{"database": "openregs", "table": "congressional_record", "rows": [["CREC-2014-12-16-pt1-PgS6922", "2014-12-16", 113, 2, null, null, "Introductory Statement on S. 3019", "SENATE", "SENATE", "SSTATEMENTSIND", "S6922", "S6923", "[{\"name\": \"Carl Levin\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}]", "[{\"congress\": \"113\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"3019\"}]", "160 Cong. Rec. S6922", "Congressional Record, Volume 160 Issue 155 (Tuesday, December 16, 2014)\n\n[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 155 (Tuesday, December 16, 2014)]\n[Senate]\n[Pages S6922-S6923]\nFrom the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]\n\n      By Mr. LEVIN:\n  S. 3019. A bill to amend the War Powers Resolution to provide for the\nuse of military force against non-state actors; to the Committee on\nForeign Relations.\n  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, when the War Powers Resolution was passed\nover a Presidential veto in 1973, its supporters expected that the War\nPowers Resolution would ensure that a national dialogue takes place\nbefore the employment of the U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities. The\nPresident--then President Nixon--was concerned that the War Powers\nResolution's termination of certain authorities after 60 days unless\nextended by Congress would create unpredictably in U.S. foreign policy.\n  The War Powers Resolution, as a practical matter, has not been\neffective. Every subsequent President since\n\n[[Page S6923]]\n\nPresident Nixon has viewed the War Powers Resolution as an\nunconstitutional impingement on the President's powers as Commander in\nChief. So the 60-day trigger in the act has never been used to\nterminate hostilities, and the national dialogue envisioned by the\nauthors of the resolution has failed to come about.\n  I have a proposal to amend the War Powers Act in those instances\nwhere nonstate actors are the target. We are the target of them. They\nmust become and should become the target for us to try to deter and\nrespond to them when they attack us and try to terrorize us.\n  I have introduced a bill today with a suggested amendment to the War\nPowers Act. When the War Powers Resolution was passed over a\nPresidential veto in 1973, its supporters expected that the War Powers\nResolution would ensure that a national dialogue takes place before the\nemployment of the U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities.\n\n  The President, on the other hand, argued that the enactment of the\nlegislation ``would seriously undermine this Nation's ability to act\ndecisively and convincingly in times of international crisis.'' In his\nveto message, President Nixon argued that: ``As a result, the\nconfidence of our allies in our ability to assist them could be\ndiminished and the respect of our adversaries for our deterrent posture\ncould decline. A permanent and substantial element of unpredictability\nwould be injected into the world's assessment of American behavior,\nfurther increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and war.''\n  The President was particularly concerned that the War Powers\nResolution's termination of certain authorities after 60 days unless\nextended by Congress would create unpredictability in U.S. foreign\npolicy. The War Powers Resolution requires the President to consult\n``in every possible instance'' prior to introducing U.S. Armed Forces\ninto hostilities and to report to Congress within 48 hours when, absent\na declaration of war, U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into\n``hostilities or . . . situations where imminent involvement in\nhostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'' After this\nreport is submitted, the resolution requires that U.S. troops be\nwithdrawn at the end of 60 days, unless Congress authorizes continued\ninvolvement by passing a declaration of war or some other specific\nauthorization for continued U.S. involvement in such hostilities.\n  Every subsequent President has viewed the War Powers Resolution as an\nunconstitutional impingement on the President's powers as Commander in\nChief. As a result, the 60-day trigger in the Act has never been used\nto terminate hostilities, and the national dialogue envisioned by the\nauthors of the Resolution has failed to come about.\n  At this very moment, our troops have been engaged in hostilities in\nIraq and Syria for more than 60 days, without the enactment of an\nauthorizing resolution by Congress. Some believe that the continuing\nhostilities are a violation of the War Powers Resolution. Others argue\nthat the War Powers Resolution has not been triggered, because our\nmilitary actions can be justified under earlier authorizations. Either\nway, it is clear that the 60-day limitation in the resolution has had\nno more force and effect in the case of the battle against ISIS than it\ndid in earlier actions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere.\n  I believe that the War Powers Resolution needs to be modernized to\nmake it more relevant to the situations our military is likely to face\nin the 21st century--in particular, the ongoing struggle against new\nand evolving terrorist groups.\n  Today, I filed a bill that would amend the War Powers Resolution to\nauthorize the President to act against non-state actors like ISIS,\nwhere he judges it necessary to address a continuing and imminent\nthreat to the United States, subject to a resolution of disapproval by\nCongress under the War Powers Resolution. This approach would allow the\nPresident to take decisive action to address imminent terrorist\nthreats, while reserving a clear role for Congress through a resolution\nof disapproval. I believe that this approach would provide for a\nnational dialogue on the use of military force with respect to non-\nstate actors like ISIS, while avoiding the dead end provided unworkable\nrequirement of the current War Powers Resolution, under which\ncongressional inaction could require U.S. troops to suddenly disengage\nfrom the enemy while in harm's way.\n  My amendment would provide that the authority to use U.S. Armed\nForces against non-state actors would terminate after 60 days unless\neither: 1, the President's actions are based on a law providing for the\nuse of military force against a non-state actor; or 2, the President\nnotifies Congress that continued use of military force is necessary\nbecause the non-state actor poses a ``continuing and imminent threat''\nto the United States or U.S. persons, and Congress does not enact a\njoint resolution of disapproval under expedited procedures.\n  Expedited procedures under the War Powers Resolution would ensure\nthat Congress considers the issue. Under these procedures, if a\nresolution of disapproval is filed in a timely manner by any Senator,\nthe Senate Foreign Relations Committee would have 15 calendar days to\nreport the resolution or be discharged. The Senate would then have 3\ndays to consider the Resolution, with time equally divided between\nproponents and opponents of the measure. As with any joint resolution,\nthe measure could be vetoed, and such a veto would be subject to an\noverride vote in Congress.\n  I believe this approach would provide greater clarity for the\nExecutive and Legislative branches and I hope a future Senate will\nconsider it.\n                                 ______"]], "columns": ["granule_id", "date", "congress", "session", "volume", "issue", "title", "chamber", "granule_class", "sub_granule_class", "page_start", "page_end", "speakers", "bills", "citation", "full_text"], "primary_keys": ["granule_id"], "primary_key_values": ["CREC-2014-12-16-pt1-PgS6922"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 51.9705549813807, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}