safety exception.
Sixth Circuit
In Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ reading of the safety exception and held that a negligent hiring claim against a freight broker fell within § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s safety exception. Following a truck accident that killed her spouse, the plaintiff in Cox settled a negligence lawsuit against the motor carrier and truck driver, and then brought a separate lawsuit under state law against the freight broker for negligently hiring the motor carrier. The plaintiff alleged that the broker acted negligently by disregarding publicly available safety information about the motor carrier on the FMCSA’s Safety Measurement System, including the carrier’s history of safety violations.
After examining the safety exception’s “plain wording,” broader statutory context, and relevant judicial precedent, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the negligent hiring claim fell within the safety exception and was not preempted. The court explained that there was “no way to disentangle” motor vehicles from a claim alleging that a broker failed “to exercise reasonable care in selecting a safe motor carrier to operate a motor vehicle on the highway,” and that the common-law negligence claim was therefore “with respect to motor vehicles” for purposes of the safety exception. While the Sixth Circuit doubted that the safety exception requires a “direct” connection between a state claim and motor vehicles, as the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits had held, the court declined to decide that issue. The court did, however, determine that the plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim in this case had a direct connection, in the event one were required. The court reasoned in part that § 14501(c)’s larger statutory context recognizes that motor vehicles are “core to the services provided by brokers,” and brokers are “ultimately responsible for placing . . . motor vehicles on the road, even if those motor vehicles are driven and owned by a different entity.” 
Ninth Circuit
In Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., the majority of a Ninth Circuit panel held that a negligent selection claim against a broker is encompassed by the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” for purposes of § 14501(c)(2)(A), when the claim arises out of a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff in Miller was injured when a truck transporting a shipment arranged by a freight broker crashed into his vehicle, and he alleged that the broker acted negligently in selecting the motor carrier. In determining that § 14501(c)(2)(A) excepted the negligent selection claim from preemption, the court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the statute exempts state safety laws that have even an indirect “connection with” motor vehicles.
In the dissenting judge’s view, the “attenuated connection” between a broker’s selection of a motor carrier and a motor vehicle crash is “too remote” to satisfy the safety exception. The dissenting judge also expressed concern that motor carriers are already subject to safety regulation at the federal and state levels, and that allowing the plaintiff’s claim to avoid preemption would “inevitably conscript brokers into a parallel regulatory regime that required them to evaluate and screen motor carriers . . . according to the varied common law mandates of myriad states.”
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC
The petitioner in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC suffered injuries when a tractor-trailer hit his own tractor-trailer while he was stopped on the shoulder of a highway. In addition to suing the driver of the other truck and the motor carrier that employed the driver, the petitioner brought a state-law negligent hiring claim against the freight broker that had arranged the other truck’s shipment. According to the petitioner, the broker knew or should have known that the motor carrier had a history of safety problems, including hours-of-service violations, a high percentage of out-of-service vehicles and drivers, and a “conditional” safety rating from the FMCSA.
A federal district court in Illinois dismissed the petitioner’s negligent hiring claim under Seventh Circuit precedent established in the Ye case (discussed above). On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the petitioner conceded that Ye foreclosed his negligent hiring claim, but he argued that the court should overturn its Ye decision. The Seventh Circuit declined to overturn Ye and summarily explained that it found “no compelling reason” to revisit the case. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery, and the Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in the case on March 4, 2026. The petitioner’s legal briefs focus primarily on arguing that the safety exception shields state common-law negligent selection claims from preemption, and the petitioner asserts that the safety exception resolves the case without the need for the Court to address whether the claims fall within the scope of § 14501(c)(1)’s preemption clause in the first place. The petitioner also argues that, in the event the Court disagrees and interprets the safety exception to exclude negligent selection claims against brokers, then the Court should similarly adopt a narrow interpretation of § 14501(c)(1), such that negligent selection claims would not fall within the preemption provision. The respondent, in turn, argues that negligent selection claims against freight brokers are encompassed under § 14501(c)(1)’s preemption clause and are not saved from preemption under § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s safety exception. 
The parties in Montgomery also emphasize that federal preemption of state common-law negligent selection claims against freight brokers may implicate significant safety and economic concerns in the trucking industry. According to the petitioner, preempting negligent selection claims will make roads less safe, because such claims “force negligent brokers to internalize the costs of putting unsafe drivers and carriers on the road” and thereby ensure that Congress’s economic deregulation of the industry does not result in a “race to the bottom that achieves lower prices only at the cost of greater safety risks to third parties.” Additionally, while the FMCSA may revoke an unsafe motor carrier’s operating authority, the petitioner argues that freight brokers “often have more information about the safety risks posed by particular carriers and drivers than the federal government.” 
In contrast, the respondent argues that allowing the enforcement of state-law negligent selection claims against freight brokers would undercut Congress’s economic deregulation of the trucking industry by subjecting brokers to a “patchwork” of state standards governing their business decisions about which motor carriers to hire. In the respondent’s view, this would result in “fewer motor carriers competing for business,” increased costs passed on to consumers, and a freight transportation industry that is “less accessible, less resilient, and more vulnerable to disruption.”
Considerations for Congress
An eventual ruling from the Supreme Court in Montgomery may clarify whether § 14501(c) preempts state-law negligent selection claims against freight brokers. Congress has authority to regulate interstate transportation under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and Congress may choose to monitor developments in Montgomery and consider whether the eventual ruling in the case aligns with Congress’s judgment about the types of state-law claims it believes should or should not be preempted as against freight brokers. If the Supreme Court interprets § 14501(c) as preempting state laws more broadly or more narrowly than Congress prefers, Congress could choose to enact legislation amending the statute’s preemptive scope, such as by explicitly preempting or permitting state-law negligent selection claims against freight brokers. Congress also may choose to step in to enact legislation clarifying § 14501(c)’s preemptive scope even absent a ruling from the Court.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11400/LSB11400.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11400.html
IN12663,Elections in Bangladesh,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T13:31:25Z,Active,Posts,Maria A. Blackwood,,"Overview
On February 12, 2025, Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority South Asian country of 174 million, held parliamentary elections and a concurrent referendum. Sixty-nine percent of voters endorsed the July National Charter, which proposed changes to “reconstruct the state on the foundation of democracy and human dignity.” At the same time, voters gave one of the country’s two historically dominant political parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a parliamentary supermajority. The party’s leader, Tarique Rahman, was sworn in as Prime Minister on February 17. The elections follow a period of turbulence; in August 2024, student-led protests led to the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League (AL). After Hasina fled to India, an interim government headed by Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist, assumed power and initiated a reform process. Although the interim government enjoyed general support, Yunus’s administration encountered ongoing challenges that the new government now faces, including crime, inflation, human rights concerns, and the rise of Islamist groups. Rahman has committed to bolstering democracy in Bangladesh, but some observers have questioned the extent to which his party may implement the July Charter.
Background
Since Bangladesh’s 1971 independence from Pakistan, the country’s politics have been dominated by two parties, the AL and the BNP, both of which have faced accusations from some human rights organizations and foreign governments of repression and corruption when in power. According to Human Rights Watch, for example, after returning to power in 2009, the AL “gradually consolidated power by silencing critics, harassing activists, and arbitrarily arresting, forcibly disappearing, and killing members of the opposition or civil society who spoke out against [Hasina].” Hasina secured a fourth consecutive term in office in January 2024 elections that were boycotted by major opposition parties and described by the U.S. Department of State as “not free or fair.”
In July 2024, student-led protests over access to government jobs expanded into widespread unrest, fueled in part by the Hasina government’s violent response to the demonstrations. A United Nations report concluded that Bangladeshi authorities “systematically engaged in serious human rights violations” during the protests, and estimated the death toll at up to 1,400. After the army refused to enforce a nation-wide curfew declared by the government, Hasina fled to India. Yunus, a longtime Hasina critic, was sworn in as the country’s interim leader on August 8. In May 2025, the interim government banned all political activities by the AL, and the party’s registration was suspended. Some Members of Congress urged Yunus to revisit this decision in the interest of holding free and fair elections. 
Results and Outlook 
Voter turnout, reported to be 60%, was higher than in 2024, when some critics questioned the government’s reported 42% figure as inflated, but lower than in the 2018 elections, when 80% of eligible voters reportedly participated. In Bangladesh’s 350-member unicameral legislature, 300 deputies are elected directly, while the constitution reserves 50 seats for women elected by members of parliament through proportional representation. The BNP secured 208 of the 300 elected seats. The Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) won 68 seats, an unprecedentedly strong showing for that party, and comprises the bulk of the 77-seat opposition. The National Citizen Party (NCP), a new formation that grew out of the student protest movement, secured 6 seats as part of a JI-led 11-party alliance. Hasina denounced the elections as “deception and farce.”
Despite political violence in the leadup to the elections, international observers described election day as generally peaceful and orderly. The International Republican Institute’s election observation mission concluded that “election administration was technically sound” but “the broader political environment remains fragile.” The European Union’s election observation mission described the vote as “credible and competently managed,” noting that it was “genuinely competitive” despite “sporadic localized political violence.” Some analysts have questioned whether an election without AL participation can be considered fully credible.
Some analysts foresee “political hesitation” in implementing the July Charter, which would, among other reforms, curb the prime minister’s powers. The BNP objected to some provisions and BNP deputies have so far refused to join the Constitution Reform Council, the body responsible for instituting the proposed reforms. Some observers suggest the BNP’s supermajority is potentially detrimental to democratic institutions. Rahman, who returned from self-imposed exile in London in December 2025, is the son of BNP founder Ziaur Rahman and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, and some have questioned whether his victory heralds true change.
JI’s emergence as the main opposition force after years of political marginalization marks a shift in parliamentary dynamics and represents a potential challenge to any BNP policies at odds with JI’s Islamist conservatism. Whether and how the AL will resume political activity remains unclear.
Some observers have predicted a pragmatic and multipolar foreign policy under Rahman, arguing that he will seek constructive engagement with the United States, China, and India. Some analysts have asserted that India will seek to reset ties with Bangladesh after Hasina’s ouster and perceptions of India as pro-AL gave rise to tensions in the bilateral relationship; others have forecasted improved relations with Pakistan under the new BNP government, continuing a trend that began under Yunus. 
Issues for Congress
Bangladesh’s interim government concluded a trade deal with the United States on February 9, 2026, that included a 19% “reciprocal” tariff on most imports from Bangladesh. The Rahman government is reviewing that agreement in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s February 2026 decision concerning tariffs President Trump had imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Congress could consider potential legislative action related to tariffs on Bangladesh. 
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about violence targeting Hindus and other religious minorities in Bangladesh during unrest leading up to and following Hasina’s 2024 ouster. Bangladesh hosts over 1 million Rohingya refugees from Burma, and the United States historically supported the humanitarian response in Bangladesh. Like the AL, the BNP supports repatriating Rohingya to Burma. The Burma GAP Act (H.R. 4140) would call on the Secretary of State to provide support for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12663/IN12663.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12663.html
IN12661,Law Enforcement and the Evolving Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) Landscape,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T13:52:56Z,Active,Posts,Kristin Finklea,,"As the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)—commonly referred to as drones—for both commercial and recreational purposes has increased, so too has law enforcement agencies’ use of this technology. Simultaneously, law enforcement has been concerned about the malicious use of drones and the ability to counter it. UAS may pose unique public safety or security risks. Some have warned, for instance, that drones can be used as reconnaissance tools for criminals “because they can fly past bollards, checkpoints, and other security mechanisms.” For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has noted that transnational criminal organizations use drones to surveil and evade border officials. Drones have also been used to drop illicit drugs and other contraband into jails or prisons. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, for example, notes that criminal networks deliver illicit drugs, weapons, cell phones, and other contraband to inmates via drones and that these drone incursions are increasing. Yet another concern involves potential use of drones to “drop a bomb, shoot firearms, or spray a poison gas over large crowds of people” at a public event. Consequently, policymakers have questioned whether or how law enforcement may be able to engage in counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) activities—including detecting, identifying, monitoring, tracking, communicating with, and disrupting or disabling suspicious or malicious drones. 
Law Enforcement C-UAS Landscape
Law enforcement C-UAS activities generally fall into two broad categories: detection (including monitoring and tracking) and mitigation (including both kinetic and non-kinetic solutions). However, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and other federal agencies have advised that various federal criminal laws have generally limited law enforcement C-UAS options. For instance, criminal surveillance laws, like the Wiretap Act and Pen/Trap Statute, may be implicated when law enforcement attempts to intercept signals or communications in order to detect, identify, monitor, track, or communicate with a drone and its operator. Certain mitigation techniques, such as jamming (e.g., blocking or interfering with signals and communications), spoofing (e.g., modifying signals), and hacking (e.g., accessing a drone’s communications), may involve navigating laws that surround communication lines, stations, or systems; interference with satellite operations; and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. And law enforcement attempts to disrupt, disable, or destroy a drone may implicate federal laws that prohibit destroying or disabling an aircraft, such as the Aircraft Sabotage Act and Aircraft Piracy Act.
Law Enforcement C-UAS Authorities
The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 (Division H of P.L. 115-254; 6 U.S.C. §124n) granted DOJ and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) certain C-UAS authorities to protect covered facilities and assets from drones. In doing so, it provided them with relief from possible violations of certain federal laws, including those noted above, when taking particular actions, including those related to detecting, identifying, monitoring, and tracking drones; warning the drone operator; and disrupting control of, seizing, and disabling, damaging, or destroying the drone. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (FY2026 NDAA; P.L. 119-60) amended 6 U.S.C. §124n to authorize these agencies to take such actions when “necessary to enforce the law, protect the public, or to mitigate a credible threat that an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft poses to the safety or security of a covered facility or asset.” The 6 U.S.C. §124n authorities were originally limited to a four-year period following enactment of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018. They have since been extended several times, most recently through the FY2026 NDAA, and are currently set to expire on September 30, 2031.
Until recently, Congress had not authorized state, local, tribal, or territorial (SLTT) law enforcement to engage in C-UAS activities because of potential violations of certain federal statutes. However, in response to growing concerns about law enforcement’s ability and capacity to mitigate potential drone threats, Congress granted SLTT law enforcement and correctional agencies authority through the FY2026 NDAA to engage in actions to mitigate potential UAS threats. This authority is contingent on these entities undergoing DOJ training and certification. DOJ, in consultation with the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and Transportation, is required to develop regulations for this training by June 2026. DOJ is also to maintain a list of authorized C-UAS systems and technologies that may be used by law enforcement and report on SLTT C-UAS use. 
Law enforcement entities, including agencies outside of DOJ and DHS at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels, that have not completed the training and certification required to engage in C-UAS activities—and even those who have—can still reach out to DOJ or DHS to request assistance when the use of C-UAS measures are being considered to assist with their law enforcement missions or to protect an event. However, in congressional testimony, officials from DOJ’s National Security Division and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) noted that while the FBI is authorized to conduct C-UAS activities at special events, it only has the capacity to cover a fraction of them. 
In additional support to SLTT law enforcement’s C-UAS activities, the FY2026 NDAA also expanded the purpose areas of two criminal justice grant programs—the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program—to allow recipients to use funds to purchase and operate approved C-UAS technology.
Going Forward
Policymakers may now look to how these expanded SLTT C-UAS authorities are being implemented. In particular, they may examine how DOJ rolls out the C-UAS training and certification and whether SLTT law enforcement are applying or able to be certified.  Given that SLTT law enforcement must report when they engage in authorized C-UAS activities, policymakers may opt to evaluate how these expanded authorities are used. Congress might also examine how DOJ and DHS entities continue to conduct C-UAS activities to support state and local agencies in their investigative missions and to secure special events.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12661/IN12661.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12661.html
IF13116,National Park Service: FY2026 Appropriations,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T10:53:15Z,Active,Resources,Laura B. Comay,"Federal Agencies & Appropriations for Energy & Natural Resources, Interior & Environment Appropriations","The National Park Service (NPS) administers the National Park System, which includes 433 units valued for their natural, cultural, and recreational importance. System lands cover 81 million federal acres and 4 million nonfederal acres. As part of the Department of the Interior (DOI), NPS receives funding in annual appropriations laws for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. Selected issues for Congress related to NPS appropriations include the overall staffing levels supported by the appropriations, funding to address NPS deferred maintenance (DM), allocations for land acquisition, and NPS assistance to nonfederal entities.
FY2026 Appropriations
The Trump Administration requested $2.116 billion in discretionary appropriations for NPS for FY2026. The request was 37% lower than NPS’s FY2025 discretionary appropriation of $3.337 billion enacted in P.L. 119-4. The request would have decreased or eliminated funding for all NPS accounts compared with FY2025 (Table 1). 
P.L. 119-74, enacted on January 23, 2026, contained $3.267 billion for NPS for FY2026 in Division C. This was 2% less than the FY2025 regular appropriation and 54% more than the Administration’s request. The law increased funding for three NPS accounts compared with FY2025 and decreased funding for two accounts (Table 1). In earlier action, on July 24, 2025, the House Committee on Appropriations had reported H.R. 4754 (H.Rept. 119-215), with $3.124 billion for NPS for FY2026. Also on July 24, 2025, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 2431 (S.Rept. 119-46), with $3.270 billion for NPS for FY2026. Because appropriations were not enacted by the start of the fiscal year, NPS experienced an appropriations lapse from October 1, 2025, to November 12, 2025. NPS then received appropriations at FY2025 levels under a continuing resolution (P.L. 119-37) until enactment of P.L. 119-74.
Separately, NPS receives mandatory appropriations from entrance and recreation fees, concessioner fees, donations, and other sources. NPS’s mandatory appropriations also include land acquisition and state assistance funding from the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF; 54 U.S.C. §§200301 et seq.). DOI estimated more than $1 billion in NPS mandatory appropriations for FY2026. Outside of these mandatory appropriations, for each of FY2021-FY2025, NPS received more than $1 billion annually in allocations from the National Parks and Public Land Legacy Restoration Fund (LRF)—the DM fund established by the Great American Outdoors Act (GAOA; P.L. 116-152). FY2025 was the final year of new LRF funding.
NPS’s Appropriations Accounts
NPS has five discretionary appropriations accounts (Figure 1). The majority of NPS discretionary appropriations typically have gone to the Operation of the National Park System (ONPS) account to support day-to-day activities, programs, and services at park units. These include resource stewardship, visitor services, park protection, facility operations and maintenance, and administrative costs.
Figure 1. NPS’s Discretionary Appropriations by Account (FY2026 Share of Total)
/
Sources and Notes: See Table 1. ONPS = Operation of the National Park System; NR&P = National Recreation and Preservation; Historic Pres. = Historic Preservation Fund. Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Table 1. NPS Discretionary Appropriations by Account ($ in millions)
Account
FY2025 Enacted (P.L. 119-4) FY2026 RequestHouse Committee-Reported H.R. 4754 Senate Committee-Reported S. 2431FY2026 Enacted (P.L. 119-74)% Change from FY2025Operation of the Nat’l Park System
2,894.4
1,994.0
2,718.1
2,869.4
2,901.2a
+<1%

Construction
172.3
99.5
135.6
140.8
88.5
-49%

Historic Preservation Fund
168.9
11.0
168.9
168.2
181.1a
+7%

Nat’l Recreation and Preservation
89.6
12.0
89.6
91.6
91.6
+2%

Centennial Challenge 
12.0
—
12.0
—
5.0
-58%

Total
3,337.2
2,116.5
3,124.2
3,270.1
3,267.3
-2%

Sources: Joint explanatory statement for P.L. 119-74; H.Rept. 119-215; S.Rept. 119-46. Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
Amount reflects amendments to P.L. 119-74 in P.L. 119-75, Division D, Section 426(d). 
NPS’s Construction account covers repair, replacement, and improvement of existing facilities as well as new construction. Projects are evaluated based on criteria related to the condition of assets, their importance to park purposes, and project benefits and risks. The account also covers other construction activities and planning.
NPS administers historic preservation programs through its Historic Preservation Fund (HPF) account. Under the National Historic Preservation Act (54 U.S.C. §§300101 et seq.), the HPF receives $150 million annually from offshore energy revenues, but monies are available only as provided in appropriations acts. Some funding goes to state and tribal historic preservation offices as formula grants to preserve cultural and historical assets. Congress also has provided funding for nationally competitive grant programs.
The National Recreation and Preservation (NR&P) account funds NPS programs that assist state, local, tribal, and private land managers with grants for outdoor recreation planning, natural and cultural resource preservation, and other activities. The largest single program funded through the account is NPS assistance to national heritage areas.
The Centennial Challenge account supports the National Park Centennial Challenge Fund (54 U.S.C. §§103501 et seq.), which matches donations for projects or programs that further the NPS mission and visitor experience. The fund also receives offsetting collections from sales of federal recreation passes to seniors.
Issues for Congress
NPS Staffing Levels
In May 2024 testimony before the House Natural Resources Committee, the then-NPS Director highlighted declines over time in NPS staffing capacity. Over the past decade (FY2016-FY2025), NPS’s full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing levels fell by an estimated 6%, based on budget data. In the President’s FY2026 Budget Appendix, NPS’s request would have supported 13,598 FTE staff, a 26% reduction in FTE levels compared with FY2025 estimates. FTEs supported by P.L. 119-74 have not been estimated. Separately, P.L. 119-21, the FY2025 budget reconciliation act, rescinded unobligated balances from a $500.0 million mandatory appropriation enacted in P.L. 117-169 to hire NPS employees. The amount of unobligated funding is not readily available.
Staffing capacity supported by appropriations does not necessarily measure the number of positions filled at any given time. For example, following Administration initiatives during 2025 to reduce the size of the federal workforce to achieve efficiencies, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management reported a 16% drop in NPS employee counts between FY2025 and FY2026. 
Deferred Maintenance (DM)
NPS’s DM backlog, estimated by NPS at $22.986 billion as of the end of FY2024 (the most recent data available), has been a focus in the appropriations process. Despite legislation and agency actions aimed at addressing the backlog, it has grown over the past decade, including a 59% nominal-dollar increase between FY2020 and FY2021 that NPS attributed partly to changes in its methods for estimating DM. Congress may continue to assess NPS’s authorities and sources of funding to address DM, including the balance of discretionary and mandatory funding provided for this purpose. Congress also may consider funding for preventive (e.g., cyclic and routine) maintenance that could help keep DM from accumulating.
Two discretionary appropriations activities (“Line-Item Construction and Maintenance” in the Construction account and “Facility Operations and Maintenance” in the ONPS account) have been primary sources of discretionary funds for NPS preventive and deferred maintenance. For FY2025, P.L. 119-4 provided $994.8 million for these two budget activities combined. For FY2026, Congress provided $948.4 million for the two activities, increasing Facility Operations and Maintenance by 3% while providing no funding for Line-Item Construction and Maintenance, except for one item of community project funding / congressionally directed spending (CPF/CDS). With respect to DM, the Line-Item Construction and Maintenance activity has typically focused on projects costing $2.0 million or more. The joint explanatory statement for P.L. 119-74 stated that this activity was not funded because NPS did not submit a list of line-item project funding requests. 
For FY2021-FY2025, mandatory spending for NPS DM derived primarily from the LRF. For each year, NPS received the maximum annual authorized amount of $1.3 billion from the fund. In the 119th Congress, S. 1547 would reauthorize LRF funding through FY2033, with specified changes. Separately, allocations from the Highway Trust Fund support NPS road repair and improvements, including DM. Other mandatory funding sources, such as recreation fees, also have been used for NPS DM. 
Land Acquisition Funding
The GAOA shifted LWCF land acquisition funding from discretionary to mandatory spending. The funding typically has been allocated to agencies and projects through the annual appropriations process. For FY2026, P.L. 119-74 provided $94.7 million for NPS’s own land acquisition (not including state grants). DOI had requested $10.2 million for NPS land acquisition and proposed to repurpose $241.6 million from the LWCF to address NPS DM. 
NPS Assistance to Nonfederal Sites and Programs 
Some Members of Congress and other stakeholders have questioned whether NPS assistance to nonfederal sites and programs should be reduced to better focus on the agency’s “core” mission of managing national parks. In particular, some have encouraged national heritage areas, which are nonfederally managed, to develop plans for self-sufficiency, while Congress has increased heritage area funding over the past decade as new areas have been added. Two NPS discretionary accounts (NR&P and HPF) provide funds for nonfederal assistance. The NPS request would have reduced these accounts’ combined funding by 96% (Table 1); P.L. 119-74 increased funding for both accounts and included CPF/CDS for 40 nonfederal assistance projects. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13116/IF13116.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13116.html
IF12310,The Small Business Administration’s Growth Accelerator Fund Competition,2026-02-27T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T17:52:57Z,Active,Resources,Adam G. Levin,"Small Business, R&D Programs & Policies","Small businesses and startups sometimes benefit from assistance growing their companies, including support for commercialization, mentorship programs, and capital access. Accelerators—organizations often operated by experienced businesspeople—provide technical assistance and other services to new entrepreneurs in an effort to meet those needs and support the starting and scaling of businesses. 
Since 2014, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has administered the Growth Accelerator Fund Competition (GAFC) to provide financial support for accelerators assisting science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) and research and development (R&D)-focused small businesses and startups. Historically, the GAFC has often targeted accelerators that supported businesses and/or geographies that traditionally faced barriers in obtaining R&D funds and investment capital, including businesses owned or led by women, minorities, and veterans, or businesses located in rural areas. Until FY2023, the GAFC provided $50,000 awards to accelerators for operating capital. Since FY2023, the SBA has continued to fund accelerator operations, but now makes GAFC awards in two stages: in FY2025, stage one awards were worth $75,000, and stage two awards were worth $150,000. More information on the purpose and structure of these awards is available below. 
Purpose
The SBA’s intent for the GAFC is to help facilitate the success of startups by supporting accelerators that advise such businesses on growing revenue, sourcing outside funding, and avoiding common mistakes. The GAFC’s goals include
increasing the pipeline and success of STEM/R&D-focused entrepreneurs and small businesses;
accelerating the growth and maturity of innovation-based entrepreneurship networks;
catalyzing partnerships and relationships between accelerators to strengthen the national innovation ecosystem; and
connecting both new and established participants in the national innovation ecosystem.
Some GAFC award announcements have noted SBA’s desire for the GAFC to stimulate entrepreneurship in “underserved” regions and industries. In discussing GAFC-related legislation, some Members of Congress have noted the GAFC’s success in facilitating innovation in regions beyond traditional coastal technology hubs.
History
The SBA first operated the GAFC in FY2014, after a series of regional events in 2012 that convened over 100 universities and accelerators in discussions about how to work with high-growth entrepreneurs. These events helped lead to the development of the GAFC, which SBA has thus far held in FY2014, FY2015, FY2016, FY2017, FY2019, FY2021, FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025. 
Congress has not provided the GAFC with specific statutory authorization. Rather, the program operates as an SBA initiative under authority provided by Section 105 of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-358), which authorizes federal agencies to administer innovation-related prize competitions. Several bills in recent years, discussed below, attempted to provide statutory authority for the GAFC. 
Table 1 presents the number of awards and the total dollar amount awarded since the GAFC’s inception. From FY2014 to FY2025, the GAFC made 634 awards totaling $37.9 million. In FY2026, Congress recommended the GAFC receive $9 million in appropriations.
Table 1. GAFC Awards Given, Total Value of Awards, and Recommended Funding Levels, FY2014-FY2025
Fiscal Year
Number of Awards
Total Awards Amount ($  in millions)
Congressionally Recommended Funding ($ in millions)

2014
50
$2.50
$2.50

2015
88
$4.40
$4.00

2016
85
$4.25
$1.00

2017
20
$1.00
$1.00

2018
0
$0
$1.00

2019
60
$3.00
$2.00

2020
0
$0
$2.00

2021
84
$4.20
$2.00

2022
0
$0
$3.00

2023
75
$7.25
$10.00

2024
96
$5.60
$9.00

2025
76
$5.70
$9.00

Sources: SBA, Congressional Budget Justification and Annual Performance Report (various years) and explanatory statements from appropriations bills.
Program Implementation
The GAFC is open to applicants that are
private entities, both nonprofit and for-profit—including corporations—based in the Unites States;
nonfederal government entities including state, county, tribal, and municipal governments; 
academic institutions based in the United States; or
individuals or teams comprised of U.S. citizens or permanent residents 18 years and older.
In FY2023, the SBA implemented a new award structure for the GAFC and began awarding prizes in two stages. In FY2025, stage one awards, for $50,000, went to entrepreneur support organizations (ESOs) that have identified challenges in their local entrepreneurial and small business “ecosystems.” ESOs included accelerators, membership organizations, institutions of higher education, and nonprofits supporting innovation-focused small businesses and startups through training and mentoring; facilitating access to resources; building connectivity within an innovation ecosystem; and other activities. 
Stage two awards—in FY2025 worth $150,000—are to go to ESOs to facilitate implementation of plans to address challenges identified in stage one. The SBA intends for ESOs to help entrepreneurs commercialize R&D efforts by using stage two awards to, among other activities, support collaboration between entrepreneurs and institutions of higher education; develop intellectual property strategies; and generate proposals for new debt and equity instruments to financial STEM and R&D small business capital. 
In FY2025, the SBA requested that ESOs support small businesses and startups working in one of two “themes”:
lab to market, intended to bridge the gap between research and commercialization in fields including national and economic security, domestic manufacturing and production, biotechnology, and other critical and emerging technologies; or
capital formation, intended to increase capital access for entrepreneurs and small businesses during the business formation and growth phases.
Recent Legislation
The primary purpose of most GAFC-related bills in recent Congresses has been to provide the program with statutory authority. For example, in the 115th Congress, H.R. 2686 would have given the GAFC permanent statutory authority and required the SBA to develop metrics evaluating the program’s effectiveness. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 4387 similarly would have provided the GAFC permanent statutory authority and required the SBA to develop efficacy metrics. The bill passed the House but was not taken up by the full Senate. 
In the 117th Congress, the House-passed version of the Build Back Better Act (BBA, H.R. 5376) would have appropriated a total of $400 million to the GAFC through FY2031, established a minimum award amount of $100,000, and provided the GAFC permanent statutory authority. H.R. 5376 evolved into P.L. 117-163 (commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, IRA); the IRA, however, did not include any of the BBA’s GAFC provisions. Also in the 117th Congress, H.R. 4945 would have amended the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) to give the GAFC permanent statutory authority and increase minimum award size to $1 million. The bill was introduced in the House but did not advance.
Considerations for Congress
Congress may consider whether to give the GAFC statutory authorization. Some Members of Congress have previously argued that providing statutory authorization, rather than continuing the GAFC as an SBA initiative, would give Congress an opportunity to provide greater oversight. Codifying the GAFC could also provide an opportunity for Congress to determine and codify the competition’s priorities and mission. For example, as noted, the GAFC has historically targeted small businesses and regions that have had difficulty attracting financing. Congress could codify this or other missions. Should Congress consider doing so, it could also want to assess how effective such efforts have been, for example in the geographic diversity of awards. Congress may also be interested in assessing the efficacy of the GAFC since it began its new, two-stage format in FY2023. 
The SBA is not required to collect specific performance metrics for the GAFC. H.R. 2686 and H.R. 4387 in the 115th and 116th Congresses, respectively, would have required the SBA to gather certain metrics. For example, H.R. 4387 would have stipulated that the SBA develop “science-based” metrics that measured the GAFC’s economic impact. Additionally, a 2018 evaluation of the GAFC by the Library of Congress’s Federal Research Division (FRD) recommended that the SBA develop “statistically sound” reporting metrics for the GAFC; improve the collection, monitoring, and maintenance of those metrics; and enforce mandatory reporting requirements. Congress may debate if and how to act on those recommendations. 
Congress may consider whether to require cost sharing. GAFC awardees are not required to provide matching funds. However, Congress and the SBA have considered a cost share requirement. In the explanatory statement to the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), Congress instructed the SBA to require $4 in matching funds for every $1 the agency awarded through the GAFC; the SBA did not act on the directive. The 2018 FRD evaluation also suggested a required match could increase awardee engagement.
Congress may consider the GAFC’s award size. As noted, bills in previous Congresses sought to set minimum award sizes. The 2018 FRD evaluation (conducted when all awards were $50,000) also noted feedback that the awards would benefit from being increased or scaled. However, Congress may note that the evaluation also found that the GAFC had been effective at its existing award sizes.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12310/IF12310.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12310.html
RL33487,Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T16:52:55Z,Active,Reports,Christopher M. Blanchard,"Middle East & North Africa, Europe, Russia & Eurasia","Since the December 2024 collapse of the government of Bashar Al Asad, Syrians have pursued political and economic opportunities created by the end of the country’s 12-year civil war. Internal tensions and external pressures pose obstacles to the country’s transition. Transitional President Ahmed Al Sharaa led a group long designated by the U.S. government as a foreign terrorist organization and still designated as a specially designated global terrorist entity. He has renounced former ties to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State and met with President Donald Trump in the White House in November 2025. Interim authorities have outlined a five-year transitional constitutional framework after limited consultation with Syrian citizens. Indirect elections were held in October 2025 for a transitional legislative assembly; elections were not held in some areas of eastern Syria, which were then under the control of ethnic Kurdish-led forces, and areas southeast of the capital, Damascus, which remain under the control of members of the Druze religious minority. Turkish forces remain in parts of the north, while Israeli forces have moved into formerly demilitarized areas between Syria and Israel and into some Syrian territory near the frontier. Sectarian violence involving government forces, their backers, and members of minority communities has marred the transition, highlighting the interim government’s limited capacity to ensure security and impose discipline on its forces. In this context, some observers have expressed skepticism about the transitional government’s commitments to inclusivity and the protection of all members of Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic fabric. Others have warned that domestic and foreign opponents of the transitional government may be exploiting communal tensions to advance their own agendas, and that fragmentation in Syria would threaten regional security.
The Trump Administration has outlined a policy of robust but conditional support for Syria’s transitional government, pairing endorsement of its leaders’ calls for the maintenance of Syria’s unity and territorial integrity with insistence that they adopt a protective and inclusive approach toward all Syrian communities. The United States is supporting dialogue between the government and Kurdish forces and political figures that controlled areas of the northeast until government forces advanced in and reasserted control in January 2026. Some U.S. military forces remain deployed in northeast Syria, but U.S. forces withdrew from an outpost in southern Syria in February 2026 and unnamed U.S. officials told press outlets on February 18 that preparations for a full withdrawal of U.S. forces are underway and may be complete within two months. U.S. forces transferred more than 5,700 Islamic State prisoners formerly secured by U.S. partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to neighboring Iraq following the Syrian government’s 2026 advance. The United States and European Union have extended broad sanctions relief to the interim government in a bid to encourage investment and prevent economic collapse and humanitarian pressures from derailing the transition. Announced changes to U.S. and international sanctions on Syria have created possibilities for more robust investment, trade, and economic growth, but Syrians are grappling with the negative effects of decades of misrule and sanctions amid the strife and destructive consequences of a decade-plus-long civil war.
Governance and security arrangements in northeast and southern Syria remain a central dilemma for transitional leaders and the minority communities in these areas. Neighboring countries, including Turkey and Israel, have security concerns about these regions and are acting inside Syria in pursuit of their preferred outcomes. Turkey opposes Syrian Kurds’ aspirations for autonomy or decentralization, citing links between Kurdish elements of the SDF and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The PKK announced in early 2025 that it would dissolve and disarm. January 2026 SDF-government agreements set terms for the integration of some SDF fighters into special brigades. Israel has struck military targets across Syria since December 2024 to neutralize Syrian capabilities, enforce its desire to see Syria’s three southern governorates remain a demilitarized zone, and in what it describes as a bid to protect the Syrian Druze minority community. Israel-Turkey tensions over Syria raise continuing risks of confrontation.
In Congress, many Members welcomed the fall of the Asad government and the setbacks it created for Iran and Russia. Members have debated U.S. policy toward the Syrian government, with some advocating for the elimination of remaining U.S. sanctions on Syria and others expressing concern about the intentions and actions of Syria’s transitional leaders and advising a more gradual and conditional approach. President Donald Trump has acted to remove many Asad-era sanctions on Syria using authorities delegated to the President by Congress; President Trump also has revised other Syria-related sanctions mechanisms to preserve his ability to impose new sanctions based on future developments in Syria. Congress repealed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act and has authorized funding for the continued provision of military assistance to U.S. partners, though the future of the U.S. military presence is uncertain. Legislative questions for Congress include whether and on what terms to authorize and appropriate funds for U.S. assistance and security operations in Syria; whether and to what extent to rescind, revise, or reenact laws providing for Syria-related sanctions; and how best to influence executive branch policies and shape the decisions of Syrian authorities, and U.S. partners and adversaries.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33487/RL33487.183.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/HTML/RL33487.html
R48864,The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Reauthorization Act of 2025: SectionbySection Summary,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T20:22:52Z,Active,Reports,"Johnathan H. Duff, Hassan Z. Sheikh, Alexandria K. Mickler, Lisa N. Sacco, Amanda K. Sarata, Nora Wells, Elayne J. Heisler","Behavioral Health Workforce, Substance Use Disorders, Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery & Treatment (SUPPORT) Act","The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Reauthorization Act (P.L. 119-44) was enacted on December 1, 2025. The act primarily reauthorized or amended existing behavioral health (i.e., mental health and substance use) programs originally authorized or reauthorized by the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271) in 2018. The SUPPORT Act of 2018 authorized or reauthorized discretionary appropriations for (1) behavioral health-related programs related to substance use disorder prevention, treatment, and recovery activities; (2) programs that seek to expand consumer education on opioid use; and (3) training for the medical and behavioral health workforce, among other activities. Many of those authorizations of appropriations expired at the end of FY2023, though most existing programs received annual appropriations in FY2024 and continued to operate. The SUPPORT Reauthorization Act of 2025 generally reauthorizes appropriations for many of these programs through FY2030. Several authorizations included in the SUPPORT Act of 2018 were not reauthorized by P.L. 119-44.
In summary, the titles of the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Reauthorization Act address the following:
Title I—Prevention focuses on activities related to the prevention of substance misuse and overdose and associated harms, including federal programs that target pregnant woman and infants, youth, and overdose prevention efforts. 
Title II—Treatment focuses on substance use disorder treatment activities, including federal programs that support behavioral health workforce training, disseminate best practices in the treatment of substance use disorders, and promote the use of approved medications for opioid use disorder and related overdoses.
Title III—Recovery focuses on substance use disorder recovery efforts, including federal programs that support a spectrum of recovery-related services and resources.
Title IV—Miscellaneous focuses on federal laws that regulate the delivery and dispensing of controlled substances and the training requirements for prescribing practitioners. 
The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Reauthorization Act of 2025 is an authorizing law; it does not appropriate any funds. Not all programs amended or reauthorized by the law have received explicit appropriations. 
This report provides a section-by-section summary of the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Reauthorization Act of 2025, organized by title of the act. It includes relevant background information, followed by a summary of each provision. Table 1 identifies expired authorizations of appropriations in the SUPPORT Act of 2018, annual appropriations associated with the authorization, and whether P.L. 119-44 reauthorizes the provision. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48864/R48864.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48864.html
R48191,Connecting Constituents to Health Information and Services: Resources for Congressional Offices,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T15:37:57Z,Active,Reports,"Sarah K. Braun, Angela Napili, Kate M. Costin, Michele L. Malloy, Kate M. Costin",Health Care Delivery,"As part of their representational activities, Members of Congress and their staffs provide a range of information and services to constituents. Some constituent communications reflect concerns about health and health care. Constituents may have, for example, difficulty finding and using health coverage; questions about finding health providers and facilities; hardships related to medical costs; requests for information on diseases, conditions, or treatments; or complaints about health providers, facilities, and products. To address these concerns, congressional offices may refer eligible constituents to various federal, state, and local resources and programs. 
This report compiles selected resources and contacts that congressional offices can use when responding to constituents’ inquiries regarding health and health care concerns. When possible, it lists federally funded referral services that provide individual assistance to constituents and matches specific circumstances to relevant federal, state, or local programs. Constituents can use these online resources, or discuss their specific situations with trained staff at the listed hotlines, to identify and access programs, resources, and benefits relevant to their needs.
This report is organized into five sections, with resources and contacts for 
finding and using health coverage;
finding health providers and facilities; 
financial hardship related to medical costs;
information on diseases, conditions, and treatments; and
complaints about health care providers, facilities, or products. 
The Appendix lists selected CRS reports for congressional clients seeking (1) additional resources to support their work with constituents and (2) background on some of the programs and policy issues mentioned in this report. This report is not intended to be a comprehensive catalog of all relevant resources and contacts; rather, it emphasizes federal or federally supported resources and hotlines to address constituents’ frequently asked questions. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48191/R48191.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48191.html
R46858,Europe: Fact Sheet on Parliamentary and Presidential Elections,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T17:52:50Z,Active,Reports,Sofia Plagakis,"Europe, Russia & Eurasia","This report provides a map of parliamentary and presidential elections that are scheduled to be held at the national level in Europe in 2026, and a table of recent and upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections at the national level in Europe. It includes dates for direct parliamentary elections only, and excludes indirect elections.
Europe is defined in this product as the 50 countries under the portfolio of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. The report does not include the Holy See (Vatican City), as there are no direct presidential or parliamentary elections held there. Electoral rules and governance structures can vary widely across European countries.
Twelve European countries have held or are scheduled to hold direct presidential and/or parliamentary elections in 2026. Some dates may be subject to change due to snap elections, parliamentary votes of no confidence, or other factors. CRS has gathered information for this report from numerous sources, including the U.S. Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) World Factbook, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) Election Guide, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and other news sources.

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46858/R46858.23.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R46858.html
IN12660,The Child Support Enforcement Passport Denial Program,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T09:07:54Z,Active,Posts,"Cory R. Gill, Jessica Tollestrup","Child Support & Family Formation, Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools","The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) Passport Denial Program is a mandatory enforcement mechanism that applies to noncustodial parents who owe past-due child support. The program was originally enacted as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA; P.L. 104-193) and was to apply to individuals owing more than $5,000 in past-due support. Subsequently, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA; P.L. 109-171) lowered this threshold to $2,500. As implemented, the program prevents individuals that meet the arrears criteria from obtaining or renewing a passport, and it can also revoke passports under certain circumstances. 
Overview of the Passport Denial Program
All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and 63 tribal nations operate CSE programs pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (this report collectively refers to these as “state” CSE programs). The program is federally administered by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Administration for Children and Families at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The program is estimated to handle the majority of all child support cases; the remaining cases are handled by private attorneys and collection agencies, or through mutual agreements between parents. In FY2024, the program served 11.6 million cases and collected an estimated $26.7 billion in child support, of which $7.5 billion was for obligations that were past-due. The amount of arrears paid were about 6% of the $115.7 billion in cumulative arrears owed to cases enforced by the program. Title IV-D stipulates that child support collected on behalf of families receiving certain forms of public assistance be retained by the state to reimburse it and the federal government for the cost of that assistance; the rest is distributed to families. 
One of the enforcement methods available to the CSE program for collecting past-due support is denying, revoking, or limiting passports pursuant to Section 452(k) of the Social Security Act (SSA). Since the inception of the CSE Passport Denial Program, combined collections due to this enforcement method have been nearly $621 million, with $30 million in 2024. 
Passport denial occurs as part of the Federal Collections and Enforcement Program, and operates through a partnership between state CSE programs, OCSE, and the Department of State (DOS, the federal agency in which Congress has vested authority to issue and revoke passports). State CSE programs identify and certify cases with past-due support that exceed the $2,500 arrears threshold, inform the obligors on those cases, and submit them to OCSE. OCSE forwards these obligors to DOS for inclusion in the Consular Lookout Support System (CLASS) to facilitate passport denial. 
A child support obligor is automatically removed from passport denial once they have paid all their arrears. If they owe arrears on more than one case, they must have paid arrears on all such cases. A state CSE program also may choose to exempt an individual from passport denial (e.g., when arrears have dropped below a certain amount but are not fully paid). OCSE urges state programs to exercise caution when exempting individuals from this child support sanction, as passports are valid for 5 or 10 years and only can be revoked in limited circumstances. 
Passport Sanctions and Emergency Situations
Prior to issuing an individual a new passport, DOS verifies that they are entitled to one (e.g., they are a U.S. citizen) and checks them against the CLASS system. An individual the CLASS system identifies as owing past-due child support in an amount exceeding $2,500 is denied a passport. DOS informs that individual and holds their passport application for 90 days to allow the arrears to be paid. If the individual is released from passport denial within that time frame, their passport application can be processed.
For an individual subject to passport denial who was previously issued a passport, that individual’s passport can only be revoked when DOS has physical possession of it and has searched CLASS for a match against the system. Circumstances that trigger revocation include at 
renewing an existing passport,
adding pages to an existing passport,
repairing/reissuing a damaged passport,
changing a name or updating a picture, and
acceptance by DOS (e.g., at a consulate) of an existing passport as proof of identification. 
If an individual is abroad when their passport expires or is revoked, DOS regulations allow that individual to be issued a passport for direct return to the United States (22 C.F.R. §51.60). In addition, state CSE programs at their discretion can allow emergency releases from the Passport Denial Program. Recent OCSE guidance indicates that emergency releases can be for circumstances that include immediate family emergencies and administrative errors (e.g., a person was erroneously submitted for passport denial). 
Recent Developments
On January 14, 2026, H.R. 6903 was ordered to be reported, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by the House Ways and Means Committee (40-2). The bill would amend Section 452(k) of the SSA to clarify that passport revocation is a mandatory enforcement remedy and that temporary passports can be issued in emergency situations (similar to what exists for other revocation statutes). In effect, it appears that these changes would more closely align statutory requirements with how the Passport Denial Program has been implemented by HHS and DOS. CBO estimates that the bill as ordered to be reported would have no significant budgetary effects if enacted. No further congressional action has occurred as of the date of this Insight.
In addition, recent media reports suggest that HHS and DOS intend to expand their capabilities within the Passport Denial Program to revoke unexpired passports even when not in the physical possession of DOS. However, no new policies or procedures have been announced by HHS or DOS as of the date of this Insight.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12660/IN12660.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12660.html
IF13169,Fourth Amendment Search Warrant Requirements,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T11:08:14Z,Active,Resources,"Cassandra J. Barnum, Peter G. Berris","Crime, Fourth Amendment, Surveillance, Search & Seizure","The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. As a result, law enforcement generally must obtain a search warrant from a “neutral and detached magistrate” before entering a private space to look for evidence. The Amendment states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This In Focus provides examples of judicial interpretations of this provision regarding what is required from law enforcement seeking to obtain a search warrant.
Probable Cause
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must be based on probable cause, a standard the Supreme Court has described as “incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages.” Exact formulations vary, but the Supreme Court has characterized the probable-cause standard as “the kind of fair probability’ on which reasonable and prudent’” people act. The Court has said probable cause is a higher standard than “reasonable suspicion,” but does not require proof that something is “more likely true than false.” Under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, law enforcement may make the probable-cause showing to a magistrate through a written affidavit or, if “reasonable under the circumstances,” by sworn testimony—both of which embody the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant must be supported by “oath or affirmation.” 

Criminal Activity and Nexus to Location
To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement must establish probable cause that the materials sought are contraband, evidence that will “aid in a particular apprehension or conviction,” or otherwise “seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity.” Law enforcement must also demonstrate “a fair probability” that these materials “will be found in a particular place.” (This may include a place occupied by a person not “implicated in the crime.”) In practice, some federal courts employ a simplified formulation of probable cause, requiring that there must be a “reasonable likelihood evidence of wrongdoing will be found” at the place to be searched.
Select Holdings and Examples:
Totality of the Circumstances: When determining whether a warrant affidavit establishes probable cause, a magistrate looks to the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit. The Supreme Court has described the magistrate’s probable cause analysis as a “practical, common-sense decision.” In Illinois v. Gates, a case involving an anonymous informant, the Supreme Court concluded that the veracity, basis of knowledge, and reliability of the informant are some of the relevant factors an issuing magistrate might consider. Although the informant’s anonymous letter in that case might have alone been insufficient under those factors, the Court concluded that the issuing magistrate could have found probable cause based on other factors, such as the fact that an initial investigation by law enforcement had verified several predictions contained in the letter.
Common Sense: Magistrates may employ common sense and make reasonable inferences when deciding whether evidence is likely to be found in a particular location. In United States v. Garza, law enforcement documented the defendant’s involvement in delivering cocaine to another person, and obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s home for evidence of drug trafficking activity. Even absent any evidence related to the defendant’s home, the court upheld the issuance of the warrant, reasoning that depending on “the nature of the evidence and the type of offense, a magistrate may draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept,” and that, “[i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live.’”
Speculation: While inferences may support a finding of probable cause, mere speculation generally does not. In United States v. Wilson, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s girlfriend’s home after the defendant brandished a gun at a Waffle House. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the warrant was invalid, because “the affidavit offered nothing—no observations, no inferences, no corroborated tips—linking the Waffle House incident” to the apartment searched. The court found that while some “inherently domestic” items like personal papers could be reasonably inferred to be in a home without further factual support, the same could not be said for firearms, and “[s]peculation about what might be found at a residence cannot satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”
Training and Experience: Law enforcement may rely on training and experience to support a finding of probable cause. In United States v. Corleto, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s home and vehicle for evidence of child pornography. The affidavit did not provide specific reasons to believe the illegal material would be in a vehicle, but the court upheld the issuance of the warrant because the agent who authored the affidavit “relied on his training and experience in child-pornography investigations to express the hardly surprising opinion that it is not uncommon’ for individuals with such contraband to store it on portable devices in multiple locations’” on their premises and in vehicles.
Staleness: Courts have also determined that probable cause that evidence of an offense may be found at a particular location is time sensitive. As the Sixth Circuit wrote in United States v. Abboud, “a warrant is stale if the probable cause, while sufficient at some point in the past, is now insufficient as to evidence at a specific location.” Applying factors from Sixth Circuit precedent for staleness (including the “character of the crime,” “the criminal,” “the thing to be seized,” and “the place to be searched”), the court determined that probable cause to search the defendant’s home for records of financial crimes occurring in 1999 was not stale in 2002 because “ongoing criminal activity at a given time may be sufficient to defeat a claim of staleness,” and business records are “created for the purpose of preservation.”
Deference to Probable Cause Determination: Reviewing courts afford “great deference” to a magistrate’s initial probable cause determination. Under one formulation, the key inquiry on review is whether the issuing magistrate had a “substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” For example, in United States v. Conley, a municipal law enforcement officer sought a search warrant for a building to gain “better insight into the internal works of [an alleged] gambling operation.” Although that statement “in isolation” might have been insufficient to establish probable cause, on appeal the Third Circuit agreed with the issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination based on allegations in the affidavit. The affidavit alleged that investigators had traced illegal gambling machines to a company registered to the address to be searched and identified the company’s owner as someone previously convicted of a state offense involving illegal gambling devices.
Particularity and Overbreadth
The Fourth Amendment dictates that search warrants must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” On this score, the Court has said that the “requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.” For a discussion of particularity and overbreadth considerations unique to the digital landscape, see CRS Report R48852, Geofence and Keyword Searches: Reverse Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, by Peter G. Berris and Clay Wild (2026).
Select Holdings and Examples:
Contextual Approach: A defect arising from a warrant’s failure to precisely describe the items to be seized can sometimes be cured by limiting seizure to evidence of particular statutory offenses and incorporating a detailed affidavit describing the violations. In United States v. Chaney, the defendants challenged a search warrant authorizing seizure of “patient files” in a search of a doctor’s office alleged to be issuing fraudulent prescriptions. Applying a “common-sense, contextual approach,” the Sixth Circuit concluded that the warrant “directed the officers to seize evidence of money-laundering violations related to the pill-mill scheme described in detail and at length in the affidavit,” and that “[t]herefore, the officers’ discretion was sufficiently guided.”
Evidentiary Determinations in Execution: A warrant limiting seizure to records constituting evidence of a particular offense, without more, may be insufficiently particular. The court in United States v. Cardwell invalidated a warrant where the “only limitation on the search and seizure of appellants’ business papers was the requirement that they be the instrumentality or evidence” of federal tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201. The Ninth Circuit stated that limiting “the search to only records that are evidence of the violation of a certain statute is generally not enough,” in part because it requires the officers executing the warrant to make legal determinations about what records would constitute evidence.
Specificity Unfeasible: Even a warrant that describes the items to be seized in broad or generic terms may be valid if greater specificity is not possible. In United States v. Janus Industries, the Tenth Circuit upheld a warrant to search the defendant’s business where the warrant described the “drug paraphernalia” subject to seizure by reference to a statutory definition. Recognizing that describing “items to be seized in broad and generic terms may be valid if the description is as specific as circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation permit,” the court found that the “criminal activity under investigation in the present case—a drug paraphernalia business—makes it difficult to list with great particularity the precise items desired to be seized which evidence such activity.”
The Exclusionary Rule
If a court finds that a warrant has not satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the typical consequence is for any evidence obtained from that search, and sometimes further evidence gathered as a consequence of the illegal search, to be excluded at trial. The Supreme Court has observed that this “exclusionary rule” is a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” In recognition of the fact that “some guilty defendants may go free” under this general approach to deterring law enforcement overreach, the Court has established a “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule allowing for admission of evidence “when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.”

Congressional Considerations
Courts would likely invalidate, as exceeding Congress’s constitutional authority, any legislation purporting to reduce Fourth Amendment protections as interpreted by courts. Congress has augmented Fourth Amendment protections in various contexts, however, including by imposing stricter protocols for wiretap warrant applications. In another example, Congress limited the extent to which law enforcement can search or seize certain news media and related materials by enacting the Privacy Protection Act of 1980. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13169/IF13169.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13169.html
IF12990,U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T10:52:49Z,Active,Resources,Karen M. Sutter,"East Asia & Pacific, Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations","Since 2018, the U.S. government has imposed a series of tariffs on imports from the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) with the stated intention of addressing U.S. concerns about PRC trade practices and foreign policies. Since 2025, the Trump Administration’s trade policy and tariff actions have maintained a focus on China among other countries. Some actions explicitly target China; others involve sectors that affect China (Figure 1). China has responded to U.S. tariffs with its own tariffs and market restrictions. Given the trade imbalance (China exports to the United States more than four times what it imports), China has fewer goods on which to raise tariffs. In that context, China has focused its tariffs on top U.S. exports and turned to nontariff measures. It has canceled orders, implemented export controls on some production inputs, and imposed market restrictions on some U.S. firms. Both sides have exempted some products from tariffs. 
On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the President cannot use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.) to impose tariffs, affecting some tariffs the United States imposed on China in 2025 (see “IEEPA (2025-2026)”). U.S. and PRC officials have been in talks since 2025 but have not reached a tariff deal. Members of Congress may consider whether to support, modify, or oppose the Administration’s approach to tariffs; sustain, expand, or pull back trade authorities Congress delegated to the President; and require approval by Congress for trade deals that result in tariff changes. See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade Relations; CRS In Focus IF12125, Section 301 and China: The U.S.-China Phase One Trade Deal; CRS In Focus IF12958, Section 301 and China: Mature-Node Semiconductors; and CRS In Focus IF12666, Section 301 and China: Shipping and Shipbuilding Issues.
Escalating Tariff Rates
As of February 20, 2026, U.S. and PRC average tariff rates on the other country’s goods were about 34% (U.S.) and 31% (PRC), not accounting for exemptions and Section 232 actions, and rates weighted for trade flows (Table 1).
Table 1. U.S.-China Two-Way Average Tariffs (%)



2025
2026


2017
2023
March
April
May
Nov.
Feb.

U.S.
2.7
19
39
73 then 164
49
39
34

PRC
8
21
21
55 then 146
31
31
31

Source: CRS with data from multiple sources.
Note: Approximate values; does not account for tariff exemptions.
After two-way tariff rates reached a high of 164% (U.S.) and 146% (PRC) in mid-April 2025, average rates fell to 49% (U.S.) and 31% (PRC) in May and August 2025, when both sides reduced “reciprocal tariffs” to 10% for 90 days. In November 2025, U.S. average tariff rates on China fell to 39% when the United States reduced the fentanyl tariff to 10% and both sides extended their tariff truce for one year. In 2023, the average U.S. tariff rate on China rose to about 19% with tariffs imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §2411 and §1862 as amended). China’s average tariff rate on U.S. goods was about 21% by 2023 as it responded with counter-tariffs. Most U.S. and PRC tariff actions are cumulative. 
U.S. Tariff Actions and PRC Responses 
Section 301 (2018, 2024, 2025)
Authority: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2411). Addresses unfair trade barriers. 
Industrial Policies: In 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) found that China engaged in forced technology transfer, cyber-enabled theft of U.S. intellectual property and trade secrets, discriminatory and nonmarket licensing practices, and state-funded strategic acquisitions of U.S. assets. USTR imposed tariffs at rates from 7.5% to 25% on about $370 billion worth of U.S. imports from China. China countered with tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. trade. Most tariffs remain in effect with some exclusions.
In 2020, the United States and China signed what both sides called a Phase One trade deal. It addressed some but did not resolve many of the issues USTR had raised. As part of the deal, China agreed to purchase during 2020 and 2021 at least $200 billion of goods above a 2017 baseline amount of U.S. agriculture (+$32 billion), energy (+$52.4 billion), manufactured goods (+$77.7 billion), and services (+$37.9 billion). As of 2021, China fell short of its commitments by 60%, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. 
In May 2024, USTR extended most 2018 tariffs and raised tariffs by an additional 25% to 100% on some goods (e.g., electric vehicles/batteries, medical products, ship-to-shore cranes, semiconductors, solar cells, steel, and aluminum). In October 2025, USTR initiated an investigation of China’s implementation of the 2020 Phase One deal. In November 2025, USTR extended certain tariff exclusions for one year. 
Semiconductors: In December 2025, USTR determined PRC policies and practices on mature-node chips and silicon carbide substrates/wafers to be “actionable” and proposed an initial 0% tariff rate until June 2027. 
Shipping/Shipbuilding: In 2025, USTR determined PRC practices to be “actionable” and proposed port equipment tariffs and fees for using PRC-built ships. China retaliated with similar measures. In November 2025, both sides halted such actions for one year.
Section 232 (2018, 2025-2026)
Authority: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). National security effects of U.S. imports. Investigations precede decisions on tariffs. The actions are taken on global imports. Some countries negotiated lower rates as part of tariff trade agreements.
Steel and Aluminum: In 2018, then-President Trump imposed tariffs on most steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) imports to address PRC practices distorting global markets. China retaliated by raising tariffs on aluminum waste/scrap (49%) and pork, fruits, and nuts (20%). In March 2025, President Trump raised aluminum tariffs to 25%, expanded the scope of products, and ended country exemptions. In June 2025, he raised steel and aluminum tariffs to 50%. China is the 2nd-largest U.S. aluminum supplier.
Cars, Light Trucks, and Parts: In March 2025, President Trump imposed a 25% tariff with some offsets. China is the 3rd-largest U.S. supplier of auto parts.
Copper: In July 2025, President Trump imposed a 50% tariff on semifinished copper. China is the 9th-largest U.S. source of copper/copper items.
Semiconductors, Equipment, and Derivative Products: In January 2026, President Trump imposed a 25% tariff on advanced chips with most imports exempted. China makes about 30% of the world’s mature-node semiconductors. 
Heavy Trucks and Parts: In November 2025, President Trump imposed a 25% tariff (and a 10% tariff on buses). China is a top U.S. source of industrial trailers and buses.
Critical Minerals: In January 2026, President Trump directed negotiations with other countries in lieu of tariffs. China controls a large share of global processing.
Ongoing Section 232 investigations (initiation date): 
Pharmaceuticals and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) (April 2025). An estimated 80% of global drug production depends on API from China.
Aircraft, Jet Engines, Parts (May 2025). China is the 9th-largest U.S. source for such items.
Drones (July 2025). China is the 2nd-largest U.S. source for these items. 
Polysilicon (July 2025). China is the 6th-largest U.S. source for these items. Between 2018 and 2025, the United States imposed tariff-rate quotas on crystalline solar photovoltaic cells and modules under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2251).
Wind Turbines (August 2025). China is the 3rd-largest U.S. source of turbine blades.
Medical Supplies, Equipment (Sept. 2025). China is among the top 8 U.S. suppliers for some items.
Robotics and Industrial Machinery: (Sept. 2025) China is in the top 7 U.S. suppliers of industrial robots.
IEEPA (2025-2026)
Authority: International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.). Emergency national security threats. 
On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the President cannot use the IEEPA to impose tariffs. President Trump lifted such tariffs and imposed a 10% global tariff for 150 days under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132). The de minimis trade action is in effect.
U.S. Border (Immigration, Fentanyl): In February 2025, President Trump announced a 10% tariff (raised to 20% in March 2025 and lowered to 10% in November 2025) on U.S. imports from China and ended de minimis treatment (an exemption of tariffs, fees, and taxes for goods valued at $800 or less), after declaring China had not taken decisive actions to address its role in fentanyl and synthetic opioids trade. China retaliated with 10%-15% tariffs on U.S. autos, agricultural machinery, coal, and natural gas; targeted U.S. firms in some antitrust actions and market restrictions; and imposed export controls on chemicals. 
Trade Deficit: In April 2025, President Trump announced a 34% tariff on U.S. imports from China. China met U.S. tariffs; a two-way escalation raised tariffs to 125% with some exceptions. China restricted rare earth exports, initiated antidumping and antitrust actions, delayed some purchases of U.S. agriculture and aircraft, and listed some U.S. firms as “unreliable” and subject to export and market restrictions. In May 2025, both sides reduced the rate to 10% for 90 days (extended in November 2025 for a year). China agreed to lift some nontariff retaliatory actions.
Venezuela: In March 2025, President Trump authorized the Secretary of State to designate and subject countries, including China, that import Venezuela’s oil to 25% tariffs.
Figure 1. U.S.-PRC Tariff Actions Since 2018*
/
Source: CRS, based on public reporting.
Note: Some PRC tariff and nontariff actions are not included.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12990/IF12990.12.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12990.html
IF12964,U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T12:22:52Z,Active,Resources,Anya L. Fink,"Europe, Russia & Eurasia, Strategic Forces, CBRN, Arms Control & Nonproliferation","The United States has periodically sought to advance its national security interests through the negotiation and conclusion of nuclear arms control agreements with its adversaries. Throughout 2025 and in 2026, President Donald Trump has discussed potential talks with Russia and China concerning nuclear weapons reductions. 
Congress plays an important role in arms control, which is implemented pursuant to treaties or agreements negotiated by the executive branch. The Senate considers providing advice and consent to the ratification of treaties and the confirmation of executive branch nominees for positions in the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy, and the intelligence community. Congress also authorizes and appropriates funds for, as well as provides oversight of, those U.S. government agencies that negotiate, implement, monitor, and verify compliance with treaties and agreements. 
Background
During the Cold War and in its aftermath, the United States and the Soviet Union (which Russia and other Soviet republics dissolved in 1991) sought to minimize the costs and risks of nuclear competition and improve so-called strategic stability. Following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union created a “hotline” to communicate in a nuclear crisis, which, along with some later risk reduction agreements, sought to reduce dangers of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. 
After the Soviet Union achieved rough parity in strategic nuclear forces with the United States, and began to deploy ballistic missile defenses, the two countries engaged in Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). The 1972 SALT I Treaty and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiated by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations and the 1979 SALT II Treaty negotiated by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations resulted in some limits on strategic nuclear forces and ballistic missile defenses. Subsequently, the Reagan Administration concluded the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which verifiably destroyed all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles of intermediate ranges. The Reagan and George H. W. Bush Administrations negotiated the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which resulted in the “largest arms control reductions in history,” according to DOD. In 2002, the George W. Bush Administration concluded the Moscow Treaty reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. 
The executive branch has also at times withdrawn from arms control, including in 2002 from the ABM Treaty and in 2019 from the INF Treaty, when it deemed these accords to no longer be in the U.S. national security interest.
New START
Until February 5, 2026, the United States and Russia were parties to the 2010 New START Treaty, under which the two countries verifiably reduced their strategic nuclear forces to 1,550 deployed warheads on 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and strategic bombers). Between 2023 and 2026, Russia did not participate in parts of the treaty’s verification regime. This followed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that Russia would “suspend participation” in New START, citing concerns about UK and French nuclear weapons and also Western efforts to achieve Russia’s “strategic defeat” in the war in Ukraine. Russian officials stated that Russia would observe treaty central limits, but would suspend data exchanges and consultations. The DOS called Russia’s suspension “legally invalid” and announced countermeasures. The DOS had also expressed concerns about Russia’s compliance with New START in congressionally mandated public annual reports. 
In September 2025, President Putin stated that Russia could continue to abide by New START limits after the treaty’s expiration date if the United States did so. On February 5, 2026, the day of New START’s expiration, President Trump posted on social media that “rather than extend” New START, the United States “should” negotiate a “new, improved, and modernized Treaty.” On February 11, Russian officials stated that Russia would abide by New START central limits as long as the United States did so. 
New START Follow-on Negotiations
In 2020, during the first Trump Administration, U.S. and Russian officials held several meetings to discuss arms control issues, including potential limits on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are nuclear weapons deployed on delivery vehicles with ranges shorter than strategic nuclear weapons. The United States also sought to include China, which declined to participate, in talks.
In 2021, the Biden Administration engaged with Russia in a Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD) to “lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.” The United States advocated including all Russian nuclear weapons in a notional agreement. Russia, in turn, proposed discussing nuclear and nonnuclear weapons, missile defense, outer space, and other issues, which, Russia argued, affected strategic stability. The SSD process ended in 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
In February 2026, citing President Trump’s post arguing for a new nuclear weapons treaty, Administration officials called for “multilateral nuclear arms control and strategic stability talks” involving Russia and China. 
Potential Considerations for Congress
Members of Congress have deliberated, including in 2025 and 2026 committee hearings, about the extent to which current and future U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control is in the U.S. national security interest. Some Members have argued that there is “continued value” in such arms control, and “urged” talks for a new treaty and mutual observance of New START limits. Other Members have expressed concerns about Russia’s noncompliance with arms control commitments, urged DOD to prepare for a future where Russian nuclear weapons are not bound by New START, and stressed the importance of U.S. nuclear modernization. 
Arms control and U.S. nuclear modernization
Congress may consider how arms control, and the timelines for any potential limits on U.S. capabilities, interact with the progress of U.S. nuclear modernization. The United States is modernizing its nuclear forces, including procuring a new ICBM, a new strategic bomber, and a new ballistic missile submarine; updating its nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system and regional deterrence capabilities; and modernizing its nuclear weapons complex. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in 2025 that the operation and modernization of U.S. nuclear forces could total over $95 billion a year. DOD has continued to prioritize modernization, but President Trump has also stated that “tremendous amounts of money are being spent” on nuclear weapons and expressed hope that the United States, Russia, and China could decrease defense spending.
Russia’s nuclear capabilities of concern
Congress may consider whether Russian nuclear weapons present a threat to the United States that could be managed through arms control. Some Russian officials have suggested that new U.S. ballistic missile defense developments may affect Russia’s willingness to maintain treaty limits. According to open sources, Russia, like the United States, has reserve nuclear warheads that it could upload on strategic delivery vehicles. 
Russia has nuclear weapons that did not fall under New START. The Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations unsuccessfully sought to negotiate verifiable limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), as per guidance in the Senate’s 2010 resolution of New START ratification. U.S. officials have considered the possibility of an agreement that would cover all types of nuclear warheads, including those for NSNW, though it would likely require intrusive verification measures. In 2023, President Putin stated that Russia had deployed NSNW to Belarus.
Russia also has novel nuclear and nuclear-capable delivery vehicles that President Putin has said are intended to counter U.S. ballistic missile defenses. Russia included some of these—a new heavy ICBM and an ICBM-mounted hypersonic glide vehicle—in New START. Others, such as a nuclear-powered cruise missile and an autonomous underwater system, remained outside of an arms control framework. According to the U.S. intelligence community’s unclassified 2025 Annual Threat Assessment, Russia was also “developing a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon.”
Arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment
Congress may consider how U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control fits into in an environment where China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding, with potential implications for U.S. deterrence requirements. According to a 2024 unclassified DOD assessment, China may have over 1,000 “operational nuclear warheads” by 2030. The Biden Administration’s 2024 nuclear employment strategy argued that “the types of limits that the United States will consider,” including in future negotiations with Russia, “will be influenced by the actions and trajectories of other nuclear-armed actors.” 
The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which warned of an emergence of a “two-nuclear-peer” threat, argued that the United States needed to start with a strategy and appropriate nuclear force requirements prior to “developing U.S. nuclear arms control limits for the 2027-2035 timeframe.” The Commission also stressed the need for research into verification technologies to support future arms control efforts and highlighted the potential importance of formal and informal risk reduction measures with both Russia and China “to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty.” 
In the absence of arms control, such measures, according to some experts, could range from data exchanges to operational constraints, such as political commitments to avoid interfering with NC3 or with monitoring by national technical means. Russia’s willingness to discuss risk reduction is uncertain.
Role of Congress in arms control and risk reduction
Congress may consider what its role may be in future efforts to manage the risks of nuclear competition. In past Congresses, Members have debated, assessed, and conducted oversight of U.S.-Russian arms control and risk reduction measures and their contributions to U.S. national security. Some Members have proposed risk reduction measures for potential executive branch enactment. Others have served as U.S. observers in arms control negotiations.
The Senate’s 2010 resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty states that “further arms reduction agreements ... may be made only pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.” However, the executive branch may also pursue nonbinding or political commitments that may not require Senate action.
CRS Products
CRS In Focus IF12672, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons 
CRS Insight IN12640, Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate 
CRS Insight IN12568, Golden Dome: Potential Strategic Stability Considerations for Congress 
CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12964/IF12964.8.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12964.html
IF12640,TikTok and China’s Digital Platforms: Issues for Congress,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T17:52:56Z,Active,Resources,"Karen M. Sutter, Michael D. Sutherland","East Asia & Pacific, Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations","Congress and U.S. policymakers at the federal and state levels have taken steps to address their national security-related concerns about the extent to which the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC or China) influences digital platforms that are directly or indirectly tied to the PRC and operating in the United States. Most U.S. actions to date have focused on TikTok, owned by ByteDance, a company with ties to the PRC government. Other expressed concerns include PRC platforms’ large user bases, access to large amounts of U.S. data, and company data and content policies. In December 2024, TikTok said in its court filings that it had 170 million U.S. users. TikTok’s CEO testified to Congress in March 2023 that ByteDance retains in the PRC at least seven years of U.S. TikTok users’ data. Enacted in April 2024, P.L. 118-50 (Div. H and Div. I) requires ByteDance to divest from TikTok, allows the President to address other PRC-controlled digital platforms, and directs the Federal Trade Commission to enforce provisions that prohibit data brokers from transferring U.S. personally identifiable sensitive data to foreign adversaries, including the PRC.
PRC digital firms are able to serve both the U.S. and PRC markets, while PRC investment and technology policies restrict U.S. firms from operating in China. This asymmetry raises issues for Congress about market access reciprocity, fair competition, and U.S. regulation of PRC firms. PRC digital platforms have expanded in the U.S. market over the past 10 years. Many firms have entered regulated or restricted parts of the U.S. economy—broadcasting, media, health, and finance—via mobile applications (apps). 
Digital platforms are internet-connected and software-based digital spaces that facilitate the exchange of goods, services, and information through online interactions. For this report, PRC digital platforms or platforms that have PRC ties refer to digital platforms that are headquartered in China, subsidiaries, or firms otherwise tied to a company headquartered in China, or whose relevant technology and core business functions (e.g., algorithms, software and technology development, and intellectual property) are based in China, owned by a PRC parent or subsidiary, and/or subject to PRC jurisdiction. In some cases, PRC digital platforms might be incorporated or headquartered outside China. The PRC digital platforms discussed in this report are not exhaustive.
China’s Digital Platform Development
PRC policies prioritize the role digital platforms play in China’s economic competitiveness, the development of emerging technologies, and PRC global projects in sectors such as communications, smart cities, financial, and logistics services. China’s digital platforms emerged in the late 1990s with the help of PRC government policies that restricted U.S. and other foreign internet services firms from operating in China while promoting alternative PRC competitors. Alibaba began in 1999 as a competitor to Amazon and formed Alipay in 2003 to compete with PayPal. Baidu started as a Google competitor in mapping and search engines. Sina Weibo began as a competitor to Twitter. Tencent’s WeChat competed with WhatsApp. In 2016, ByteDance refined the algorithm from its news aggregator business (Toutiao) to launch Douyin (a predecessor-turned companion PRC application to TikTok), a service that competed with Facebook and YouTube. The PRC universe of digital firms has expanded as industry has adopted digital services, and now includes other firms, such as BGI (biotech) and DJI (drones).
As PRC digital firms became viable in China, some moved into global markets. The PRC government allowed some PRC firms to list and expand overseas. In 2014, Alibaba raised $21.8 billion in its offering on the New York Stock Exchange. U.S. investors in TikTok’s PRC parent ByteDance include Sequoia Capital, Susquehanna Group, and KKR. Some PRC firms focused on app offerings to enter foreign markets. They used existing foreign operating systems on mobile phones (e.g., Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android) to avoid upfront technology infrastructure costs and expand quickly. Once established, some PRC firms developed their own infrastructure, such as cloud services, data storage, and semiconductor design. PRC firm Huawei has launched its own operating system (Harmony OS). 
Some PRC firms inherited foreign user bases and licenses through acquisitions. This approach gave some firms, such as TikTok’s parent ByteDance, a significant initial U.S. market position, and accelerated these firms’ expansion. In 2017, ByteDance acquired musical.ly, a short-form video app firm. The deal gave ByteDance 80 million monthly U.S. users—a base almost half of TikTok’s current user base. ByteDance then used that U.S. user base in launching TikTok. In another example, Tencent invested in Snap and Epic Games (owner of the gaming platform Fortnite).
Some PRC digital platforms, such as TikTok, are incorporated and/or headquartered in the U.S. and third markets, and have core engineering and technology functions in China and other PRC ties. Temu, founded in Boston, is controlled by a PRC firm. Zoom Video Communications, Inc., founded in California, incorporated in Delaware, and headquartered in the United States, reports in its FY2024 annual report that “a significant portion of our research and development organization resides in China” and that “we have a significant number of employees, primarily engineers, in China, where personnel costs are less expensive than in many other geographies.”
Table 1. Select Examples of Digital Platforms in the U.S. Market that have PRC Ties 
PRC Business
U.S. Business 
Sectors

ByteDance/Douyin
TikTok
Social media

Tencent
WeChat
Snap/Snapchat
Blizzard, Riot, Epic
Super app 
Social media 
Gaming

Alibaba
Alibaba, Alipay
E-commerce/payments

Baidu
Apollo
Mapping, autonomy

Yidian Yixun
Newsbreak
News, media

PDD
Temu
E-commerce, clothing

Shein
Shein
E-commerce, clothing

Zoom subsidiaries
Zoom, Zoom.gov
Business software

Shiji Tech
Shiji Technology
Business software/hotel

Binance
Binance.US
Crypto

Source: CRS, with information from media and corporate reports.
PRC Influence and Control
Since 2014, the PRC government and the Communist Party of China (CPC) have adopted interrelated laws, economic security measures, and data restrictions that enhance control over data and commercial activity, within and outside of China. They have expanded data localization requirements and placed controls on the export of data and algorithms. In 2021, they introduced security review requirements for PRC firms listing or operating overseas. These provisions require firms to adhere to PRC rules when they conflict with U.S. laws. PRC measures seem to be more extensive than other countries’ approaches to data security. Such measures have affected U.S. firms’ operations in China, raising questions about the extent to which PRC firms operating offshore are independent of the PRC government. Examples of PRC authorities include
China’s National Security Law (2015) requires information systems in China to be “secure and controllable.” The law underpins requirements that U.S. firms store data and cryptographic keys in China. 
The PRC’s National Cybersecurity Law (2017) requires firms to store personal information and data within China. The law builds on related requirements to place PRC data and related infrastructure in China. 
China’s Data Security Law (2021) covers data processing inside and outside China if it “harms the national security, public interest, or the legitimate rights and interests of citizens or organizations of the PRC.” It requires PRC government approval for the transfer of data stored in China and calls for classifying data based on its importance to economic and security interests. 
In August 2020, the PRC government placed export controls on algorithms used in social media platforms. Some experts saw this as an effort to influence TikTok and other PRC digital firms’ offshore operations.
The CPC requires all firms to house a Party committee that is empowered to attend board meetings and be part of decisionmaking. The PRC government is also an indirect shareholder in some firms. For example, it holds a board seat in Douyin Information Services Co., Ltd (the owner of TikTok’s core technology) via a 1% shareholding by a firm backed by China’s internet regulator. Other PRC tools to influence PRC digital platform firms include 
PRC official content guidelines and censorship rules restrict and promote content on PRC digital platforms.
China’s anti-espionage, cybersecurity, and data security laws compel firms to support PRC state security authorities. 
The core business (e.g., software and technology development) and intellectual property is based in China, owned by a PRC parent or subsidiary, and subject to PRC jurisdiction. Offshore structures can obfuscate such ties.
Key U.S. Government Actions to Restrict Certain PRC Digital Firms
May 2019: Executive Order (E.O.) 13873 declared a national emergency to secure U.S. information and communications technology and services supply chains. The E.O. has been renewed annually since 2019.
January 2020-present: Some federal agencies and state governments banned the TikTok app on government devices.
March 2020: A Presidential Order required Shiji Technology to divest Stayntouch, a U.S. software provider under the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) authorities. It did not ban the firm from operating in the U.S. market.
August 2020: A Presidential Order required ByteDance to divest Musical.ly/TikTok under CFIUS authorities. TikTok contested the Order in court. Since February 2021, the case has been in abeyance at the request of the parties.
August 2020: E.O. 13942 and E.O. 13943 (later rescinded) restricted the U.S. operations of TikTok and WeChat. Court injunctions blocked their implementation.
January 2021: E.O. 13971 provided for scrutiny of apps and software developed or controlled by PRC firms. 
June 2021: E.O. 14034 replaced E.O. 13942 and E.O. 13943. It created a Commerce Department program to address risks of foreign adversary-owned internet-tied and software firms.

Issues Before Congress
The executive branch has restricted some PRC digital firms’ operations (text box). P.L. 118-50 focuses on national security issues and platform conduct and allows the President to restrict foreign adversary-controlled apps. The law designates TikTok as a “foreign adversary-controlled application” and requires ByteDance to sell TikTok to a non-PRC owner by January 19, 2025, or face a ban on app stores and internet hosting services supporting the app. In December 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the law in a legal challenge by TikTok. TikTok then asked the court to bar enforcement of the law while it appeals to the Supreme Court. P.L. 118-50 allows the President to authorize a “qualified divestiture” of TikTok and impose terms. A 2020 Presidential Order required ByteDance to divest Musical.ly may inform a “qualified divestiture.” In referring the matter to the President, CFIUS “unanimously recommended” such action expressly “to protect U.S. users from exploitation of their personal data.” TikTok tried to reopen a mitigation path that CFIUS determined was not viable by legally challenging the Order, mostly on due process issues, and re-publicizing mitigation ideas. Some experts said TikTok could have stored data in the United States under U.S. government monitoring. Others said such an approach would not have addressed TikTok’s ties to technology and functions in China, such as regular software updates and continuous data transmission. In 2025, President Trump announced that TikTok’s U.S. operations are to be run by a joint venture that is majority-owned and controlled by U.S. persons in which ByteDance and its affiliates have up to a 20% stake. Congress might exercise oversight over the deal and consider whether to act with regard to other PRC platforms.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12640/IF12640.11.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12640.html
IF12473,U.S.-China Competition in Emerging Technologies: LiDAR,2026-02-26T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T17:23:00Z,Active,Resources,"Karen M. Sutter, Kelley M. Sayler","Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations, Technology, Information & Cyber Defense, East Asia & Pacific, Strategy, Operations & Emerging Threats","The governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) have both identified strategic and emerging technologies as a key element of economic competitiveness and national defense. Efforts to lead in such technologies are a core aspect of U.S.-China strategic competition. Some emerging technologies have both civilian and military uses. Among these technologies is Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), a remote sensing technology used in automotive, agriculture, manufacturing, weather, and other systems. The LiDAR market and its uses are developing quickly. U.S. firms have led in LiDAR to date, but PRC firms are advancing with the support of PRC industrial policies and access to the U.S. market and technology. Some PRC firms have used questionable practices to obtain U.S. LiDAR intellectual property (IP). 
LiDAR Technology
LiDAR is a remote sensing method that uses pulsed laser light to measure the distance, speed, and/or altitude of physical objects to map the surrounding environment. LiDAR allows for precise, accurate, and rapid three-dimensional measurements of natural and manmade environments with high resolution and long-range detection. Unlike other sensing technologies (e.g., cameras), LiDAR’s performance is not degraded in low-light conditions. There are different types of LiDAR. Scanning LiDAR uses mechanical rotation to spin the sensor and enables 360-degree detection. U.S. firm Velodyne (now merged with U.S. firm Ouster) developed the first scanning LiDAR. Microelectro-mechanical system (MEMS) LiDAR uses miniature mobile mirrors to scan the environment. MEMS firms include the U.S. firm Atomica. Optical phased array (OPA) LiDAR does not require sensor movement and is thus more durable than alternative LiDAR technologies. OPA firms include Quanergy. Flash LiDAR works like a camera to map environments using a single laser pulse. Flash LiDAR firms include LeddarTech (Canada), Sense Photonics (United States), and Continental (Germany).

LiDAR Development and Applications
The United States first developed LiDAR as a military technology in the 1960s for defense and aerospace uses. Since then, the LiDAR market has expanded with the development of systems capable of autonomous navigation, for which LiDAR is a critical enabling technology. Its use has grown rapidly with demand for electric vehicles (EV) and related autonomous driving systems (Figure 1).
Commercial: LiDAR has a range of applications in mapping, satellites, and space. In the automotive sector, LiDAR provides sensing capabilities for lane-keeping, collision avoidance, advanced driver assistance, and autonomous navigation. In precision farming, it can monitor crop conditions and soil health. In meteorology, LiDAR can improve weather forecasting. In manufacturing, firms use the technology for robotics and to monitor safety and productivity. “Smart cities” pair LiDAR with other technologies to integrate sensor networks in utilities, transportation, and infrastructure. Chattanooga, Tennessee, for example, plans to use LiDAR at 86 traffic intersections in an effort to improve traffic management and safety. 
Military: U.S. and PRC forces are among the militaries using LiDAR to support autonomous navigation capabilities for uncrewed ground and aerial vehicles (UxV). LiDAR’s precision and speed enable military-specific use. UxV equipped with LiDAR could be used to conduct battle damage assessment—an estimate of the physical and functional damage produced by an attack—removing the need for military personnel to be physically present and exposed on the battlefield. LiDAR-equipped UxV could be used to survey structural damage after natural disasters and to collect environmental data in remote or dangerous locations. The U.S. military has explored using LiDAR to identify and determine the depth of littoral sea mines and to conduct atmospheric monitoring to predict laser weapons’ effectiveness. The U.S. Army says potential uses include “platform target identification, aim point selection, range instrumentation support, weapon defenses, and mapping.”
Figure 1. LiDAR Applications: Market Forecasts
Figure is interactive in the HTML version of this In Focus.
/
Source: CRS, adapted from Yole Group.
Notes: ADAS is advanced driver assistance systems. Mfg. is manufacturing. 2021 is actual market. 2027 is forecasted market.
China’s Industrial Policies
China’s LiDAR firms benefit from PRC industrial policies and related subsidies, market protections, preferences (e.g., procurement), and other practices widely seen as unfair. PRC policies direct and finance the acquisition of foreign IP to develop China’s LiDAR and related technologies (e.g., semiconductors and optical sensors). In 2020, China prioritized state support to develop sectors that use LiDAR (e.g., smart cities, smart manufacturing, autonomous driving). Since 2022, the PRC has encouraged foreign investment in its LiDAR sector on terms that develop PRC capabilities and has placed LiDAR under export controls. 
PRC policies additionally emphasize technical standards setting to promote the use of China’s IP and help PRC firms expand globally. PRC LiDAR firm Hesai has led China’s efforts to develop national and global LiDAR standards. In the International Standards Organization, Hesai co-leads the Automotive LiDAR Working Group in developing a test method for LiDAR performance and safety. Hesai co-developed a U.S. standard for automotive LiDAR in 2020 and global optical radiation safety standards in 2022. 
PRC policies incentivize aggressive tactics to obtain foreign IP, which may distort the common use of trade tools and involve questionable practices or illicit activity. In antitrust reviews of global deals, the PRC often sets terms for asset sales and technology transfer before approving deals. In 2023, the PRC effectively blocked Intel’s bid for Israel Tower Semiconductor, a LiDAR chip producer. PRC firms use China’s courts to set foreign IP licensing terms and launch copycat cases to challenge U.S. court rulings. In 2019, U.S. firm Velodyne charged the PRC’s Hesai and RoboSense with illegally acquiring IP during talks to produce its products in China. In 2020, Veldoyne and Hesai reached a global cross-licensing patent agreement. In 2023, U.S. Ouster charged Hesai with IP infringement.
China’s Use of the U.S. Market
PRC LiDAR firms are using U.S. capital markets to secure financing, enter the U.S. market, form partnerships, and acquire U.S. technology. In 2022, CITIC, a PRC state investor, undertook a $1.4 billion reverse merger with U.S. Quanergy Systems. Quanergy declared bankruptcy 10 months later and sold its assets for $3.2 million to a limited liability company (LLC) with possible Russia ties. In 2018, China’s sovereign wealth fund CIC bought U.S. Boyd Corporation with Goldman Sachs. In 2015, the PRC state semiconductor fund financed PRC NavTech’s acquisition of Sweden’s Silex and a MEMS foundry in China that uses Silex’s IP. In 2015, PRC state investors bought OmniVision, a U.S. sensor designer (Table 1). PRC auto firm Geely is invested in U.S. Luminar and co-developing LiDAR technologies. Hesai is partnered with Bosch, a German automotive supplier and key LiDAR patent holder. China also has ties to U.S. LiDAR research. For example, Tsinghua-UC Berkeley Shenzhen Institute’s photonics lab in China works on LiDAR. The Institute’s ties to University of California may allow PRC access to the Sensor & Actuator Center and Marvell Nanolab in Berkeley. LiDAR USA is a Hesai distributor; in 2024 Hesai incorporated in the U.S. market as American LiDAR. Robosense has a North American headquarters in Michigan; in 2024, it joined MCity, a University of Michigan research center. 
Table 1. Selected PRC Purchases of LiDAR Firms 
Year 
Target 
 Acquirer
Capability

2015
OmniVision 
State investors
Sensor design

2015
Silek 
NavTech, Sino IC Fund
Microscopic sensors

2018
Boyd Corp.
CIC
Optical encoders 


Faraday Future
Evergrande, CAS
LiDAR IP

2022
Quanergy
CITIC
Hardware, software

Source: Media and industry reports.
While U.S. and other non-PRC firms have led the LiDAR market with advanced research capabilities and IP, PRC firms are poised to quickly take a leadership position. PRC industrial policies, acquisitions of foreign firms and IP, and corporate partnerships have already rapidly enhanced PRC firms’ position in the LiDAR market, particularly in automotive LiDAR, as seen in patents granted to PRC firms (Figure 2). Supported by state monies and market preferences, PRC firms are scaling up quickly in China. Hesai has a $98.4 million credit line to expand production in Shanghai and said in its 2023 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission that it would use earnings from its U.S. initial public offering for acquisitions, research, and manufacturing. PRC firms had 58% of the global automotive LiDAR market in 2020, as measured by shipments. Many PRC firms operate at a loss and may be selling below cost to gain market share. Some analysts say the LiDAR market is ripe for consolidation, which may give China openings to acquire U.S. firms and expand.
Figure 2.Major Automotive LiDAR Patent Holdings
/
Source: CRS, adapted from Henry Patent Law Firm.
Notes: *China acquired U.S. firms Faraday Future and Quanergy (and then sold Quanergy assets to an LLC in bankruptcy proceedings). A patent family is a patent collection covering similar technical content.
Military Ties and National Security Issues
In China, LiDAR systems are regulated as radio systems that require military approval. Additionally, PRC policies seek to develop technologies that are interoperable for civilian and military use and may allow PRC state access. PRC LiDAR firms support military programs. NavTech provides navigation technology for satellites (Beidou) and aviation defense (drones and fighter jets). Hesai makes equipment used in autonomous warfighting vehicles and is reportedly tied to the military’s China Electronics Technology Group Corporation. Robosense has ties to the Harbin Institute of Technology, a military university.
There are reports that the U.S. federal government, state governments, and the U.S. military may be using or considering the use of PRC LiDAR systems. If so, it could have U.S. national security implications. China could use data compiled by PRC LiDAR systems to acquire sensitive information or exquisite mapping of U.S. infrastructure. China could use this information to conduct military or industrial espionage or gain operational advantages in a military conflict. PRC firms also could introduce malware via a software update and degrade the performance of systems using the technology.
In 2025, the Department of Defense relisted Hesai on its list of military companies in accordance with the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021, Section 1260H (P.L. 116-283). Additionally, in December 2025, the Department of Commerce issued rules that restrict the use of PRC connected technology in U.S. vehicles. 
Issues for Congress
To help ensure fair competition and to protect U.S. national security, Congress could consider the tactics China is using to advance in LiDAR and whether to strengthen U.S. and allied procurement rules to review or restrict federal, state, and military acquisition of PRC LiDAR systems. Congress could also consider policies related to investment, export controls, fair trade, antitrust, standards, capital markets, IP licensing and infringement, bankruptcy, and research.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12473/IF12473.8.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12473.html
RL33003,Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T17:23:02Z,Active,Reports,Jeremy M. Sharp,Middle East & North Africa,"Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which opened in 1869 and is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Its population of more than 108 million people makes Egypt by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Its majority Sunni Muslim population and institutions have transnational influence, and its large Coptic Christian minority is the Middle East region’s largest Christian population. 
Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel stands as one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. During the war in Gaza, Egypt worked with U.S. officials to serve as a mediator between Israel and Hamas. Egypt was one of several nations which played a key role in mediating the October 2025 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. In October 2025, Egypt hosted the Sharm el Sheikh Peace Summit, where President Trump, President Sisi, and other world leaders jointly signed a declaration endorsing the ceasefire.
In 2026, Egypt is experiencing a period of relative economic growth and revived regional relevancy as the Trump Administration looks to Egypt (and others) to help stabilize Gaza. After several years of economic disruption and a balance of payments crisis caused by both domestic policies and international events, Egypt’s debt crisis has eased due to outside economic support from international financial institutions and Arab Gulf states. The Egyptian economy, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is now “showing signs of robust growth” 
In addition to Gaza, the Egyptian government is facing other foreign policy challenges. Egypt has had to contend with a politically divided Libya on its western border and a civil war in Sudan on its southern border. Conflict in Sudan and tensions with Ethiopia implicate the Nile River, a core Egyptian national security interest. In addition to insecurity on Egypt’s land borders, earlier Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and against Israel from Yemen redirected commercial shipping away from the Suez Canal, depriving Egypt of hard currency revenues for several years. 
Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $90 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation), with military and economic assistance increasing significantly after 1979. Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. 
P.L. 119-75, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, provides $1.5 billion in total aid for Egypt, of which $1.375 billion is for Foreign Military Financing grant aid, an amount $75 million above what Egypt had been receiving as an FMF baseline for decades. The act also would withhold $320 million in FMF from obligation unless the Secretary of State can make several human rights-related determinations, which are no longer delineated in the law’s text, but are now found in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 119-75. The Secretary of State may waive the withholding provision if the Secretary determines that “such funds are necessary for counterterrorism, border security, or nonproliferation programs or that it is otherwise important to the national security interest of the United States to do so, including a detailed justification for the use of such waiver and the reasons why any of the requirements cannot be met.” For FY2020-FY2023, the Biden Administration and Congress reprogrammed or withheld a total of $750 million in FMF originally designated for Egypt based on relevant provisions in appropriations law. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33003/RL33003.128.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/HTML/RL33003.html
R48863,Local and Regional Project Assistance Program: Background and Selected Considerations,2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T16:52:59Z,Active,Reports,Jennifer J. Marshall,Transportation Funding,"Local and Regional Project Assistance (LRPA) is a competitive grant program for transportation projects of significant local and regional impact. The name of the program and grant requirements have changed across Administrations, and it is currently known as the Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development (BUILD) grant program. The program is administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT). The program originated in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5), in which Congress provided $1.5 billion for a discretionary grant program to make capital investments in surface transportation infrastructure through capital projects and planning projects. The program was funded through annual appropriations acts starting in FY2010 and through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58, §21202) from FY2022 to FY2026. 
FY2026 is the LRPA program’s 21st application solicitation round, with $1.5 billion available for grants. DOT competitively awards these grants based on certain criteria, which were amended most recently to align with Trump Administration executive orders. Notices of funding opportunities (NOFOs) have highlighted and prioritized different types of transportation projects over the years. Award amounts, modes of transportation funded, and the geographic distribution of funding has changed as well. Beginning in FY2010, Congress capped the maximum individual grant award at $25 million. Road, transit, and port/maritime projects have been awarded each year. Road projects have been 54% of all projects selected for grants for the program, followed by transit (16%), bicycle/pedestrian (11%), rail (10%), port/maritime (9%), and aviation (<1%) projects. Beginning in FY2019, Congress directed DOT to award 50% of the grant funding to projects located in rural areas (areas with populations below 200,000) and 50% to projects in urban areas (areas with populations 200,000 and above). DOT requires project sponsors to develop and monitor performance measures for projects in the three years following their completion date. In the IIJA, Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to complete annual reports on projects that received a grant during each fiscal year. Congress directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess DOT’s grant administration process for LRPA and to submit to Congress a report that describes the fairness of the selection process and selection criteria for eligible projects.
Selected potential considerations for Congress that relate to LRPA include how DOT exercises discretion in selecting eligible projects for grant awards, the economic impact of grant awards, and LRPA’s purpose among discretionary grant programs. DOT has year-to-year discretion on how to define planning grants compared with how to define capital grants because planning grants are defined in NOFO documents and eligible capital projects are defined in Title 49, Section 6702, of the U.S. Code. Congress could consider the national economic impact of grant awards. It could also consider how LRPA addresses goals similar to or different from those of other DOT competitive discretionary grant programs that fund large infrastructure investments.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48863/R48863.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48863.html
R48862,"Spectrum Provisions in P.L. 119-21, the FY2025 Reconciliation Law",2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-02-26T17:08:12Z,Active,Reports,Jill C. Gallagher,,"The FY2025 reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21; commonly known as “the One Big Beautiful Bill Act”) was signed into law on July 4, 2025. The act was established pursuant to H.Con.Res. 14, a budget resolution, which set budgetary goals for certain House and Senate committees. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce and Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation each developed proposals to meet budgetary targets, which included provisions to auction radio spectrum, and to use the proceeds to meet budgetary goals. The spectrum auctions are expected to generate over $85 billion from FY2025 to FY2034, according to the Congressional Budget Office. 
P.L. 119-21 directs the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency in the Department of Commerce (DOC) responsible for managing federal spectrum use, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which is responsible for managing nonfederal spectrum use (i.e., commercial, state, and local spectrum use), to make 800 megahertz of spectrum available for commercial mobile services while also excluding certain bands from auction. Title IV, Section 40002, of the act contains the following provisions:
The FCC’s general auction authority (which had expired on March 9, 2023) is reinstated through September 30, 2034, excluding the 3.1-3.45 gigahertz (GHz) and 7.4-8.4 GHz bands from auction.
The FCC is required to grant licenses through competitive bidding (i.e., auctions) for 300 megahertz of spectrum, including not less than 100 megahertz in the 3.98-4.2 GHz band within two years of enactment.
The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information (i.e., head of NTIA), with the FCC, is directed to identify 500 megahertz of spectrum in the 1.3-10.5 GHz range (excluding the 3.1-3.45 GHz and 7.4-8.4 GHz bands) for reallocation from federal use to (1) nonfederal use, (2) shared federal and nonfederal use, or (3) a combination thereof for full-power commercial licensed use. It directs the FCC to complete, within four years of enactment, one or more auctions for no less than 200 megahertz of this spectrum and, no later than eight years after enactment, one or more auctions for the remaining spectrum. 
DOC is provided $50 million to assist the head of NTIA with analysis of three bands (2.7-2.9 GHz, 4.4-4.9 GHz, and 7.25-7.4 GHz) and to publish a biennial report on the value of federally held spectrum. 
In the past, Congress has taken a similar approach when renewing the FCC’s spectrum auction authority. With past renewals, Congress often required the FCC and NTIA to make additional spectrum available for commercial use through auctions. In some cases, Congress has named specific bands for auction; in other cases, Congress directed the FCC and NTIA to identify and reallocate bands for auction. In P.L. 119-21, Congress does both and also excludes certain bands from auction. 
With the growth in wireless communications, demand for spectrum is increasing. Making spectrum available for commercial use can spur innovation, improve services, yield economic gains, and bolster U.S. leadership in the global telecommunications market. However, much of the spectrum in the mid-band range (1-6 GHz)—where P.L. 119-21 is targeting spectrum for reallocation—is already in use. Identifying spectrum for reallocation is complex and often requires technical studies and time to determine the feasibility and costs and benefits of sharing or reallocating spectrum, including costs to reconfigure or relocate communication systems. The FCC and NTIA may face challenges in identifying and reallocating 800 megahertz of spectrum for full-power commercial licensed use in the spectrum range and timelines specified in the act, some of which were expedited in a December 19, 2025, presidential memorandum. A challenge for the FCC and NTIA is balancing spectrum needs of incumbent users, including federal agencies performing critical functions, and commercial users, which can spur economic growth. 
Configuration of spectrum and terms of use can affect auction proceeds. As Congress is relying on proceeds from spectrum auctions to fund provisions in P.L. 119-21, it may seek to monitor (1) agencies’ progress in identifying spectrum for reallocation; (2) bands selected for reallocation; (3) the impact of reallocation on incumbent users, including federal agency users; (4) auction proceeds and timelines to ensure budgetary targets are met; and (5) costs of reallocations that can diminish auction proceeds. An area of debate may be balancing spectrum use between users (e.g., federal and nonfederal) and among technologies (e.g., mobile, satellite, Wi-Fi). Other areas of interest for Congress may be enhancing interagency coordination on domestic and international spectrum decisions, and supporting research and development of new spectrum-sharing approaches.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48862/R48862.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48862.html
R48794,Social Security Administration (SSA): FY2026 Annual Limitation on Administrative Expenses (LAE) Appropriation: In Brief,2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-02-26T10:38:01Z,Active,Reports,"Tamar B. Breslauer, William R. Morton","Retirement Security & Social Insurance, Appropriations Policy, Social Security Administration (SSA), Cash Assistance","The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for administering Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which are the nation’s primary income support programs for older adults and individuals with disabilities. (Social Security includes Social Security Disability Insurance [SSDI].) As part of its duties, SSA receives benefit applications and determines program entitlement or eligibility, holds hearings and other appeals, completes program integrity (PI) reviews of certain beneficiaries, issues new and replacement Social Security number (SSN) cards, and posts workers’ earnings to their Social Security records. SSA is also responsible for supporting the administration of a number of non-SSA programs and laws, such as Medicare, and provides and verifies data for a variety of purposes.
Benefit payments for SSA’s programs are considered mandatory spending, which means that such spending is controlled by each program’s authorizing statute—not by appropriations acts. However, the resources to carry out SSA’s programs—as well as to support the administration of Medicare and other priorities—are generally considered discretionary spending and thus are controlled by appropriations acts. Nearly all of SSA’s administrative expenses are funded by appropriations to its Limitation on Administrative Expenses (LAE) account, and almost all of the funding for the LAE account is provided each year as part of the annual appropriations process. The annual LAE appropriation is a discretionary lump-sum appropriation composed of funds from the Social Security and Medicare trust funds for their respective shares of administrative expenses, the general fund for SSI’s share of administrative expenses, and a portion of user fees collected for SSA’s administration of certain activities. SSA’s annual LAE appropriation is traditionally provided under the Related Agencies section of the annual Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations act.
The FY2026 commissioner of Social Security’s budget requested $14.793 billion for the total annual LAE appropriation, an increase of $494 million (+3.5%) compared to the FY2025 enacted level. The FY2026 President’s budget requested $14.793 billion for the total annual LAE appropriation, an increase of $494 million (+3.5%) compared to the FY2025 enacted level. The FY2026 total included $12.225 billion in base LAE funding, $2.397 billion in total dedicated PI funding, and $171 million in total user fees.
The House Appropriations Committee reported its LHHS bill to the House on September 11, 2025 (H.R. 5304, H.Rept. 119-271). The FY2026 House committee bill proposed $14.793 billion for the total annual LAE appropriation, an increase of $494 million (+3.5%) compared to the FY2025 enacted level. The FY2026 total included $12.225 billion in base LAE funding, $2.397 billion in total dedicated PI funding, and $171 million in total user fees.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its LHHS bill to the Senate on July 31, 2025 (S. 2587, S.Rept. 119-55). The FY2026 Senate committee bill proposed $14.893 billion for the total annual LAE appropriation, an increase of $594 million (+4.2%) compared to the FY2025 enacted level. The FY2026 total included $12.325 billion in base LAE funding, $2.397 billion in total dedicated PI funding, and $171 million in total user fees.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (H.R. 7148, P.L. 119-75), which included the FY2026 LHHS appropriations act (Division B), was signed into law on February 3, 2026. It provided $14.843 billion for the FY2026 total annual LAE appropriation, an increase of $544 million (+3.8%) compared to the FY2025 enacted level. The FY2026 total included $12.275 billion in base LAE funding, $2.397 billion in total dedicated PI funding, and $171 million in total user fees.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48794/R48794.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48794.html
R48643,"Overview of FY2026 Appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS)",2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T09:22:51Z,Active,Reports,Nathan James,"Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations","This report describes actions to provide FY2026 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. The annual CJS appropriations act provides funding for the Department of Commerce, which includes bureaus and offices such as the Census Bureau, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology; the Department of Justice (DOJ), which includes agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Offices of the U.S. Attorneys; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the National Science Foundation; and several related agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
The Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 (FY2025 CR, P.L. 119-4) provided FY2025 funding for most CJS accounts at the FY2024 enacted level. The CR reduced funding for several CJS accounts relative to the FY2024 enacted appropriation. The reductions were the result of eliminating certain funding in CJS accounts that was for community funding projects (also known as earmarks) in FY2024. The CR also increased funding for two DOJ accounts and increased the obligation cap for the Crime Victims Fund. 
For FY2026, the Administration requested a total of $67.442 billion for the departments and agencies funded through CJS. This amount was $14.992 billion (-18.2%) less than regular FY2025 enacted funding for CJS ($82.435 billion). The Administration’s request included $8.656 billion for the Department of Commerce, $35.359 billion for DOJ, $22.722 billion for the science agencies, and $705 million for the related agencies.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations marked up and reported its FY2026 CJS appropriations bill (S. 2354) on July 17, 2025. The bill would have provided a total of $82.953 billion for CJS departments and agencies. This amount was $519 million (+0.6%) more than the FY2025 regular appropriation for CJS and $15.511 billion (+23.0%) more than the Administration’s FY2026 request. The committee-reported bill included $10.874 billion for the Department of Commerce, $36.920 billion for DOJ, $33.910 billion for the science agencies, and $1.249 billion for the related agencies.
The House Committee on Appropriations marked up and reported its FY2026 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 5342) on September 10, 2025. The bill would have provided a total of $80.245 billion for CJS departments and agencies. The amount in the committee-reported bill was $2.190 billion (-2.7%) less than the FY2025 regular appropriation for CJS and $12.803 billion (+19.0%) more than the Administration’s FY2026 request. The committee-reported bill included $10.124 billion for the U.S. Department of Commerce; $37.309 billion for DOJ; $31.848 billion for the science agencies; and $963 million for the related agencies.
On January 23, 2026, the Commerce, Justice, Science; Energy and Water Development; and Interior and Environment Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-74) was signed into law by President Trump. The act provides a total of $82.619 billion for CJS departments and agencies, which is $185 million (+0.2%) more than the FY2025 regular appropriation for CJS and $15.177 billion (+22.5%) more than the Administration’s FY2026 request. The act includes $11.132 billion for the Department of Commerce; $37.079 billion for DOJ; $33.196 billion for the science agencies; and $1.212 billion for the related agencies.

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48643/R48643.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48643.html
R48568,Federal Power Act: The Department of Energy’s Emergency Authority,2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T16:54:31Z,Active,Reports,Ashley J. Lawson,"Electricity, Energy Policy","Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. §824a(c)) grants the Secretary of Energy certain authorities over the temporary operation of the electricity system during emergencies. Actions by the Trump Administration have highlighted this authority and raised questions about its future implementation.
The Federal Power Act was enacted in 1935 and included emergency authority language. At the time, federal oversight of the electricity system was conducted by the Federal Power Commission (FPC). Now, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has most responsibilities for electricity system oversight—but not for emergencies. The emergency authority was transferred to the Secretary of Energy when the Department of Energy (DOE) was established by the Department of Energy Organization Act (P.L. 95-91) in 1977.
Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act provides DOE broad discretion to require almost any change to the operation of the U.S. electricity system on a temporary basis. Specifically, DOE may “require by order such temporary connections of facilities and such generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy as in its judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest.” DOE may execute this authority during war or at any other time it “determines that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, or of fuel or water for generating facilities, or other causes.”
DOE and FPC have used the emergency authority several dozen times since 1935 in response to different kinds of emergencies. From 2000 through February 2026, DOE used its emergency authority in response to 26 events. Twelve events were weather-related and included hurricanes, heat waves, and winter storms.
On April 8, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14262, “Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the United States Electric Grid.” E.O. 14262 directs DOE to “streamline, systemize, and expedite” its processes for issuing emergency orders when “the relevant grid operator forecasts a temporary interruption of electricity supply is necessary to prevent a complete grid failure.” The E.O. additionally directs DOE to develop a protocol to identify generation resources that are critical to system reliability. The protocol must “include all mechanisms available under applicable law, including Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, to ensure any generation resource identified as critical within an at-risk region is appropriately retained.” Further, the protocol must prevent, “as the Secretary of Energy deems appropriate and consistent with applicable law,” identified generation resources from “leaving the bulk-power system” or converting fuels in such a way that reduces their accredited capacity.
DOE issued emergency orders for three separate events in May 2025; all of the orders involved seemingly new interpretations of the emergency authority. One order directed the local utility in Puerto Rico to conduct vegetation management (e.g., shrub clearing) around specified transmission lines on the island. No other emergency order issued from 2000 to present has addressed vegetation management. Two other May 2025 orders delayed retirement plans for two power plants. Subsequently, DOE has issued emergency orders delaying the retirement of additional power plants across the country.
The primary language authorizing DOE’s emergency orders has remained unchanged since 1935, potentially reflecting Congress’s continued view over this time period that the original authorization is appropriate. Nonetheless, the U.S. electricity system has changed in many ways since 1935 and Congress might choose to reevaluate the authority. Potential aspects of the emergency authority Congress could evaluate include the definition of emergencies, the duration of emergencies, and the scope of electricity system interventions DOE may order in response to emergencies.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48568/R48568.8.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48568.html
R48545,Public Broadcasting: Background Information and Issues for Congress,2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-03-05T14:07:53Z,Active,Reports,Brian E. Humphreys,"Social Welfare, Telecommunications & Internet Policy, Public Broadcasting","Discussion of public interest in educational or noncommercial programming dates to the early days of broadcasting. In 1938, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) set aside a portion of available radio channels for noncommercial and educational broadcasting, periodically updating policy as technology evolved. 
In 1965, the Carnegie Corporation of New York created the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television to make policy recommendations on public broadcasting. It recommended that Congress create a private, nonprofit corporation to support the development of local and national programming for public television (and later radio). This was enacted as part of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (PBA; P.L. 90-129). The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) was subsequently incorporated in 1967 as a private nonprofit corporation governed by a board of directors appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The CPB served as primary custodian of federal investment in public broadcasting until it was defunded by Congress in July 2025. Congress rescinded previously enacted appropriations for FY2026 and FY2027 on July 24, 2025, through the Rescissions Act of 2025 (P.L. 119-28). However, appropriations authority remains under the jurisdiction of the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees should Congress decide to reestablish the CPB in the future. In addition to funds appropriated to it directly by Congress, the CPB was authorized to receive federal grant funds from other agencies for educational programming, support of public broadcasting emergency alerting functions, and other purposes. 
The White House took several actions in 2025 to curtail the CPB’s role in the public broadcasting enterprise, including directives to dismiss certain members of the CPB Board, to prohibit CPB funding of National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), and to terminate or repurpose all other grant funding by federal agencies. Several of these actions were being litigated in federal court when the CPB announced the planned cessation of its operations. (The CPB periodically received private donations, but these were not sufficient to sustain operations.) On August 1, 2025, the CPB announced that it was beginning an orderly winding down of its operations in response to the rescission of congressional appropriations and Senate appropriators’ decision not to include CPB funding in their FY2026 appropriations bill. On January 5, 2026, the CPB announced its intention to completely dissolve the organization.
The dissolution of the CPB reconfigured the landscape of public broadcasting. Historically, the CPB distributed appropriated funds to independent public broadcasting stations and content producers according to a statutory formula. In FY2024, approximately 10.6% of public television and 6.0% of public radio broadcasting revenue came from the CPB’s Community Service Grants (television and radio station grants). For some stations—particularly those in underserved or rural locations—the proportion of revenue was much higher. The CPB grants were the largest single source of funding for public television and radio stations and for programming development and distribution.
Some of the nearly 1,500 independently licensed member stations that previously received CPB funding have announced staffing and programming cuts or announced plans to cease operations altogether. Many—but not all—of these stations are members of PBS and NPR, which were created by the CPB over 50 years ago to facilitate production and distribution of programming content in partnership with their member stations. With few exceptions, both PBS and NPR have retained member station affiliations and continued operations after the dissolution of the CPB, albeit with cutbacks. Much of their programming remains widely available as of the publication date of this report. 
Prior to the defunding of the CPB, much of the debate over the future of public broadcasting centered on the value of public broadcasting as a public good. Advocates for public broadcasting argued that public broadcasters provided balanced and objective information, news, children’s education, and entertainment in an internet-dominated media environment. Critics contended that public broadcasting has become less essential and that PBS- and NPR-branded public affairs comments reflected political and cultural bias. Congress may consider actions to clarify executive branch legal authorities vis-à-vis public broadcasting entities. Congress may also consider future annual appropriations to reestablish the CPB—under either current or amended authorities—or provide support to public broadcasting stations or content producers through other authorities and programs. Congress may also take no action. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48545/R48545.16.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48545.html
LSB11399,Congressional Court Watcher: Circuit Splits from January 2026,2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T07:07:54Z,Active,Posts,Michael John Garcia,Jurisprudence,"The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the thirteen “circuits” issue thousands of precedential decisions each year. Because relatively few of these decisions are ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are often the last word on consequential legal questions. The federal appellate courts sometimes reach different conclusions on the same issue of federal law, causing a “split” among the circuits that leads to the nonuniform application of federal law among similarly situated litigants.
This Legal Sidebar discusses circuit splits that emerged or widened following decisions from January 2026 on matters relevant to Congress. The Sidebar does not address every circuit split that developed or widened during this period. Selected cases typically involve judicial disagreement over the interpretation or validity of federal statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight functions. The Sidebar includes only cases where an appellate court’s controlling opinion recognizes a split among the circuits on a key legal issue resolved in the opinion. This Sidebar refers to each U.S. Court of Appeals by its number or descriptor (e.g., “D.C. Circuit” for “U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit”).
Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to the CRS Legal Update and receive regular notifications of new products and upcoming seminars by CRS attorneys.
Commerce: In consolidated cases, the Ninth Circuit rejected challenges to residency requirements in cannabis dispensary licensing schemes in Washington State and the City of Sacramento, California. Both California and Washington state laws permit marijuana sales for recreational and medicinal use, and the challenged licensing schemes allow only state or city residents to hold dispensary licenses. Plaintiffs argued these requirements discriminated against out-of-state businesses in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, a judicial doctrine that construes the Commerce Clause to prohibit state laws that unduly restrict interstate commerce, even in the absence of federal legislation. Observing that the Supreme Court has urged caution in the doctrine’s application, the Ninth Circuit held that it did not apply to the challenged residency requirements because medical and recreational marijuana remain illegal under federal law. As such, according to the court, the challenged laws aligned with Congress’s efforts to eliminate interstate drug markets. The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion diverges from the First and Second Circuits, which have held that the dormant Commerce Clause applies to state economic restrictions even if the market is unlawful under federal law (Peridot Tree WA, Inc. v. Washington State Liquor & Cannabis Control Bd.).
Criminal Law & Procedure: The Third Circuit held that a criminal defendant’s bare, nonspecific motion for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 did not preserve specific arguments for appellate review regarding whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. The circuit panel observed that its approach diverges from the D.C., First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which recognize that a broadly stated Rule 29 motion preserves such arguments on appeal. Because the Third Circuit concluded that the defendant’s specific sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims were not preserved on appeal and therefore were not subject to de novo review, the court instead reviewed the defendant’s insufficiency claims under the stringent plain-error standard and found no reversible error (United States v. Abrams).
Firearms: A Fifth Circuit panel vacated a criminal defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, holding that the statute violated the Second Amendment as applied to the defendant based on his prior state-law conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine. The panel concluded that permanently prohibiting firearm possession based on this defendant’s illegal possession of methamphetamine was inconsistent with the Second Amendment because the prohibition was not sufficiently analogous to historical restrictions on firearm possession by dangerous or intoxicated individuals. The court acknowledged widespread disagreement among the appellate courts over how to apply the Supreme Court’s history-based framework set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen to assess the compatibility of firearm restrictions with the Second Amendment, including with respect to Section 922(g)(1). The panel observed that an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion identified the Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits as upholding the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) as applied to all felons. The panel also recognized disagreement among those courts that hold that a criminal defendant’s dangerousness must be assessed to determine whether he may, consistent with the Second Amendment, be permanently disarmed under Section 922(g)(1). The Third and Sixth Circuits consider both felony and misdemeanor histories in assessing dangerousness, while the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of dangerousness focuses exclusively on the predicate felony convictions giving rise to the Section 922(g)(1) violation (United States v. Hembree).
Firearms: A divided Ninth Circuit panel held that California’s ban on open carry of firearms in urban areas violated the Second Amendment, while its licensing regime for rural areas—requiring permits for individuals expressing a general desire for self-defense—survived a facial constitutional challenge. The majority emphasized that open carry was historically the default lawful method of firearm carriage, with no evidence of outright bans at the time of the Founding. Applying the history-based framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Bruen to assess a firearms restriction’s compatibility with the Second Amendment, the panel concluded that open carry is clearly protected by the Second Amendment and that California’s urban ban is unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit criticized the Second Circuit’s approach, which permits the government to ban either open or concealed carry provided that at least one of the two forms of public carry remains available. The Ninth Circuit contended that such reasoning rested on a misreading of Bruen and was inconsistent with the historical tradition of allowing open carry. The panel also upheld California’s rural licensing regime on its face, characterizing Bruen as indicating that licensing schemes are permissible when, as here, a permit shall be issued when the request is based on a general desire for self-defense (Baird v. Bonta).
Immigration: In a per curiam opinion, a divided Third Circuit panel held that although a federal district court retained habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained by the federal government, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the alien’s claims challenging the lawfulness of his detention and removability. Federal courts exercising habeas jurisdiction typically may review the legality of an individual’s incarceration. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States shall be available only” as part of a federal appeals court’s consideration of a petition for review (PFR) of a final removal order. In this case, the government argued that the alien was removable from the United States on foreign policy grounds and for obtaining lawful permanent resident status through fraud or willful misrepresentation, and he was arrested and detained pending removal proceedings. Before those proceedings were completed, the alien sought habeas relief, claiming that his detention and placement in removal proceedings constituted unlawful retaliation for engaging in protected political speech under the First Amendment. The panel majority held that Section 1252(b)(9) stripped the habeas court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider these claims because they involved legal and factual questions that could ultimately be reviewed by a federal appeals court considering a PFR. The majority acknowledged that its ruling diverged from recent decisions in similar cases by other courts—including published opinions from the Second Circuit—holding that Section 1252(b)(9) does not prevent aliens from challenging, in habeas proceedings, the underlying basis for their removability and detention prior to the issuance of a removal order (Khalil v. President).
Immigration: The Fourth Circuit affirmed a defendant’s criminal convictions and sentence for fraudulently preparing immigration visa petitions under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). The petition applications submitted to the government included fraudulent or forged supporting documents, but the defendant had not signed the applications and therefore did not certify under penalty of perjury their accuracy. The Fourth Circuit upheld the defendant’s convictions under multiple fraud-related statutes, including paragraph four of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), which imposes criminal penalties on a person who “knowingly makes under oath, or as permitted under penalty of perjury ... knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any ... document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, or knowingly presents any such ... document which contains any such false statement.” Aligning with the Second Circuit but splitting with the Third Circuit, the panel held that the oath requirement in Section 1546(a) applies only to the “knowingly makes” offense listed in that paragraph, and not to other listed offenses including the “knowingly presents” offense with which the defendant was charged (United States v. Aborisade).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11399/LSB11399.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11399.html
IF13168,Data Privacy vs. Bank Secrecy: Regulating the Flow of Information Within Bank-Fintech Partnerships,2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-03-03T17:52:56Z,Active,Resources,Andrew P. Scott,"Data Privacy, Financial Market Regulation, Banking, Financial Technology Innovation","Banks are increasingly interconnected with nonbank financial technology. As this trend continues, policy responses to update regulatory frameworks may be proposed. 
Bank-nonbank relationships—particularly ones involving data transfers—are often subject to different regulatory requirements across a range of legal frameworks. When policymakers change or update one set of rules for banks, it could cause confusion, inconsistencies, or even conflicting incentives among market participants.
For example, financial institutions, including depository institutions such as banks and credit unions, are required to understand whom their customers are and what their purposes are for establishing accounts. This serves as a foundational element of the anti-money laundering (AML) regulatory framework in the U.S. financial sector. Concurrently, banks are required to protect consumer nonpublic personal information (NPI). Further, banks are responsible for ensuring that any partnerships they engage in comply with relevant banking laws, including AML and data privacy provisions. 
This In Focus explains how banks manage information in a manner that complies with three laws—the Bank Secrecy Act (P.L. 91-508), the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (P.L. 106-102), and the Bank Service Company Act (P.L. 87-856)—particularly in light of increased partnership activity between banks and nonbank financial technology companies (fintechs).
Anti-Money Laundering
The statutory foundation for AML policies was established in the 1970s in the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA, 31 U.S.C. §5311 et seq). At a general level, this framework requires financial institutions to keep certain records and report certain transactions. Over time, the regulations implementing this framework have been updated to reflect new ways of conducting transactions and to include novel business models. Further, in 2003, bank and credit union regulators jointly issued the Customer Identification Programs (CIP) rulemaking, which implemented provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) by setting “standards for financial institutions regarding the identity of the customer that shall apply in connection with the opening of an account at a financial institution.” Essentially, a depository institution is responsible for obtaining, at a minimum, the following information from a customer prior to opening an account: the customer’s name, date of birth, address (for an individual), and Tax Identification Number (TIN) or Social Security Number.
The CIP requirements in the BSA generally apply to all financial institutions, including banks, credit unions, broker/dealers, insurance companies, exchanges, money transmitters, and several others. Financial technology firms are not explicitly covered, but Section 5312(a)(2) does include “any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secretary of the Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an activity which is similar to, related to, or a substitute for any activity in which any business described in this paragraph is authorized to engage” and “any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.” Further, BSA policy is broadly developed by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the bureau in Treasury responsible for AML. However, the CIP regulations are implemented by the various financial regulators. These policies may change with changes in agency leadership. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley
In the financial system, data privacy is governed by Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA, 15 U.S.C. §6801 et seq). Financial institutions, including banks, are required to develop and give notice of their privacy policies to their own customers and must give notice and an opportunity for a consumer to “opt out” before disclosing any personal financial information to an unaffiliated third party. The provision also requires financial regulators to issue regulations to safeguard personal financial information. 
The privacy provisions in GLBA apply to institutions that engage in “activities that are financial in nature.” While financial technology is not explicitly listed as an activity that meets this definition, the statute requires regulators to consider “changes ... in the technology for delivering financial services” and “whether such activity is necessary or appropriate to allow [a bank] to compete effectively with any company seeking to provide financial services [or] efficiently deliver information and services that are financial in nature through the use of technological means.” 
Further, under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 2024 open banking rulemaking (12 C.F.R part 1033, subparts B and C), authorized third parties that seek access to covered data on behalf of a consumer to provide a product or service that the consumer requested must satisfy the applicable safeguard rules under GLBA. For more on the open banking rule, see CRS In Focus IF13117, Access to Consumer Financial Data: Open Banking and the CFPB’s Section 1033 Rule, by Karl E. Schneider.
Bank Service Company Act
Banks often partner or contract with other firms to facilitate certain services. For example, a bank may use a data processor to help manage its marketing with clients. Bank regulators examine banks for safety and soundness as well as for compliance with certain banking laws. They also supervise the relationships banks hold with third parties pursuant to their authorities under the Bank Service Company Act (12 U.S.C. §1861 et seq.). 
The provisions under this law apply to permissible bank service company activities, including check and deposit sorting and posting, bookkeeping, accounting, statistical, or other related activities. There is no explicit reference to fintech activities, though fintechs often perform these functions. 
Regulating Bank-Fintech Partnerships
Consumers can interact with banks directly through local branches or online through the internet or banking apps. Similarly, consumers can use fintechs to access various financial services. Sometimes, a consumer interacts with a fintech to obtain banking services, and behind the scenes a bank is performing the banking service, while the fintech is running the consumer interface.
Banking as a Service
One way banks and fintechs work together is in a model referred to as “banking as a service.” In this model, a fintech pays a bank to provide core banking services, and those services are effectively white labeled for consumption on the fintech’s platform.
Consider the following example: A customer uses a fintech app to open a checking account and deposit a cash balance that was previously held in a digital wallet. To open the bank account, the bank now faces a number of regulatory requirements:
The bank must be able to verify the customer’s identity and purpose for opening the account.
The bank must be able to disclose its privacy policies to the customer and provide the customer with an opportunity to opt out of certain third-party disclosures.
The bank relationship with the fintech(s) is subject to supervisory oversight by the bank regulators.
If the customer later wants to apply for a personal loan, the fintech app may use a data aggregator to highlight certain credit options that the customer could qualify for. While the data aggregator may rely on publicly available data, it may be able to draw insights that serve as a proxy for sensitive information. 
Exceptions to Bank CIP Requirements
Typically, a bank must obtain CIP information from the customer except with respect to credit card accounts, where banks are allowed to obtain such information “from a third-party source prior to extending credit to the customer.” (See 31 C.F.R. §1020.220(a)(2)(i)(C).) The BSA (as amended by Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act) provides financial agencies the authority to exempt financial institutions from these regulations.
In June 2025, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and FinCEN jointly issued an order that would exempt banks from needing to directly obtain TINs from customers. Instead, they could “use an alternative collection method to obtain TIN information from a third-party source rather than the customer.” In July 2025, the Federal Reserve joined the other regulators in issuing a similar exemption order. 
These agencies believe that the “importance of collecting TIN information from the customer rather than through another method for identification and verification purposes has lessened ... particularly in light of the availability of new methods that a bank can use alongside TIN information to form a reasonable belief that the bank knows the true identity of each customer.”
Relevant Policy Issues
Several questions arise over how or whether the layer of technology that sits between a fintech and a bank makes it easier or more difficult for the bank to comply with various laws. For example:
Can a bank effectively verify the identity of a potential customer when there is no in-person interaction?
Can the bank rely on the transmission of information through a fintech app?
Is the technology that connects the bank to the fintech secure enough to adequately safeguard the customers’ NPI?
Can the bank and its regulators examine the operations of the partnership?
Privacy concerns are elevated when sensitive information is used, and the bank account initiation process is one where significant NPI can be exposed. Further, data privacy regulations under GLBA only apply to “customers” and not “consumers”—this distinction is potentially important in protecting the flow of information at account opening. 
The statutory and regulatory language in the implementation of Title V of GLBA suggests that the data privacy and safeguard provisions apply only to a customer, defined as a “consumer who has a customer relationship” with the financial institution. According to Title 12, Section 1016.3, of the Code of Federal Regulation, this definition does not appear to include the consumer onboarding process. 
To the extent this is true, the potential gap in the regulatory framework could mean that a consumer who relies on fintech enterprises to enter the banking system could be exposed to vulnerabilities in the security of consumer NPI.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13168/IF13168.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13168.html
IF11141,Employer Tax Credit for Paid Family and Medical Leave,2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-02-26T13:08:08Z,Active,Resources,Anthony A. Cilluffo,"Business & Corporate Tax, Wages & Benefits, Tax Reform","Employers providing paid family and medical leave to their employees may be able to claim a tax credit under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 45S. This In Focus provides an overview of the employer credit for paid family and medical leave, its legislative history, and possible fiscal effects of the credit. For background on paid family and medical leave generally, see CRS Report R44835, Paid Family and Medical Leave in the United States, by Sarah A. Donovan.
The Employer Credit for Paid Family and Medical Leave
The employer credit for paid family and medical leave (PFML) can be claimed by employers providing paid leave (wages) to employees under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3, as amended).
The tax credit is calculated as a percentage of either the actual PFML wages paid or the insurance premiums paid on a policy that would provide PFML wages. The credit percentage is the same in either case; it is based on the ratio of PFML wages to the employee’s normal hourly wage rate. If PFML wages are 50% of the employee’s normal hourly wage, then the tax credit is for 12.5% of the qualifying amount (either actual PFML wages or insurance premiums). The tax credit rate increases proportionately up to 25% of the qualifying amount if PFML wages are 100% of the employee’s normal hourly wage. No credit is available for PFML wages below 50% of normal hourly wages, nor for PFML wages above 100% of normal hourly wages. When the credit is claimed based on insurance premiums, the credit is available regardless of whether any employees took PFML during the year.
The credit can only be claimed for PFML provided to certain lower-compensated employees. For wages paid to an employee to be credit eligible, compensation to the employee in the preceding year cannot exceed 60% of a “highly compensated employee” threshold. For 2026, that threshold is set at $96,000. To be eligible for the credit, an employer’s written policy must make PFML available to all employees who meet the income threshold and have been employed by the employer for at least one year. Employers may elect to offer PFML and claim the credit for such employees who they have employed for at least six months.
All qualifying employees who customarily work at least 20 hours per week must be provided at least two weeks of PFML for an employer to be able to claim the credit (the two-week period is proportionally adjusted for part-time employees). Further, the amount of PFML wages for which the credit is claimed cannot exceed 12 weeks per employee per year.
Tax credits cannot be claimed for leave paid by state or local governments, or for leave that is required by state or local law. Thus, this tax incentive does not reduce the cost of providing leave in jurisdictions where employers are required to do so by a state or local authority. However, the tax credit may be claimed for leave provided above any legally required amounts.
A tax credit can only be claimed for wages paid for family and medical leave. General paid leave (e.g., vacation, personal, or sick leave) that is not specifically set aside for an FMLA-qualifying purpose is not considered PFML leave for purposes of the tax credit. Family and medical leave is restricted to leave associated with (1) the birth of a child or placement of an adopted or foster child with the employee; (2) a serious health condition of the employee or the employee’s spouse, child, or parent; (3) an exigency arising out of the fact that a close relative is a member of the Armed Forces and on covered active duty; or (4) to care for a seriously ill or injured covered servicemember who is a close relative of the employee. Per IRS guidance for the tax credit, an employer’s PFML policy may allow leave to be used to care for a broader group of individuals than allowed under FMLA (such as adding grandparents) and still be a valid PFML policy for purposes of the tax credit. However, the credit may only be claimed for caregiving that qualifies for FMLA-protected leave, which is generally limited to caregiving for a child, spouse, or parent.
To claim the credit, an employer generally must have a written family and medical leave policy in effect. The policy cannot exclude certain classifications of employees. For employers, the amount of wages and salaries deducted as a business expense is reduced by the amount of credit claimed. Further, the credit cannot be claimed for wages that have been used for another tax credit (to avoid a double tax benefit). The credit is part of the general business credit, meaning that it is subject to limitations (generally, it can be used to offset up to 75% of tax liability). Unused credits from the current tax year can be carried back one year (offsetting the prior year’s tax liability) or carried forward up to 20 years to offset future tax liability. The credit is allowed against the alternative minimum tax (AMT). 
Legislative History
The employer credit for paid family and medical leave was enacted as part of P.L. 115-97. When enacted, this credit was made available for two years, 2018 and 2019. The credit was extended through 2020 in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) and through 2025 in the Taxpayer Certainty and Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2020 (Division EE of P.L. 116-260). The credit was made permanent by P.L. 119-21.
The Credit Before 2026
In addition to making the credit permanent, P.L. 119-21 made several changes to the credit that took effect on January 1, 2026. Before 2026, the credit was only available for actual PFML wages paid; it was not available for PFML insurance premiums. Starting in 2026, an employer can claim the credit based on PFML insurance premiums paid, regardless of whether any employees received PFML wages under the insurance plan during the year.
The definition of a “qualifying employee” was also changed. Before 2026, a qualifying employee had to be employed by the employer for at least one year; PFML wages paid to employees with shorter tenures did not qualify for the credit. Starting in 2026, employers may claim the credit for employees employed for at least six months, if they opt to extend PFML leave to such employees. Additionally, all employees who met the FLSA definition of an employee were required to be covered by the employer’s written PFML policy, regardless of the number of hours worked. Starting in 2026, a qualifying employee must be customarily employed for at least 20 hours per week.
The treatment of leave required by state or local law was also changed. Before 2026, any leave required by state or local law was disregarded for purposes both of calculating the credit and of determining if the policy offered at least 50% wage replacement. Employers could have potentially claimed the credit for PFML benefits provided above legally required amounts. However, since state and local PFML programs usually provide for wage replacement rates above 50%, it would not be possible for employers in those jurisdictions to offer an additional benefit that provided at least 50% wage replacement. Starting in 2026, legally required leave can be included for purposes of meeting the minimum 50% threshold, but cannot be claimed as part of the credit.
For example, suppose an employer offered a PFML benefit with 100% wage replacement. The employer is located in a state that requires a benefit with at least 60% wage replacement. Under the pre-2026 rules, this policy would not qualify for the credit since the required 60% is disregarded and the remaining 40% does not meet the minimum 50% threshold. Now, the employer would be considered to have a qualifying plan since it meets the 50% threshold; however, it could only apply the 40% voluntary portion toward calculating the tax credit.
Before 2026, the credit used a stricter standard to determine if two employers were related and therefore treated as a single employer. For example, two businesses would be related if an owner controlled more than 50% of the voting power (for corporations) or ownership interest (for partnerships). Starting in 2026, the standard was changed to generally controlling at least 80% of the voting power or ownership interest of related businesses. If two or more employers are related, then they would generally need to have a written policy providing PFML to all qualified workers at each employer to qualify for the credit. In addition to changing the affiliation standard, employers may qualify for an exception to the written policy rule starting in 2026 if they can demonstrate “a substantial and legitimate business reason for failing to provide” one. Both of these changes could increase the number of employers potentially eligible for the credit.
Credit Outreach and Awareness
The explanatory statement accompanying the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) appropriations for FY2026 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75) directs the SBA to use up to $1 million of its salaries and expenses appropriations (a total of $323 million) for outreach and awareness of the PFML tax credit. Specifically, the statement directs “SBA to educate small businesses about the availability of the [PFML] tax credit,” and that, “[i]n partnership with [SBA’s nationwide network of] district offices, the SBA shall conduct outreach which could include targeted communications, education, training, and technical assistance to the relevant parties.”
Estimated Take-up and Revenue Loss of the Credit 
Research on employer participation in the Section 45S tax credit is limited. One of the only studies is a Department of the Treasury Office of Tax Analysis report from 2023, which found that 1,230 firms claimed credits worth about $101 million in 2020. According to that study, more service-industry firms claimed the credit than goods-producing firms (810 vs. 420). Most firms claiming the credit had revenue under $25 million (62% of claimants), however most of the credits were claimed by firms with revenue over $1 billion (88% of the total).
The credit is only available for PFML wages paid to certain employees: those who meet the income, tenure, and weekly hours requirements. Therefore, the credit provides an incentive for employers to offer PFML benefits to lower-income workers, who are less likely to receive those benefits. By targeting the incentive toward employees who are less likely to receive PFML benefits, the credit might be effective at inducing employers to offer PFML benefits when they otherwise would not have. However, the credit’s targeting could reduce take-up if employers are in a situation where they need to finance PFML benefits for non-covered employees themselves, such as if the employer offers a PFML benefit to all employees.
When the credit was first enacted, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated the two-year tax credit would reduce federal revenue by $4.3 billion between FY2018 and FY2027. The one-year extension through 2020 was estimated to reduce federal revenue by an additional $2.2 billion between FY2020 and FY2029, while the subsequent extension through 2025 was estimated to reduce federal revenues by an additional $3.8 billion between FY2021 and FY2030. JCT estimated that the 10-year cost of making the credit permanent would be about $5.5 billion over FY2025-FY2034 under both the current-law and current-policy baselines.
A previous version of this In Focus was written by Molly F. Sherlock, former CRS Specialist in Public Finance.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11141/IF11141.6.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11141.html
IF10538,U.S. Intelligence Community (IC): Appointment Dates and Appointment Legal Provisions for Selected IC Leadership,2026-02-25T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T13:08:06Z,Active,Resources,"Michael E. DeVine, Michael E. DeVine",National & Military Intelligence,"This In Focus provides the names and appointment provisions for selected Intelligence Community (IC) senior officials, as reflected in U.S. Code, public laws, executive orders, and custom. Table 1 also includes the committees involved when Senate confirmation is required. As a general rule, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has jurisdiction over the confirmation of those nominated to IC leadership positions outside the Department of Defense (DOD, using the Department of War as a “secondary title” under Executive Order (E.O.) 14347, dated September 5, 2025), while the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) has jurisdiction over the confirmation of IC leadership positions inside the DOD. In some cases (e.g., the Directors of the National Security Agency and National Reconnaissance Office), nominations may be referred sequentially to the SSCI and the SASC, with the order of referral depending on the nominee’s status as a member of the Armed Forces on active duty. If the nominee is a servicemember on active duty, the nomination begins with the SASC, if not, it begins with the SSCI.Table 1. U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) Leadership: Appointment Dates and Legal Provisions
Element
Leadership Appointment Date
Appointment Legal Provisions

Non-Department of Defense (DOD)



Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard (sworn in February 12, 2025)
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) Aaron Lukas (sworn in July 24, 2025) 
50 U.S.C. §3026(c) “Not more than one of [the DNI and the Principal Deputy DNI] may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in active status”; DNI: §3023(a), PDDNI §3026(a)(1): presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (SSCI). 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Director of the CIA (DCIA) John Ratcliffe (sworn in January 23, 2025)
50 U.S.C. §3041(a)(2)(B) DNI recommends; then, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §3036(a), presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (SSCI).

Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE/OICI)
Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Jay A. Tilden (October 2023)
50 U.S.C. §3041(b)(2)(E&F) DOE Secretary needs DNI to concur with recommendation; then pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §3041(b)(1), DOE Secretary appoints.

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/I&A)
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (U/S IA) Matthew A. Kozma (confirmed July 31, 2025). 
For the position of Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis: 50 U.S.C. §3041(b)(2)(I) DHS Secretary needs DNI to concur with recommendation; then pursuant to 6 U.S.C. §121(b)(1), presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed (SSCI). 

Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, Intelligence Division (USCG/CG-2)
Assistant Commandant for Intelligence (CG-2) RDML Rebecca Ore, USCG (August 2022)
50 U.S.C. §3041(c)(2)(B) USCG Commandant appoints, after consulting with the DNI.

Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of National Security Intelligence (DEA/ONSI) 
Assistant Administrator and Chief of Intelligence Carrie N. Thompson (appointed October 2022)
Deputy Assistant Administrator and Chief of ONSI Tamara L. Weismann (December 2019)
5 U.S.C. §3151 Attorney General appoints the FBI-DEA Senior Executive Service officials.

Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Directorate of Intelligence 
Assistant Director for Intelligence Timothy Stone (December 2025)
50 U.S.C. §3041(b)(2)(G) Attorney General needs DNI to concur with recommendation; then pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §532 note and §2002 of P.L. 108-458, Attorney General appoints. 
Department of Justice, National Security Division (DOJ/NSD) (NSD is not a statutory element of the IC.)Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Eisenberg (confirmed June 5, 2025)50 U.S.C. §3041(c)(2)(C) Attorney General recommends, after consulting with the DNI; then pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §506 and S.Res. 470, 113th Congress, presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (Senate Judiciary Committee and SSCI).

Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DOS/INR)
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Donald Blome (acting February 3, 2025);
Michael J. Vance (nominated January 2026)
50 U.S.C. §3041(b)(2)(D) DOS Secretary needs DNI to concur with recommendation; then pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §2651a (c)(1), presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (SSCI).

Department of the Treasury, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (Treasury/OTFI)
Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley (confirmed July 23, 2025).
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis Peter Metzger (confirmed December 18, 2025).
Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence: 31 U.S.C. §312(a)(2)(A)-(B), presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed.
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis: 50 U.S.C. §3041(b)(2)(G) Treasury Secretary needs DNI to concur with recommendation; then pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §311(b) presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (SSCI).

Department of Defense



DOD-Wide



Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) (using Under Secretary of War for Intelligence and Security as a “secondary title” under Executive Order (E.O.) 14347, dated September 5, 2025)
Under Secretary of Defense (using Under Secretary of War as a “secondary title” under Executive Order (E.O.) 14347, dated September 5, 2025) for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) and the DNI’s Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) Bradley D. Hansell (sworn in July 25, 2025)
E.O. 12333 §1.3(d)(2) DOD Secretary recommends, after consulting with the DNI; then pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §137(a), presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (SASC). 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (D/DIA)); Lt. Gen. James Adams III, USMC (confirmed January 30, 2026)
50 U.S.C. §3041(c)(2)(A) DOD Secretary recommends after consulting with DNI; then pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §601(a), as an active duty 3-star general, presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed (SASC). 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (D/NGA) LTG Michele H. Bredenkamp, USA (sworn in November 5, 2025)
50 U.S.C. §3041(b)(2)(C) DOD Secretary needs DNI to concur; then, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §441(b) and §601(a), if civilian—presidentially appointed, if active duty military—presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed (SASC).

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (D/NRO) Christopher J. Scolese (sworn in August 5, 2019)
50 U.S.C. §3041(b)(2)(B) DOD Secretary needs DNI to concur with the recommendation to the President; and 50 U.S.C. §3602(a)(2), Director is appointment by the President, Senate confirmed; then pursuant to S.Res. 470, 113th Cong., Senate confirmed (SSCI and SASC). 

National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS)
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS) 
LTG William Hartman, USA (acting April 3, 2025);
LTG Joshua Rudd, USA (nominated January, 2026)
50 U.S.C. §3041(b)(2)(A) DOD Secretary needs DNI to concur; then, pursuant to S.Res. 470, 113th Cong., presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed (SSCI and SASC). 

Service-Level



U.S. Air Force Intelligence (AF/A2)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters USAF (AF/A2) Lt. Gen. Max “Harpo” Pearson, USAF (August 2025)
E.O. 12333 (as amended) §1.3(d)(2)—“relevant department head” is to consult with the DNI prior to these appointments; then pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §601 “Positions of importance and responsibility,” nominees are presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed (SASC).
10 U.S.C. §601(a): “The President may designate positions of importance and responsibility to carry the grade of general or admiral or lieutenant general or vice admiral.... An officer assigned to any such position has the grade specified ... by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

U.S. Army Intelligence (G2)
Deputy Chief of Staff (G-2), LTG Anthony R. Hale, USA (January 2024)


U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence (MCISRE)
Director of Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Mark A. Cunningham, USMC (June 2025); Assistant Director of Intelligence, Leila Gardner (November 2023).


U.S. Space Force Intelligence (S-2)
Deputy Chief of Space Force Operations for Intelligence, U.S. Space Force (S-2) Maj Gen Brian Sidari, USSF (July 2025)


U.S. Navy Intelligence (N2/N6)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance and Director of Naval Intelligence (N-2/N6) Steven L. Parode (acting December 2025)


Sources: CRS, based on provisions in U.S. Code; E.O. 12333; and S.Res. 470, July 7, 2014. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10538/IF10538.11.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10538.html
R48768,The Department of Education’s Proposed Rule to Define “Professional Student”: Frequently Asked Questions,2026-02-24T05:00:00Z,2026-02-25T16:37:51Z,Active,Reports,Alexandra Hegji,Postsecondary Education,"Title VIII of P.L. 119-21 (also referred to as the FY2025 budget reconciliation law) amended the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to update several aspects of the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) program, which is the single largest source of federal financial assistance to support students’ postsecondary education pursuits. 
Among other changes, P.L. 119-21 eliminates the availability of Direct PLUS Loans to graduate and professional students in future years and specifies one set of annual and aggregate loan limits for graduate students and a separate set of such limits, in higher amounts, for professional students. In general, these changes are applicable to individuals who, as of June 30, 2026, are not enrolled in a program of study for which they received a Direct Loan. Prior to P.L. 119-21, Direct Loan limits generally did not distinguish between graduate students and professional students, with the exception of certain health professions programs (e.g., Doctor of Allopathic Medicine, Doctor of Dentistry) for which the Secretary of Education invoked previous HEA authority to raise limits because such students were “engaged in specialized training requiring exceptionally high costs of education.” 
On January 30, 2026, the U.S. Department of Education published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with proposed regulatory text to implement the P.L. 119-21 amendments to the Direct Loan program. This proposed regulatory text reflects draft regulatory text on which a negotiated rulemaking committee reached consensus and includes definitions of “graduate student” and “professional student.” Under the proposed rule, “professional student” would be defined as a “student enrolled in a program of study that awards a professional degree,” and “graduate student” would be defined as a “student enrolled in a program of study that is above the baccalaureate level and awards a graduate credential (other than a professional degree).” “Professional degree” would be defined as one that
“signifies completion of the academic requirements for beginning practice” in a particular profession and “a level of professional skill beyond that normally required for a bachelor’s degree”;
is “generally at the doctoral level ... requires at least six academic years of postsecondary education coursework for completion,” at least two years of which must be postbaccalaureate level coursework;
“generally requires professional licensure to begin practice”; and
includes a four-digit program Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) Code (as assigned by the institution of higher education or determined by the Secretary of Education) in the same “intermediate group” as 11 fields identified in regulation.
The 11 fields in which a professional degree could be awarded, under the consensus definition, are (1) Pharmacy (Pharm.D.), (2) Dentistry (D.D.S. or D.M.D.), (3) Veterinary Medicine (D.V.M.), (4) Chiropractic (D.C. or D.C.M.), (5) Law (L.L.B. or J.D.), (6) Medicine (M.D.), (7) Optometry (O.D.), (8) Osteopathic Medicine (D.O.), (9) Podiatry (D.P.M., D.P., or Pod.D.), (10) Theology (M.Div., or M.H.L.), and (11) Clinical Psychology (Psy.D. or Ph.D.). Based on these definitions, numerous programs of study covering a range of fields would be excluded from the definition of “professional degree.” These include, for example, programs of study for architecture, engineering, business, rehabilitation and therapeutic professions (e.g., occupational therapy and physical therapy), and nursing. Thus, students enrolled in such programs would be considered graduate students for purposes of Direct Loan borrowing limits and would therefore have lower borrowing limits compared to individuals who are considered professional students.
Members of the public may comment on the proposed rule on or before March 2, 2026.

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48768/R48768.6.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48768.html
R46991,Economic Development Administration: An Overview of Programs and Appropriations (FY2012-FY2026),2026-02-24T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T10:53:05Z,Active,Reports,Julie M. Lawhorn,"U.S. Economy, Economic Development","The Economic Development Administration (EDA), a bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), is the only federal agency with economic development as its sole mission. The agency was established pursuant to the enactment of the Public Works and Economic Development Act (PWEDA) of 1965 (42 U.S.C. §§3121 et seq.) to assist state and local stakeholders with developing the conditions and amenities to grow businesses, create jobs, and expand investment in economically distressed areas. Changing industry dynamics, global competition, technological developments, and other events, conditions, and priorities have shifted EDA’s programs and priorities over time. During the agency’s first 30 years, its programs focused on industrial growth and emphasized public works, roads, and infrastructure. Since then, Congress has supported an expanded portfolio of EDA programs to also advance existing and emerging industry clusters, develop human capital, strengthen supply chains, expand access to capital, build new types of infrastructure, and implement regional innovation and technology strategies. Additionally, EDA has also taken on new roles in developing state and local capacity, resiliency, disaster and economic recovery, as well as economic development integration across federal agencies. 
EDA generally administers multiple programs that fund a range of construction and non-construction activities in both urban and rural areas—primarily through competitive processes that solicit community-directed proposals aligned with the agency’s investment priorities. EDA administers both flexible and targeted programs focused on innovation, technical assistance, and support for long-term, regional economic development planning. In 2025 and 2026 (to date), EDA has open funding notifications for a subset of its typical programs.
Congress approves annual appropriations for EDA programs as well as administration expenses, and occasionally approves supplemental appropriations for economic recovery purposes. Between FY2012 and FY2026, EDA’s annual appropriations (not including supplemental appropriations) averaged approximately $337 million. Annual appropriations decreased between FY2012 and FY2013, and then increased each year between FY2014 and FY2023. In FY2024, the agency received $468 million in annual appropriations—a decrease of $30 million (or 6%) from the annual appropriations provided in FY2023 (excluding supplemental appropriations). EDA funding remained flat in FY2025 at $468 million and decreased slightly to $466 million in FY2026. The Trump Administration proposed to eliminate the EDA in its FY2026 discretionary funding request.
In January 2025, the Economic Development Reauthorization Act (EDRA) of 2024 (P.L. 118-272) reauthorized the EDA. EDRA revised existing authorities, codified new and existing roles, expanded criteria for existing programs, and changed program and administrative requirements. Although EDRA implementation may not be complete as of the date of publication, EDA has initiated activities associated with several new programs authorized by the legislation. Prior to 2025, Congress last amended and extended EDA authorities in 2004.
Congress may wish to consider policies to change, expand, or focus the distribution of the agency’s funding and related program requirements. Congress may also seek to adjust the overall role and authority of EDA and its programs in the context of changing economic conditions, specific industry trends, innovation, and disaster economic recovery and resiliency funding. Congress may consider the role of broad-based and/or targeted approaches to the allocation of economic development resources. For instance, Congress has approved appropriations to address coal-impacted and nuclear closure communities as well as demands for a STEM-capable workforce and innovation-ready regions. Congress may consider reviewing the implementation, interagency coordination, and outcomes of new programs as well as the staffing resources required for such programs. For instance, in FY2023 Congress authorized two new regional programs, which received over $600 million in their first round of appropriations (i.e., the Recompete Pilot and the Tech Hubs programs), and Congress may want to conduct oversight on how those programs as well as a new Artificial Intelligence workforce program are implemented. Congress may also seek to conduct oversight on the implementation of reauthorization legislation as well as plans for administering programs that have received appropriations in recent years, including programs that have recently been discontinued by the EDA (i.e., the University Center, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms, and STEM Talent Challenge programs). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46991/R46991.30.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R46991.html
R43631,"The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Part C: Early Intervention for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities",2026-02-24T05:00:00Z,2026-02-28T13:38:01Z,Active,Reports,Kyrie E. Dragoo,"Early Childhood Care & Education, Students with Disabilities, Elementary & Secondary Education","The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a statute that authorizes grant programs that support special education services. Under the IDEA, a series of conditions are attached to the receipt of grant funds. These conditions aim to provide certain educational and procedural guarantees for students with disabilities and their families. 
The grant programs authorized under the IDEA provide federal funding for special education and early intervention services for children with disabilities (birth through 21 years old) and require, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) (i.e., specially designed instruction provided at no cost to parents that meets the needs of a child with a disability) and an accessible early intervention system (a statewide system to provide and coordinate early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families). The IDEA also outlines and requires the use of procedural safeguards pertaining to the identification, evaluation, and placement of students in special education services that are intended to protect the rights of parents and children with disabilities. These procedures include parental rights to resolve disputes through a mediation process, and present and resolve complaints through a due process complaint procedure and through state complaint procedures.
Originally enacted in 1975, the IDEA has been the subject of numerous reauthorizations to extend services and rights to children with disabilities. The 1986 reauthorization of the IDEA created a grants program that would provide early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families, what is now known as Part C, Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities. The most recent reauthorization of the IDEA was P.L. 108-446, enacted in 2004. 
Funding for Part B of the IDEA, Assistance for Education of all Children with Disabilities, the largest part of the act, is permanently authorized. Funding for Part C, Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, and Part D, National Activities, was authorized through FY2011. Funding for Part C and Part D programs continues to be authorized through annual appropriations.
Part C of the IDEA authorizes a grant program to aid each state in implementing a system of early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families. In 2023, approximately 463,000 infants and toddlers with disabilities received early intervention services under Part C of the IDEA. Annual funding to each state for Part C programs is based upon the state’s proportion of the number of children, birth through two years old, in the general population. In FY2025, approximately $15.4 billion was appropriated for the IDEA, $540 million of which was appropriated for Part C, representing 3.5% of total IDEA funding. 
Part C requires each state to implement a public awareness program and “child find” activities to identify infants and toddlers who may be eligible for early intervention services. To be eligible for early intervention services under Part C of the IDEA, an infant or toddler must meet his or her state’s definition of an infant or toddler with a disability or developmental delay. Once a child is determined to be an infant or toddler with a disability, the early intervention system is to provide an assessment of the needs of both the child and the child’s family. Early intervention coordinators are then to either help the family coordinate services for their child through outside service providers or directly provide early intervention services to the child and the child’s family, depending on the design of the early intervention system in the state. Before a child receiving Part C services turns three years old, the child is to be assessed to determine whether he or she will continue receiving IDEA services, and, if so, whether the child will remain in an extended Part C service arrangement or transition into a special education preschool program funded by Section 619 of Part B of the IDEA.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R43631/R43631.15.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R43631.html
IG10049,U.S. Shale Gas and Federal Lands,2026-02-24T05:00:00Z,2026-02-25T16:07:54Z,Active,Infographics,"Michael Ratner, Lexie Ryan","Natural Resources Policy, Energy Policy, Fossil Energy, Federal Land Management","/
U.S. Shale Gas and Onshore Federal Lands
The United States has been the largest producer of natural gas since the advent of shale gas development in the early 2000s. Shale gas production has mostly taken place on private lands, with the largest contribution coming from the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. Of the top five states for natural gas production and revenue generation from federal lands, only New Mexico is also among the top five producers of gas overall. Given that most of the rise in U.S. production has been on private lands, federal revenues from natural gas have not increased as rapidly as gas production on nonfederal lands.
Most shale formations are not on federal lands
Onshore federal lands
Current shale play
Prospective shale play
Includes onshore surface acres of federal land administered by federal land management agencies (Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, National Park Service) in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. This excludes Department of Defense, Bureau of Reclamation, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers lands and other lands administered by other federal agencies. Excludes Tribal lands. 
62%
Shale gas production is 81% of overall U.S. gross production
Plays that overlap are at dierent geologic depths
2024 U.S. Total
Top 5 States % Total US
Top 5 States
Rest of U.S. onshore
Total Gross Natural Gas Production*1
43,564 bcf
69%
TX 12,918
PA 7,422
LA 3,609
NM 3,625
WV 3,418
Rest of US 12,580
Natural Gas Production on Federal Lands1
4,160 bcf
96% 
bcf
NM 2,297
WY 973
CO 456
UT 145
ND 136 
US 153
Production on Federal Lands as % of Total Gross Production, by State 10%3
WY 72%
NM 64%
UT 45%
CO 25%
MO 18%
US <1%
U.S. Federal Natural Gas Revenue1
$1.4 billion
96%
$ in millions
NM $876
WY $270
CO $72
UT $57
ND $48
US $49
Western states account for most natural gas production and revenues on federal lands. Data are from 2024, the latest year of available data for all categories. Data from these four graphs are for natural gas from all sources, including shale and non-shale.
bcf = billion cubic feet
*Gross production = Full well-stream volume, including all natural gas plant liquids and all nonhydrocarbon gases, but excluding lease condensate. Also includes amounts delivered as royalty payments or consumed in field operations.
Notes:  1. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals (eia.gov).  2. Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR), Query Natural Resources Revenue Data (revenuedata.doi.gov). Excludes Tribal lands.  3. In 2024, production of natural gas on federal lands accounted for 10% of total U.S. gross natural gas production. Map geography created by CRS using data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Geological Survey, and ESRI.  Information as of February 23, 2026. Prepared by Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy; Lexie Ryan, Analyst in Energy Policy; Mari Lee, Visual Information Specialist; and Molly Cox, Geospatial Information Systems Analyst.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10049/IG10049.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10049.html
IF12902,Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act (SAVE America Act) and Federal Voter Registration Policy and Law,2026-02-24T05:00:00Z,2026-02-26T16:38:10Z,Active,Resources,"L. Paige Whitaker, Sarah J. Eckman, L. Paige Whitaker, R. Sam Garrett","Voting, Elections & Redistricting","This CRS In Focus provides an overview of existing voter registration policy and law in federal elections and discusses how the voter registration and voter identification (ID) provisions in certain recent legislation would affect the status quo. As discussed in the following sections, current federal law prohibits aliens from voting in federal elections and requires states to follow various registration requirements for federal elections. There is no existing federal voter ID requirement. Most recently as of this writing, the House passed (218-213) the Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act, also known as the SAVE America Act, as an amendment to S. 1383 on February 11, 2026. The legislation would, among other provisions, require documented proof of U.S. citizenship for registration, and specified voter ID to cast a ballot.
Current Federal Law and the Voter Registration Process
As explained below, current federal law addresses voter eligibility, as well as certain elements of voter registration and voter registration list maintenance for federal elections. States and territories are responsible for conducting and administering voter registration. States are primarily responsible for voter registration and election administration. Election jurisdictions (typically counties) rely on information from registrants and from state and federal sources to verify eligibility. 
Voter Eligibility and Voter Registration Verification for Federal Elections 
Section 611 of Title 18, U.S. Code, generally prohibits “any alien to vote” in an election for candidates for “the office of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner,” with limited exceptions, including if (1) each natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is or was a U.S. citizen (whether by birth or naturalization); (2) the alien permanently resided in the United States prior to attaining the age of 16; or (3) the alien reasonably believed at the time of voting in violation of such subsection that he or she was a U.S. citizen. Further, 18 U.S.C. §611 provides an exception to the prohibition when an alien is authorized to vote by state or local law for nonfederal candidates or issues and the ballot is designed so that the alien has the opportunity to vote solely for nonfederal candidates or issues.
In addition, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA, 52 U.S.C. ch. 205) establishes certain requirements for voter registration applications for federal elections, which include a statement specifying eligibility requirements, including citizenship; an attestation that the applicant meets each requirement; and the applicant’s signature under penalty of perjury. Under the NVRA, states “may only require the minimum amount of information necessary” to prevent duplicate voter registrations and ensure that election officials can assess the applicant’s eligibility and administer voter registration and election processes. In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., the Supreme Court held that the NVRA’s requirement that states accept the federally created National Mail Voter Registration Form for registering voters in federal elections preempted a state law requiring documentary proof of citizenship for registering to vote in federal elections. 
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, 52 U.S.C. ch. 209) also prohibits states from accepting or processing voter registration applications for federal elections unless the applicant provides certain identifying information, namely a current and valid driver’s license number; if the applicant does not have a driver’s license, the applicant may provide the last four digits of his or her Social Security number, and if the applicant has neither, the state shall assign the applicant a unique identification number for voter registration purposes. Election officials may use various methods, generally governed by state law, for verifying voter registration information, some of which involve federal data. HAVA requires a state’s department of motor vehicles (DMV) to enter into information-sharing agreements with state election officials and with the Social Security Administration to verify voter applicant information. Election officials may also use the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS's) Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system to help verify voter registration applicants’ citizenship status.
States and localities may have separate eligibility requirements for nonfederal elections. In Arizona, for example, state law requires documentary proof of citizenship for registering to vote in nonfederal elections. 
Voter Registration List Maintenance and Voter Removal for Federal Elections
The NVRA specifies reasons why and the circumstances under which a state may remove names of voters from federal election voter rolls. Reasons specified under NVRA for voter removal include change of residence, death, or (depending on state law) ineligibility due to mental incapacity or criminal conviction.
The SAVE America Act (119th Congress)
In amending the NVRA, the version of the SAVE America Act passed by the House as an amendment to S. 1383 on February 11, 2026, would establish additional requirements for states, particularly concerning providing and verifying voter ID during the registration and voting processes. The legislation would create documentation requirements at the time of registration and would establish additional state voter list maintenance requirements for federal elections. It appears that the relevant requirements would apply to all 50 states. 
The House-passed bill would amend the NVRA to require documentary proof of citizenship when registering to vote in federal elections. As specified in Section 2, the acceptable documentary proof of citizenship for voter registration would include an ID that complies with the REAL ID Act of 2005 that indicates U.S. citizenship; a valid U.S. passport; a military ID together with a U.S. military service record indicating that the applicant’s birthplace was in the United States; a government-issued photo ID indicating the applicant’s birthplace was in the United States; or another government-issued photo ID that does not indicate birthplace or citizenship together with another specified document. For federal voter registration applicants without such documentation, the bill would require states to establish a process whereby applicants could submit other documentation and sign an attestation under penalty of perjury that the applicant is a U.S. citizen and eligible to vote in federal elections. In addition, the bill would require states to establish a process to accept registrations for individuals who otherwise meet the bill’s ID criteria but whose names differ on their acceptable IDs.
In addition, the House-passed legislation would amend the NVRA to require states to remove names of individuals from the official voter rolls for federal office whenever the state receives “documentation or verified information that a registrant is not a United States citizen.” The bill would require states, within 30 days of enactment, to submit voter lists to the USCIS/DHS SAVE system to verify citizenship for voter eligibility. As indicated previously, states currently may use the system to verify voter eligibility.
The House-passed bill generally specifies effective dates upon enactment. The bill also would require the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to issue guidance on implementation for Section 2 within 10 days of enactment. 
Section 3 of the House-passed bill would require individuals to present “valid photo identification” to vote in federal elections. As specified in Section 3, such ID would include a valid state-issued driver’s license containing a photograph and an expiration date; a valid state-issued nondriver ID containing a photograph and an expiration date, issued by the state DMV; a valid U.S. passport; a valid military ID; or a valid tribal ID that includes a photograph and an expiration date. Section 3 also would require states to notify voters of the ID requirements at the time of registration, including for online registration.
Additional Legislative Background
The version of the SAVE America Act passed by the House as an amendment to S. 1383 on February 11, 2026, contains some provisions that are similar to parts of the language found in previous versions of the Safeguard American Voter Eligibility (SAVE) Act, the SAVE America Act, or the Make Elections Great Again (MEGA) Act. The SAVE Act was introduced at the beginning of the 119th Congress as H.R. 22 by Representative Roy and as S. 128 by Senator Lee. The House passed (220-208) H.R. 22 on April 10, 2025. S. 128 has not substantially advanced beyond introduction. The similarly titled SAVE America Act (H.R. 7296) was introduced on January 30, 2026, by Representative Roy in the House. Senator Lee introduced a companion Senate measure, also titled the SAVE America Act, on January 29, 2026 (S. 3752). (This In Focus does not discuss S. 1383 as passed by the Senate by unanimous consent on December 18, 2025. That bill did not address elections. S. 1383 is serving as a legislative vehicle for the House-passed version of the SAVE America Act.)
The MEGA legislation (H.R. 7300) was introduced by Representative Steil on January 30, 2026. The Committee on House Administration held a hearing on the MEGA bill on February 10, 2026. 
Additional CRS Resources
The following CRS products provide further information on the topics discussed in this In Focus:
CRS Report R45030, Federal Role in Voter Registration: The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and Subsequent Developments (2025).
CRS Report R48735, Federal Voter Eligibility and Voter Registration: Overview and Issues for Congress (2025).
CRS Report R46943, Voter Registration Records and List Maintenance for Federal Elections.
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10175, Supreme Court Rules Ohio Voter Roll Law Comports with National Voter Registration Act (2018).
CRS In Focus IF12742, Federal Criminal Laws Prohibiting Unlawful Voting (2024).
CRS Report R46949, The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA): Overview and Ongoing Role in Election Administration Policy (2023). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12902/IF12902.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12902.html
IF12265,China Primer: Human Rights,2026-02-24T05:00:00Z,2026-02-26T16:23:05Z,Active,Resources,"Thomas Lum, Michael A. Weber, Caitlin Campbell",East Asia & Pacific,"Overview 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China)’s party-state is an “authoritarian regime” that “has become increasingly repressive in recent years,” according to the nongovernmental human rights organization Freedom House. Some analysts argue China has moved in a totalitarian direction. The party-state is dominated by Xi Jinping, who became Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary in 2012 and began a norm-breaking third five-year term in 2022. Xi has attempted to enforce greater ideological and cultural conformity and tighter control over society, aided by digital technologies. PRC leaders long have asserted that human rights standards vary by country, that economic development is a key human right, and that a country’s human rights policies are an “internal affair.” 
Amid apparent deepening repression in China, U.S. policymakers have implemented measures intended to deter PRC human rights abuses, prevent U.S. complicity in such abuses, and/or hold perpetrators accountable. Since 2020, U.S. actions have focused, in particular, on responding to reports of mass detentions and forced labor of ethnic Uyghur and other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and elsewhere in China. The U.S. Department of State first assessed in January 2021 that PRC policies and practices in the XUAR constitute crimes against humanity and genocide, and reaffirmed this assessment most recently in its annual human rights reports covering 2024 (the department has not yet released human rights reports covering 2025). In the PRC’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), measures adopted by both central PRC and local HKSAR authorities have eroded Hong Kong residents’ civil rights and stifled the city’s civic culture and media. See CRS In Focus IF12070, China Primer: Hong Kong. 
Selected Human Rights Issues
Under Xi’s leadership, China has further restricted and suppressed civil society, religious and ethnic minority groups, human rights defenders, speech, and media. The party-state has closed much of the space that previously had existed for limited social activism. The PRC oversees one of the most extensive internet censorship systems in the world, which blocks major foreign news and social media sites, censors domestic social media platforms, and bans foreign messaging apps. 
According to the U.S. Department of State, arbitrary arrest, detention, and enforced disappearance are “systemic” in China, and police target religious leaders and adherents, rights lawyers and activists, independent journalists, and dissidents and their family members. As of March 2025, the nonprofit Dui Hua Foundation identified 7,157 active cases of political prisoners in China. 
Civil and Political Rights
The PRC constitution provides for many civil and political rights, including the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and demonstration. Other provisions in China’s constitution and laws, however, circumscribe or place conditions on these freedoms, and the state routinely restricts these freedoms in practice. 
Popular protests in China are common and often focused on local and/or economic grievances. China Dissent Monitor, a Freedom House initiative that tracks protest activities in China, identified 5,014 instances of dissent in 2025. Protests in China generally are quashed before becoming widespread, highly publicized demonstrations. One exception was in 2022, when people across the country protested COVID-19 lockdown conditions and the government’s suppression of information and speech. Following the protests, the CPC cracked down on the budding protest movement, but also moved quickly to end lockdown measures.
Rights of Religious and Ethnic Minorities
The Department of State has consistently designated China as a “Country of Particular Concern” for “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292, as amended). In 2016, Xi launched a policy known as “Sinicization,” by which the CPC requires religious and ethnic minorities to “assimilate” or conform to majority Han Chinese culture as defined by the CPC and adhere to “core socialist values.” The PRC government has mandated, for example, that schools and other institutions use Mandarin rather than minority languages. Since 2018, regulations have required religious organizations to obtain government permission for nearly every aspect of their operations, submit to greater state supervision, and register clergy in a national database. The government enacted regulations in 2022 to restrict internet use and online worship among religious groups. The government has continued to arrest and to persecute practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual exercise. 
Tibetans: Human rights issues in Tibetan areas of China include religious and political repression, forced assimilation, and the incarceration of hundreds of political prisoners. Since 2018, the PRC government has required Tibetan monks and nuns to undergo education in CPC ideology and demonstrate “political reliability.” Authorities have arbitrarily detained and imprisoned hundreds of Tibetan writers, intellectuals, and cultural figures on broad charges of “separatism.” PRC assimilation policies in Tibetan areas have included resettling and urbanizing nomads and farmers, policies that include elements of forced labor, according to some reports. 
Uyghurs: Between 2017 and 2019, XUAR authorities arbitrarily detained more than 1 million ethnic Uyghur and other Muslims in “vocational education and training” facilities, also known as “reeducation” centers. Detainees generally were not accused of crimes, but rather were held on the basis of past religious, cultural, scholarly, social, and online activities, as well as foreign travel, that the government deemed “extremist,” “pre-criminal,” or potentially terrorist. Detainees were compelled to renounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs as a condition for their release. Treatment in the centers reportedly included food deprivation, psychological pressure, sexual abuse, forced sterilization, medical neglect, torture, and forced labor. Since 2019, the XUAR government appears to have released some detainees, prosecuted many as criminals, and sent others to work in factories. In 2026, UN human rights experts said that PRC policies to relocate millions of other Uyghurs through labor transfer programs are in many cases “so severe that they may amount to forcible transfer and/or enslavement as a crime against humanity.” 
Women’s Rights
The protection of women’s rights in China is uneven, and authorities sometimes harass and arbitrarily detain women’s rights activists. Facing a looming demographic crisis, the CPC in the past decade has pivoted away from its “one child” policy, which limited women’s reproductive choices to suppress population growth. It is now implementing pro-natalist policies, some of which exacerbate existing challenges faced by women, such as domestic violence, discrimination, and economic inequality, according to some observers. PRC authorities reportedly continue to conduct forced abortions and sterilizations of Uyghur women. 
Selected U.S. Policy Tools
Foreign Assistance: Congressional appropriations have funded efforts to promote human rights, the rule of law, civil society, and internet freedom in China, as well as Tibet-related programs that promote sustainable development, environmental conservation, and the preservation of indigenous culture. These have included programs supported by relevant agencies as well as by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private nonprofit organization funded primarily by congressional appropriations. As part of its 2025 foreign aid review, the Trump Administration reportedly terminated numerous China-related human rights programs. The Administration also sought to withhold appropriated funding for NED.
International Media: Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA), funded by the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), have provided external sources of news and opinion to audiences in China and PRC exiles around the world. Pursuant to a March 2025 executive order targeting “unnecessary” elements of the federal bureaucracy, the Trump Administration has reduced USAGM’s staffing and operations, resulting in China-related VOA and RFA service disruptions and reductions. 
Targeted Legislation: Congress has enacted laws to respond to human rights developments and related issues in Tibet and Xinjiang specifically. U.S. policy toward Tibet is largely guided by the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (Title VI, Subtitle B of P.L. 107-228, as amended). Other Tibet-related legislation includes the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-330), the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 (Division FF, Title III, Subtitle E of P.L. 116-260), and the Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act (P.L. 118-70). Xinjiang-focused legislation includes the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-145) and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA, P.L. 117-78). Some provisions of broader enacted bills also have addressed human rights issues in China (e.g., Section 7401 of P.L. 118-31). 
Targeted Sanctions and Export Restrictions: The executive branch has made use of broad authorities enacted by Congress, including the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328; implemented through Executive Order 13818), to impose economic sanctions and visa restrictions against some PRC individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses. The United States also has imposed restrictions on the sale or transfer of U.S. goods and services to certain PRC entities for human rights reasons, pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act (Title XVII, Subtitle B of P.L. 115-232).
Forced Labor Import Restrictions: Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1307) forbids the importation of products into the United States that were produced with forced labor. UFLPA in part creates a rebuttable presumption that Xinjiang-related imports are made with forced labor.
Congressional Considerations
The CPC generally appears to view U.S. human rights advocacy as a challenge to its hold on power, and some analysts contend U.S. capacity to deter PRC human rights violations is limited. Others argue that sanctions and international pressure can help moderate China’s practices. Congress may debate the overarching goals of U.S. human rights policy and the differing possible benefits, costs, risks, and likelihoods of success of these goals, as well as assess the effectiveness of U.S. actions to date. 
Relative to other Administrations, the second Trump Administration has downgraded human rights as a U.S. foreign policy concern and has taken actions (some noted above) that appear to have curtailed certain long-standing U.S. efforts to promote human rights in China. The Administration’s immigration policies (e.g., concerning refugees) also may have implications for victims of human rights abuses in China seeking protection in the United States. As with prior Administrations, Congress may conduct oversight over executive branch actions and consider whether to accept, reject, or seek to modify executive branch policy approaches. The consolidated FY2026 appropriations bill enacted in February 2026 (P.L. 119-75) appropriates resources for certain activities to promote human rights in China that the Trump Administration has curtailed or sought to curtail.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12265/IF12265.6.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12265.html
IF10256,U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Economic Relations,2026-02-24T05:00:00Z,2026-02-27T10:38:14Z,Active,Resources,Karen M. Sutter,East Asia & Pacific,"Taiwan is a top U.S. trade partner and a key link in global technology supply chains. Taiwan’s economy is highly dependent on global trade; exports account for about 70% of its gross domestic product (GDP). Taiwan’s policies are seeking to generate growth in emerging technologies and reduce its dependence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) by diversifying trade and investment. Central to these efforts are U.S. and Taiwan government actions to deepen commercial ties. Issues before Congress include the January 2026 U.S.-Taiwan tariff and investment deals and provisions for Taiwan to invest $500 billion in the United States, and bills aimed at preventing double taxation and promoting U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Taiwan. Also see CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF12481, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues; and CRS Infographic IG10073, Taiwan’s Role in Global Semiconductor Supply Chains. 
U.S.-Taiwan Commercial Ties
Taiwan is the United States’ 5th-largest merchandise trading partner ($256.1 billion in total goods trade), 9th-largest export market ($54.7 billion), and 5th-largest source of imports ($201.4 billion), according to 2025 U.S. data (and when the European Union is considered as one trading partner). Taiwan’s trade deficit with the United States was $146.7 billion in 2025. U.S. agricultural exports to Taiwan in 2025 were $4.3 billion. In 2024, U.S. service exports to Taiwan were $13.7 billion, and Taiwan’s services exports to the United States were $13.2 billion.
Taiwan’s exports to the United States have been growing as firms have shifted some production and finished goods exports away from the PRC and with strong U.S. demand for semiconductors and electronics. Between 2018 and 2025, Taiwan’s goods exports to the United States grew by 341% while U.S. exports to Taiwan grew by 75%. In 2025, Taiwan’s U.S. exports rose by 73% while U.S. exports to Taiwan rose by 29% over 2024 levels. (Figure 1.) 
Figure 1. U.S.–Taiwan Goods Trade 2001-2025
/
Source: CRS, with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Notes: In 2025, Taiwan firms received $268.3 billion in U.S. export orders globally, which includes Taiwan firms’ PRC-based production.
In 2024, U.S. direct investment stock in Taiwan was $20.1 billion, and Taiwan’s direct investment stock in the United States was $14.8 billion, according to BEA. (Data do not include investments made through Hong Kong and offshore tax havens.) Taiwan is a top holder of foreign exchange reserves, with $604.5 billion in reserves as of January 2026. Taiwan is the 10th-largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasuries with $310.6 billion in holdings as of December 2025. 
Taiwan’s Economy
Population: 23.4 million people.
2025 nominal GDP: $884.4 billion (1.5% agriculture, 39.8% industry, 58.7% services); 22nd largest global economy. Taiwan’s economy grew by 3.7% in 2025 due mostly to strong global demand for chips and electronics.
Unemployment Rate: 3.4% (11.6% ages 20-24; 5.9% ages 25-29).
Main industries: Electronics, semiconductors, information technology, petrochemicals, textiles, steel, machinery, cement, food, autos, and pharmaceuticals. 
Semiconductors: About 90% of global advanced chips are made in Taiwan. Taiwan firms are also active in design; R&D; materials; and assembly, packaging, and testing. 
Energy Mix (consumption): Oil and gas (47%); coal (31%); renewables (13%); and nuclear (5%). Taiwan relies on imports for almost 98% of its energy needs.
Competitiveness: Switzerland’s International Institute for Management Development Business School ranks Taiwan as the world’s sixth most competitive economy. Taiwan is coping with stagnant wages; technical talent gaps; an aging population; and land, power, and water shortages. The government has taken some steps to phase out nuclear power, but alternatives at this time are limited. The Taiwan government’s “5+2” plan is boosting targeted industries—advanced manufacturing, biotechnology, renewable energy, recycling, and defense.

Efforts to Strengthen Economic Ties
The United States and Taiwan have undertaken several efforts to address market barriers and bolster economic ties:
In 2026, Taiwan joined as a non-signatory the U.S.-led Pax Silica effort on secure technology supply chains.
In 2022, the United States and Taiwan launched a “U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade,” in parallel to the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, which does not include Taiwan. The initiative covers issues including trade facilitation, regulatory practices, anti-corruption, technical standards, and nonmarket practices. The two sides reached their first agreement in 2023.
In 2021, the United States and Taiwan resumed talks, last held in 2016, under a 1994 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Taiwan’s barriers in agriculture led the U.S. government to suspend TIFA talks between 2007 and 2013. Other U.S. concerns about Taiwan’s market barriers include those in digital services, biotech, medical devices, and energy. 
In 2020, the two sides launched a U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, which meets annually to discuss supply chains; PRC coercion; digital trade; research; energy; and tax issues. In 2024, the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. said it would invest with Taiwan in some overseas projects.
Since 2020, the Treasury Department has listed Taiwan in its currency monitoring report for macroeconomic policies and currency practices of concern, citing Taiwan’s large trade account surplus and foreign exchange reserves. Taiwan operates a managed floating exchange regime and intervenes to maintain “stability.” 
U.S. policy encourages Taiwan’s membership in global economic organizations for which statehood is not required. Taiwan is a member of the World Trade Organization, the Asian Development Bank, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which refer to it as an economy or a separate customs territory, not a state. 
Cross-Strait Economic Ties
The PRC (including Hong Kong) is Taiwan’s largest investment and trading partner with $263.7 billion in trade in 2025. Taiwan data shows that Taiwan’s goods exports to the PRC as a share of Taiwan’s total exports were 23% in 2025, down from 42.3% in 2021. An estimated 177,000 Taiwan citizens worked in the PRC in 2022, down from 242,000 in 2020.
Since 2016, Taiwan authorities have sought to diversify away from the PRC and address the risks of PRC investment in Taiwan’s infrastructure (e.g., shipping, finance, and media). This follows the 2008-2016 period when the Kuomintang party negotiated direct trade, transportation, and postal links and a 2010 economic cooperation deal with the PRC. Beijing has pressured Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party over its opposition to the PRC’s “one country, two systems” framework for cross-Strait relations. The PRC uses incentives to attract Taiwan investment and immigration and pressures its government and firms to constrain Taiwan’s diversification efforts. Since 2023, the PRC has promoted economic integration of its Fujian province with Taiwan. In April 2023, the PRC opened a review of Taiwan’s “trade barriers” that lasted through Taiwan’s 2024 election cycle. Ahead of the vote, in December 2023, Beijing revoked tariff preferences for 12 petrochemical products. In June 2024, the PRC reinstated tariffs on 134 products from Taiwan. 
Taiwan authorities’ efforts to curtail industry’s role in the PRC’s semiconductor sector have had limited success. Taiwan engineers and firms have partnered with the PRC government to develop PRC capabilities. The PRC has used firms in Taiwan to make chips, recruit engineers, and steal technology. In 2022, Taiwan amended its National Security Act to criminalize economic espionage and require approval to use trade secrets and critical technologies outside of Taiwan.

Issues Facing Congress
Tax. Congress has sought to address the complexities posed by the unofficial status of U.S. relations with Taiwan as it seeks to deepen economic ties. In 2025, H.R. 33 passed the House (423-1). H.R. 33/S. 199 includes the U.S.-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act and the U.S.-Taiwan Tax Agreement Authorization Act. It aims to avoid double taxation and encourage Taiwan investment in the United States. It would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by providing special rules for the taxation of certain Taiwan residents with income from sources in the United States. It would authorize the President to negotiate a tax agreement 
with Taiwan and require a Senate vote on an agreement. 
U.S. Tariffs and Investment. In January 2026, the United States and Taiwan reached a deal for a 15% U.S. tariff rate on Taiwan, reducing a 32% tariff that President Trump imposed in 2025 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq). The 2025 action and the 2026 deal both except electronics, semiconductors, and goods subject to Section 232 actions. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that the President cannot use IEEPA to impose tariffs. In response, President Trump imposed a 10% global tariff for 150 days under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132). Taiwan officials have said that, despite U.S. tariff policy changes, they would like to keep the deal. The deal exempts generic drugs, aircraft parts, and certain natural resources from the 15% IEEPA tariff. It caps at 15% Section 232 tariffs on auto parts, timber, lumber, and wood derivative products. It creates duty-free and lower-tariff-rate quotas for semiconductor imports for firms that invest in U.S. capacity. Taiwan is to cut some tariffs on U.S. goods and cooperate on export controls, investment, infrastructure, and supply chain security. Taiwan also is to invest $250 billion in the U.S. semiconductor sector; provide $250 billion in credit guarantees to support other U.S. investment; and establish U.S. industrial parks. Since 2020, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. (TSMC) has invested in three fabrication plants in Arizona. In 2025, it committed to invest an additional $100 billion. 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Some Members say they support a comprehensive FTA with Taiwan. An FTA could lower Taiwan’s barriers to U.S. agriculture and services, increase Taiwan’s investment in the United States, and encourage countries to pursue similar deals with Taiwan. Taiwan has signed FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore and an investment deal with Canada. Its efforts to seek trade deals with the European Union, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom prompted the PRC to exert pressure on those countries. In 2021, Beijing imposed an embargo on Lithuania for enhancing Taiwan ties. In 2021, Taiwan and the PRC applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership; Beijing has pressed countries not to admit Taiwan.
Trade Negotiations. Congress enacted P.L. 118-13, which bars the executive branch from negotiating trade deals without congressional consent. The law asserts congressional ex-post approval of the May 2023 trade agreement with Taiwan, sets conditions for its entry into force, and requires consultation for future agreements.
Energy. Taiwan’s transition away from nuclear power and reliance on imported LNG with limited stockpiling capacity may leave it vulnerable to supply disruptions, such as a PRC blockade. S. 2722 would promote U.S. LNG exports to Taiwan and the development of LNG storage in Taiwan.
Export Controls. U.S. export control actions since 2020 restrict any firm that uses U.S. technology from making certain chips for some PRC firms. Many PRC firms are not restricted, however, and some have reportedly used proxies to work around controls and make chips at TSMC: In 2021, Pythium procured chips for China’s hypersonic missile program; in 2024, Huawei procured its 910 Ascend chips.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10256/IF10256.35.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10256.html
R48861,History of the Federal Communications Commission’s Spectrum Auction Authority: 1993-2025,2026-02-23T05:00:00Z,2026-03-06T15:37:52Z,Active,Reports,"Jill C. Gallagher, Patricia Moloney Figliola","Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Spectrum Policy, Telecommunications & Internet Policy","Radio spectrum (“spectrum”) is the continuum of frequencies used to provide wireless services, such as radio broadcasting, mobile communications, and satellite services. Certain frequency bands are allocated for specific services; this means that not all frequencies are available to all users and for all uses. Thus, spectrum is often described as a finite and valuable resource. In 1934, Congress created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and charged it with managing and allocating nonfederal use of spectrum. It grants licenses to nonfederal entities to use specific frequencies and sets terms and conditions to serve the public interest, avoid interference among users, and promote the most efficient use of spectrum. 
In 1993, Congress authorized the FCC to use competitive bidding (i.e., auctions) to grant licenses for rights to use specific frequencies for commercial wireless communications. That general spectrum auction authority was originally due to expire on September 30, 1998, but Congress extended it several times. In 2012, Congress granted a long-term (10-year) extension, as part of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), which was set to expire on September 30, 2022. Four additional extensions were made during the 117th Congress that allowed the FCC to conduct spectrum auction activities through March 9, 2023, when the FCC’s spectrum auction authority expired. Loss of spectrum auction authority meant that the FCC could not auction any new spectrum bands to meet existing and future demands for wireless communications, accommodate new technologies that often lead to economic growth, improve spectral efficiencies, or advance U.S. government priorities through spectrum allocation. Loss of spectrum auction authority also meant loss of proceeds from such auctions. 
During the approximately two years that the general auction authority remained lapsed, Congress debated a number of options to reinstate it, including stand-alone bills that would extend the FCC’s auction authority and comprehensive spectrum packages that would identify bands for future auctions, enhance interagency planning and coordination on spectrum, designate funding from spectrum auction proceeds to specific programs (e.g., improvements to 911 centers, investment in spectrum-sharing research and development), and extend the FCC’s auction authority. During the 117th Congress, three bills and one Senate amendment would have extended the FCC’s auction authority (H.R. 7783, H.R. 7624, S. 4117, and S.Amdt. 6585). None became law. In the 118th Congress, four bills would have extended or reinstated the authority (H.R. 1108, H.R. 3345, H.R. 3565, and S. 650). None became law. 
The FCC’s spectrum auction authority was reinstated during the 119th Congress in P.L. 119-21, the FY2025 reconciliation law (commonly referred to as “the One Big Beautiful Bill Act”). The law, enacted July 4, 2025, includes several spectrum provisions. Specifically, Title IV, Section 40002, reinstates the FCC’s spectrum auction authority for nine years, through September 30, 2034. It also directs the auction of 800 megahertz of spectrum for commercial wireless use and sets timelines for spectrum auctions, designed to meet budgetary goals agreed to in the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2025 (H.Con.Res. 14). The auctions are expected to generate over $85 billion in offsetting receipts from FY2025 to FY2034, according to the Congressional Budget Office. 
Much of the spectrum in the range targeted in P.L. 119-21 is already allocated for specific uses and assigned to specific users. Reallocation of services from one band to another, as called for in the act, is often complex, and it takes time to assess costs to incumbent users and impacts on services. Those factors mean that the FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, which manages and allocates spectrum for federal use, may face challenges in identifying 800 megahertz of spectrum for reallocation and auction in the timelines specified in the act. Congress may be interested in monitoring the spectrum auctions outlined in P.L. 119-21, including the bands selected for reallocation; interagency coordination on reallocation; impacts on incumbent users, including federal agency users; costs of reallocation; and proceeds generated. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48861/R48861.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48861.html
R48859,Mexico: Background and Key Issues in U.S. Relations,2026-02-23T05:00:00Z,2026-02-26T09:37:57Z,Active,Reports,"Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Clare Ribando Seelke","Latin America, Caribbean & Canada","Mexico, the 10th most populous country and 13th largest economy in the world, is bound to the United States by geography and deep economic, cultural, and historical ties. In addition to sharing a nearly 2,000-mile land border, Mexico was the top U.S. trade partner in goods in 2025 and the second-largest oil supplier, behind Canada. Drug cartels, six of which the Trump Administration has designated terrorist organizations, have endangered the lives of people, including U.S. citizens, in parts of Mexico. U.S.-Mexico ties and issues, including addressing the production and trafficking of fentanyl from Mexico, have prompted legislative activity and oversight interest in the 119th Congress.
Mexico has undergone significant change under successive National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) presidencies. The party’s founder, former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024), concentrated power in the presidency and focused government efforts on raising wages and increasing social programs. Observers criticized López Obrador for trying to weaken autonomous institutions and the judiciary and for increasing military involvement in public security.
In October 2024, President Claudia Sheinbaum took office for a six-year term. Sheinbaum, a former head of government of Mexico City (2018-2023), is Mexico’s first female president and a close ally of López Obrador. She has benefitted from MORENA and its allies’ two-thirds majorities in both chambers of the legislature seated in September 2024. In her first year, Sheinbaum shepherded 22 constitutional reforms through congress, many of which were proposed by López Obrador. Although President Sheinbaum has continued aspects of López Obrador’s policies, she has adopted a more aggressive public security policy and appears to have partially aligned her trade policy with that of the United States by backing legislation that imposed tariffs on imports from the People’s Republic of China and other countries with which Mexico does not have a free-trade agreement. Some observers are concerned that MORENA has increased control of the federal, state, and local governments just over a decade since its founding as a party.
U.S. Policy
U.S.-Mexican relations have been tested as the Sheinbaum administration has sought to maintain Mexico’s sovereignty while addressing U.S. concerns on various issues. Since February 2025, President Trump has used the imposition or threat of tariffs to spur the Mexican government into action on migration control, drug trafficking, and Rio Grande water deliveries to the United States. President Trump has repeatedly threatened unilateral U.S. military intervention in Mexico to combat drug cartels, which could derail cooperation. A successful joint review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)—through which most Mexican exports entered the United States duty-free in 2024—is a top priority for Mexico. 
The 119th Congress has considered legislation and conducted oversight on varied aspects of U.S. relations with Mexico through hearings, delegations, and letters. The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 119-60) requires several reports, plans, and strategies to track Mexico’s efforts against illicit synthetic drugs and to improve joint training and security cooperation. The National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Division F of the FY2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 119-75), conditions the provision of non-fentanyl-related U.S. foreign assistance on Mexico’s water deliveries to the United States. The Senate Intelligence Committee’s reported version of the FY2026 Intelligence Authorization Act (S. 2342) would require U.S. intelligence agencies to develop plans to improve their antidrug collaboration with the Mexican government. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported legislation (S. 1780) that would require a strategy for U.S. security assistance to Mexico and annual reporting on its implementation, as well as legislation (S. 860) that would impose targeted sanctions related to the production and trafficking of synthetic opioids. Congress has a consultative role in the 2026 USMCA joint review and may evaluate whether potential revisions to USMCA require congressional approval. Congress also may consider legislation to shape U.S. trade policy and/or to authorize or prohibit certain tariffs or other trade measures. Regarding Administration threats for military action in Mexico, Congress could authorize or prohibit such activity, appropriate or restrict funding for such policies, and conduct oversight through hearings, inspector general reports, letters, or other measures.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48859/R48859.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48859.html
R48444,The Reconciliation Process: Frequently Asked Questions,2026-02-23T05:00:00Z,2026-02-25T17:37:52Z,Active,Reports,Tori Gorman,,"When Congress adopts a budget resolution, it establishes budgetary goals for the years covered in the resolution. In some cases, it is necessary to change existing revenue, direct spending, or debt limit laws to achieve those goals. One method Congress may use to consider such legislation is through reconciliation—an expedited process made available under Section 310 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (the Budget Act). A distinctive feature of reconciliation is that debate time is limited in the Senate, which means cloture (and its requisite three-fifths majority vote) is not necessary to reach a vote on final passage. 
Reconciliation is a two-phase process. In the first phase, the House and Senate adopt a budget resolution containing reconciliation directives to one or more committees (also referred to as reconciliation instructions). There are three types of reconciliation directives: to change laws providing for spending, to change laws providing for revenues, and to change the public debt limit. 
In the second phase, the named committees respond with recommended changes in law within their jurisdictions consistent with their directives in the budget resolution. No more than one reconciliation bill may include provisions in response to each type of instruction in one budget resolution, for a maximum of three reconciliation bills. In practice, Congress has generally combined the reconciliation submissions from every committee into a single, omnibus reconciliation measure.
Once a reconciliation bill is on a chamber’s calendar, the House and Senate consider it under the rules and expedited procedures enumerated in the Budget Act. Any differences between the House and Senate are resolved via conference committee or an exchange of amendments between the two chambers, or one chamber may adopt the reconciliation legislation of the other without any changes. 
The contents of a reconciliation bill are constrained by several rules, most notably Section 313 of the Budget Act, known as the Senate’s Byrd rule. This provision prohibits the inclusion of matter in a reconciliation bill that is extraneous to the purpose of reconciliation and a committee’s directives. The Byrd rule establishes six tests used to identify extraneous matter. A point of order made under the Byrd rule is surgical: If sustained, the offending matter is stricken from the text, but the rest of the measure remains before the Senate. 
In the Senate, a reconciliation bill enjoys certain privileges unavailable to most other bills and resolutions: It is not required to lie over one day before it can be considered, and the motion to proceed is not debatable. Pursuant to the Budget Act, debate on a reconciliation bill is limited to 20 hours (10 hours for a conference report), which means cloture is not required to reach a final vote. Once all debate time has expired in the Senate, consideration may continue during a period referred to as “vote-arama.” In the House, consideration is typically structured by a special rule reported from the House Rules Committee, which sets the terms for debate and may permit specified amendments to be offered from the floor. 
Since 1980, Congress has considered 29 reconciliation bills and enacted 24—four were vetoed and one did not pass the Senate. Of the 24 bills enacted into law, the length of time between adoption of a congressional budget resolution and enactment of the resulting reconciliation bill ranged from 28 to 385 days, with an average of 148 days.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48444/R48444.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48444.html
R47578,The Federal Communications Commission’s Spectrum Auction Authority: History and Options for Reinstatement,2026-02-23T05:00:00Z,2026-03-04T11:09:05Z,Archived,Reports,"Patricia Moloney Figliola, Jill C. Gallagher, Jill C. Gallagher",Telecommunications & Internet Policy,"Radio spectrum (“spectrum”) is the continuum of frequencies used to provide wireless services, such as radio broadcasting, mobile communications, and satellite services. It is a finite and valuable resource. In 1934, Congress created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent agency, to manage and allocate nonfederal use of spectrum. It grants licenses to nonfederal entities to use specific frequencies and sets terms and conditions to serve the public interest, avoid interference among users, and promote the most efficient use of spectrum. 
In 1993, Congress authorized the FCC to use competitive bidding (i.e., auctions) to grant licenses for rights to use specific frequencies for commercial wireless communications. That general auction authority was originally due to expire on September 30, 1998, but Congress has extended it several times. The most recent long-term extension, granted as part of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), was set to expire on September 30, 2022. Four additional extensions were made during the 117th Congress that allowed the FCC to conduct spectrum auction activities through March 9, 2023, when the FCC’s spectrum auction authority expired. It has not been reinstated.
Supporters of reinstating the FCC’s auction authority see auctions as an effective means to manage spectrum access and use. During the 117th Congress, three bills and one Senate Amendment (H.R. 7783, H.R. 7624, S. 4117, and S.Amdt. 6585) would have extended the FCC’s general auction authority, the FCC’s authority to auction specific bands, or a combination of both. None became law. These bills and the amendment, however, highlight different methods for addressing the FCC’s spectrum auction authority that the 118th Congress could consider if it seeks to reinstate the FCC’s general spectrum auction authority or its auction authority for specific bands.
In the House of Representatives, Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers, chairwoman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, has introduced three bills to reinstate the FCC’s spectrum auction authority: H.R. 1108, introduced on February 21, 2023, would have reinstated the FCC’s auction authority through May 19, 2023 (passed by the House on February 27, 2023); H.R. 3345, introduced on May 15, 2023, would have reinstated the FCC’s auction authority through June 30, 2023; and H.R. 3565, introduced on May 22, 2023, would, among other spectrum provisions, reinstate the FCC’s spectrum auction authority through September 30, 2026. In the Senate, Senator Mike Rounds has introduced one bill to reinstate the FCC’s spectrum auction authority: S. 650, introduced on March 2, 2023, would reinstate the FCC’s auction authority through September 30, 2023. Members are currently debating the duration of a possible reinstatement of the FCC’s spectrum auction authority and the best legislative vehicle for it. Possible options include
passing a stand-alone bill to provide a short-term (e.g., months) reinstatement of the FCC’s auction authority;
passing a stand-alone bill to provide a mid-term (e.g., one- to two-year) reinstatement of the FCC’s auction authority;
passing a stand-alone bill to provide a long-term (e.g., five or more years) or permanent reinstatement of the FCC’s auction authority;
passing comprehensive spectrum legislation that contains multiple provisions, including a mid- or long-term reinstatement of the FCC’s auction authority;
reinstating the auction authority in FY2023 appropriations legislation; or
passing legislation that identifies specific bands and grants the FCC authority to auction those bands only.
Many Members support reinstating the FCC’s auction authority. Some see the support for the reinstatement as an opportunity to build consensus around a comprehensive spectrum bill that packages multiple provisions—the identification of additional spectrum bands for auction, allocation of spectrum auction revenues, improvement of interagency coordination of spectrum management—in addition to a mid- or long-term extension of the FCC auction authority. Each option—a stand-alone extension or comprehensive legislation—comes with its own policy benefits and challenges.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47578/R47578.10.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R47578.html
R47037,Geographic Cost of Living Differences: In Brief,2026-02-23T05:00:00Z,2026-02-24T15:37:54Z,Active,Reports,"Lida R. Weinstock, Lida R. Weinstock",U.S. Economy,"Cost of living is generally important to the standard of living of individuals across the United States. Changes to cost of living over time measure how quickly prices increase in a given area compared to past prices in that same area. However, such measures (such as inflation measures for specific areas produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) do not express how cost of living differs from place to place. Geographic cost of living differences may be important for certain public policies, particularly when not accounting for these differences cause distortionary effects. The main publicly available source of data for geographic cost of living differences is the relative price parity index produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This series measures differences in cost of living between and within states compared to a national average price level index. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47037/R47037.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R47037.html
R45277,Health Savings Accounts (HSAs),2026-02-23T05:00:00Z,2026-02-24T16:37:55Z,Active,Reports,"Ryan J. Rosso, Alice Y. Choi","Individual Tax, Private Health Insurance","A health savings account (HSA) is a tax-advantaged account that individuals can use to save and pay for unreimbursed medical expenses (e.g., deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, and services not covered by insurance). Although eligibility to contribute to an HSA is associated with enrollment in a high-deductible health plan (HDHP), an HSA is a trust/custodial account and is not health insurance.
HSAs have several tax advantages: individual contributions are tax deductible unless made through a cafeteria plan; employer contributions and individual contributions made through a cafeteria plan are excluded from taxable income and from Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance taxes; account earnings are tax exempt; and withdrawals are not taxed if used for qualified medical expenses.
Individuals may establish and contribute to an HSA for each month that they are covered under an HSA-qualified HDHP, or a bronze or catastrophic plan available through an individual exchange. Individuals also must not have disqualifying coverage, and cannot be claimed as a dependent on another person’s tax return. The account is tied to the individual and account holders retain access to their accounts (and can keep using HSA funds) if they change employers, insurers, or subsequently become ineligible to contribute to the HSA. 
To be considered an HSA-qualified HDHP, a health plan must meet several tests: it must have a deductible above a certain minimum threshold, it must limit total annual out-of-pocket expenditures for covered benefits to no more than a certain maximum threshold, and it can cover only preventive care services, certain insulin products, and telehealth and other remote care before the deductible is met. In 2026, HSA-qualified HDHPs must have a minimum deductible of $1,700 for self-only coverage and $3,400 for family coverage and an annual limit on out-of-pocket expenditures for covered benefits that does not exceed $8,500 and $17,000, respectively. These amounts are adjusted for inflation (rounded to the nearest $50) annually.
If an individual is eligible to contribute to an HSA any time during a given tax year, the total amount that individual may contribute to his or her HSA is capped. Generally, the maximum amount an individual may contribute to his or her HSA in a tax year is based on the months during the year that he or she was considered HSA eligible; the type of coverage the individual had during those months (self-only or family); and the individual’s age (those aged 55 or older are allowed additional catch-up contributions). For 2026, the maximum annual contribution limit amounts are $4,400 and $8,750, respectively. For those aged 55 or older, the maximum annual amount an individual can contribute to his or her HSA is increased by $1,000. Individuals may have lower contribution limits if they were not HSA eligible for the entire year.
Individuals may make tax-free HSA withdrawals to pay for the qualified medical expenses for the account holder, the account holder’s spouse, or the account holder’s dependents. Qualified medical expenses include the costs of diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease and the costs for treatments affecting any part of the body; the amounts paid for transportation to receive medical care; and qualified long-term care services. HSA qualified medical expenses also include menstrual care products, and over-the-counter medications and drugs (without a prescription). Health insurance premiums generally are not considered qualifying medical expenses (except in limited circumstances). Withdrawals not used to pay for qualified medical expenses must be included in an individual’s gross income when determining federal income taxes and generally are subject to a 20% penalty. Individuals do not need to be enrolled in an HSA-eligible plan to make withdrawals from an HSA.
For tax year 2021, the IRS reported that 12.1 million tax returns (7.5%) included HSAs with employer contributions and 2 million tax returns (1.2% of filed tax returns) included HSAs with individual contributions. Employer contributions include both direct employer contributions and employee pre-tax contributions through a cafeteria plan. Individual contributions are those made by or on behalf of an individual, excluding employer involvement. These categories are not mutually exclusive, as a single tax return may report both types of contributions. Furthermore, these data are at the tax return level (not individual) and do not account for individuals who were eligible to contribute to an HSA in 2021 but did not do so.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45277/R45277.11.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R45277.html
LSB11398,Supreme Court Rules Against Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),2026-02-23T05:00:00Z,2026-02-25T11:52:48Z,Active,Posts,Christopher T. Zirpoli,"Import Policy, Judicial Branch, Separation of Powers, Tariffs, U.S. Trade Policy, Jurisprudence, Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)","On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., two appeals concerning tariffs President Trump had imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that IEEPA does not give the President authority to impose tariffs. The Court thus affirmed a lower court decision that invalidated two sets of IEEPA tariffs: one set of tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) based on declared emergencies concerning illicit drugs, and another set of tariffs on most other U.S. imports based on a declared emergency concerning the U.S. trade deficit. Six other Justices wrote opinions in concurrence or dissent.
This Legal Sidebar explains the context and background for the Supreme Court’s decision, the opinions of the Court and individual Justices, and potential ramifications of the Court’s decision for current and future U.S. tariff actions.
Background on Tariff Authorities, IEEPA, and Lower Court Decisions
Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to impose import tariffs and regulate foreign commerce. Congress, in turn, has enacted several laws authorizing the executive branch to impose tariffs in various circumstances. The executive branch has utilized some of these laws in recent administrations, imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum, automobiles and parts, and other products under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862) and tariffs on many imports from the PRC under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411), for example. 
IEEPA (50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706) gives the President extensive economic authorities to address certain emergencies declared under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651). IEEPA provides authority to “regulate” or “prohibit” imports of certain property, although it does not specifically authorize tariffs. IEEPA authorizes the President to act upon declaring a national emergency “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” Until 2025, no President had invoked IEEPA as legal authority for imposing tariffs.
On February 1, 2025, President Donald Trump invoked IEEPA to announce tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the PRC, declaring emergencies largely concerning illicit drugs (the trafficking tariffs). On April 2, 2025, President Trump declared a separate emergency concerning “a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships . . . as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits.” Based on this declaration, President Trump invoked IEEPA to announce tariffs of at least 10% on imports from almost all U.S. trading partners and higher, country-specific “reciprocal tariffs” for many countries (collectively, the worldwide tariffs). President Trump subsequently modified the trafficking tariffs and the worldwide tariffs several times. The President also cited IEEPA when imposing tariffs on imports from Brazil, India, and various other imports based on emergency declarations. 
Several parties filed lawsuits challenging the trafficking and worldwide tariffs, contending that IEEPA did not give the President authority to impose tariffs. In September 2025, the Supreme Court chose to review a pair of lower court decisions holding IEEPA did not authorize the trafficking or worldwide tariffs: the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. and the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump.
Although the lower courts reached broadly similar decisions on the merits in V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources, they differed as to which court had jurisdiction. In V.O.S. Selections, the Federal Circuit and the trial court, the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), both held that lawsuits challenging tariffs under IEEPA must be filed in the CIT due to its exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits “aris[ing] out of [a] law of the United States providing for . . . tariffs.” In Learning Resources, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that, since IEEPA did not authorize tariffs, these lawsuits did not fall within the CIT’s jurisdiction. Both the V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources decisions were stayed (i.e., paused) by the lower courts, allowing the tariffs to remain in effect until the Supreme Court’s decision. A separate Legal Sidebar provides analysis of the lower court opinions.
The Supreme Court’s Decision and Opinion
On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Learning Resources and V.O.S. Selections. The Court held that IEEPA’s phrase “regulate . . . importation” does not authorize the President to impose tariffs, considering both the meaning of the word “regulate” as well as statutory context. The Court’s opinion was authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. As discussed below, additional sections of Justice Roberts’s opinion were joined only by two other Justices and thus do not constitute the opinion of the Court.
The Court analyzed the meaning of the word “regulate.” Referring to a Black’s Law Dictionary definition stating the word means to “fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws,” the Court observed that the word “captures much of what a government does on a day-to-day basis” but that it “is not usually thought to include[] taxation.” The Court also considered the usage of the term “regulate” in other federal statutes, pointing out that “the Government cannot identify any statute in which the power to regulate includes the power to tax.” The Court thus concluded: “When Congress addresses both the power to regulate and the power to tax, it does so separately and expressly.”
Turning to statutory context, the Court observed that the pertinent clause in IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B), includes eight verbs besides “regulate,” authorizing the President to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit . . . importation or exportation.” Given the specificity of this list, the Court inferred that Congress would have expressly included tariffs had it intended to authorize them. Moreover, the Court reasoned, construing the word “regulate” broadly enough to include tariffs would render the other verbs in this list duplicative. 
The Court also observed that the other eight verbs in 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) do not authorize raising revenue but allow “action a President might take in sanctioning foreign actors or controlling domestic actors engaged in foreign commerce,” consistent with how past Presidents have used IEEPA. The Court surmised that these “neighboring words” indicated “regulate” did not include means to raise revenue. Rejecting the government’s argument that IEEPA’s authority to “prohibit . . . importation” made it natural to read “regulate” as including tariffs—which the government characterized as a lesser authority than outright prohibition—the Court reasoned that tariffs “are different in kind, not degree, from the other authorities in IEEPA.” 
As another contextual point, the Court observed that IEEPA allows the President to regulate “exportation” as well as “importation.” The Export Clause of the Constitution prohibits Congress from imposing taxes or tariffs on “Articles exported from any State.” The Court declined to interpret “regulate” to include tariffs partly because, it reasoned, that interpretation would render IEEPA unconstitutional to the extent it would authorize export tariffs.
The Court was not persuaded by the government’s arguments concerning a trio of earlier judicial decisions. The Court declined to extend the holding of Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., a 1976 Supreme Court decision holding that the term “adjust . . . imports” in Section 232 allowed the President to impose monetary exactions at least including license fees. Unlike IEEPA, the Learning Resources Court reasoned, Section 232 gives the President authority to “take such action . . . as he deems necessary” to adjust imports and refers to a “duty or other import restriction” in another subsection, indicating that the phrase “adjust . . . imports” in that statute includes monetary exactions. In short, the Court considered the language of IEEPA to be less clear and less specific than that of Section 232.
The Court was also not swayed by the government’s reliance on United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., a 1975 circuit court decision holding that the phrase “regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA’s predecessor statute authorized the President to impose some kinds of tariffs. Although Congress enacted IEEPA two years after Yoshida, the Court reasoned that a “single, expressly limited opinion from a specialized intermediate appellate court” did not render that definition sufficiently “well settled” to presume that Congress incorporated it into IEEPA. (Another Legal Sidebar provides analysis of Yoshida.)
Finally, the Court distinguished Dames & Moore v. Regan, in which the Supreme Court upheld several actions President Jimmy Carter took after declaring an emergency under IEEPA regarding the Iran hostage crisis. The Dames & Moore Court held that the text of IEEPA did not authorize the President’s suspension of legal claims by U.S. persons against the government of Iran but nonetheless upheld the action, reasoning that the statute “indicat[ed] congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action” and reinforced the President’s own powers under Article II of the Constitution. The Learning Resources Court characterized Dames & Moore as an “exceedingly narrow” case presenting “distinct legal and factual issues” not applicable to tariffs.
Based on its holding that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision in V.O.S. Selections. The Court vacated the district court’s decision in Learning Resources on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the CIT rather than the district court had original jurisdiction over lawsuits challenging the IEEPA tariffs. 
Additional Opinions and Debate Over Major Questions Doctrine
Seven Justices wrote opinions in Learning Resources. Of these seven opinions, only those parts of the Chief Justice’s opinion summarized above were joined by a majority of Justices and thus constitute the opinion of the Court. The remainder of the opinions do not constitute binding precedent but provide additional reasoning.
Three main opinions were endorsed in full by three Justices each: the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Gorsuch and Barrett), a concurring opinion by Justice Kagan (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson), and a dissenting opinion by Justice Kavanaugh (joined by Justices Alito and Thomas). The six Justices supporting the Court’s decision split over whether to invoke a principle known as the major questions doctrine to decide the case. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the major questions doctrine precluded the use of IEEPA to impose tariffs, while Justice Kagan argued it was unnecessary to invoke this doctrine. Justice Kavanaugh interpreted IEEPA to authorize the imposition of tariffs and therefore dissented. In addition, Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson penned solo opinions.
As the Court has explained in prior opinions, the major questions doctrine is a principle requiring executive agencies to have “clear congressional authorization” when they take action of such extraordinary “history and breadth” or “economic and political significance” that there is “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to confer such authority.” The Court has indicated that cases are more likely to present major-question concerns where an agency “discover[s] in a long-extant statute an unheralded power representing a transformative expansion in its regulatory authority.” The Supreme Court has previously applied the major questions doctrine to overrule certain executive agency actions including, for instance, executive action to cancel student loans based on statutory authority to “waive or modify” loan requirements.
In Learning Resources, Justice Roberts applied the major questions doctrine to conclude that IEEPA did not authorize tariffs. He reasoned that the doctrine “appl[ies] with particular force where, as here, the purported delegation involves the core congressional power of the purse.” Pointing to several statutes including Section 232 and Section 301, Justice Roberts observed that “[w]hen Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits.” By contrast, he observed, the government claimed that IEEPA “give[s] the President power to unilaterally impose unbounded tariffs.” Justice Roberts found it “telling” that IEEPA had never been used to impose tariffs from its enactment in 1977 until 2025. Comparing the present case to the Court’s prior major questions decisions, he opined that “the economic and political consequences of the IEEPA tariffs are astonishing” and “dwarf those of other major questions cases.”
Justice Kagan, in concurrence, wrote that it was unnecessary to invoke “the so-called major-questions doctrine” because she thought “the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation amply support” the Court’s decision. She reasoned, for example, that “the meaning of regulate,’ both in common parlance and as Congress uses the word, does not encompass taxing.” In addition, Justice Kagan emphasized that none of IEEPA’s several other authorities permits the President to raise revenue. She also pointed to “Congress’s consistent practice in delegating tariff power” via statutes that specifically refer to tariffs and set limits on the President’s discretion, unlike IEEPA. Justice Kagan concluded that “no major-questions thumb on the interpretive scales” was needed to resolve the case. In addition to joining Justice Kagan’s opinion, Justice Jackson authored a solo opinion arguing that the legislative history of IEEPA, particularly Senate and House Reports, demonstrate that “Congress intended to delegate . . . the power to freeze and control foreign property transactions,” not to impose tariffs. 
Justice Kavanaugh, in dissent, argued that “[s]tatutory text, history, and precedent” showed that tariffs may be used to “regulate . . . importation” under IEEPA. He opined that tariffs fall within the plain meaning of “regulate,” as they can be a means to “control” imports, “adjust [imports] by rule,” or “subject [imports] to governing principles or laws.” He also observed that “[s]ince the Founding, the Constitution’s assignment to Congress of the broad power to regulate’ foreign commerce has been understood to include tariffs on foreign imports.” Further, Justice Kavanaugh argued, since IEEPA was enacted shortly after the Yoshida and Algonquin decisions, Congress and others at that time would have understood IEEPA to authorize tariffs. 
In light of these considerations, Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that IEEPA provided clear authorization for tariffs, precluding application of the major questions doctrine. He also contended that the major questions doctrine should not be extended to “a foreign affairs statute” like IEEPA, noting the Court has previously suggested that Congress may delegate broader authority to the President in foreign than domestic matters. In the portion of his opinion joined only by Justices Gorsuch and Barrett, Justice Roberts disagreed with making a foreign affairs exception in this case, reasoning that, notwithstanding the President’s inherent constitutional powers over some aspects of foreign affairs, the constitutional power to impose tariffs, at least in peacetime, belongs to Congress alone.
As well as joining Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent, Justice Thomas authored a solo dissent arguing that IEEPA’s use as a tariff authority does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Thomas characterized the nondelegation doctrine as “forbid[ding] Congress from delegating core legislative power,” meaning “the power to make substantive rules setting the conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property.” Justice Thomas argued that the tariff is not such a “core” power, partly because importation of goods is a privilege rather than a “core private right.” Thus, he argued, the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to delegations of authority concerning tariffs. Justice Gorsuch, in his solo concurrence, criticized this argument as irrelevant to whether IEEPA did in fact delegate tariff authority to the President. Justice Gorsuch also observed that the Court’s past nondelegation cases, including those involving tariffs, did not hinge on a distinction between “core” powers and other powers Article I grants to Congress.
The two associate Justices who joined Justice Roberts’s opinion in full expressed differing views as to the nature of the major questions doctrine. Justice Gorsuch characterized it as “a clear-statement rule,” arguing that it reflects a “substantive norm about delegated powers.” In his view, the doctrine “safeguards” Congress’s lawmaking power “against executive encroachment.” Unless courts require a clear statement of delegated authority in cases presenting major questions, he warned, delegations to the executive branch “may prove almost impossible for Congress to retrieve.” Justice Barrett, in her solo concurrence, described the major questions doctrine instead as “an ordinary application of textualism” that seeks “to ascertain the most natural reading of a statute” in light of its context. She expressed concern that Justice Gorsuch’s “substantive” formulation of the doctrine could lead judges to adopt “inferior” interpretations of law that substitute their own preferences for those of Congress.
Although the portions of Justice Roberts’s opinion concerning the major questions doctrine did not command a majority of the Court, the Justices’ opinions may illuminate how they are likely to approach this doctrine in future cases.
Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Decision and Options for Congress
Congress holds the constitutional power over tariffs. As the Court observed in Learning Resources, “Regardless of what [certain precedents] might mean for the President’s inherent wartime authority, all agree that the President enjoys no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime.” Thus, the President may impose tariffs only pursuant to delegated authority. While the Court decided that IEEPA does not provide such authority, it did not address tariffs the President may impose under other statutory authorities, including Section 232 and Section 301. Congress may take stock of these statutory authorities and consider whether they are consistent with congressional tariff policy and international commitments. Some bills introduced in the 119th Congress would require enactment into law of a joint resolution of approval for the President to impose tariffs, or, alternatively, would add or repeal specific authorities. 
Following the Court’s decision, President Trump proclaimed new tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 122), a statute which, like IEEPA, had not been used to impose tariffs before the second Trump Administration. Section 122 gives the President authority to impose a “temporary” import surcharge of up to 150 days, with a maximum rate of 15%, when necessary “to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits” and certain other “fundamental international payments problems.” Like the emergency declaration underlying the worldwide tariffs under IEEPA, the Section 122 proclamation cited issues including “large and persistent trade deficits.”  
As discussed in another CRS report, it is unclear whether Section 122 authorizes tariffs in response to trade deficits, as sources regarding the meaning of “balance-of-payments deficits” from economists and the U.S. government, statutory context, and legislative history indicate that this term is not synonymous with trade deficits. In a brief submitted to the Federal Circuit in V.O.S. Selections, the government averred that Section 122 “does [not] have any obvious application here, where the concerns the President identified in declaring an emergency arise from trade deficits, which are conceptually distinct from balance-of-payments deficits.” It is uncertain how much deference courts might afford to the President’s determination that the predicate to invoke Section 122 has been satisfied.
While President Trump responded to the Learning Resources ruling by ending various tariff actions based on IEEPA, he also issued a proclamation continuing his use of IEEPA to suspend the de minimis exemption in 19 U.S.C. § 1321, which generally authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to allow the duty-free importation of up to $800 of certain merchandise per person, per day. One lawsuit filed in the CIT in May 2025 (Axle of Dearborn, Inc. v. Department of Commerce) has already challenged this use of IEEPA. Axle of Dearborn claims that IEEPA does not allow the President to override the de minimis provisions of Section 1321 and that exceptions to the de minimis exemption must be made through notice-and-comment rulemaking. In July 2025, the CIT stayed the lawsuit pending “final resolution” of V.O.S. Selections. In addition to Axle of Dearborn’s other arguments, the CIT may now be faced with considering whether the Supreme Court’s holding in V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources forecloses the use of IEEPA to suspend de minimis importation in Axle of Dearborn or other cases.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Learning Resources did not address potential refunds of tariffs the government collected pursuant to IEEPA. Justice Kavanaugh observed in his dissent that “[t]he United States may be required to refund billions of dollars to importers who paid the IEEPA tariffs, even though some importers may have already passed on costs to consumers or others.” A separate CRS publication, CRS In Focus IF13150, Potential Refunds of Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), analyzes various means by which importers might obtain such refunds, as well as options for Congress regarding refunds.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11398/LSB11398.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11398.html
IF13025,The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): FY2026 Appropriations,2026-02-23T05:00:00Z,2026-02-25T16:52:48Z,Active,Resources,"Anna E. Normand, Anna E. Normand","Wildlife & Ecosystems, Interior & Environment Appropriations, Earth Sciences & Natural Hazards, Water Resource Management","Background
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI) provides scientific information to support the management of water, energy, mineral, biological, and land resources and to help communities prepare for natural hazards. The USGS also collects long-term data to understand and report on the Earth’s geologic and ecosystem processes, using satellite imagery, mapping, and ground-based instruments. The USGS is not a regulatory agency and does not manage federal lands.
Congress created the USGS in 1879 in the USGS Organic Act (43 U.S.C. §31). The USGS Organic Act defined the initial scope of the USGS:
[The Director of the USGS] shall have the direction of the United States Geological Survey, and the classification of the public lands and examination of the geological structure, mineral resources, and products of the national domain.
Since then, Congress has expanded the USGS’s statutory authority to “such examinations outside the national domain where determined by the Secretary [of the Interior] to be in the national interest.” Under this authority and additional congressional direction, the USGS now also conducts activities related to water resources, ecosystems, and natural hazards. The USGS conducts scientific activities under interdisciplinary mission areas, and each mission area has its own budget line (Table 1). The USGS also has budget lines for Science Support (administrative activities and information) and Facilities. Congress typically appropriates funds for the USGS under its Surveys, Investigations, and Research Account in annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations acts.
FY2026 Appropriations
P.L. 119-74 appropriated $1.420 billion to the USGS for FY2026 under Division C (Figure 1). This FY2026 annual appropriation was $528.9 million above President Trump’s FY2026 budget request of $891.6 million and $29.8 million below the regular FY2025 enacted level of $1.450 billion.
As described in the accompanying explanatory statement, P.L. 119-74 generally funded USGS activities that the budget request proposed to cut. For example, the President requested eliminating funding for the Ecosystems Mission Area, but P.L. 119-74 funded the mission area (Table 1). The budget request also proposed creating a new mission area—Geology, Energy, and Minerals—by merging some geologic data and mapping activities (portions of the Core Science Systems Mission Area) and offshore energy and minerals activities with traditional energy and mineral resources program activities. Instead, P.L. 119-74 funded these activities under the existing mission area and program structure. 
Figure 1. USGS Enacted Annual Appropriations, FY2018-FY2026
($ in millions)
/
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on enacted appropriations laws. 
Notes: Inflation-adjusted amounts in FY2025 dollars using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Table 3.9.4. Price Indexes for Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment.”
Table 1. USGS Funding: FY2025 and FY2026 Enacted Annual Appropriations and FY2026 Budget Request
(nominal $, in millions)
Mission Area or Budget Line
FY2025 Enacted
FY2026 Request
FY2026 Enacted

Ecosystems
299.4
—
294.7

Energy and Mineral Resources
101.1
137.1
104.7

Natural Hazards
198.6
136.5
200.1

Water Resources
288.8
223.8
288.8

Special Initiatives
—
—
2.3

Core Science Systems
273.2
165.0
276.1

Science Support
105.0
80.0
73.7

Facilities
184.1
149.1
180.1

Total
1,450.2
891.6
1,420.4

Sources: Explanatory statement for P.L. 119-74, Division C. 
Note: The table presents FY2026 request funding under the current mission area structure and does not reflect the funding for the reorganized mission area structure proposed in the FY2026 President’s budget request. Table figures may not add to totals shown due to rounding.
Mission Area and Budget Line Funding
The following sections further describe the FY2025 enacted appropriations, FY2026 budget request, and FY2026 enacted appropriations for selected activities under mission areas and budget lines, as described by the explanatory statement. Also, Congress included three congressionally directed spending items for the USGS, totaling $2.3 million, under “Special Initiatives.”
Ecosystems Mission Area. The Ecosystems Mission Area conducts biological and ecological science to inform natural resource management decisions through its five programs and its Climate Adaptation Science Centers (CASCs) and cooperative research units (CRUs). Science activities conducted under the mission area include research related to invasive species, wildlife management, ecosystem restoration, land use, climate adaptation, and environmental contaminants, among others. The President requested eliminating funding for the mission area, except for invasive carp activities to be conducted in the Water Resources Mission Area. Instead, P.L. 119-74 provided $294.7 million for the mission area, $4.7 million less than in FY2025. The explanatory statement specified that some programs and CASCs are to receive increased funding compared with FY2025 levels; others are to receive decreased funding, and CRUs are to receive level funding.
Energy and Mineral Resources Mission Area. The budget request proposed creation of a new mission area: Geology, Energy, and Minerals. The request stated that the proposed mission area would support several executive orders, including Executive Orders 14154 and 14241, “Unleashing American Energy” and “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production,” respectively. Instead, P.L. 119-74 continued to fund scientific research and assessments for energy and minerals and analysis and forecasts of critical mineral supply chains under the existing Energy and Mineral Resources Mission Area. The explanatory statement stipulated funding the Mineral Resources program at the same level as FY2025 annual appropriations. The law increased funding for the Energy Resources program by $3.6 million, and the explanatory statement specified that $10.0 million of the program’s funding be set aside for certain geothermal activities.  
Natural Hazards Mission Area
The Natural Hazards Mission Area provides scientific information to help communities prepare for natural hazards, such as earthquakes, landslides, volcanoes, and coastal hazards. The budget request sought to reduce appropriations for the mission area by 31% compared with FY2025; however, the FY2026 explanatory statement directed $200.1 million for the mission area, an increase of $1.5 million over FY2025. Some hazards programs received the same appropriations as FY2025, although others received reduced or additional funding. For instance, funding for Coastal and Marine Hazards and Resources program was reduced by $0.9 million compared with FY2025. The Earthquake Hazards program increased by $2.3 million compared with FY2025, and the explanatory statement specified that $34.9 million of the program’s funding was for continued development and expansion of the ShakeAlert earthquake early warning system in the West Coast. 
Water Resources Mission Area
The Water Resources Mission Area monitors water resources and researches water processes. The FY2026 budget request proposed a 22% reduction for the mission area compared with FY2025. The explanatory statement directed that funding for the mission area remain at $288.8 million, with $66.5 million for Cooperative Matching Funds, which support cost-shared activities across the mission area. Funding for the National Water Quality Program decreased compared with FY2025. Funding increased for the Groundwater and Streamflow Information Program, with portions of the funding for Federal Priority Streamgages ($31.0 million) and Next Generation Water Observing Systems ($30.0 million). The Water Resources Research Act Program, a federal-state partnership that conducts water research, also received increased funding, although the President proposed not to fund the program.  
Core Science Systems Mission Area. The Core Science Systems mission area generally focuses on mapping activities and supports science across agency activities. The budget request proposed a 40% decrease from FY2025 funding of $273.2 million; however, the explanatory statement directed an increase of $2.9 million for the mission area. The National Land Imaging Program and National Geospatial Program received increased funding compared to FY2025, with level funding for the remaining programs. Within National Land Imaging, Landsat satellite operations received level funding ($95.3 million). The explanatory statement reiterated language in S.Rept. 119-46, which directed NASA and the USGS to maintain the current superspectral three-satellite constellation architecture for Landsat Next, with a launch target by 2031. The budget request had directed the agencies “to identify a more affordable architecture for the next Landsat mission.”  
Science Support and Facilities. The Science Support budget line includes funding to provide business services and information technology management to operate USGS programs. The explanatory statement included a reduction of $31.3 million for the budget line compared to FY2025 funding of $105.0 million. The reduction was mostly under Administration and Management. The budget request noted recent consolidation of roles under the activity. The Facilities budget line includes funding for rent, facility operations and maintenance, and deferred maintenance and repair. The explanatory statement directed $180.1 million to the budget line, a reduction of $4.0 million from FY2025. 
Supplemental Appropriations for FY2026
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58) provided the USGS with supplemental appropriations of $510.7 million, of which $64.0 million were first made available in FY2026. This FY2026 funding was for the Earth Mapping Resources Initiative (Earth MRI), first funded with FY2019 annual appropriations. DOI stated that as of early 2025, regular and supplemental appropriations have supported Earth MRI, in partnership with 40 states, to “more than triple coverage of high-resolution data” that can support assessments of critical mineral resources.  ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13025/IF13025.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13025.html
IF13017,President Trump’s April 2025 Executive Order on American Seafood Competitiveness: Considerations for U.S. Fisheries,2026-02-23T05:00:00Z,2026-02-24T16:07:55Z,Active,Resources,Anthony R. Marshak,"Wildlife & Ecosystems, Oceans & Fisheries, Agricultural Trade & Food Aid","Introduction
On April 17, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14276, “Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness,” which required multiple federal agency actions related to U.S. fisheries science and management, the seafood trade, and commercial fishing in marine national monuments (MNMs). President Trump directed the Secretary of Commerce (hereinafter the Secretary), whose authorities include administration of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), as amended, to address U.S. seafood trade practices, including the U.S. seafood supply chain and seafood imports, and the regulation of domestic and foreign fishing in U.S. waters. The Department of Commerce includes the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), which is the primary federal agency responsible for the regulation and management of U.S. fisheries and seafood. Congress, through its enactment of MSA and other living marine resource (LMR)-related statutes, has regularly shown interest in U.S. fisheries and seafood production, including their sustainable management and economic contributions. 
Executive Order 14276
E.O. 14276 builds on elements of E.O. 13921, “Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and Economic Growth,” issued on May 7, 2020, which included directives related to U.S. fisheries, international seafood trade, aquaculture production, and combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. E.O. 14276 identifies most American fish stocks as healthy and having “viable markets.” NMFS noted in its 2023 Report to Congress on the Status of U.S. Fisheries, the most recent such report, that 94% of the U.S. stocks and stock complexes for which overfishing status was known at the time were not subject to overfishing. Similarly, data in the report indicated that 82% of stocks and stock complexes for which overfished status was known at the time were not classified as overfished. Additionally, the report noted that nearly 30% of U.S. fish stocks and stock complexes have unknown overfishing status and that overfished status is unknown for approximately half of all U.S. fish stocks and stock complexes. Further, 51 U.S. stocks had been rebuilt from overfished conditions as of December 2024.
E.O. 14276 also notes concerns about the global competitiveness of U.S. seafood and domestic seafood markets as related to trade practices and regulation. The E.O. states that the majority of seafood consumed by Americans is imported and identifies a “seafood trade deficit” of “over $20 billion.” According to NMFS annual commercial landings statistics and fishery trade data, in 2023, 91.6% of the total edible U.S. supply of fishery products were identified as imported. Additionally, the volume of imported edible fishery products is approximately double that of U.S. domestically caught edible fishery products, with much of that domestic harvest ultimately exported. From 2019 to 2023, the difference in the total nominal value of imported and exported edible fishery products ranged from approximately $17 billion to $24.7 billion, with a difference of approximately $20.4 billion in 2023 (i.e., greater imported value).
Directives for Fisheries Science and Management
E.O. 14276 states a U.S. policy “to promote the productive harvest of [U.S.] seafood resources” and to “unburden” commercial fishers from “costly and inefficient regulation” while also combatting IUU fishing and protecting U.S. seafood markets. Several of these elements also were identified in E.O. 13921. E.O. 14276 identifies U.S. seafood as being “heavily regulated” and lists several factors (e.g., “restrictive catch limits”) it identifies as impediments to fisheries harvest. Similarly, E.O. 13921 emphasized removal of “unnecessary regulatory burdens” to fishers. E.O. 14276 directs the Secretary—with input from other parties, including the U.S. fishing industry—to “immediately consider suspending, revising, or rescinding” regulations perceived as burdensome to commercial fishing, aquaculture, and fish processing industries. It further directs the Secretary to “identify the most heavily overregulated fisheries requiring action” and to “take appropriate action to reduce the regulatory burden on them,” in cooperation with U.S. Regional Fishery Management Councils (FMCs) and other relevant federal and public-private partnerships. 
E.O. 14276 directs the Secretary to request that each FMC, within 180 days, provide updates to its recommendations pursuant to E.O. 13921 regarding regulation of domestic fishing practices and their management; such “identified actions should stabilize markets, improve access, enhance economic profitability, and prevent closures.” E.O. 13921 included that these recommendations are to be consistent with MSA and other applicable laws (e.g., the Marine Mammal Protection Act). FMCs are to commit to a work plan and an implementation schedule for prioritization of these actions. E.O. 14276 also directs the Secretary to solicit public comments, including from industry members, technology experts, marine scientists, and other relevant parties, for ideas to improve fisheries management and science within the requirements of MSA and other laws. 
E.O. 14276 directs the Secretary to pursue additional public engagement to ensure executive departments and agencies “are focusing core fisheries management and science functions” to support U.S. seafood supply chain priority needs. With respect to fisheries science and technology, the Secretary is to direct NMFS to incorporate cost-efficient technologies, and information collected from cooperative research with the fishing community, for conducting fishery assessments. The Secretary also is to expand exempted fishing permit programs with the intent of promoting nationwide fishing opportunities and to modernize data collection and analyses to improve fisheries management responsiveness to real-time ocean conditions.
Directives for U.S. Seafood Trade
Regarding U.S. seafood imports and exports, E.O. 14276 directs the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, to develop and implement a national seafood strategy to promote the production, sale, and trade of U.S. fishery and aquaculture products and to increase domestic processing capacity. The program is intended to accelerate Department of Agriculture efforts to educate U.S. consumers about seafood health benefits and to increase seafood purchases in nutrition programs. The E.O. also directs the Secretary and the United States Trade Representative (USTR)—the cochairs of the Interagency Seafood Trade Task Force (ISTTF) established under E.O. 13921—in consultation with members of the ISTTF, to assess seafood competitiveness issues and jointly develop a seafood trade strategy within 60 days. This strategy is to be based on the November 2020 Seafood Trade Strategy and is to address “unfair” seafood trade practices and domestic access to foreign markets. The USTR also is directed to examine trade practices of “major seafood-producing nations,” including any IUU fishing practices and use of forced labor in the seafood supply chain. Regarding these practices, the USTR is to consider appropriate responses, including through negotiations or trade enforcement authorities, such as Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
E.O. 14276 directs the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other relevant agencies, to consider revising or rescinding expansions of the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP) regarding the inclusion of additional species and to improve the program’s effectiveness. The Secretary also is to consider using additional technologies to identify violations by foreign fisheries. In 2023, NMFS withdrew a proposed rule to expand the number of species covered under SIMP. Following a program review with stakeholder input, NMFS issued a November 2024 action plan for SIMP. Among its contents, the action plan intended for SIMP to cover all U.S. seafood imports, in addition to those determined to be at high risk for IUU fishing. The E.O. directs the Secretaries to use cost-effective and thorough auditing to prevent the U.S. entry of IUU seafood.
Marine National Monuments
E.O. 14276 directs the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, to review the five MNMs (Figure 1) and provide recommendations to the President within 180 days regarding the opening of any to commercial fishing. The Secretary is to consider whether such opening of MNMs is consistent with the intent of preserving historic structures and other objects of historic or scientific interest. These directives aligned with an April 17, 2025, presidential proclamation to prevent the Secretary from prohibiting commercial fishing within 50-200 nautical miles of the Pacific Islands Heritage MNM’s landward boundaries. More recently, on February 6, 2026, President Trump issued a presidential proclamation directing the removal of commercial fishing restrictions in the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts MNM.
Figure 1. U.S. Marine National Monuments (MNMs)
/
Sources: CRS and NOAA, NMFS, “Marine National Monuments.”
Considerations for Congress
In MSA, Congress requires fisheries management to be in accordance with 10 national standards (NS), such as the prevention of overfishing while achieving optimum yield. Congress may consider how directives in E.O. 14276 align with the 10 NS and other provisions in MSA, including those for fisheries science, and how future ocean conditions might affect their applications. Congress also may consider how data limitations for assessing the status of certain stocks may affect regulation or marketability, and the potential utility or cost-effectiveness of ecosystem-level management actions for regulating fisheries. In addition, Congress could amend MSA to codify or counter elements of E.O. 14276. In doing so, Congress might consider stakeholders’ perspectives supporting or opposing certain directives in the E.O. Congress also may consider its previous authorizations and directives regarding SIMP and the seafood trade, including commentary from some Members and stakeholders regarding SIMP’s effectiveness and future functioning (e.g., calls to expand or dismantle SIMP). Congress may consider how changes to fisheries regulations may affect other LMR-related provisions, such as marine mammal authorizations for categorized fisheries. Congress also may consider the alignment between presidential authorities for MNMs in the Antiquities Act of 1906 and in concurrent mandates for the conservation and management of fisheries and LMRs. Further, Congress may consider how the Administration’s budgetary and staffing priorities may align with implementing the science and management directives in E.O. 14276.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13017/IF13017.6.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13017.html
R48860,FY2026 Defense Budget: Funding for Selected Weapon Systems,2026-02-20T05:00:00Z,2026-02-24T14:52:47Z,Active,Reports,Daniel M. Gettinger,"Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces, Defense Authorization, Defense Budgets & Appropriations","The second Trump Administration’s Department of Defense (DOD) budget request for FY2026 included $848.3 billion in discretionary funding and $113.3 billion in mandatory funding (DOD is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025). Of the discretionary funding portion, the Administration requested a combined total of $295.3 billion in procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding, including proposed amounts for various weapon systems of congressional interest.
By way of background, in its FY2026 budget request, DOD included two types of funding: mandatory funding that DOD assumed Congress would provide in an FY2025 reconciliation law (later enacted as P.L. 119-21) and discretionary funding that DOD requested for Congress to authorize and appropriate for FY2026 as part of a base budget (i.e., recurring costs to staff, train, and equip the armed forces). For FY2026, to varying degrees, DOD proposed allocating both mandatory and discretionary funding for programs, projects, and activities associated with weapon systems procurement and RDT&E.
DOD has described its FY2026 budget request as making “generational investments” in Administration priorities, including in air and missile defense, the Air Force’s F-47 next-generation fighter aircraft, and shipbuilding. Relative to amounts Congress authorized and appropriated for FY2025, DOD’s FY2026 request also proposed increasing funding for certain hypersonic weapons programs and space-based systems. At the same time, DOD’s FY2026 request proposed reducing funding for other weapon systems, such as certain ground systems, the Navy’s F/A-XX next-generation fighter, and the Air Force’s E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning aircraft—changes that could lead to program delays or cancellation.
During consideration of proposals for a National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (NDAA; later enacted as P.L. 119-60) and a Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026 (later enacted as Division A of P.L. 119-75), Members of Congress proposed providing more funding, the same amount, or less funding than the President requested for selected weapon systems. The enacted versions of the bills authorized and appropriated more funding than DOD requested for the Virginia-class submarine, Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, and E-7A Wedgetail, and less funding than requested for the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft, among other changes. Appropriators diverged from the amounts requested and those authorized for several weapon systems, including by providing more funding than requested for the Medium Landing Ship, C-130J Hercules cargo aircraft, and the F/A-XX fighter, among others. 
Divergent views in the Administration and Congress over perceived threats, defense strategy and requirements, and program performance generated debates over FY2026 funding for weapon systems procurement and RDT&E. Disagreements accompanying Congress’s decision to use, for the first time, the reconciliation process to provide additional funding to DOD, and DOD’s estimation of how such funds should be allocated to programs, contributed to changes to funding for certain weapon systems. Authorizers and appropriators, for example, disagreed with the Navy’s plan to fund the procurement of additional Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers and a second Virginia-class submarine using resources provided in the reconciliation process instead of the annual authorization and appropriation process. In the enacted NDAA and defense appropriations act, Congress authorized and appropriated more discretionary funding than requested for the destroyers and the Virginia-class submarine. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48860/R48860.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48860.html