{"database": "openregs", "table": "congressional_record", "rows": [["CREC-2004-12-20-pt1-PgE2209", "2004-12-20", 108, 2, null, null, "CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 2845, INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004", "HOUSE", "EXTENSIONS", "ALLOTHER", "E2209", "E2210", "[{\"name\": \"Peter Hoekstra\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}]", "[{\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"10\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2845\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2845\"}]", "150 Cong. Rec. E2209", "Congressional Record, Volume 150 Issue 140 (Monday, December 20, 2004)\n\n[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 140 (Monday, December 20, 2004)]\n[Extensions of Remarks]\n[Pages E2209-E2210]\nFrom the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]\n\n    CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 2845, INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM\n                         PREVENTION ACT OF 2004\n\n                                 ______\n\n                               speech of\n\n                          HON. PETER HOEKSTRA\n\n                              of michigan\n\n                    in the house of representatives\n\n                       Tuesday, December 7, 2004\n\n  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, as chairman of the conference on the bill\nI would also like to briefly discuss the interpretation of this\nlegislation.\n  The conference report embodies the substantial agreement between the\nHouse bill, H.R. 10, and the Senate bill, S. 2845, on the core reforms\nto be carried out by this legislation. It is also important to note,\nhowever, that the conference faced many challenges in reconciling often\nfundamentally different philosophies and visions underlying those\nreforms and the specific provisions in each bill. Accordingly, the\nconferees agreed to submit only a very limited Joint Explanatory\nStatement on the conference report, relying on the text of the\nlegislation to represent our agreements.\n  Only that text, which is controlling, and the Joint Explanatory\nStatement were agreed to by both houses and reflect the intent of the\nconferees. I should also note that Chairman Hyde intends to submit a\nstatement for the record reflecting bipartisan and bicameral\nunderstandings with respect to certain foreign affairs provisions of\nthe bill. Other statements by Members of Congress outside the scope of\nthe Joint Explanatory Statement, media reports, or the reports or work\nproduct of any of the outside panels or commissions whose work\ncontributed to this legislation reflect their own views and should not\nbe construed as determinative guidance with respect to legislative\nintent.\n  While that framework ultimately controls interpretation of the bill,\nI would like to note my understanding as chairman of the conference of\nseveral matters within this legislation.\n\n          Authorities of the Director of National Intelligence\n\n  The nature of the authorities to be granted to the Director of\nNational Intelligence, DNI, and the relationship of the Director to\nother Federal officials were delicate and precisely negotiated issues,\nwith resulting agreements reflected in the legislative language of the\nconference report. Only that legislative language controls the\nauthorities of the DNI.\n  This principle bears special emphasis in a number of areas. With\nrespect to budget formulation, the text of the agreement carefully and\nexplicitly specifies the authorities of the DNI and the relationships\nbetween the DNI, the heads of individual agencies and organizations\nwithin the National Intelligence Program, and the heads of executive\ndepartments containing those agencies and organizations. Those roles\nand authorities should be construed solely by reference to the\nprovisions of the conference report and existing law--no more, and no\nless.\n  For example, the text explicitly provides that both the heads of\nexecutive departments containing agencies or organizations within the\nintelligence community and the heads of those discrete agencies may\neach provide annual budget proposals to the DNI, based on the DNI's\nguidance, for the DNI to use in determining and presenting an\nintelligence budget to the President. Beyond this direction, the\nlegislation does not specify how the budget proposals are to be\ndeveloped or provided, and it is properly for the executive branch to\ndetermine how to execute the statute consistent with its text.\n  Similarly, the legislation provides, in amended section 102A(e)(2)(A)\nof the National Security Act, that personnel transfers are to be made\nin accordance with procedures developed by the DNI and the heads of\naffected departments and agencies. It does not specify what role is to\nbe played in the transfers by department and agency heads pursuant to\nsuch procedures. Presumably, that matter will be determined by the\nexecutive branch within the agreement on procedures developed under the\nlegislative text.\n  Consistent with basic constitutional principles, the legislation\nprovides that the DNI's authority is ``[s]ubject to the authority,\ndirection, and control of the President.'' Accordingly, the text does\nnot specify who is to perform the President's daily intelligence\nbriefing or under what specific operational circumstances the President\nwill interact with the Director of the CIA, which should be matters for\nthe President to decide himself.\n  The legislation also contains a detailed provision dealing with the\napportionment of funds. That provision textually speaks only to the\napportionment of funds, not to apportionment plans or any other related\nmatter. Similarly, the conference report does not specifically\nauthorize the creation of an entity within the Office of the DNI to\nperform common services or of a Chief Financial Officer for the DNI.\nNor does it provide that an open source intelligence center, if\ncreated, should be a new element of the intelligence community. Nor is\nthe conforming amendment to section 105(a) of the National Security Act\ncontained in section 1072(a)(2) of the legislation intended to\nsubstantively amend the authority of the Secretary of Defense. That\nprovision merely clarifies that section 105(a) of the National Security\nAct should be construed in conjunction with the specified statutory\nauthorities of the DNI. Had the conference intended to address any of\nthese matters in this legislation, appropriately specific provisions\nwould have been included to do so.\n\n   national counterterrorism center and national intelligence centers\n\n  The authorities of the National Counterterrorism Center were issues\nof great and delicate debate during the conference. This is\nparticularly true with respect to the balance between the authority of\nthe NCTC to conduct ``strategic operational planning'' and the\nauthority of individual departments and agencies to plan and direct the\nconduct of the resulting operations. There was full agreement that the\nNCTC properly should assign ``roles and responsibilities'' to agencies\nparticipating in Counterterrorism operations. However, the text of the\nlegislation specifies that the assignment of ``roles and\nresponsibilities'' does not extend to directing the execution of any\nresulting operations. The legislation does not, for example, authorize\nthe NCTC to determine which personnel or specific capabilities should\nbe utilized by agencies in mission execution.\n  Similarly, careful discussions took place in the conference with\nrespect to the detail of personnel to the NCTC, with the outcome\nmemorialized in the legislative text. There is no specific direction to\nconcentrate personnel holding scarce and desirable skills in the NCTC,\nnor is such concentration prohibited. In exercising authorities to\ntransfer or detail personnel, it will be important for the DNI to weigh\nthe needs of an effective NCTC with the needs of other agencies and the\nintelligence community as a whole.\n  The conference also reached compromise on the scope and authorities\nof any future National Intelligence Centers that might be created by\nthe Director of National Intelligence. The conference report authorizes\nthe DNI to establish, if appropriate and necessary to complete the\nmission, national intelligence centers that are administratively\ndistinct from the other agencies of the intelligence community.\nHowever, it does not require that all National Intelligence Centers be\ncreated as separate and administratively distinct entities. As with the\nNCTC, it will be important for the DNI\n\n[[Page E2210]]\n\nto weigh the needs of any additional National Intelligence Centers\nagainst the needs of the agencies within the intelligence community,\nwith due consideration for the expert personnel that make the\nintelligence community effective.\n\n                information flow and information sharing\n\n  The legislation specifies that the information sharing system created\nin section 1016 is to facilitate the sharing of terrorism information,\nas specifically defined in section 1016(a)(4). The conference\nspecifically chose to remove references to any specific system,\nnetwork, or proposal as a model. As provided in section 1016(b)(1)(a),\nthe system is to be established consistent with ``applicable legal\nstandards'' relating to privacy and civil liberties.\n  Further, the conference did not establish specific qualifications for\nthe program manager to be designated under the bill. While experience\nwith managing an ``enterprise architecture'' is desirable, that\nexpertise is a narrow category of necessary qualifications and it is\nequally important that the manager have program management and systems\ndevelopment expertise. I should also note that the legislation refers\nto the ``Information Sharing Council.'' This is intended to refer to\nthe ``Information Systems Council'' established by Executive order.\n\n              privacy and civil liberties oversight board\n\n  The Privacy and Civil Liberties Board also was a carefully negotiated\nprovision in conference. Once again, only the text of the legislation\nreflects our final agreement. The conference dropped a proposed\nprovision that would have limited the board to providing advice only\nwhen requested by the head of an agency, choosing to remain silent on\nthe specifics. Such silence should not be construed, however, as a\nrequirement for executive branch officials to routinely or\naffirmatively consult with the Board. Such a requirement does not\nappear in the legislation, and again this is a matter for the Executive\nto carry out consistent with the legislative text.\n  In addition, there was extensive discussion of the exemption that is\nincluded in section 1061(d)(4) of the bill with respect to the\nauthority of the DNI to withhold information from the Board for\nnational security reasons. The legislation speaks for itself, but I\nwould like to emphasize that the possession of a security clearance\ndoes not automatically provide a ``need to know'' classified\ninformation, especially where it is uniquely sensitive. This provision\nshould not be used to routinely withhold information, but is instead\nintended to come into play where preventing potential harm to national\nsecurity from disclosure precludes the ``need to know'' served by the\ninterests of the Board.\n  It is also important to note that the conference did not have an\nopportunity to consider the relationship of section 1062, a sense of\nCongress provision dealing with designation of agency privacy officers,\nto similar provisions contained in the Omnibus Appropriations Bill\ndealing with Chief Privacy Officers.\n\n                 public interest declassification board\n\n  Section 1102 of the conference report, dealing with the Public\nInterest Declassification Board, provides that the board may conduct\nreview and make recommendations to the President with respect to\nrequests from congressional committees of jurisdiction to declassify\ncertain records or reconsider a declination to declassify certain\nrecords. It is important to emphasize that the text of section 1102(b)\nand, by reference, section 1102(e) refer only to requests from\ncommittees of jurisdiction and not individual Members of Congress, and\nthat no authority for individual members to make such requests should\nbe inferred.\n\n      drivers license and personal identification card provisions\n\n  Finally, I note two provisions that were the subject of negotiation\nin section 7212 of the conference report, dealing with standards for\ndrivers' licenses. First, a detailed specification of which\n``interested parties'' should participate in the negotiated rulemaking\nprovided for in this section was specifically omitted from the text. It\nis therefore erroneous to infer or suggest that a requirement for\nmandatory participation by any particular ``interested party'' or group\nin the rulemaking is intended in the bill. Second, a provision was\nremoved from section 7212(b)(3)(E) that would have required the\nregulations developed in the rulemaking to include requirements to\nprotect unspecified ``civil and due process'' rights of individuals\napplying for and holding drivers licenses and personal identification\ncards. This legislation is not intended to create or infer the creation\nof any civil or due process right relating to drivers' licenses or\nidentification cards, nor is any such provision included in the text of\nthe legislation.\n  My statement is not exhaustive and is without prejudice to\ninterpretation of other items in the conference report, which I again\nemphasize in closing should be made solely by reference to the text of\nthe conference report and the Joint Explanatory Statement.\n\n                          ____________________"]], "columns": ["granule_id", "date", "congress", "session", "volume", "issue", "title", "chamber", "granule_class", "sub_granule_class", "page_start", "page_end", "speakers", "bills", "citation", "full_text"], "primary_keys": ["granule_id"], "primary_key_values": ["CREC-2004-12-20-pt1-PgE2209"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.9231120347976685, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}