{"database": "openregs", "table": "congressional_record", "rows": [["CREC-2004-12-08-pt1-PgS11939", "2004-12-08", 108, 2, null, null, "INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004--CONFERENCE REPORT", "SENATE", "SENATE", "ALLOTHER", "S11939", "S12010", "[{\"name\": \"William H. Frist\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Harry Reid\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Arlen Specter\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Susan M. Collins\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Joseph I. Lieberman\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Richard J. Durbin\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Thomas R. Carper\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Carl Levin\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Norm Coleman\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Pat Roberts\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Bob Graham\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Charles E. Schumer\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"John D. Rockefeller IV\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Ron Wyden\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"John Warner\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Robert C. Byrd\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"James M. Inhofe\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Bill Nelson\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"John E. Sununu\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Frank R. Lautenberg\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Pete V. Domenici\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Daniel K. Akaka\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Kent Conrad\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Barbara A. Mikulski\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Jack Reed\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Saxby Chambliss\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Mary L. Landrieu\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Herb Kohl\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"George V. Voinovich\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Olympia J. Snowe\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Barbara Boxer\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Russell D. Feingold\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Dianne Feinstein\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Patty Murray\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Jon S. Corzine\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Joseph R. Biden Jr.\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Christopher J. Dodd\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Hillary Rodham Clinton\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Jon Kyl\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"John Cornyn\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Ted Stevens\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"John McCain\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Mitch McConnell\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}, {\"name\": \"Thomas A. Daschle\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}]", "[{\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"10\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"10\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"113\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"SRES\", \"number\": \"445\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"589\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"1230\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"1534\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"1606\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"1678\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"1718\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"1837\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2204\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2485\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2568\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2586\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2599\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2664\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2665\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2679\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2774\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2811\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2845\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"2845\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"2939\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"3040\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"S\", \"number\": \"3107\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"3179\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"3209\"}, {\"congress\": \"108\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"3552\"}]", "150 Cong. Rec. S11939", "Congressional Record, Volume 150 Issue 139 (Wednesday, December 8, 2004)\n\n[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 139 (Wednesday, December 8, 2004)]\n[Senate]\n[Pages S11939-S12010]\nFrom the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]\n\n INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004--CONFERENCE\n REPORT\n\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will\nproceed to consideration of the conference report to accompany S. 2845\nwhich the clerk will report.\n The legislative clerk read as follows:\n\n The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the\n two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S.\n 2845) to reform the intelligence community and the\n intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the\n United States Government, and for other purposes, having met,\n have agreed that the Senate recede from its disagreement to\n the amendment of the House and agree to the same with an\n amendment, and the House agree to the same, signed by a\n majority of the conferees on the part of both Houses.\n\n (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the\nRecord of December 7, 2004.)\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority leader.\n Mr. FRIST. I suggest the absence of a quorum.\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.\n The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.\n Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for\nthe quorum call be rescinded.\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, in a discussion with the Democratic\nleadership, we have come to an agreement that gives us a pretty good\ntemplate for the organization during the course of the day. This will\nbe useful, and I will ask unanimous consent shortly to allocate time\nfor the people who have come forward and said they would like to speak\nprior to the vote.\n As part of this, the managers will have time right before the vote--\nup to 30 minutes, but probably that much time will not be used before\nthe vote--to add closing statements.\n I ask unanimous consent that debate on the conference report be\nlimited to the list below:\n Senator Collins will be controlling 45 minutes; Senator Lieberman, 45\nminutes; Senator Byrd, 120 minutes, to begin at 12:30 p.m.; Senator\nStevens, 5 minutes; Senator Roberts, 10 minutes; Senator Rockefeller,\n10 minutes; Senator Durbin, 15 minutes; Senator Warner, 30 minutes;\nSenator Levin, 15 minutes; Senator Graham of Florida, 15 minutes;\nSenator Coleman, 10 minutes; Senator Carper, 5 minutes; Senator\nSpecter, 20 minutes, and his comments will follow Senator Lieberman's\ncomments this morning.\n I further ask that following the use or yielding back of the time,\nthe Senate proceed to a vote on the adoption of the conference report,\nwith no intervening action or debate.\n Mr. REID. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I will ask a\ncouple of things: One, that the time for quorum calls run off of the\ntime equally against everybody. I suggest that those people who have\ntime come over and use it. Senator Byrd will be here at 12:30. That\ntime is locked in for 2 hours. I think this is fair and reasonable. I\nwill also ask the distinguished majority leader if we will be able to--\nthis vote is not close or controversial in any way, and nobody is\ntrying to do anything untoward. People on both sides may not be here at\nwhatever time the vote begins.\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is the Senator asking that the time be\ncharged against all those who have time, or just against--\n Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the quorum calls--when they\nare in effect--be charged against everyone except Senator Byrd at\n12:30. After 12:30, it would be charged against him also. So the time\nduring quorum calls I ask be charged against all speakers equally.\nOtherwise, we are going to wind up with more people----\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair is constrained to ask the\nSenator to modify that. The occupant of the Chair has asked for 5\nminutes. That could entirely wipe out the amount of time I have\nallocated to me.\n Mr. REID. It would not if it is done on a proportionate basis. Well,\nif the vote does not occur until 7 o'clock, I don't really care. I will\nwithdraw that request and we will let things fall where they may.\n Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, for clarification, this is a plea to our\ncolleagues to be here and be speaking on the floor of the Senate. We\nare trying to do an awful lot, so we can start the vote around 3\no'clock. It will likely finish around 5:15. In order to accomplish\nthat, we cannot be sitting in quorum calls. We need the people wishing\nto speak to be here on time and to be available. Check with the\nmanagers.\n\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. May the Chair suggest that the time for\nquorum calls be charged against the next person in line to speak and\nput these speakers in order?\n Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, since we have not talked to each\nindividual, I don't want them necessarily to have to come in this\norder. I think we can leave it with the understanding that we need\nspeakers here to work with the floor managers and to have no down time\nover the course of the morning and, if so, we are going to ask people\nto try to shorten their remarks.\n\n[[Page S11940]]\n\n Mr. REID. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President: If in fact we don't\nlock in a time for the vote, and Senators decide not to come and speak,\nwe cannot have a vote until they finish their time; is that right?\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. I am informed that if one Senator does not\nappear, or does not use his or her allocated time, that will not delay\nthe Senate from voting at the time specified.\n Mr. REID. Well, so there is no confusion, it is my understanding this\nadds up to about 3:45 this afternoon.\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair is so warned by the\nParliamentarian not to have a debate with the Senator, but the Senator\nis correct.\n Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur\nno later than 4 o'clock, and that it could occur more quickly if the\ntime is used up.\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the leader's request\nas modified?\n Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, for clarification, I will follow Senator\nLieberman for 20 minutes. So it is Senator Collins and Senator\nLieberman, and then I am up for 20 minutes?\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct. The Chair's\nunderstanding is that this becomes the order for Senators to speak.\n Mr. FRIST. No, Mr. President. We have no specific order. The\nunanimous consent request was granted that Senator Specter follow\nSenator Lieberman, and that is the only specific request. The order,\notherwise, has not been determined. Senator Collins will speak, then\nSenator Lieberman and Senator Specter.\n Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, Senator Durbin would like to\nspeak after Senator Specter.\n The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? Without objection, the\nmodified request is agreed to.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham of South Carolina). The Senator\nfrom Maine.\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, in New England, we have an old\nexpression: The difficult we do immediately; the impossible takes us a\nlittle longer.\n The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 before\nus today at times seemed to be an impossible goal. So it took us a\nlittle bit longer. It has been a long and arduous journey to reach this\npoint today, but the extraordinary perseverance of the 9/11 Commission,\nthe families of the victims of the attacks on our country, the\nconferees, our talented staff, our leaders, and, most of all, the\nPresident of the United States brought us to this point today.\n We would not be at this historic moment without the informed, strong,\nand bipartisan leadership of my good friend, the Senator from\nConnecticut, Mr. Lieberman. I am deeply grateful to him for his\nleadership and for working in partnership with me.\n When Senator Lieberman and I were first assigned this task by our\nSenate leaders back in late July, we pledged to work together and to\nrecognize that when it comes to matters of national security, there is\nno place for partisanship. We worked from the very beginning to forge a\nbipartisan bill, and I am very pleased that the conference agreement we\nbring before the Senate today is a bipartisan agreement. I am confident\nthat later today it will receive a strong bipartisan vote. But it was\nSenator Lieberman's determination, his leadership, and his commitment\nto this cause that made it possible. It has been a great pleasure to\nwork with him, and I look forward to many future collaborations.\n I am also very proud of all of our colleagues on the Homeland\nSecurity and Governmental Affairs Committee. They worked so hard. From\nthe very first hearing that we held in late July to the completion of\nthe conference agreement over the weekend, they were there every step\nof the way. No leaders of a conference could ever have had more devoted\nand dedicated conferees than Senator Lieberman and I had.\n We were also fortunate to be blessed with an outstanding staff. Both\nSenator Lieberman's staff, and my staff, headed by Michael Bopp, have\nworked countless hours over the last 4\\1/2\\ months. They sacrificed\nfamily vacations, and they have sacrificed a great deal of sleep. They\nhave been here night and day working because they so believed in this\nlegislation. We could not have done it without them.\n On the House side, I want to thank Speaker Hastert. His chief of\nstaff devoted hundreds of hours to assisting in these negotiations.\nCongressman Pete Hoekstra and Representative Jane Harman led the\nconferees on the House side. They did outstanding work. They were\nabsolutely committed to the principle of crafting legislation that\nwould make America safer and more secure.\n Throughout this process, President Bush has provided outstanding\nleadership. I would say that without the help of the President of the\nUnited States and his Vice President, we would not be here today. Their\nintervention at critical points throughout the debate was absolutely\nessential in helping us to forge the compromises that were necessary to\nmove this bill along.\n We all owe a great debt to the members and the staff of the 9/11\nCommission. I have worked very closely with the chairman and vice\nchairman, Gov. Tom Kean and former Representative Lee Hamilton. The\nwork they did, their leadership, their investigations, their interviews\nof 1,200 people in 10 countries provided a solid foundation for the\nrecommendations they made and for the reforms included in this bill.\n\n I am very pleased that we have their endorsement. They said:\n\n We believe this is a good bill and a strong bill. We\n believe it will make our country safer and more secure. We\n also believe that the essential elements of the Commission's\n recommendations remain intact. We are of the firm view what\n this conference report deserves the support of the House and\n the Senate.\n\n But, Mr. President, perhaps the greatest debt of all is owed to the\nfamilies of the 9/11 victims. In their profound loss, they found\ncourage and determination. Their knowledge has contributed greatly to\nour debate, and their passion constantly reminded us of why we are here\nand what is at stake. They never let us give up. They refused to let us\nfail.\n I am grateful to Senator Frist and Senator Daschle for assigning our\ncommittee this important task. They showed great confidence in us, and\nI am pleased we did not let them down.\n This legislation addresses the alarming flaws in our national\nintelligence structure that were so horribly and painfully exposed on\nthat black September morning more than 3 years ago. It does what nearly\na half century of studies and legislation calling for intelligence\nreform failed to do. It is legislation whose time has finally come.\n The legislation implements the major recommendations of the 9/11\nCommission. We are rebuilding a structure that was designed for a\ndifferent enemy in a different time, a structure that was designed for\nthe Cold War and has not proved agile enough to deal with the threats\nof the 21st century.\n We have transformed that structure into one with the agility needed\nto respond to international terrorism, rogue states, the proliferation\nof weapons of mass destruction, and the other challenges and threats of\nthe 21st century.\n The legislation reforms the intelligence community and it gives us\nthe tools to respond to threats of which we may not even be aware at\nthis point.\n It is fitting that this legislation comes to a final vote during the\nweek when we pause to remember the events of December 7, 1941. Just as\nthe National Security Act of 1947 was passed to prevent another Pearl\nHarbor, the Intelligence Reform Act will help us prevent another 9/11.\n I am not saying that this legislation will prevent future terrorist\nattacks, but it will increase the capabilities of the intelligence\ncommunity and help us improve the opportunity to better detect,\nprevent, and, if necessary, respond to attacks on our country.\n The four primary components of this legislation are the creation of a\ndirector of national intelligence, the establishment of a national\ncounterterrorism center, the creation of a civil liberties board, and\nstrong information-sharing provisions. There are also many other\nprovisions in this bill that improve border security, that improve\ntransportation security, that set a new direction in our foreign\npolicy.\n This is a comprehensive approach that embodies many--indeed, most--of\nthe recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.\n The new director of national intelligence will be a strong position\nwith clear and effective authority to build\n\n[[Page S11941]]\n\nand execute the intelligence budget. The DNI will be a dramatic\nimprovement over the structure we have today. For the first time, we\nwill have, in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, an\nempowered quarterback for our intelligence team.\n To illustrate why this is important, why these authorities are\ncrucial, let us consider a passage from the 9/11 Commission Report. In\nlate 1998, it had become apparent to CIA Director George Tenet that al-\nQaida was a growing and deadly threat to the people of this country, so\non December 4 of that year, he issued a memorandum that said the\nfollowing:\n\n We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this\n effort, either inside CIA or the Community.\n\n Now, that is a pretty clear, concise, direct order from the head of\nthe intelligence community.\n According to the Commission, the memorandum had virtually no impact.\nOne reason it had so little overall effect on mobilizing the resources\nof the intelligence community is that the Director of the CIA, beyond\nthe direct control of the CIA, has very little authority over the\nfunding, the people, and the other resources in the intelligence\ncommunity. This legislation will ensure that in the future, when such a\nclear, concise order is issued, it will mobilize and galvanize the\nresources we can bring to bear.\n The second important key component in this bill is the creation of\nthe National Counterterrorism Center. This will build on the good work\nalready being done by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center created\nby the President through an Executive order. The NCTC will help\ndemolish the information stovepipes that the 9/11 Commission found and\nit will replace them, it will turn them into conduits for information\nsharing across the intelligence community. The NCTC will also conduct\nstrategic operational planning to coordinate the agencies that are\nplanning our response to al-Qaida and the other threats to our national\nsecurity.\n Throughout the debate on this bill, in addition to improving the\nability of the intelligence agencies to cooperate and coordinate their\nefforts, we have also been mindful of our troops fighting on the front\nlines in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both\nSenator Lieberman and I are privileged to serve on the Senate Armed\nServices Committee. I contend that our current system has not always\nserved our troops well. It did not predict the insurgency that has cost\nus so many lives in Iraq. We owe it to our troops on the battlefields,\nas well as to our civilians at home, to improve the quality of\nintelligence they receive, and I believe, as does Secretary Powell,\nthis bill will do just that.\n I emphasize that nothing in this bill in any way hinders or impairs\nmilitary operations or readiness. To the contrary, I believe this\nlegislation will help improve the reliability and the quality of\nintelligence provided to our troops.\n Another important provision of this bill would implement the\nrecommendations of the 9/11 Commission by creating a civil liberties\nboard. As we increase the power of Government to deal with the threat\nof terrorism, we must be mindful to preserve those freedoms that define\nus as Americans. We would be handing the terrorists a victory if we\nwere to compromise the civil liberties Americans cherish. This board\nwill help make sure we strike the right balance.\n\n Finally, other key provisions of this bill, for which Senator Durbin\ndeserves great credit, are provisions that will improve the sharing of\ninformation across our intelligence agencies and throughout the Federal\nGovernment. We know from the extensive review of the 9/11 Commission\nthat various agencies throughout our Government had pieces of the\npuzzle that had it been assembled might have allowed them to prevent\nthe attacks on our country on 9/11. We need to make sure we have a\nculture in our Government of assembling the pieces of that puzzle, of\nsharing information. I believe the Counterterrorism Center, the\ninformation-sharing provisions, and having a DNI will all improve and\nremedy that problem.\n The 9/11 Commission has told us repeatedly of the valiant and\ntalented men and women we have in our intelligence agencies, and I\nsalute their good work. I believe today that we will be giving them the\ntools they need to be more effective. This legislation provides those\ngood people with a good structure.\n Time, commitment, and perseverance have brought us this far. I urge\nmy colleagues to join us in completing the journey by giving this\nlandmark legislation an overwhelming vote later this afternoon. This\nlegislation will implement the most sweeping significant reforms of our\nintelligence community in more than 50 years. The reforms are long\noverdue, and they will help to make our Nation more secure.\n I reserve the remainder of my time.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to join with Chairman Collins in\nrecommending the adoption of this conference report on the Intelligence\nReform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which, of course,\nimplements the key recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission Report.\n I begin by thanking Senator Collins for her extraordinary leadership\nin this effort. In the 16 years I have been here--and it is self-\nevident to the Presiding Officer and others that I am much the senior\nof Senator Collins--I have never had a better legislative experience.\n This task came to us quickly. There was an enormous amount of work to\ndo. As I said yesterday, it was a long and winding road we walked down,\nbut we ended up where we needed to be and where the Nation needed us to\nbe, and it simply could not have happened without Susan Collins'\nleadership. She has an extraordinary sense of purpose and principle.\nShe understands the difference between right and wrong and, in a\nlegislative context, perhaps, the difference between better and worse\nbecause that is often where we are. She is a persistent and very\neffective negotiator, knows when to hold them and when to fold them.\n She is a wonderful person--I think maybe I should be that explicit--\nand that doesn't hurt around here, either, because it gains the\nconfidence of the people who work with her. Part of her being a great\nperson is her great sense of humor which got us through some of our\ndarker moments.\n I was thinking one of the great moments in the process was when we\ndecided, late in the process, that the original title we gave to the\ncentral position we created, the National Intelligence Director, would\nhave the acronym NID. It doesn't resonate the strength that we wanted.\nSome member of our conference with an inferior sense of humor said it\nwould lead to a lot of ``NIDpicking.'' A lot of laughter led to the\nchange of the title to the Director of National Intelligence, the DNI.\nYou can feel the force radiating. We laughed a lot about that and about\na lot of other things.\n It is a familiar saying in public service and life, and certainly in\ncampaigns, that victory has a thousand parents and defeat is an orphan.\nThis is a victory for the American people. Many people have a right,\nhere in the Senate, on the 9/11 Commission, the families of the 9/11\nvictims, the President of the United States, the Vice President of the\nUnited States--so many people can say, and we might say: Without their\ninvolvement this would not have happened. But nobody, really, can say\nthat more or feel that more than Senator Susan Collins of Maine. I\nthank her very much for her friendship, for her partnership, for her\nleadership here, and I, too, look forward to working with you in many\nsimilar collaborations in the years ahead.\n Before I get to the substance of the bill, I do want to say something\nabout the process here. As we end the 108th session of Congress,\nunfortunately a session that was very often polarized and partisan, it\nis really great--besides the specifics of this accomplishment that is\nso critical to our national security--that we have ended it with a\nbipartisan, nonpartisan triumph. It ought to send a message to the\nAmerican people, and perhaps just as important to us here, that we are\ncapable of doing this. When the chips are down, we are capable of\ngetting together across party lines and doing what is right for the\ncountry. That, ultimately, is why we all came here. That gives us the\ngreatest satisfaction and,\n\n[[Page S11942]]\n\nincidentally, it is probably the smartest and most productive thing we\ncan do politically as well.\n This simply would not have happened in the Senate without the\nchairman of the committee on Homeland Security and Governmental\nAffairs, and ultimately the chairman of the conference, Senator\nCollins, setting exactly that tone. I thank Peter Hoekstra on the House\nside, Jane Harman, and all the members of the conference committee for\nall they contributed.\n This legislation is a testament to the courage and persistence of the\nfamilies of the victims of September 11. Their personal sacrifices,\ntransformed into a steadfast devotion to see this bill to passage, will\nhelp make the rest of America safer. This bill was conceived in the\nmemory of their husbands and wives, their sons and daughters, their\nmothers and fathers and brothers and sisters, and simply would not have\nbeen possible without the constancy of effort and the increasingly\nsophisticated advocacy by the surviving family members. I thank them.\n We have worked hard for this historic agreement because we believe,\nquite simply, that the security of our Nation depends on it. There were\nvarious times at which people in this Chamber and the other body said\nwe were moving too quickly; what was the cause for haste? I can tell\nyou it didn't seem we were moving too quickly to Senator Collins and\nme. But what was the cause for our haste? Our enemies, our terrorist\nenemies, al-Qaida and their ilk, are not waiting, as we know. They are\nhere. They are planning. We are at peril. Accordingly, we approached\nthis task with a real sense of urgency, a grave and growing sense of\nurgency because we know we face a clear and present danger from\nterrorists.\n\n The bill before us today is a landmark achievement because, as others\nhave said and will say throughout the day, for the first time in over\nhalf a century we are going to modernize our national intelligence\nstructure to meet the new challenges we face in today's world. With\nthis bill, we recognize we can no longer keep the American people safe\nsimply by projecting military force abroad. The world has changed. Our\nterrorist enemies today make no distinction between soldiers and\ncivilians, between foreign and domestic locations when they attack us.\nTo defeat them, we must have the best possible intelligence about their\nplans before they strike so we can stop them before they strike.\n This legislation moves us toward that goal significantly by\ntransforming our intelligence community from a Cold-War model--and\nafter all, it was at the outset of the Cold War that the current\nstructure was conceived--a Cold-War model that shared information only\nif there was a need to know, to a 21st-century model that will share\ninformation to maximize the intelligence community's substantial\nresources and expertise and, yes, guarantee greater returns for the\nbillions and billions of dollars of taxpayer money that are invested in\nintelligence to protect the American people.\n The 9/11 Commission supports our compromise. Chairman Kean and Vice\nChairman Hamilton said in a statement:\n\n We believe this is a good bill and a strong bill. We\n believe it will make our country safer and more secure.\n\n They support this compromise because it implements the Commission's\nkey recommendations to establish that DNI and a National\nCounterterrorism Center that will improve coordination and\ncollaboration, as the Commission puts it, ``to forge unity of effort''\nbetween the 15 intelligence agencies scattered throughout the\nGovernment, and to ensure that, unlike up until now, someone is\ngenuinely in charge.\n I said to a business executive in my home State this morning, talking\nabout this bill, explaining why I couldn't be with him today at a\nmeeting in Connecticut, that if anybody in business really got inside\nand looked at how we are spending the billions of dollars we do on\nintelligence, they--well, they wouldn't believe it because no one is in\ncharge.\n The Commission indicted the status quo of America's intelligence\ncommunity. The 9/11 Commission report is an indictment of the status\nquo. Those who pick and try to look for loopholes in this reform have\nto remember that the status quo failed to protect the American people\non 9/11 and it has failed in different ways to provide us with the\nquality, accuracy and reliability of intelligence that we need.\n Vice Chairman Hamilton memorably told our committee in our hearings\non this Commission report:\n\n A critical theme that emerged throughout our inquiry was\n the difficulty of answering the question: Who's in charge?\n Who ensures that agencies pool resources, avoid duplication\n and plan jointly? Who oversees the massive integration and\n unity of effort to keep America safe? Too often [the 9/11\n Commission said] the answer is no one.\n\n The fact is, below the level of the President no one has been in\ncharge of overseeing the entire intelligence community and its\nmultibillion-dollar budget. Today, as testimony before our committee\nvalidated, no one is clearly in charge of the hunt for Osama bin Laden.\nNo one has had the authority to knit together the efforts of the 15\ndisparate agencies working on intelligence for the American people,\nand, therefore, no one has ultimately been accountable for the deadly\nmistakes that have been made.\n This legislation changes all of that, putting a clear command\nstructure in place so that in the future the puzzle pieces will be put\ntogether, the dots will be connected, and so, I hope, pray, and\nbelieve, we will never have to suffer through another attack like the\none we did suffer through, and still do, on September 11, 2001.\n I wish to briefly discuss some of the key provisions, starting with\nintelligence reform.\n Under our current intelligence structure, the CIA Director has to\nperform three jobs: acting as the President's principal intelligence\nadviser, overseeing the intelligence community as a whole, and\ndirecting the CIA. The 9/11 Commission reported what many had said\nbefore: The tasks are simply too much to expect of any one person.\n So we have created a Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed\nDirector of National Intelligence, who will lead the national\nintelligence community but be separate from the Director of the CIA.\nThe DNI will be the President's principal intelligence adviser and will\nfocus exclusively on breaking down those barriers that have obstructed\ninformation sharing and professional collaboration in the public\ninterest. With the CIA Director in charge of daily CIA operations, the\nDNI will be able to forge that unity of effort which we need to better\nprotect the American people.\n The DNI will exercise significant budget authority over the\nintelligence community both in the development and the execution of the\nbudget, and he or she will consult closely with the Secretary of\nDefense, the Director of the CIA, the head of the FBI, and other\nintelligence leaders on both funding and personnel issues.\n The DNI will have unprecedented authority in the implementation and\nexecution of all funding under our national intelligence program.\n Our bill makes clear that the DNI will have the power to ``develop\nand determine'' the intelligence budget and that the Director of the\nOffice of Management and Budget must apportion the national\nintelligence program funds at the ``exclusive direction'' of the DNI.\nThe DNI is further responsible for managing the appropriations by\n``directing the allotment and allocation'' of appropriations through\nthe heads of Departments containing the elements of the intelligence\ncommunity. Just to make sure there is no slow-walking in moving those\nfunds forward, the Department comptrollers must then allot, allocate,\nreprogram, or transfer funds--in the words of the report--``in an\nexpeditious manner.''\n The DNI will have a major hand in the appointment of key officials\nacross the intelligence community, thus elevating the authority of that\nposition. He or she will recommend appointment of the Director of the\nCentral Intelligence Agency to the President. The Secretary of Defense\nwill have to obtain the DNI's concurrence in appointing the heads of\nthe National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and\nthe National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The Secretary will consult\nwith the DNI before appointing the Director of the Defense Intelligence\nAgency. The Secretaries of the Departments of Energy, Homeland\nSecurity, Treasury, State, and the Attorney General will need the\nconcurrence of the DNI to appoint the heads of intelligence agencies\nunder their immediate jurisdiction and under the DNI's\n\n[[Page S11943]]\n\noverall jurisdiction. That is real authority in this new office.\n The DNI will also have significantly expanded authority to transfer\npersonnel and funds beyond those of the current DCI so that he or she\nmay react quickly to changing threats and direct intelligence resources\nwhere they are needed.\n In addition to creating the DNI, this conference report will create--\nas recommended by the Commission--the National Counterterrorism Center\nand a series of National Intelligence Centers to ensure that critical\nnational security issues are addressed with maximum coordination and\nteamwork.\n This may well be the most significant process we have begun with this\nbill, the authority of DNI, but creating a model, and a model built on\nthe most effective, modern corporate models of joint team efforts to\ndeal with problems. But it really deals directly and grows out of the\nexperience of the Pentagon post-Goldwater-Nichols, in joint warfare.\n\n This says when we have a critical national security problem the best\nway to deal with it will be to create a center to deal with it, a table\nat which every element of our Government involved in dealing with that\nproblem is present so they can collect intelligence together, analyze\nit together, and then plan how to combat the problem.\n Specifically created in this bill, of course, is the National\nCounterterrorism Center which will seek to make ensure the disastrous\ndisconnect between the FBI and the CIA that occurred prior to 9/11 will\nnever occur again. It will develop plans, assign roles, and monitor the\nagencies' implementation of those plans in order to thwart the next\nterror attack.\n This is not a narrowly focused, constricted center. The Center's\nplanning will be at the strategic level such as how do we best win the\n``hearts and minds'' of the great majority of people in the Muslim\nworld. It will be at the tactical level--for instance, how we are going\nto capture Osama bin Laden.\n The National Counterterrorism Center Director will be confirmed by\nthe Senate and it will report to the Director of National Intelligence,\nand in some cases to the President himself.\n Let me talk about those other centers.\n This bill creates one other center to deal with a most pressing\nthreat to our security; that is, the proliferation of weapons of mass\ndestruction. This part of the bill was inserted as a result of the\nleadership of the majority leader, Senator Frist. It is an enormous\nstep forward in dealing with the threat of WMD.\n These are the central structures of the intelligence reform, but our\nlegislation goes beyond that. The 9/11 Commission documented that, in a\nperiod preceding September 11, 2001, potentially helpful information\navailable to one part of the Government was not shared with others\nwhich could have used it.\n This legislation takes that direction from the Commission to heart\nand requires the President to establish a network of technologies and\npolicies that will resolve conflicts between the need to share and the\nneed to protect sources and methods. It will create and allow us to use\nthe best technology to make sure we are sharing and culling and\nfiltering and applying the vast amount of data we get from our\nintelligence networks most effectively.\n Beyond intelligence reform, this bill contains much more. In fact,\nthe 9/11 Commission made 41 recommendations to protect our Nation from\nterrorism. In August, Senator McCain and I drafted legislation to\naddress them all. I am pleased and proud to say I am grateful for the\nconferees, to the Senate, and to the House that most of those\ninitiatives have become part of this conference report.\n For example, the 9/11 Commission observed that many of the actions\nnecessary to protect us in the war against terror also involves a\nconsolidation of governmental authority and the increased presence of\ngovernment in our lives to protect us. In response, the Commission\ncalled for ``an enhanced system of checks and balances'' to protect the\ncivil liberties that define us as Americans. In fact, this conference\nreport creates a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.\n The Board will have two functions. First, to advise the President and\nFederal agencies at the front end of policymaking and, second, to\nconduct oversight at the back end, investigating and reviewing\nGovernment actions to determine whether executive branch officials are\nappropriately respecting the individual freedoms of the American\npeople.\n The 9/11 Commission also recognized the futility of combating\nterrorism only by military means. Of course, we have been, and will\ncontinue, doing our best to capture and kill all the terrorists we can\nas soon as possible. But we understand that ultimately what is required\nto stop the growth of terrorism are initiatives of foreign policy,\ndiplomacy, economics, and of politics.\n Our legislation--this conference report--includes many of the\nprovisions recommended by the Commission which will do just that,\nincluding increased American foreign assistance to Afghanistan and a\nrenewed U.S. commitment to Pakistan. It provides enabling authorities\nto help us win ``the struggle of ideas'' through the greater funding\nand use of much more imagination in American broadcasts to the Islamic\nworld. It calls for broadening and growth of scholarships and exchange\nprograms between the United States and the Muslim world, with students\nand faculty going back and forth.\n The bill also takes aggressive measures to prevent attacks, as well,\nby targeting terrorist travel, improving screening at entry and exit\npoints, and securing identification documents.\n Our legislation requires secure identification for travel documents\nfor all travel into the United States. This was a topic about which\nmuch was said and debated in the conference, and before, during, and\nafter House adoption of this conference report yesterday. I guess the\nconferees, in their wisdom, decided some of the immigration reform in\nthe House bill would have weighted the bill down and inhibited or\nprohibited its passage. It is urgently needed and we cannot afford to\ndo that. We will get to that next year.\n\n Make no mistake, this conference report contains some tough\nantiterrorist law enforcement measures, and some tough immigration\nenforcement measure. It specifically implements the 9/11 Commission\nReport recommendation for the Federal Government to establish minimum\nstandards for birth certificates, driver's licenses, and personal\nidentification cards. Those provisions will help decrease fraud so\nterrorists are not able to hide their identity. They will not deprive\nthe States of the right that States understandably want, to determine,\nnot the form of the driver's license, but who is eligible to receive a\ndriver's license within their States.\n Other measures in this conference report will go far to tighten\nborder security. It will increase the number of border guards,\nimmigration officers, and detention beds for those who are being held\nfor legal action and other action to determine their immigration status\nand whether they should be deported. No longer will we have a case, as\nin the past, where a challenge is made to someone's immigration status\nbut they are allowed to wander and disappear into the vastness of\nAmerica. There will be thousands of new beds created, detention\nfacilities, to hold those people while their cases are being reviewed.\n We added a provision allowing the Government to deport anyone who has\nreceived military training from a terrorist organization. The\nGovernment will also be able to obtain a Foreign Intelligence\nSurveillance Act warrant for anyone engaging in terrorist activities\neven if they are not clearly connected to a specific terrorist\norganization. That is common sense, but it is not in the law now.\n To better safeguard the Nation's transportation networks, this\nlegislation also requires the Department of Homeland Security to\nproduce a national transportation strategy that evaluates the risks\nfaced by all modes of transportation, not just aviation, and sets some\nclear priorities and deadlines for security needs.\n We also have included measures to help first responders, the hundreds\nof thousands of men and women, largely in uniform, some out, at the\nlocal and State levels. We want to help them obtain interoperable\ncommunications equipment so in a crisis they can talk with each other\nand work cooperatively.\n I have long believed if we are going to make sense of what happened\non\n\n[[Page S11944]]\n\nSeptember 11 we need to look back honestly with clear eyes and honest\nhearts. The 9/11 Commission's extraordinary work enabled us to do just\nthat. Its 587-page report did not close the book on September 11. It\nwill never be closed. The legislation does not close the book on\nSeptember 11. It will live alongside December 7 as a day that will live\nin infamy throughout American history and America's future.\n The work on this conference report and its adoption today will open a\nnew chapter for a safer America. Chairman Kean has said:\n\n Our biggest weapon of defense is our intelligence system.\n If that doesn't work, our chances of being attacked are so\n much greater. So our major recommendation is to fix that\n intelligence system and do it as fast as possible.\n\n That is exactly what this historic legislation does.\n In this Congress, this President fulfills our constitutional duty to\nprovide for the common defense of our Nation. I said before that many\ncan claim to be parents of this victory. Members of both parties in\nCongress, leaders of both parties, bipartisan leadership in this\nChamber certainly stood by Senator Collins and me all the way. This\nsimply would not have happened without the support of the President of\nthe United States, the Vice President of the United States, and their\nstaffs, working hard and long to do something that institutions and\ngovernment do not do easily, which is to change. If it was easy, the\n20-some-odd attempts made in the last half century to reform our\nintelligence system would have worked, would have succeeded. They did\nnot.\n\n This is about to succeed because of the effort that has been made\nacross party lines in the national interests by everyone from the\nPresident of the United States to every single Member of Congress who\nworked hard on this measure.\n Maybe I should add another thank you. Maybe I should go from the\nPresident to our staffs. Senator Collins has said the legions of staff\nmembers on both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol put\ntheir lives on hold and worked through nights and weekends for the\ncause of a safer America. I particularly thank Kevin Landy on my staff,\nwhose work started with the legislation to create the 9/11 Commission--\nthat was a story in itself--and who has been single minded in his\ndevotion to crafting this legislation in a way that was real and\nexcellent. I also single out the work of Majority Staff Director\nMichael Bopp, and all of his team. Michael has terrific legislative\nskills and leadership abilities and has served the conference and the\ncountry extraordinarily well. On my staff I also thank my staff\ndirector Joyce Rechtschaffen, and Dave Barton, Mike Alexander, Raj De,\nChristine Healey, Holly Idelson, Beth Grossman, Larry Novey, Jason\nYanussi, Kathy Seddon, Dave Berick, Mary Beth Schultz, Tim Profeta,\nFred Downey, Andrew Weinshenk, and Donny Ray Williams, Leslie Phillips,\nBill Bonvillian and Laurie Rubenstein. I could go on and on. Many other\nstaffers of other Senators contributed much to this bill and I thank\nthem. I would especially like to thank Marianne Upton and Joe Zogby\nfrom Senator Durbin's staff. And I particularly express my personal\nappreciation, in this and so many partnerships we have been involved\nin, to Senator John McCain of Arizona, and to his staff. We worked in\nclose partnership to craft the legislation implementing the 9/11\nCommission recommendations. Many provisions were adopted in the Senate\nand are integral parts of the conference report. I thank them all.\n I come back to the beginning to particularly thank my colleague and\nfriend, our chairman, Senator Susan Collins of Maine.\n I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record two documents\nfrom the 9/11 Public Discourse Project regarding driver's licenses and\nmilitary chain of command.\n There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in\nthe Record, as follows:\n\n Fact Sheet: Driver's Licenses, 9/11, and Intelligence Reform\n\n What happened in the 9/11 plot\n\n The hijackers obtained 13 driver's licenses (two of which\n were duplicates) and 21 USA or State-issued identification\n cards (usually used for showing residence in the U.S. or a\n State).\n The driver's licenses themselves were all legal, that is,\n they were not forged. But they were not all legally obtained.\n Seven hijackers used fraudulent means (false statements of\n residency) to acquire legitimate identifications in Virginia.\n Their fraud in obtaining driver's licenses did not arise\n from them being undocumented aliens. All the hijackers\n entered the United States with proper immigration documents,\n but several had committed fraudulent acts to get them.\n One hijacker who obtained a driver's license when he was in\n status was out of status on 9/11. Another hijacker whose\n documents clearly showed that he was out of status and had\n overstayed his 30-day visitor's visa did not seek or obtain a\n driver's license. He used his passport to prove\n identification and board the aircraft.\n Based on what we learned in the 9/11 story, we recommended\n stronger immigration enforcement to catch terrorists who were\n exploiting weaknesses in America's border security. We\n recommended greater attention to terrorist travel tactics and\n information sharing about such travel.\n We also recommended strong Federal standards for the\n issuance of birth certificates and other sources of\n identification, such as driver's licenses, to avoid the\n identity fraud that terrorists can exploit.\n We did not make any recommendations to State governments\n about which individuals should or should not be issued a\n driver's license.\n Specifically, we did not make any recommendation about\n licenses for undocumented aliens. That issue did not arise in\n our investigation, as all hijackers entered the United States\n with documentation (often fraudulent) that appeared lawful to\n immigration inspectors. They were therefore ``legal\n immigrants'' at the time they received their driver's\n licenses.\n\n What the pending Conference Report (following the Commission's\n recommendations) would require\n\n The establishment of new standards to ensure the integrity\n of the three basic documents Americans use to establish their\n identity-birth certificates; State-issued driver's licenses\n and i.d. cards; and social security cards.\n New standards to ensure that the applicant for the identity\n document is actually the person the applicant claims to be;\n and improvements to the physical security of the document.\n States would receive grants to assist them in implementing\n the new standards.\n\n What H.R. 10 requires\n\n H.R. 10 requires that before issuing a driver's license a\n State would need to verify that each applicant:\n Is a citizen of the United States;\n Is an alien lawfully admitted to permanent residence status\n in the U.S.;\n Has conditional permanent residence status in the U.S.;\n Has a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant visa or nonimmigrant\n visa status for entry into the U.S.; or\n Has a pending application for adjustment of status to that\n of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the\n U.S. (There are additional requirements but these are the key\n ones).\n Only citizens and permanent residents could receive\n driver's licenses; all others with documentation would have\n temporary driver's licenses issued for the length of visa\n stay or not more than one year if there is no definite end to\n the period of authorized stay. Undocumented aliens could not\n receive licenses.\n\n Observations\n\n It is important to have national standards on driver's\n licenses, passports and other identification documents.\n There is no doubt hijackers used State-issued documents to\n get through a lot of checkpoints. For this reason, we believe\n Federal minimum standards for such State-issued documents are\n important.\n Whether illegal aliens should be able to get driver's\n licenses is a valid question for debate.\n The debate over this issue ought not to hang up the\n hundreds of provisions in the conference report that would\n strengthen intelligence, improve information sharing,\n strengthen transportation and border security, improve\n American foreign policy, and support first responders.\n We would also note that if the hijackers presented visa\n documentation that appeared valid to DMV officials (as they\n apparently did), they would still have been issued temporary\n driver's licenses for the duration of their visa, under the\n provisions in the House bill.\n ____\n\nFact Sheet: The Conference Report and Intelligence Support for Military\n Operations\n\n1. the proposed reforms do not change the chain of command for control\n of national intelligence assets\n\n The warfighter today can call upon real-time intelligence\n support from the military services (like the Air Force), from\n his joint forces command (like CENTCOM), and from national\n agencies (like the signals intelligence analyzed by NSA).\n The bill does not affect support relationships between\n combat units and military services (like the Air Force).\n The bill does not affect support relationships between\n combat units and the joint\n\n[[Page S11945]]\n\n forces command to which they are assigned (like CENTCOM). It\n would not affect CENTCOM's management of the assets assigned\n to that command. So, for example, the bill would have no\n effect at all on the support relationship between the soldier\n in the field and a JSTARS aircraft or Predator UAV assigned\n to CENTCOM's intelligence component, its J-2.\n Assets, like satellites, that are run by national agencies\n are managed for the benefit of the whole US government. That\n is why these are called ``national'' agencies. The chain of\n command for operational decisions about those assets\n therefore goes outside of DOD under the status quo.\n Under President Bush's executive order (August 2004), DCI\n Goss has the duty to set the requirements and priorities for\n collection by these agencies. The DCI also has the authority\n to ``resolve conflicts in the tasking of national collection\n assets. . . .''\n Under the conference report these same authorities simply\n move from the DCI to the DNI, for ``resolving conflicts in\n collection requirements and in the tasking of national\n collection assets of the elements of the intelligence\n community.''\n At the operational level, the job of getting national\n assets in support of the warfighter is managed by the unified\n combatant commands with the help of the Joint Staff's J-2 and\n the J-2's National Military Joint Intelligence Center.\n None of the current practices for the allocation of\n national assets would change as the focal point for national\n coordination moves from the DCI to the DNI.\n\n 2. the specific concerns articulated by jcs chairman general myers in\n his letter of october 21st were addressed in the conference report\n\n General Myers' letter of October 21st (attached) did not\n register any concerns about the chain of command in\n operational intelligence support for the warfighter.\n General Myers focused only on budget matters, where he\n specifically requested that:\n (a) ``the budgets of the combat support agencies should\n come up from the agencies through the Secretary of Defense to\n the National Intelligence Director''; and\n (b) ``it is likewise important that the appropriations are\n passed from the National Intelligence Director through the\n Department to the combat support agencies.''\n This latter point, on ``this vital flow,'' is the one--the\n only one--singled out for a ``recommendation that this\n critical provision be preserved in the conference.''\n It was.\n VVIn the conference report, the appropriations do not go to\n the National Intelligence Director. The appropriations for\n national intelligence go through the heads of the relevant\n departments.\n With the help of OMB, the DNI can direct allotment or\n allocation of these funds, but the flow of funds goes through\n the department to (in DOD's case) the combat support\n agencies:\n ``Department comptrollers or appropriate budget execution\n officers shall allot, allocate, reprogram, or transfer funds\n appropriated for the National Intelligence Program in an\n expeditious manner.''\n Thus the conference report accepted the recommendation of\n General Myers for how to direct the flow of funds.\n Even on the issue of budget preparation, the conference\n report addressed the concern raised by General Myers.\n In the conference report, the budgets from the combat\n support agencies come up through the Secretary of Defense. If\n the combat support agencies are not national intelligence\n agencies and are covered under the appropriations for joint\n military intelligence or for tactical intelligence and\n related activities, the proposed DNI participates with the\n Secretary of Defense in developing the final budget for them.\n For these combat support agencies the authority of the\n Secretary of Defense remains exactly as it is now.\n If the combat support agencies are also national\n intelligence agencies (which is the case for the National\n Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency,\n and the National Reconnaissance Office), the proposed DNI\n would develop and determine the national intelligence program\n budget ``based on budget proposals provided . . . by the\n heads of agencies and organizations within the intelligence\n community and the heads of their respective departments and,\n as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the Joint\n Intelligence Community Council.''\n Thus, in the conference report, the Secretary of Defense\n has input into budget preparation for these national agencies\n both directly and through his participation in the proposed\n Joint Intelligence Community Council.\n\n 3. the commission considered dod concerns in the preparation of its\n recommendations\n\n Commissioners and Commission staff discussed DOD concerns\n about intelligence reorganization with Secretary Rumsfeld,\n Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Cambone, Director\n of the National Security Agency General Hayden, the Director\n of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency General\n Clapper, and many others. General Hayden and General Clapper\n have spent their careers in providing military intelligence\n support for the warfighter.\n Commissioners and/or Commission staff made three\n investigative visits to HQ Central Command and HQ Special\n Operations Command. They interviewed officers at HQ Northern\n Command and HQ Joint Special Operations Command. They\n interviewed users of intelligence in the field, in\n Afghanistan and Pakistan.\n\n 4. a better structure enables better management\n\n The Commission never took the view that reorganization\n solves all problems. A better structure enables better\n management.\n Numerous specific management reforms are needed, in areas\n such as human intelligence collection; common standards for\n information technology and network capabilities; more\n efficient use of available experts; improved language skills;\n standardized processing of raw intelligence; and better all-\n source analysis.\n What we found is that these and other management reforms\n falter in an unmanageable intelligence community. A better\n structure makes it more likely that such urgent management\n reforms will succeed.\n ____\n\n Appendix: Letter From Gen. Richard Myers to HASC Chairman Hunter\n\n Chairman of the Joint\n\n Chiefs of Staff,\n\n Washington, DC, October 21, 2004.\n Hon. Duncan Hunter,\n Chairman, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives,\n Washington, DC.\n Dear Mr. Chairman: As we discussed during our recent\n telephone conversation, I know that you and the conferees are\n discussing intelligence reform and the intelligence budget\n process. This is a vitally important subject as we look at\n the effectiveness of the intelligence provided by our combat\n support agencies. It is my belief that the responsibilities\n of the Secretary of Defense for the operation of these\n agencies, including budget preparation and execution, should\n be addressed as the conferees proceed to a final bill. In\n this regard the budgets of the combat support agencies should\n come up from the agencies through the Secretary of Defense to\n the National Intelligence Director, ensuring that required\n warfighting capabilities are accommodated and rationalized\n and ensuring that the Secretary meets his obligations. For\n appropriations, it is likewise important that the\n appropriations are passed from the National Intelligence\n Director through the Department to the combat support\n agencies. It is my understanding that the House bill\n maintains this vital flow through the Secretary of Defense to\n the combat support agencies. It is my recommendation that\n this critical provision be preserved in the conference.\n The combat support agencies provide critical combat\n intelligence capabilities important to the day to day\n operations of our armed forces, including, of course, combat\n operations. Establishing the budget process in this manner\n would allow the combat support agencies to continue their\n outstanding support to the warfighters, our on-going\n counterterrorism efforts, and the men and women of our\n nation's armed forces serving in harm's way.\n Sincerely,\n Richard B. Myers,\n Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.\n\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I yield the floor.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, before the Senator from Pennsylvania is\nrecognized, I have a unanimous consent request.\n Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Senator McCain be allocated 5\nminutes of my time at some point during the debate today.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I will be putting into the record a list\nof the Senate conferees because each of them contributed in\nextraordinary ways to this bill. I will be making comments about some\nof them and their particular contributions later in the debate today.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Carper of\nDelaware be given 5 minutes to speak at an appropriate time of the time\nallotted to me.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n The Senator from Pennsylvania.\n Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I begin by congratulating the chairman,\nSenator Collins, and the ranking member, Senator Lieberman, for their\nextraordinary leadership in the beginning of the legislative process\nwhich has culminated in where we are today and their steadfast\ndetermination in pursuit of this bill throughout many arduous months.\n Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman took up at the direction of the\nmajority leader and the Democratic leader in structuring hearings which\nbegan at the end of July of this year immediately after the Democratic\nNational Convention. They proceeded in August in an unprecedented way\nwhere the regular schedules were interrupted, a difficult thing to do\nin a campaign year. They reconvened the Governmental Affairs Committee\non which\n\n[[Page S11946]]\n\nI served and the committee members were advised of schedules--difficult\nto do in a campaign season when many Members are up for reelection--but\nthe legislative objective was of paramount importance and the committee\nresponded and the committee pursued the hearings and came up with the\nlegislation.\n I believe what we have here is really a battlefield victory over the\nDepartment of Defense. The essential issue has long been a turf\nstruggle, and I think we have taken a short step, but a significant\none, in the legislation which is presented in the conference report\ntoday.\n I do not think we should overstate where we have come, but I think,\nat the same time, we need to recognize we have stepped significantly\nforward, albeit a single step, as a result of the insistence of the\nPresident of the United States who deserves commendation for his\nleadership in the final stages of this matter to bring the legislation\nwhere it is today.\n Where we have had a good bit of discussion on the issue of chain of\ncommand, I think realistically that has been more smoke than substance.\nBut, at any rate, the key participants in the House of Representatives\nwere satisfied so the bill did come to a vote in the House, and the\nSenate is ready to take the matter up today.\n A great deal of credit is obviously due to the families of the 9/11\nvictims in their insistence that the 9/11 Commission be formed. And\nthen great credit is due to the 9/11 Commission itself in structuring a\nreport, which was filed in July, and then putting considerable pressure\nto have their report enacted.\n I think, to repeat, the realities are that the final legislation is\nshort of where the 9/11 Commission would like to have gone either with\nrespect to budget control or with respect to day-to-day operations, but\nin the tortuous process of making changes in the intelligence\ncommunity, the 9/11 Commission has been a catalyst here in a very\nimportant way.\n It became apparent, when 9/11 occurred, that had there been proper\ncoordination among the intelligence agencies that 9/11 might well have\nbeen prevented. There was that FBI report out of Phoenix about the\nsuspicious character who was interested in learning how to fly a plane,\nnot concerned about takeoffs or landings. That FBI report never got to\nthe proper line in FBI headquarters in Washington.\n Then, the CIA knew about the two al-Qaida operatives in Kuala Lumpur,\nbut that information was never transmitted to the Immigration and\nNaturalization Service. It was not in the INS computers. Those al-Qaida\noperatives got into the United States and were two of the pilots on 9/\n11.\n Then there was the FBI report out of Minneapolis with Special Agent\nColleen Rowley, who wrote a 13-page, single-spaced report which finally\nreceived public attention, finally came to the attention of the key\nofficials of the FBI.\n The Judiciary Committee held hearings in June of 2002, and there was\nsurprise and consternation that the appropriate test under the Foreign\nIntelligence Surveillance Act had not been applied. Had that material\nbeen known and had we been able to pick up the trail of Zacarias\nMoussaoui at an early date, again the case was building that 9/11 might\nwell have been prevented, had these facts come to the attention of the\nappropriate authorities and been collated and put all under one\numbrella.\n So the need was imperative for revision and reform of the national\nintelligence system.\n I had seen this need when I chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee\nback in the 104th Congress. At that time I introduced S. 1718, which\ncontained very material changes in the national intelligence community.\nI will not put that legislation in the Record at this time. I have done\nso on prior debates. But it was apparent at that time there needed to\nbe a revision of the national intelligence community. While the\nDirector of the Central Intelligence Agency had paper authority, he did\nnot have budgetary authority or day-to-day control sufficient to really\nput all of the intelligence operations under one umbrella.\n Following 9/11, after the report from Colleen Rowley came to light in\nJune of 2002, the administration agreed there should be a new\nDepartment of Homeland Security. Senator Lieberman and I introduced S.\n1534, 30 days after 9/11, on October 11 of the year 2001. The hearings\nwere held and there was considerable debate, and the legislation\nlanguished and had a lot of opposition. It finally came to the Senate\nfloor in the fall of 2002. Then, as what frequently happens, the House\npassed a bill and left town, leaving us with the option of either\ntaking their bill in October of 2002, which was an election year, or\nputting the matter over, which would have gone to spring.\n\n At that time, Senator Lieberman and I made an effort to give the new\nSecretary of Homeland Security authority to direct--not to task or not\nto ask or not to request but to direct--the other intelligence\nagencies. It seemed to us when you were creating a new Department that\nthis was the time to make some fundamental changes in the national\nintelligence structure. But the administration was opposed.\n I talked to Secretary Ridge, Vice President Cheney, and I talked to\nthe President, and there was opposition, as concerns had been expressed\nto putting any agency or any instrumentality or any unit between the\nCIA and the President. It seemed to me--and I made this argument--that\nwould not have been the case. But we were unable to make that\nmodification. That is where the status of the record lay, until the\n9/11 Commission came into operation and filed its report in July of\nthis year.\n Immediately thereafter, Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman, Senator\nBayh, and I introduced a bill which tracked what the 9/11 Commission\nwanted done. When the Governmental Affairs Committee took up the issue,\nwith the hearings in July and August, it seemed to me we needed a bill\nwhich gave a great deal more authority to the National Intelligence\nDirector than where the committee was heading, and I introduced S.\n2811, which gave the National Intelligence Director authority. I am not\ngoing to make that bill a part of the Record. It has already been made\na part of the Record in prior debates.\n The committee report did not give the National Intelligence Director\nday-by-day authority, which, as I say, I thought it should have. I\noffered an amendment which had cosponsors, including the former\nchairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby; the\npresent chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Roberts; and\nmany others who had very extensive experience on the intelligence\nstructure for the country. I offered that amendment on the floor, and\nit was defeated by a vote of 78 to 19, so that the National\nIntelligence Director in the Senate legislation was not given day-to-\nday operation.\n It was my thought then, and continues to be my thought, that if we\nraised the bar a little higher, perhaps in the negotiations--as we\nknow, as a practical matter, in a House/Senate conference there are\ncompromises--we might have ended up with a stronger Director than we\nhave at the present time. In the course of the negotiations with the\nHouse, the budgetary control was not maintained.\n So what we have today is a step forward. But there is a great deal\nmore, in my judgment, of which the National Intelligence Director needs\nto have effective control over in the national intelligence community.\nBut again, this is a step forward, not a big step but a significant\nstep, and it is something upon which we can build.\n It would be a colossal mistake to reject this bill with the thought\nof going back to the drawing board next year to begin again what we\nhave accomplished, putting us on another plateau from which we can\nwork.\n We have in this legislation significant improvements on\ntransportation security, on terrorist travel and effective screening,\non border protection, immigration and visa matters, on terrorism\nprevention. We do have those areas of very significant improvement.\n I believe that Congress is going to have a big job of oversight now,\nto see precisely what is done by the new National Intelligence\nDirector. We have changed our Senate procedures to make permanent the\nIntelligence Committee so there will be some institutional knowledge\nthere without the shift on 8-year terms. I served 8 years on the\nIntelligence Committee and had an opportunity to chair the committee\n\n[[Page S11947]]\n\nin the 104th Congress. That continuity will be very important.\n On the Appropriations Committee on which I serve, we have structured\na new intelligence subcommittee. In the line of seniority, I may have\nthe opportunity to chair that subcommittee. That is something I am\nthinking about. I am reluctant to give up the subcommittee on Labor,\nHealth, Human Services, and Education, but when we move forward from\nthis point on the restructuring of the national intelligence community,\nthis is a very significant period and is something to which I am giving\npersonal consideration.\n The creation of the new National Counterterrorism Center is a\nsignificant step forward. That has been an outgrowth of the mistake\nrecognized by the intelligence community from\n9/11. That had been in process, and this legislation takes a very\nimportant step beyond what is in existence at the present time, putting\nit into a statutory form. I have conferred with the top officials of\nthe FBI, and the Judiciary Committee has oversight over the FBI. This\nis something which requires very substantial oversight.\n It is my hope, depending on how the Judiciary Committee is structured\nnext year, that this is something which the Judiciary Committee can\naccomplish. But the Intelligence Committee and the Governmental Affairs\nCommittee and perhaps other relevant committees, Armed Services\nCommittee, will have a big job in not resting on our laurels on\nlegislation which will be enacted today. We ought not to take too much\nsolace in laurels, although though it is justifiable to some extent.\nBut there is a great deal more which needs to be done to see to it that\nthere is the kind of coordination and that we have made a successful\nattack on the cultures of concealment which are present in the\nintelligence community.\n I have seen that culture of concealment from the work that I have\ndone on the Judiciary Committee on oversight for the past 24 years. I\nsaw that culture of concealment in the Central Intelligence Agency in\nthe 8 years I was on the Intelligence Committee. It may be that what\nhas happened with the events of 9/11 and with the pressure of the 9/11\nCommission, with the legislation on the Department of Homeland\nSecurity, that the intelligence community has been sensitized, perhaps\neven more than sensitized, perhaps more accurately stated, bludgeoned\nby congressional criticism and by public criticism over their failures\nto coordinate intelligence activities which, had they been coordinated,\n9/11 might have been prevented.\n In conclusion--the two most popular words in every speech--I urge my\ncolleagues to adopt this legislation. I further urge my colleagues in\nboth this body, the Senate, and the House to be vigilant, to pursue\noversight, to see to it that the ultimate objective of coordination and\ncentralized direction is obtained with this legislation as a\nsignificant starting point.\n Far from perfect, it nonetheless provides a valuable foundation for\nfuture legislation and puts us on the path to meaningful intelligence\nreform. As such, I believe it is preferable to act now on a finite\nnumber of matters that can be accomplished immediately. Any attempt in\nthe future to enact intelligence reform legislation from scratch,\nespecially reform of intelligence budget matters, will be subject to\nthe bitter turf battles involving the self-protection of entrenched\nbureaucratic prerogatives that have characterized this and past efforts\nat reform. And while the contentious issues of State driver's license\nstandards and refugee asylum must be addressed, it is far better to do\nso in the context of hearings and additional input from interested\nparties. But simply starting over in the next Congress will likely\naccomplish little, if anything. Passage of this legislation--which\nincludes a statutory requirement for the issuance of Presidential\nguidelines assuring that the statutory responsibilities of the heads of\nvarious departments of our government will not be abrogated--will\nprovide a legislative base for Congress to build upon, while preserving\nthe requisite military chain of command.\n Valuable preliminary objectives have been accomplished in this\nlegislation, consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11\nCommission. This legislation creates a Presidential-appointed, Senate\nconfirmed director of national intelligence, DNI, who, while not\nserving as the head of CIA, will 1. oversee national intelligence and\nprovide all-source analysis on specific subjects of interest across the\nU.S. government, and plan intelligence operations for the whole\ngovernment on major problems such as counterterrorism; 2. manage the\nnational intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute\nto it; and 3. ``manage and direct'' the tasking of collection and\nanalysis. The legislation also will establish a national\ncounterterrorism center, with a Senate-confirmed director, for\ndeveloping joint counterterrorism plans covering key missions,\nobjectives to be achieved, tasks to be performed, interagency\ncoordination of operational activities, and the assignment of roles and\nresponsibilities in the consolidated counterterrorism mission. Also,\nunder this bill the President must establish a national\ncounterproliferation center which, as envisioned by the provision's\nsponsor, Majority Leader Frist, implements a key recommendation of my\n1999 Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to\nCombat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. And the\nlegislation will enable the implementation of other policy objectives\nthat I have favored such as expansion of the electromagnetic spectrum\nto enhance first responder interoperability, deployment and use of\nexplosives detection equipment at airport screening checkpoints,\nimproved watch lists for passenger prescreening, improved border\nsecurity, including an increase in full-time border patrol agents and\ndetention beds, an increase in criminal penalties for alien smuggling,\nand for those who seek to use weapons of mass destruction, an increase\nin the number of serious criminal offenses designated as ``Federal\ncrimes of terrorism,'' improvements in financial crime enforcement and\nterror financing abatement, authority to use our Foreign Intelligence\nSurveillance Act powers against ``lone wolf' terrorists, authorization\nto share grand jury information about terrorist threats with State and\nlocal officials, and development of a national strategy on terrorist\ntravel and travel documents.\n Many crucial objectives were not achieved, however. The budget\nexecution authority deemed essential for the DNI to exercise genuine\ncontrol over the intelligence community has been removed from the bill,\nso that the appropriation for the national intelligence program does\nnot go directly to the DNI, and the DNI does not have authority to\ndirect the allocation of funds to the various elements of the\nintelligence community. Further, the top line budget figure for the\nnational intelligence program will be kept secret, and thus\nintelligence spending will remain unaccountable to the American people.\nThe DNI is left with the power to ``develop and determine'' the\nnational intelligence program budget, which is effectively the same\nauthority that the current DCI is given over the National Foreign\nIntelligence Program budget by executive order. Also, personnel and\ntransfer authority has been further diluted in this final legislation.\nSpecifically, while the DNI can move intelligence community funds in\ntheir year of execution, the heads of the intelligence community\nagencies will have a right of refusal over any reprogramming or\ntransfer exceeding 5 percent of their agency's aggregate budget, or\nexceeding $150 million, or involving the termination of an acquisition\nprogram, e.g., satellite procurement. Personnel transfer is also\ntightly circumscribed and can be accomplished only with the approval of\nthe Office of Management and Budget.\n\n Beyond budget and transfer authority, the new DNI has not been\ngranted authority that approximates what I consider to be the\nappropriate level of operational control over the various elements of\nthe intelligence community. The DNI also does not have, as the 9/11\nCommission recommended, ``hire and fire'' authority over senior\nintelligence community officials, but rather has the right of\nconcurrence in the hiring of senior intelligence community officials\nand the right to be consulted in the appointment of the head of DIA.\nNor does the DNI control information infrastructure standards.\n I also believe that the failure to include a statutory inspector\ngeneral weakens the oversight of the new DNI\n\n[[Page S11948]]\n\nand thus raises additional privacy and civil liberties concerns.\n Finally, the legislation sets up an inadequate structure within which\nthe DNI must operate. I had initially proposed that the DNI serve as\nthe head of an independent agency, or department, and the final Senate\nbill arrived at a similar ``National Intelligence Authority'' to house\nthe office of the DNI and the national counterterrorism center.\nContrary to the concepts conceived in the Senate, the NCTC and the\nDNI's officers under this legislation will be housed within the office\nof the DNI. In other words, there is no power base from which the DNI\ncan operate. He will have no ``troops'' other than those that filter\nthrough the NCTC and the office, and no actual authority with which to\ninfluence, direct, or control intelligence community entities and\npersonnel.\n These shortcomings must be addressed in future legislation if we are\nto have an intelligence apparatus that can be effective against 21st\ncentury threats, while protecting constitutional rights.\n It will not be easy, however, to overcome the ingrained bureaucratic\ntendencies to protect turf and the status quo. It has recently been\nreported that the Department of Defense fought extremely hard during\nthe conference committee negotiations to further reduce the powers that\nwould be accorded to the DNI. My experience in attempting to enhance\nthe budget and operational authority of the Director of Central\nIntelligence in 1996 led me to the conclusion that the same turf\nbattles existing prior to 9/11 would endure during the process of\nformulating this most recent attempt at intelligence reform.\nUnfortunately, this is precisely what has occurred this year and, like\nin 1996, the Pentagon has successfully attenuated intelligence reform\nlegislation.\n Thus, while we have gained marginal advantages over current law and\npractice in this legislation, the conference report in its totality\nshould be viewed as the basis for building upon the powers of the DNI\nin future legislation. Conversely, if we reject this bill, it is ``back\nto the drawing board'' when we reconvene with an entirely new set of\npriorities to tackle in the next Congress. This delay will allow reform\nopponents the time and renewed vigor to marshal their resources in\nopposition to changing the status quo. It is far less likely that we\nwill accomplish anything meaningful on intelligence reform next year if\nwe must start from scratch, lacking the momentum of the 9/11 report and\nwithout the pressure of the congressional and presidential elections.\n I thank the Chair and yield the floor.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.\n Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, we gather today in the Senate for an\nhistoric occasion. What we are about to consider is a conference report\non the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In\nabout 250 written pages, we will literally rewrite the laws governing\nthe intelligence community of America.\n This is an historic moment. It is rare, if ever, that the Congress\nrises to the occasion as it has with this legislation. It is rare, if\never, that we can find a bipartisan consensus on an item of such\ncontroversy. Yet we have achieved it. The National Security\nIntelligence Reform Act will make America safer. It will force our\nGovernment to modernize the way we collect and use intelligence.\n This legislation was born from the tragedy of 9/11 and the\ndetermination of the victims' families that their loved ones would not\nhave died in vain. These courageous survivors are the reason this\ncongressional effort could not and did not fail. In their grief, many\npeople tend to withdraw, to say that they will mourn in private. These\nvictims' families, after a period of mourning, decided to step forward\nand to lead our country and our Government toward a safer America.\nTheir dedication and their determination have resulted in this\ndocument.\n The bipartisan 9/11 Commission gave us an excellent blueprint, a\nsense of urgency, and a constant reminder that we had to rise above our\npartisan differences. We all know about this report. It is so well\nknown and so well read. It was even nominated as one of the great\nliterary works. That is rare for a Government publication, but it\ndeserved that nomination because it is well written, well thought out,\nwell prepared. Governor Kean of New Jersey, Congressman Lee Hamilton of\nIndiana put together an extraordinary panel of Democrats and\nRepublicans who brought us this report. And this report was our\nblueprint, as we sat down to write this historic legislation.\n My personal contributions to this bill were in two specific areas.\nAfter three years of effort, we finally broke through the technical and\nbureaucratic obstacles to information sharing among our intelligence\nagencies by adopting a proposal which I suggested for a new government-\nwide approach, one with clear goals and clear authority to reach the\ngoals. And for the first time, at the suggestion of the 9/11\nCommission, we added to our intelligence efforts a privacy and civil\nliberties board which was crafted to ensure that we do not pay for our\nsecurity with our freedoms. Let me salute those who made this possible,\nparticularly on the Senate side.\n Senator Susan Collins, chairman of the Governmental Affairs\nCommittee, has really been an extraordinary leader. She is a close\nfriend. We have worked on so many things together. I knew she would\nrise to the occasion, but I didn't know that she would have the\nendurance and the determination to bring it to this day. I watched as\nthe conference committee drove on and on, day after day, hour after\nhour, week after week, month after month--many times appearing to\ndisintegrate before our eyes. She never quit. She just kept pushing\nforward. She did it not just with a determination, but with such a\nunique understanding of what was in this conference report. She would\ndismiss critics in a moment if they misstated what was within the\nreport. She knew it cover to cover. She was well prepared.\n Had Senator Collins been doing this alone, she might not have\nachieved her goal. Standing by her side throughout was Senator Joe\nLieberman of Connecticut. Joe is my colleague in the Senate, a good\nfriend, and a great Senator. I think what he did with Susan Collins was\nto demonstrate to America what Congress can do, that we can rise to the\noccasion, that we can put aside partisanship and have a genuine, honest\ndiscussion for the good of this country. That dynamic duo of Senator\nSusan Collins of Maine and Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, on our\nside of the Rotunda, were the guiding force.\n I want to say a word about Congresswoman Jane Harman and Congressman\nPeter Hoekstra who, on the other side of the Rotunda, on the House\nIntelligence Committee, did an extraordinary job as well.\n They would be the first to add that they could not have achieved any\nof this without extraordinary staff contributions. On my own staff, I\nsalute Marianne Upton, who has put in more hours than you could\npossibly imagine, doing around-the-clock sessions, preparing different\nportions of this bill; Joe Zogby, an attorney on my staff who really\ncarried the banner many times on issues of civil rights and civil\nliberties, oftentimes a lonely battle, not always successful but with a\nreal determination and extraordinary skill that he brought to the\nSenate; and Shannon Smith, a member of my staff who looked at this bill\nfrom the perspective of defense issues and foreign policy issues. Those\nthree, from my point of view, made my presence felt, even when there\nwere times I could not be in conference committee meetings.\n The path that led us to this point has not been without obstacles. We\nhad to make major compromises in order to move the legislation forward.\nBut this conference report proves that Congress could work in a\nbipartisan manner to bring together strength and wisdom and produce\nthis significant bill.\n Many people recall what happened on 9/11 and where they were when\nthey learned of the tragedy. I remember. Everybody listening remembers.\nWe also remember that late in the evening, after that sad and worrisome\nday, the Members of Congress, on a bipartisan basis, gathered on the\nsteps outside and together sang God Bless America. How many times as I\nwent through Illinois and across this country people would say: That\nwas a good thing. We were sure glad you did it, to put aside your\ndifferences and to stand together.\n\n[[Page S11949]]\n\n That day was a precursor of this day because this day we will stand\ntogether again. There will be a vote today that will be a bipartisan\nvote, and it will be a clear and definitive victory for the passage of\nthis legislation.\n Let me speak to two or three areas that were of particular\nimportance. First, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The\n9/11 Commission realized that one of the problems we have is when we\ngive Government enough power to protect us, occasionally it\noverreaches. That has happened in virtually every war and in every\nperiod when there was a threat to our national security. Abraham\nLincoln, who I believe to have been our greatest President, suspended\nhabeas corpus during the Civil War. There were those who said he went\ntoo far in usurping the Constitution. During the period of World War I,\nwhen there was concern, we had the Espionage and Sedition Acts, which\nsome believe was an overstepping of governmental authority. In World\nWar II, Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave personal approval to the\nJapanese internment camps, where innocent Americans were, in fact,\njailed and imprisoned when they had done nothing wrong, just for fear\nthat they might. In the Cold War, with our fear of the Soviet Union, we\nwent into the McCarthy era, questioning the patriotism of good\nAmericans, destroying lives and careers in the process. During the\nVietnam war, J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI compiled a list of suspects\nacross America. The President compiled an enemies list.\n\n This list goes on and on. It tells us that as we try to be safe,\nsometimes we go too far. The 9/11 Commission said we need to put into\nplace something that is unique, has never existed in history. This\nPrivacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board will make certain they keep\nan eye on Government activity, make sure it doesn't violate privacy or\ncivil liberties. I agree with the Commission when the Commission said\nto us ``the choice between security and liberty is a false choice.'' I\nbelieve, the Commission believes, we can be both safe and free.\n We can protect the lives of Americans, and we can also protect their\nliberties. That is what the Board is setting out to do.\n As Governor Kean said in answer to a question I asked, this Board\nshould be ``disinterested'' and it should not be speaking for the\nGovernment. It should be independent in its oversight of the Government\nand its activities. This Board will have the authority to obtain\ninformation, to ensure the Government is respecting our privacy and\ncivil liberties. If someone outside of the Government refuses to\nprovide needed information, the Attorney General will have authority to\nsubpoena it.\n There is an exception for the National Intelligence Director and the\nAttorney General to withhold information in the interest of national\nsecurity. That is understandable, but members of the Board and the\nBoard's staff will have high-level security clearances, so we expect\nthat it will only rarely, if ever, be necessary to invoke this national\nsecurity exception.\n The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board will be required to\nreport to Congress about its work on an annual basis. These reports, to\nthe greatest extent possible, will be unclassified so we can all look\nat the activities of our Government when it comes to respecting privacy\nand civil liberties. This transparency will keep us informed. The\nbright sunlight will shine on these activities when it doesn't\ncompromise national security. This Board will ensure that as we fight\nthe war on terrorism, we will respect the precious liberties that are\nthe foundation of our society.\n The second area I worked in that I think may turn out to have\nhistoric importance relates to information sharing. When the 9/11\nCommission Report came out a little over 135 days ago, they kept\nreferring to one basic theme. This is what the report said:\n\n The biggest impediment to all source analysis--to a greater\n likelihood of connecting the dots--is the human or systemic\n resistance to sharing information.\n\n I have really focused on this since\n9/11. So many colleagues looked at different aspects of the challenge\ncreated by that terrible day. When I looked at information sharing, the\nfirst thing I did was turn to the FBI, the premier law enforcement\nagency in America, the top of the heap, the best and brightest when it\ncomes to law enforcement. I asked the basic question: Tell me about the\ncomputers at the FBI headquarters on September 11, 2001.\n Do you know what I learned? Just three years ago, if you looked at\nthe computers at the FBI, you found computers with no e-mail capacity,\nno access to the Internet, no mechanism for word/name search matching,\nand no capacity for the electronic transmission of photographs. Anyone\nlistening--particularly younger people--have to shake their heads and\nsay: Senator, they could have gone down to the local computer store and\nbought a basic computer that had all of this capacity.\n What happened? Why did the FBI fall so far behind in technology? What\nhappened was, in their vanity and in their bureaucratic protectionism,\nthey said: We don't need to go to other firms creating computers. The\nFBI will create its own computer system.\n They did and what a mess it was. On September 11, 2001, the\ntechnological capability of the FBI was virtually nonexistent when it\ncame to computers. That is hard to imagine, isn't it?\n As I spoke to every level that I could of Government leadership,\nincluding Vice President Cheney; Attorney General Ashcroft; FBI\nDirector Mueller, every one of them conceded that this was an obvious\nproblem. Let me tell you something else. We asked the FBI and the\nBorder Patrol to establish a common fingerprint database.\n That makes sense, doesn't it? If we are going to bank all the\nfingerprints of suspects around America, wouldn't the Border Patrol\nwant to have an integrated network of fingerprints they could check\nagainst the FBI base?\n Let me tell you where we are on that. For more than six years, we\nhave been trying to achieve this. For more than six years, we have been\ntrying to get two agencies of Government to cooperate in comparing\nfingerprints. Earlier this year, the inspector general of the Justice\nDepartment reported it would take at least four more years to combine\nthe systems.\n I am sure a lot of people following this debate are saying: He has to\nbe exaggerating. Why would it take ten years to reach the point that\nthe fingerprints collected by one agency of the Federal Government\ncould be compared to the fingerprint database of another agency?\n It is a fact. It has to do with two things. First, it has to do with\nequipment. It has to do with technology. And second, it has to do with\na mindset of cooperation rather than exclusion.\n That is what led me to this whole issue of information sharing. I\ntried to encourage a debate on this issue when we created the\nDepartment of Homeland Security. I said to my colleagues on both sides\nof the aisle: It is great for us to talk about a new department\nbringing together all these agencies, but if they do not have\ncompatible computer databases and the will to share, then we are going\nto lose out when it comes to information gathering.\n I did not win that debate when we created the Department of Homeland\nSecurity, but I am happy to tell you that we have won the debate when\nit comes to this bill.\n It is distressing to read chapter 8 of the 9/11 Commission's report\nentitled ``The System was Blinking Red.'' It is hard to make sense out\nof the information-sharing breakdowns before September 11.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.\n Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 10 additional\nminutes.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n Mr. DURBIN. On July 10, 2001, an FBI agent in the Phoenix field\noffice sent a memo to FBI headquarters and to two agents on the\ninternational terrorism squads in the New York field office advising of\nthe ``possibility of a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden'' to send\nstudents to the U.S. to attend civil aviation schools--the famous\nPhoenix memo.\n This Phoenix memo went into the system and virtually disappeared. On\nits face, this memo was fair warning. This memo was a flare that went\noff, climbed into the sky, and flashed a warning of danger, and no one\nnoticed. This was July 10, 2001. The Phoenix memo went forward, and it\ndisappeared in the sky without even notification.\n\n[[Page S11950]]\n\n The notice was there. Something needed to be done, but no one\nresponded within the FBI or in the other appropriate agencies.\n As we learned, the Phoenix memo was not an alert about suicide\npilots. We learned the author was more concerned about a Pan Am 103\nscenario. The fact is, whether they are talking about the Phoenix memo\nor what led up to the intelligence investigation involving Zacarias\nMoussaoui, we did not have a sharing of information among agencies that\nmight have protected America and the 3,000 victims on September 11.\n For well over two years, I have urged that we do something profound\nand historic. I thought about the Manhattan Project. That was a\nproject, if you recall, that dates back to the attack on Pearl Harbor.\nPrior to that attack, Franklin Roosevelt had his atomic project that\nwas looking into this new scientific research when it came to use of\nthe atom. It was moving along at a snail's pace, and then came December\n7, 1941. On that date, the President said we were shifting into a new\napproach. We want to know if we can use this new research in science to\ncreate atomic bombs, weapons that we may need in this war.\n\n He shelved the commission that had been working on it and created a\nnew group under the head of GEN Leslie Groves. GEN Leslie Groves, who\nwas involved in the Army Corps of Engineers, dubbed it the Manhattan\nProject. What the general said was we are going to break all the rules.\nWe are going to have Government leadership to develop this atom bomb,\nbut we are going to turn to the academic side, the universities doing\nresearch, and we are going to turn to private business, and we are\ngoing to create what this country needs to defend itself. And we did.\nThe Manhattan Project met its goal and produced the bombs that ended\nthe Second World War.\n I thought we needed something very similar when it comes to\ninformation sharing and technology in fighting this war on terrorism.\nThis bill moves us in that direction. It creates an environment for us\nto have computers that communicate with one another, databases that can\nwork with one another, information that can be shared. But all of the\ngood words in this bill mean little or nothing if there is not the will\nin these agencies to make it happen, not only the person supervising\nthis new environment, but each person who is involved at each agency to\nshare this information and to make certain that we do not protect turf\nat the expense of protecting America.\n Let me address one aspect of this bill--a bill which I am happy to\nsupport and will vote for--that is troubling to me. It is an aspect of\nthe bill where we lost a provision in the conference which I think is\nvery important.\n That is a provision that was added in the Senate relative to the\ndetention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. A provision in\nthe Senate bill, which passed 96 to 2, addressed it. Unfortunately, the\nHouse Republican conferees insisted the provision be removed from the\nfinal version of the bill, so the bill is silent.\n This is especially serious from my point of view because of the poor\ntrack record over the last several years when it comes to the use of\ntorture.\n In a January 2002 memo to the President, White House Counsel Alberto\nGonzales concluded that the Geneva Conventions, which have guided us\nfor decades when it comes to the humane treatment of prisoners, in the\nwords of Mr. Gonzales were ``quaint'' and ``obsolete.''\n In August 2002, the Justice Department sent a memo to Mr. Gonzales in\nwhich they adopted a new, very restrictive definition of torture. They\nstated that physical abuse only rises to the level of torture if it\ninvolves ``intense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to\nthe pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so\nsevere that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a\nloss of significant body function will likely result.''\n They also concluded that the torture statute, which makes torture a\ncrime, did not apply to interrogations conducted under the President's\nCommander-in-Chief authority.\n Under our Constitution, the President does not have the authority to\nmake his own laws by creating a new definition of torture, and he\ncannot choose which laws he will obey. There is no wartime exception to\nour Constitution.\n In November 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld approved the use of\ncoercive interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay. These included\nremoval of clothing, using dogs to intimidate detainees, sensory\ndeprivation, and placing detainees in painful physical conditions.\nAccording to a recent Red Cross report, the use of these techniques has\ngrown ``more refined and repressive'' and constitutes torture.\n There are so many unanswered questions about the administration's\nposition on the use of torture. Mr. Gonzales said, ``We categorically\nreject any connection'' between the administration's torture memos and\nthe abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere. But how can\nthe administration reject these connections when the torture techniques\nthat they approved for use in Guantanamo were being used in Abu Ghraib\nand elsewhere in Iraq?\n Mr. Gonzales was recently nominated to be the Attorney General. I\nlook forward to getting to the bottom of this issue when he comes\nbefore the Judiciary Committee in January.\n The 9/11 Commission correctly concluded that the Iraqi prisoner abuse\nscandal has negatively affected our ability to combat terrorism. They\nwrote:\n\n Allegations that the United States abused prisoners in its\n custody make it harder to build the diplomatic, political,\n and military alliances the government will need.\n\n As a result, the Commission recommended that the U.S. develop\npolicies to ensure that captured terrorists are treated humanely. That\nis exactly what we did in the Senate bill. In fact, the Senate\nprovision is similar to an amendment which I offered to the Department\nof Defense authorization bill requiring that the Department issue\npolicies to ensure that they will not engage in torture or cruel,\ninhumane, or degrading treatment, a standard embodied in our\nConstitution and in numerous international agreements.\n The Senate intelligence reform bill would have simply extended these\nrequirements to the intelligence community. What possible basis could\nthe House conferees have had for opposing this provision, turning its\nback on the Geneva Convention's basic standards that we have held in\nthis country for decades?\n I think what we have here, unfortunately, is a decision by the\nconferees to be less than explicit about America's commitment. We need\nto make certain that we stand by standards which America has preached\nto the world for decades, that we realize we are not just not talking\nabout detainees captured by our Government, but the potential treatment\nof Americans and American soldiers facing detention.\n For us to remove this provision from this new bill is troublesome to\nme.\n I think the intelligence community should be held to the same\nstandards as the Department of Defense, and taking this language out of\nthe bill will make that very difficult to monitor, as I hoped we would\nbe able to do.\n As the 9/11 Commission report admonishes, we have to think more\nimaginatively to protect America and use information in a more sensible\nand thoughtful way. Intelligence is the first line of defense against\nterrorism. With this legislation, our intelligence gathering, analysis,\nand application will be significantly improved. No agency can do it\nalone. Collective vigilance requires mutual cooperation and not just\nwithin the executive branch. We need to do our part on Capitol Hill.\n Congress needs to be part of this new concerted effort. I am ready to\nwork with administration officials to make this happen. I salute\nPresident Bush, Vice President Cheney, Speaker Hastert, and many other\nRepublican leaders who stepped up to make certain they did their part\nto pass this legislation.\n As we have done on the Senate side, we have demonstrated that this\nkind of bipartisan cooperation makes America a safer place.\n Finally, thanks to the decision of my colleagues on the Senate\nDemocratic side, I step into the capacity of the Senate whip, the\nassistant Senate leader, in a few days. As a result of that, I will\nhave new responsibilities on the floor and more demands on my time. It\nwas necessary for me to step aside from\n\n[[Page S11951]]\n\nmy service on the Governmental Affairs Committee, which I really\nenjoyed during the period I have been in the Senate.\n I am glad the last action of the committee was the passage of this\nimportant legislation. I think a lot of work that was put in in that\ncommittee paid off with the passage of it. I am going to miss this\ncommittee. I wanted to make certain that whoever would fill that slot\nwould have the time to dedicate to its important work of protecting\nAmerica.\n I thank Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Susan Collins, as\nwell as Senator Lieberman, for all of the kindness they have extended\nto me during my period on the committee. I hope I will be able to\ncontinue to help them in my new capacity as the Democratic whip of the\nSenate.\n I yield the floor.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Illinois for his\ncomments. He has been an extraordinarily active member of the\nGovernmental Affairs Committee. He has contributed to so many different\ninvestigations. Whether it was our review of mental health services for\nchildren or the food safety investigation, he has always been front and\ncenter in the committee's deliberations, as he has been with this\nintelligence reform bill. We will miss very much having him as a member\nof the committee, but I am grateful for his past service, and we hope\nhe will return to the committee some day.\n I know that two of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs\nCommittee members are waiting to speak, so I will not prolong. I will\ntalk more about my conferees, my wonderful, able group of conferees,\nlater.\n I ask unanimous consent that Senator Carper be recognized next. He\nhas already reserved time under the time agreement; to be followed by\nSenator Coleman, who has already reserved time under the time\nagreement; to be followed by the chairman of the Intelligence\nCommittee, Senator Roberts, who similarly has reserved time. Two out of\nthe three of these individuals were conferees on the bill. Two of the\nthree also are members of the Governmental Affairs Committee. Each of\nthem has played a significant role in bringing us to where we are\ntoday, and I am grateful for their support and involvement.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n The Senator from Delaware.\n Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, I say to our chairwoman of the committee,\nSenator Collins, a heartfelt thank-you for the leadership and\npersistence that she and my good friend Joe Lieberman have demonstrated\nto get us to this day.\n I also say to the President, thanks for using some of that political\ncapital. You picked up a little bit last month, and I am pleased you\nhave decided to invest a little bit of it in a worthwhile cause.\n I plan to vote for this bill. I was privileged to be a member of the\ncommittee in the Senate that developed the proposal under which this\nbill is based, and we are happy to be here for this day.\n To the members of the 9/11 Commission who have worked hard for about\n18 months, their staff, a lot of folks who lost loved ones who provided\nthe impetus, really the wind beneath the wings for the Commission and\nreally for this effort, I say just a heartfelt thank-you for their\nefforts, and I hope they are pleased with where we are today.\n Is this proposal perfect? No. Few of mine are. Is it better? You bet\nit is. It is a real improvement.\n Back in 1947, the year I was born, the CIA was born as well. The\nintelligence structure that was created around the CIA and Cold-War\nyears that followed was a structure that was designed to enable us to\nwin the war against communism, the Cold War. That war is over. We won\nthat war. We have a new war that we are fighting today, and it is a war\nagainst terrorism.\n Just as the one approach worked well for many years--our intelligence\napparatus worked well for many years against communism--it does not\nnecessarily mean it is going to work well against terrorism. In fact,\nit has not.\n When I was a naval flight officer, when I was not flying in a P-3\nairplane, one of my ground jobs was to be the air intelligence officer\non the ground, briefing other crews for their missions. We had a crew\nover here that was flying a top-secret mission, needed information\nabout it, and then another group over here with the same clearance that\ndid not fly that same mission. We did not brief the crew that was not\ngoing to fly the mission. There was a need to know. If they had a need\nto know, we provided the information for them. If they did not have a\nneed to know, we did not provide it for them. It worked well in naval\naviation. It did not work so well when it came to sharing information\nacross 15 different intelligence agencies on information about\nterrorism.\n We had one agency that knew there were bad guys around the world who\nwanted to come here and hurt us. We had another agency that knew the\nnames of the people who actually came in and actually could have said\nthat these were some of those bad guys. We had another agency that knew\nfolks were being trained to fly in airplanes, not to land them, not to\ntake them off but to literally fly them straight and level. Among those\n15 different agencies, I call them stovepipes, they had the information\nbut they never talked. At least they did not talk enough. We did not\nput it together.\n People talked about connecting the dots. That is exactly what did not\nhappen. So we were not talking; we were not sharing information. There\nwas a need-to-know mentality that existed and has existed for a long\ntime with respect to our agencies. It has to change. This bill is going\nto change it.\n Another problem we had, nobody was in charge. There was nobody to\nassess accountability and say you were accountable for not letting this\nhappen. With this provision, we are going to have a powerful person put\nin place, nominated by the President, selected by the President. It has\nto be an extraordinary individual, somebody smart, somebody who enjoys\nthe confidence of both sides of the aisle, somebody who will enjoy the\nconfidence of the intelligence community, somebody who will be willing\nto work real hard. I am sure that person is out there. My hope is the\nPresident will find him. My hope is we will confirm that person.\n Some people say this is not a perfect bill; there are some provisions\nthey do not like maybe with respect to our borders, maybe with respect\nto immigration, maybe with respect to the rights and prerogatives of\nthe military and making sure they are still in a position to be strong\nand provide the intelligence that is needed when it is needed to our\nbattlefield soldiers.\n This is not a constitutional amendment. This is not something that is\nin concrete. This is a bill. It is a bill that has been hard fought and\na compromise has been well won, but it is not forever. To the extent we\ngo forward and we find that changes need to be made, we can make them,\nand we should.\n In conclusion, we have been working at this stuff for a long time.\nPeople have known the system was broke for a long time. We have had any\nnumber of recommendations and studies that said, fix this system and\nthis is how to do it. We have not done it. Today we have the\nopportunity to change it and to take a real step in the right\ndirection. We would be foolish not to. I am happy to say we are\nnot foolish. We are doing the right thing. It is time to seize the day,\nand that is exactly what we are going to do.\n\n My thanks again to all those who have worked so hard to get us to\nthis point.\n I yield back my time.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.\n Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield for a\nunanimous consent request, unless there was someone else who was in\norder here? I wonder if we could set up an order following the Senator\nfrom Minnesota, the Senator from Kansas be recognized, and then I be\nrecognized following the Senator from Kansas.\n Ms. COLLINS. That is fine.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is\nso ordered.\n The Senator from Minnesota.\n Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I serve on the Governmental Affairs\nCommittee. I served on the conference committee that helped draft this\nbill, and I am going to be very proud to vote for this bill this\nafternoon.\n\n[[Page S11952]]\n\n I wish to start and end by thanking the chair, Senator Collins, for\nher incredible leadership. This was not easy to do. When we left around\nThanksgiving, there were a lot of folks who said this would not happen,\nthat it could not be done. We had people who had some very strong\nopinions about a wide range of issues, and there were differences.\n Leadership makes a difference. The leadership of Chairman Collins\nmade a difference. The leadership of Ranking Member Lieberman made a\ndifference.\n I will also note, I am sure before we finally vote on this the\nchairman will talk about staff. But I see Michael Bopp, who is the\nstaff director and chief counsel of the Governmental Affairs Committee.\nStaff worked very hard. They did an extraordinary job. We were on\nbreak, weren't around, but folks were working day and night over\nholidays to give us this opportunity to get it done. I do want to\ncompliment Mr. Bopp and all of the staff, on a bipartisan basis,\nincluding my own staff who worked so hard. America should thank them\nbecause this bill is good for America. This bill makes America safer.\n As I look back on the opportunities I had in my first session of\nCongress, the 108th, I believe the passage of this bill is the most\nsignificant thing this Congress has done. We have made America safer.\nThere are a lot of important achievements--Medicare reform, tax cuts--\nbut in the end you can't have economic security without national\nsecurity. Americans cannot live if they live in fear. The threat of\nterrorist attack is the greatest threat that faces America, and we have\nnow taken substantial steps in making America safer. We make us safer,\nas I said before, by the creation of a Director of National\nIntelligence, a single person whom we can say is in charge.\n I was struck during the hearings by my understanding of the statement\nof George Tenet that a few years before\n9/11, he made a statement, sent out an e-mail, that we were at war with\nal-Qaida, but a lot of folks didn't know the war was happening. The CIA\ndidn't talk to the FBI and the Defense Department was not coordinated\nwith the CIA to the degree it needed to be for us to be as safe as we\nshould be. This bill addresses that by creating a Director of National\nIntelligence to advise the President, to be the go-to person, the\nperson we know is in charge. It then creates a National\nCounterterrorism Center so we can bring the best and brightest together\nto make America safer.\n This bill is not the same bill the Senate passed, but it is a good\none. At the beginning of our efforts way back in June, Senator Carper,\nfrom Delaware, shared the credo that one of his constituents lived by:\nThe main thing is to keep the main thing the main thing. I believe we\nhave done that in this bill.\n This bill implements both of the 9/11 Commission's most important\nrecommendations. It creates a Director of National Intelligence to\noversee and coordinate the effort in the intelligence community. A\ncentral problem the Commission identified was that prior to 9/11, no\none was in charge of our intelligence operations. We have taken care of\nthat problem.\n It is important to note a lot of people were doing a lot of things\nand doing good things, but they were not sharing information, they were\nnot coordinating efforts to the degree we needed. We had this concept\nthat has been talked about on the Senate floor of silos, folks working\nin their own areas, doing a good job. But the reality is, to be\neffective, you can't work in a silo, you can't work in isolation; you\nhave to work together so all the activities of all those involved in\nintelligence reflect similar priorities.\n We have corrected that now. The DNI is in charge of intelligence. He\nhas the power to shape the intelligence community over time. He can\nimplement joint policies on personnel, training, information systems,\nand communications. The DNI also has a National Counterterrorism Center\nto lead our counterterrorism efforts. The Center will contain the best\nand brightest the Government has. Merely by creating these two new\nentities we take an important step forward. This is not about more\nbureaucracy; this is about more effective, focused, targeted efforts to\nimprove the safety of America, to improve our intelligence efforts. It\nis a base upon which we can continue to move forward.\n\n Like all legislation, this bill represents a compromise. On\nintelligence reform, we agreed to many of the provisions in the House\nbill. We gave the Department of Defense more of a say in how funds are\nallocated after Congress appropriates them. We agreed to keep the total\namount of money spent on intelligence classified. But the House, in\nturn, has agreed to respond to many of our concerns with the rest of\ntheir original language.\n This bill makes important reforms in immigration and law enforcement\npowers but omits the most controversial sections included in the House\nbill, and I believe that is wise. We need to address the issue of\nimmigration reform. It is a critical issue. But we cannot allow our\nefforts to improve intelligence, we cannot allow our efforts to improve\nsecurity to get pushed aside, to somehow get held up because we have\nnot had the kind of debate and analysis and scrutiny we need to have in\nboth Chambers on the important issue of immigration reform.\n 9/11 was a horrible tragedy. We saw the face of evil. We learned the\ndesperate measures people will take to stamp out our way of life. But\nwe have seen and we have learned. From learning--I want to stress\nthis--in this process we had extensive hearings. We moved forward\nquickly, but we didn't rush to judgment. The Senator from Kansas,\nSenator Roberts, who chairs the Intelligence Committee, has been part\nof our discussions. He noted there have been decades of efforts to\nreform intelligence. We had a base to build upon, but we had not moved\nforward until today, and we have moved forward building on so much of\nwhat has been done in the past and building on a record, which we heard\nabout from folks who headed the CIA, doing operations work today.\n There was a very extensive analysis of what the needs are. We looked\nat the work of the Commission, the families of the victims, the history\nof intelligence reform, and we made a difference today. For that,\nChairman Collins, Ranking Member Lieberman, and all involved--and the\nPresident of the United States--should be proud. The President of the\nUnited States played a tremendous role in getting this done.\n One final point before I yield the floor. When we talk about\nintelligence reform, we do talk about the big things. We talk about\ncreating a Director of National Intelligence and the National\nCounterintelligence Center. But I also want to take a moment to talk\nabout what this bill does for the rest of us, some of the folks at the\nlocal level.\n I come from Minnesota. It is a small State, located on our border\nwith Canada. But, like her northern neighbors such as Maine, Minnesota\ncan be a gateway for many of the goods and people crossing by boat,\ncar, plane, and train. They may end up in Chicago or San Francisco or\nNew York, but many come in through the border States. Homeland security\nstarts with border security.\n\n This bill recognizes that. It understands that when it comes to\nborder security, it is going to be folks at the local level, not folks\nat the Federal level, who are going to be the first on the scene. That\nis why this bill contains a provision to ensure that State and local\nofficials will be part of an integrated command system so first\nresponders can communicate with each other. Communication and teamwork\ngo hand in hand, and thanks to this bill, if we face another 9/11,\nlocal, State, and Federal officials will not only be ready but will be\nable to work as a team.\n This bill also understands that border security takes resources and\nmanpower by providing an additional 10,000 agents over 5 years to\nprotect U.S. borders and unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor our border\nwith Canada. This is good news for America and good news for places\nsuch as International Falls, MN.\n International Falls is just a small town in Minnesota, but because of\nits location, this city is among the 50 busiest gateways in this\ncountry, admitting many hundreds of thousands of men and women through\nit into this country each year. I went there this August to see what\nwas going on and to talk with people directly responsible for our\nborder security, people like\n\n[[Page S11953]]\n\nPaul Nevanen, director of Koochiching County's Economic Development\nAuthority, and Glen Schroeder, the chief agent in charge of border\npatrol. People like Paul and Glen highlighted the difficulties they had\njust communicating with their Federal counterparts and the difficulty\nof adequately screening entry of people into the United States without\nproper technology and resources. After talking with the people at\nInternational Falls, I came back to Washington and fought hard for our\nfolks on the border. This bill reflects that hard work. It gives them\nthe resources and manpower necessary to support and secure our border.\n This is a good bill. I am going to vote for it with a great sense of\npride. There are some who may say we could walk away from this bill and\nhope for something better next year. That would be irresponsible. This\nbill makes America safer. Passage of intelligence reform will only\nbecome more difficult as time passes--unless, God forbid, there is\nanother terrorist attack. In that case, of course, there will be\nanother call for reform. But I submit that Congress will have failed in\nits duty to the American people if it waits until then to do anything.\n We don't have to wait. We have a great bill before us. We have been\nprovided with great leadership from Chairman Collins, from the ranking\nmember, and the President's efforts. I applaud all of them. As I said\nbefore, I look forward to voting for this bill.\n I yield the floor.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.\n Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, it is my understanding that I have\nallotted to me 10 minutes. I had originally understood it was 15. I ask\nthe distinguished chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee if she\ncould yield me 5 minutes out of her time, which I know is precious,\nthus making it 15?\n Ms. COLLINS. I am happy to yield to the distinguished chairman of the\nIntelligence Committee 5 additional minutes from my time. It is my\nunderstanding that the ranking member of the committee, the vice\nchairman of the committee, is also seeking some additional time.\n In between, however, Senator Levin has set a schedule to speak. I\nappreciate the order amongst Members. I will also be happy to yield 5\nminutes from Senator Lieberman's time to Senator Rockefeller.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n The Senator from Kansas is recognized for 15 minutes.\n Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Presiding Officer, and I thank the chairman.\n Mr. President, one day after the 62nd anniversary of the attack on\nPearl Harbor, and 3 years and 82 days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks\non our country, we will now pass the National Security Intelligence\nReform Act of 2004.\n I rise in strong support of this conference report which is a\nremarkable first step in our goal to strengthen and improve our\nNation's intelligence capabilities.\n My colleagues, we should start--and others have said this, and it is\ncertainly true--by recognizing Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman\nand their staff for their efforts to get a bill which will have a\npositive impact on our intelligence community. They have put in a\ntremendous amount of hard slugging, sometimes very contentious and very\ndifficult work, and overtime, since they began this effort back as of\nthe 1st of August. I thank them. Together, we will have made a positive\ndifference in behalf of our national security.\n I would also like to thank President Bush for his instrumental\nefforts in getting this conference report moving. Without his\nleadership, this reform would still be in the midst of a turf and issue\ngridlock. The President knows that national security demands\nintelligence reform and that the status quo is not an option. So I\nthank the President for weighing in.\n All one had to do is listen to the debate on this bill in the other\nbody yesterday to understand that this bill by necessity is a\ncompromise. When you compromise you do not get everything you want. In\nmy case--and in the view of many who serve on the Senate Intelligence\nCommittee--it does not do everything that I believe is necessary to\nclearly streamline the structure of our intelligence community. It is\nno secret that I believe we should have gone farther.\n\n It is perplexing to me and a paradox of enormous irony that after the\n9/11 investigation by both the Senate and House Intelligence\nCommittees, after our Senate committee's WMD report, after the findings\nof the 9/11 Commission, after the report of the President's WMD\ncommission, and after all of the hearings we have held within the\nappropriate committees and the Senate Intelligence Committee--we have\nheld over 200 hearings this session, 60 percent more than the previous\nsession of Congress--after all of this, and the knowledge of the\nattacks on the Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and the embassy bombings,\n9/11, terror attacks all over the world that we know are connected,\nthat still some believe we do not need comprehensive reform or have or\nwill vote against this legislation because they believe it is a rush to\njudgment or that the legislation did not include what they deem their\ntop national security priority.\n In this regard, some have argued that this bill will interrupt the\nmilitary chain of command or prevent the men and women of the armed\nservices from receiving crucial intelligence information. Certainly\nthese arguments should not be ignored. But in the end, this legislation\ndoes very little to modify the chains of command within the\nintelligence community.\n The tactical intelligence elements of the U.S. Government remain\nclearly and explicitly under the command of the Secretary of Defense.\n The leadership construct for national intelligence assets remains\nlargely unchanged. The Director of National Intelligence remains\nprimarily a budget and policy leader for national intelligence assets.\n Undoubtedly, the Director's budget and policy authorities are\nstrengthened. But day-to-day operational control of our national\nintelligence collection agencies remains dispersed. The Central\nIntelligence Agency will now be led by an independent Director. The\nSecretary of Defense retains the operational control of the National\nSecurity Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the\nNational Reconnaissance Office.\n Note the word of all three agencies, ``national.''\n These are not only combat support agencies, but national policy\nassets.\n I cannot see how the existing chains of command have been seriously\nchanged.\n The history of the intelligence community does not support the\nopponents' second argument--that the Armed Forces will somehow be\ndeprived of intelligence by a stronger Director of National\nIntelligence. The former DCI has always set requirements and priorities\nfor collection by national assets. Moreover, neither the President nor\nCongress--certainly not this Member of Congress, a former marine--would\never permit the crucial intelligence needs of our military to be\nignored by the Director of National Intelligence.\n Certainly, the requirements of our men and women in the military must\nbe met. That has been said over and over again, especially in the\nHouse. But we must also recognize that the principal user of national\nintelligence that is produced by our national intelligence agencies are\nour national policymakers, primarily the President of the United\nStates, the National Security Council, and the Congress of the United\nStates. The DNI must have authority to ensure that the intelligence\nrequirements of the President and other national policymakers are met.\n\n Thus, while the Department of Defense is by volume--everybody\nunderstands that, by volume--the largest user of national intelligence,\nwe must not forget that our national collection assets at the CIA and\nat the NSA, the NRO and the NGA--what the critics call combat support\nagencies--serve our policymaking needs as well.\n However, while this is not the best bill possible, it is the best\npossible bill. It is also a big step in the right direction.\n As has been said it will create a Director of National Intelligence,\nor a DNI, who is separate from the Director of the CIA. It will give\nthis Director, the DNI, marginally improved budget authorities over our\nintelligence community agencies. It will provide authority to conduct\nquality control\n\n[[Page S11954]]\n\nchecks of the analytic products of our intelligence community. It will\nalso create a National counterterrorism Center which will, I hope,\neventually serve as the Nation's true clearinghouse for terrorist-\nrelated intelligence. These are, in my view, very positive steps\nforward in our intelligence community.\n I would also like my colleagues to take note of several other\nimportant and long overdue provisions in this bill. For example, this\nbill will consolidate what is now a needlessly complicated and\nexpensive background investigation and security clearance process under\none agency. Today, it takes too long to get good people in very crucial\npositions. Noting the debate in the other body, it is important to\nstress this bill will also bring important improvements to our Nation's\nborder security.\n I am not, however, under any illusions. This bill is not perfect. No\nbill is. Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman were forced to put the\nSenate bill through the filter of the demands of the House and still\nmanage to get a bill that is a step in the right direction--a big step.\n In conjunction with the administration, we in the Congress--more\nespecially those of us who had the privilege of serving on the House\nand Senate Intelligence Committees--will need to nurture this new\nintelligence structure over the years and clarify as necessary the\nvarious authorities in order to make it effective.\n For those who are uneasy with the unprecedented speed with which this\nbill was brought to this point, I would like to offer the reassurance\nthat what we will pass today is certainly not the final chapter on the\nreform of our intelligence. After this bill becomes law, we will\nmonitor its implementation and make any needed adjustments in\nsubsequent years. If one looks at history, the process of amending and\nimproving the National Security Act of 1947 began almost immediately\nfollowing its passage. I expect that this bill will be no different.\nThis bill is only the beginning of the intelligence reform\nprocess. Since July, several other Senators and I have made it clear\nthat while we believe this bill has many good provisions, what it fails\nto do is create a leader of the intelligence community who is clearly\nin charge and as a result is fully accountable.\n\n That does not make this a bad bill. It just means that Congress must\ncontinue to monitor and guide the intelligence reform process. We must\ncontinue the logical reform of our intelligence community. If we are\nnot diligent, our newly created Director of National Intelligence could\nend up a director in name only. Our national security certainly demands\nbetter.\n I am determined to work with my colleagues in this Congress and the\nadministration to continue the process that has been started by this\nreform effort. This process will be difficult, but it is essential and\nwe must persevere. President Eisenhower, a five-star general, a\nnational hero, was unable to achieve the reforms he sought to unify the\nDepartment of Defense in the 1950s. Instead, President Eisenhower's\nreforms would have to wait another 30 years for the Goldwater-Nichols\nAct which made the U.S. military the very remarkable and unified force\nit is today.\n The forces of the status quo beat back President Truman's efforts in\n1947 to put military operations under the control of the Joint Chiefs\nof Staff and the unified commands that had shown their utility during\nWorld War II. Instead, in 1947, President Truman was forced to accept a\nNational Security Act that codified a system in which the military\nservices were loosely joined under a very weak Joint Chiefs of Staff\norganization that had no significant authority independent of the\nmilitary services.\n The compromise President Truman was forced to accept mirrors in many\nways the compromise bill we are voting for today. But there is reason\nfor optimism. That shell of a Joint Chiefs of Staff which was codified\nin 1947 did provide the foundation upon which the Goldwater-Nichols Act\nwould build the remarkable unified command and control structure we\nhave today.\n In addition to serving as that important foundation, the Joint Chiefs\nof Staff also became a voice. That voice was independent of the\nmilitary services turf interests in the debate over how to continue the\nprocess of the reform of our defense. That was the first step in the\nstruggle that resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and a major\noverhaul of the military command structure.\n This bill does not give the Director of National Intelligence all of\nthe authorities I would like to provide. It is my sincere hope,\nhowever, that it will at least create the same kind of voice,\nindependent of the institutional interests that currently divide our\nintelligence community, a voice that can lead us toward the ultimate\ngoal: a more rationally organized intelligence community with a clear\nchain of command and the real accountability that comes with it.\n Since 1949, 24 attempts have been made to pass comprehensive\nintelligence reform legislation. I thank all concerned that we have\nbeen successful on the 25th attempt. It has been 3 years and 82 days\nsince September 11. On behalf of the families of the victims of\nSeptember 11 and on behalf of national security and every American, I\nam thankful we will not wait another day.\n I yield the floor.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). The Senator from Michigan is\nrecognized for 15 minutes.\n Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Presiding Officer. I ask unanimous consent,\ninstead of my proceeding, that the Senator from Florida be recognized\nand I be recognized following that; and following that, Senator\nRockefeller, and then we proceed to Senator Byrd, who, I understand,\nhas agreed to begin at about 12:40 instead of 12:30.\n I ask unanimous consent that be the order of debate.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n The Senator from Florida.\n Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Madam President, I am going to submit for the\nRecord a fuller statement, but in deference to the limited time we\nhave, I have a few brief comments on what I consider to be one of the\nmost important enactments of my 18 years in the Senate.\n This is an accomplishment which did not happen beginning this summer\nbut rather has been underway for at least the 15 years since the fall\nof the Berlin Wall. I am extremely pleased we have now arrived at the\npoint we may be in a position to enact serious intelligence reform for\nthe first time in over 50 years.\n There are many important aspects of this legislation. One, it will\ncentralize the intelligence agencies, not as an end in itself, but to\ncreate the platform from which we can then decentralize. As Senator\nRoberts was discussing, in 1947, the various separate military\nbranches--there was a Secretary of the Army, there was a Secretary of\nthe Navy--were brought together under a Secretary of Defense. Then, 39\nyears later, that centralized organization was decentralized into the\ncombatant joint commands that now are the principal warfighters for\nAmerica.\n That is exactly the process anticipated here. The only major\ndifference is it will not take 39 years to get from centralization to\ndecentralization.\n A second aspect of this bill I point out, we have much work to do in\nthe area of human intelligence. The case could be made that both the\nwar in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq were a product of our inadequate\nhuman intelligence capabilities. We must make a major effort to rebuild\nour human capabilities. This bill takes a step in that direction\nthrough emphasis on more linguistic training in the Defense bill that\nwas the establishment of what I refer to as the intelligence equivalent\nof the Reserve Officers Training Corps. We need many other initiatives\nto fill this gaping hole in our intelligence.\n\n The third area--and I particularly commend Senator Wyden and Senator\nLott and others involved in this--is to try to make our security\nclassifications more truly an issue of security rather than agencies\ntrying to bury their mistakes.\n In this legislation we establish a new classification board that will\nreview decisions that are made in the executive branch to determine if\nthere has been an excessive use of secrecy. Our former colleague,\nSenator Pat Moynihan, used to say that secrecy is for losers. We do not\nwant the United States to be in that category of losers.\n What we are doing today is an important step. It is not by any means\nthe\n\n[[Page S11955]]\n\nlast step. Let me mention a few things that will need to flow from our\ndecision today. Some are rather tangential to the issue of intelligence\nreform. As an example, we are now requiring any visa applicant to have\na face-to-face encounter with a visa agent. That may sound like an\nappropriate protection against inappropriate people getting access to\nthe United States.\n There are also, however, very practical matters. A country that will\nbe of increasing significance to the United States is the country of\nBrazil. Brazil is a country which is the size of the continental United\nStates plus a second Texas. It is the fourth largest country in\npopulation in the world. Today we have three places in which a person\ncould get a visa. They are relatively close together. It would be as if\nthe only place you could get a visa in the United States was\nWashington, New York, or Boston. We have to develop some strategy to\nmake it more reasonable for persons around the world, but particularly\nin these large-sized nations that are so important to our economy, to\nbe able to have reasonable access to the visa process.\n The second part of this legislation relates to the United States\nrelationship with Saudi Arabia. It points out that the Government of\nSaudi Arabia has not always responded promptly or fully to the United\nStates request for assistance in the global war on Islamic terrorism.\n I believe we need an enormous increase in the transparency of the\nrelationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and that is a\ngoal we have been retreating from. In the joint House-Senate report on\nthe factors that led to 9/11, an 800-page report contained 27 pages on\nthe role of Saudi Arabia in 9/11. Every one of those 27 pages was\nclassified, so the American people in that and other instances have\nbeen denied access to the information about our relationship with Saudi\nArabia. I hope the provision contained in this legislation will move us\ntoward a greater frankness and candor in that important relationship.\n Finally, this legislation places responsibility for important future\nactions in at least three places. One of those is the President. The\nPresident will have the responsibility for making a series of critical\nappointments so there will be the human beings responsible for\nimplementing this legislation in a creative, dynamic manner.\n He also must assure there is a value system in relationship to this\nnew office and other positions which are also his responsibility to\nappoint. The most notable of these will be between the Director of\nNational Intelligence and the Department of Defense. It will require\ncontinued Presidential involvement and monitoring to assure that\nrelationship achieves rather than frustrates the objectives of this\nlegislation.\n The new Director of National Intelligence will have enormous\nresponsibility. He or she will have to establish clear priorities for\nthe intelligence community, and this will be reflected in the creation\nof additional national intelligence centers. These are the\ndecentralizing units that have been established in the case of\nterrorism and counterproliferation and will be under the directive of\nthe DNI to establish in other emerging threat areas. The DNI must also\nrevise current budget priorities, particularly in areas such as\nresearch and development, to reflect response to our emerging threats.\n He also will have to establish communitywide personnel policies that\nsupport the recruitment, training, and retention of the most effective\nintelligence community personnel.\n Finally, there will be a responsibility here on the Congress. In the\nSenate, we have taken steps to reform our oversight of intelligence. No\nlonger will there be an 8-year term limit. No longer will intelligence\nbudgets go through the Defense subcommittee but, rather, through their\nown Appropriations subcommittees.\n These are good starts. But we are also going to have to look at the\nculture of the congressional oversight committees, focusing much more\non the future and the threats that are coming at us and relatively give\nless of our time to constant focus on the accidents that can be seen\nthrough the rearview mirror. By its nature, the intelligence community\nis going to create accidents from time to time. They need to be\nreviewed, but we cannot afford for them to be totally consuming in\nterms of our oversight responsibility. It is in the future that the\nthreats are to be found, and it is our responsibility to be able to\nassure the American people that our intelligence communities are\ncapable of identifying those threats and providing information to\ndecisionmakers to mitigate the chances that those threats will become\nthe next Pearl Harbor or the next 9/11 tragedy.\n Madam President, in conclusion, I thank all the people who have\nplayed such a significant role. Obviously, Senator Collins and Senator\nLieberman deserve special notice. But there are many other people in\nthis Chamber today, such as Senator Roberts and Senator Rockefeller,\nwho have played a continuing role in seeing that our intelligence\ncommunity is able to serve its responsibility to the people of America.\n Thank you very much.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.\n Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed\nto yield 2 minutes of my time to the Senator from New York.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n The Senator from New York is recognized.\n Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I thank my friend from Michigan for\nyielding. I thank all those who worked on this bill. It is not\neverything we all would have wanted, but it is a large improvement, and\nI am proud to vote for this bill. I want to take a few brief minutes\nsimply to praise the families from the New York metropolitan area who\nworked so long and hard on this bill.\n Today we live in a cynical time. But these families showed that a\nsmall group of people, if they have the will and the fortitude and the\nstrength and the courage, can move mountains, even here in Washington.\nWithout the families, we would not have had a 9/11 Commission. Without\nthe families, we would not have had a 9/11 bill. Without the families,\nwe would not have had each House pass its own bills. And without the\nfamilies, we would not have had the agreement we have come to now.\n They are an amazing group. When you look into their eyes, as they\ncarry their pictures of their lost husbands and wives and children and\nparents, you see the best of America and the best of New York. They are\na beacon, a model of strength, of courage, of indomitability, and they\ncan rest easier tonight, as we all can, that our world will be safer,\nand perhaps the horrible thing that happened to our city and our\ncountry on that tragic day of 9/11 will not be repeated, God willing,\nagain.\n Madam President, I yield the floor and thank my colleague from\nMichigan for his generosity.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.\n Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, first, I want to state how indebted we\nall are to the 9/11 Commission and to the families for their work in\nputting us on the road to reform. That road will reach a culmination\ntoday. It is appropriate that we spent the time we did to try to put\ntogether a bill which is comprehensive and the most dramatic reform in\nthe intelligence community that we have had in many decades.\n We in the Congress started out on that road with the goal of creating\na strong Director of National Intelligence, or DNI. One milepost was to\nempower that Director with real budget power and adequate control over\npersonnel in the intelligence community. Another milepost was the\ncreation of a strong National counterterrorism Center, or NCTC, with\nthe authority to conduct strategic counterterrorism planning and to\nassign roles and responsibilities for counterterrorism activities. The\nmanagers deserve great credit as the conference agreement represents a\nsignificant achievement in regard to those issues. Their work, the work\nof Senators Collins and Lieberman, is a model of bipartisanship, and I\nheartily commend them for it.\n The conference agreement contains a number of provisions that I\nproposed in the Senate-passed version. For example, it is critical that\nthere be a customer focus instead of a top-down focus in setting\nintelligence collection and\n\n[[Page S11956]]\n\ntasking requirements. There is language in this conference report to\nprovide that customer focus.\n The Senate bill contains language which I offered which precludes the\nNCTC Director from assigning specific responsibilities directly to\ncomponents of the Department of Defense. That authority would have had\na negative impact on the military chain of command. That authority\nshould remain in the Department of Defense. The conference report\nretains our Senate language.\n The legislation also contains a provision which I authored with\nSenator Coleman to stop money laundering and terrorist financing. The\n9/11 Commission acknowledged that disrupting terrorist financing is one\nkey to winning the battle against terrorism. Our provision strengthens\nbank oversight by imposing a 1-year cooling-off period on Federal bank\nexaminers before they can take a job with one of the financial\ninstitutions which they oversaw. The need for this provision arose from\nour investigation conducted by the Permanent Subcommittee on\nInvestigations which disclosed the weak anti-money laundering controls\nat Riggs Bank which resulted in highly suspicious financial\ntransactions.\n Among other problems, we were surprised to learn that the Federal\nbank examiner who oversaw Riggs and allowed the bank to continue\noperating for years with a deficient anti-money laundering program\nretired from the Government and immediately took a job at the bank,\nraising conflict of interest concerns. Our new provision will help\neliminate such conflicts.\n\n Our provision also directs the Treasury Department to conduct a study\nof current Federal anti-money laundering efforts and recommend\nimprovements to the process for setting priorities so that we direct\nour efforts where they are most needed.\n On the other side of the ledger, I want to talk about a number of\nprovisions that were included in the Senate-passed bill but which are,\nunfortunately, absent from this conference report. We had a number of\nprovisions in our Senate bill, on which we worked so hard, that are\nomitted from this bill. It seems to me the bill is weaker as a result.\n One Senate-passed provision would have permitted the new DNI to\ntransfer military billets among activities within the intelligence\ncommunity but would not have permitted the new Director to transfer\nindividual members of the armed forces, thereby avoiding the potential\nfor the Director to interfere with the military chain of command. That\nwas changed and it mystifies me as to why our provision was dropped.\n Another Senate provision would have provided that the administration\nreview certain Defense Intelligence Agency programs to determine\nwhether they should be managed by the new Director of National\nIntelligence or by the Secretary of Defense rather than automatically\ntransferring them to the new DNI without review. The conference report\nnow gives that nonreviewable power to the new Director of Intelligence.\nThe programs, then, that the new Director will have that kind of\ncontrol over include the intelligence staffs of the Chairman of the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence staffs of the commanders, and\nthe intelligence staffs of certain communications, and control over\ncertain communications systems which support sensitive military command\nand control activities within the Department of Defense.\n As I said, I am mystified why these two provisions, which were\nincluded in the Senate-passed bill, were omitted from the conference\nagreement. Did House Republicans object to those provisions even though\nthose provisions addressed concerns that a number of us have and, as a\nmatter of fact, that the Armed Services chairman in the House, Duncan\nHunter, had about protecting the military chain of command and about\nthe Department of Defense having a voice in budget matters which so\ndirectly and keenly affect them?\n There are a number of other troubling omissions from the conference\nreport. I happen to be one who agrees that we need a new strong\ndirector of national intelligence and a new NCTC, a new national\ncounterterrorism center, with strong authority. But their creation will\nnot solve all or even the most critical of the problems in our\nintelligence community. In fact, the creation of a stronger\nintelligence director makes it even more important that we enact\nreforms to ensure that intelligence assessments are not influenced by\nthe policy judgments of whatever administration is in power and that a\nstronger DNI is not just a stronger political arm of any\nadministration.\n I am deeply troubled that the conference report does not contain\ncritical provisions that were included in our Senate-passed bill on a\nbipartisan basis that were intended to promote independent and\nobjective intelligence analysis.\n The scope and the seriousness of the problem of manipulated\nintelligence cannot be overstated. History has too many examples of\nintelligence assessments being shaped to support an administration's\npolicy goals, with disastrous results. Forty years ago Secretary of\nDefense McNamara invoked dubious classified communication intercepts to\nsupport passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which was then used by\nPresident Johnson as the legislative foundation for expanding the war\nagainst North Vietnam.\n\n Director of Central Intelligence Bill Casey heavily manipulated\nintelligence during the Iran Contra period. A bipartisan Iran Contra\nreport concluded that CIA Director Casey ``misrepresented or\nselectively used available intelligence to support the policy that he\nwas promoting.''\n The intelligence failures before the Iraq war were massive. The CIA's\nfailures were all in one direction, making the Iraqi threat clearer,\nsharper, and more imminent, thereby promoting the administration's\ndecision to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power. Nuances,\nqualifications, and caveats were dropped. A slam-dunk was the\nassessment relative to the presence of weapons of mass destruction in\nIraq. The CIA was telling the administration and the American people\nwhat it thought the administration wanted to hear.\n In July of 2004, just a few months ago, our Intelligence Committee in\nthe Senate issued a 500-page unanimous report setting out a long list\nof instances where the CIA or its leaders made statements about Iraq's\nWMD and, to a lesser extent, Iraq's links to al-Qaida, which statements\nwere significantly more certain than the underlying intelligence\nreporting and more certain than the CIA's earlier findings.\n In fact, the first overall conclusion on WMD in the intelligence\ncommittee's report was that ``most of the key judgments in the\nIntelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate .\n. . either overstated or were not supported by the underlying\nintelligence reporting'' regarding Iraq's programs of weapons of mass\ndestruction.\n These are life-and-death issues. We in Congress and the American\npeople need to know that we are getting objective assessments on North\nKorea's nuclear program or Iran's nuclear intentions, for instance. We\ncannot have any doubt in our mind the intelligence assessments that we\nget represent the facts as they are objectively assessed and are not\nshaped to serve policy goals of the White House--this White House or\nany other White House.\n We need a stronger national director of intelligence, but a stronger\nDNI must not simply be a stronger yes man for whatever administration\nhappens to be in power at the time. When we wrote the Senate bill, we\nincluded provisions to promote the objectivity and independence of\nintelligence assessments and to provide a check on the new National\nIntelligence Director from becoming a policy or political arm of the\nWhite House. I am troubled that the conference report excludes some of\nthose checks and significantly weakens others.\n Perhaps the most troubling area in which this conference report falls\nshort in that regard is the elimination of provisions which we had in\nour bipartisan Senate bill which gave Congress the tools to do\neffective oversight of the intelligence community. On this issue, the\n9/11 Commission itself said that ``Of all of our recommendations,\nstrengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult\nand important.'' That is why during the Senate's consideration of the\nbill, we worked so hard to include provisions\n\n[[Page S11957]]\n\naimed at achieving that goal. The absence of these provisions from this\nconference report is deeply troubling.\n The bipartisan bill that we passed here in the Senate contained\nlanguage that required the new Director of Intelligence, the National\nIntelligence Council, the NCTC, and the CIA to provide intelligence not\nshaped to serve policy goals. The conference report omits that\nlanguage.\n The Senate-passed bill promoted independence of the NCTC by stating\nthat the Director could not be forced to ask permission to testify\nbefore Congress or to seek prior approval of congressional testimony or\ncomments. The conference report leaves out that provision.\n The Senate-passed bill contained a provision requiring the DNI to\nprovide Congress access to intelligence reports, assessments,\nestimates, and other intelligence information and to do so within a\ntime certain.\n The conference report omits that Senate-passed requirement giving us\na tool to do oversight. There is a long, painful history of efforts in\nCongress, on a bipartisan basis, to obtain information from the\nintelligence community which have never been answered or have been\nslow-walked for weeks, months, and years at a time. It is unacceptable.\n A more powerful DNI could make matters worse--or better. Congress is\ncoequal to the executive branch on intelligence issues and it baffles\nme why any Member of Congress, over in the House where we had this\nopposition, would oppose strengthening our ability to access\ninformation and carry out our oversight responsibilities and to prod\nthe intelligence community to give us objective facts without spin.\n I ask unanimous consent for 1 more minute.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n Mr. LEVIN. I was also troubled to find out that White House staff was\nactually present in the room during staff negotiations of these issues.\nIt is my understanding that the White House objected to the\nCongressional oversight provisions during those discussions. I know\nthese Senate provisions were strongly supported by both the Senator\nfrom Maine and the Senator from Connecticut. I know how difficult those\ndiscussions were and I appreciate that support very much. It was not a\nlack of trying on their part which led to the exclusion of these\nprovisions. It was the opposition of the White House carried by House\nRepublicans.\n In the final negotiations leading up to the November 20 draft\nconference agreement, I even offered what I know the managers agreed\nwas a reasonable compromise that would have simply required that the\nDNI report to Congress the status of outstanding requests for\nintelligence information from committee chairmen and ranking members.\nIt is my understanding that the House Republicans and the White House\nopposed even that language. The record should be clear on this matter\nif we are to carry on the battle for stronger Congressional oversight,\nwhich is so essential.\n Other provisions directed at the production of independent, objective\nintelligence were also included in the Senate-passed bill but were\ndropped from this conference report. For example, the Senate-passed\nbill created a statutory ombudsman to initiate inquiries into problems\nof politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis.\nThis conference report weakens that provision by requiring merely that\nthe DNI identify an individual--and that could be any individual,\nincluding the DNI him or herself--to fill that role.\n The Senate-passed bill created a statutory inspector general in the\noffice of the DNI with strong investigative powers. This conference\nreport does not. Instead, it simply leaves it up to the DNI to create\nan IG or not.\n The Senate-passed bill created a statutory Office of Alternative\nAnalysis or ``red team.'' This conference report weakens that by simply\nrequiring the DNI to establish a process and assign an individual or\nentity--again, any individual or entity--to conduct the function of red\nteaming.\n Let me summarize. While I am pleased that we were successful in\ncreating a strong DNI and NCTC, I am deeply disappointed that we did\nnot reach our destination in these other equally important areas.\n Mr. President, on balance, I have concluded that I will vote for this\nbill, but I am concerned about what has been left out of this\nconference report. I think the managers share my concern about these\nomissions and would ask that they work with me to address these issues\nin the 109th Congress.\n While we have the chairman of the committee on the floor, I thank her\nand Senator Lieberman for the strong support they gave to the\nprovisions I just described. We should give Congress the tools to do\nthe oversight which is so essential if we are going to get independent,\nobjective analysis. I don't know why the House--apparently Republicans\nwho are carrying out the desires of the White House--took this\nposition. But it weakens Congress. I want to create a record here,\nnumber one, acknowledging and thanking and commending our managers for\nthe work they did in conference, trying to preserve our bipartisan\nprovision, but asking, if I could, that they comment on what I just\nsaid relative to where the objection came from to these provisions that\ngave Congress the tools to do effective oversight over intelligence\nassessments, which we had in our bipartisan Senate bill, and whether I\nwas correct in stating that.\n Perhaps the Senator can answer on her own time as to whether the\nobjection came from the House Republicans and the White House.\n Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, the Senator from Michigan worked so\nhard to craft a series of provisions that were included in this bill.\nUnfortunately, the conference agreement does not include many of the\nprovisions the Senator cared most about concerning access to\ninformation by Congress in order to ensure effective congressional\noversight.\n I think the loss of those provisions is unfortunate. On the Senate\nside, they had bipartisan support. I think it reflects a historic\ntension between Congress and the executive branch when it comes to\noversight and the inadequate sharing of information with Congress.\n This has been a problem in previous administrations, and it has\ncontinued to this day. So the Senator is correct that this objection\ndid not originate with any of the Senate conferees, either Republican\nor Democrat, and it did reflect the views of the executive branch. I\nwant to make it clear that regardless of whether we have had a\nDemocratic President or a Republican President, that tension has\nexisted over decades.\n Mr. LEVIN. I thank the chairman of the committee.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.\n Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I will spend a minute on separate\nintelligence-related matter before speaking about the bill currently\nbefore the Senate. In the time I have been vice chairman of the\nIntelligence Committee, I have worked hard to try to make sure that\nfunds are channeled to where they ought to be in intelligence. For this\nreason, and with a great deal of reluctance, I am going to oppose the\nfiscal year 2005 intelligence authorization conference report, which\nthe Senate will consider later today.\n My decision to take this somewhat unprecedented action is based\nsolely on my strenuous objection--shared by many in our committee--to a\nparticular major funding acquisition program that I believe is totally\nunjustified and very wasteful and dangerous to national security.\n Because of the highly classified nature of the programs contained in\nthe national intelligence budget, I cannot talk about them on the\nfloor. But the Senate has voted for the past 2 years to terminate the\nprogram of which I speak, only to be overruled in the appropriations\nconference. The intelligence authorization conference report that I\nexpect to be before the Senate later today fully authorizes funding for\nthis unjustified and stunningly expensive acquisition. I simply cannot\noverlook that.\n My decision is shared by a number of my colleagues. Speaking for\nmyself, if we are asked to fund this particular program next year, I\nwill seriously consider and probably will ask the Senate to go into\nclosed session so the Senators can understand, fully debate, become\ninformed upon, and then vote on termination of this very wasteful\nacquisition program.\n Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, I rise today to express my concern\nregarding\n\n[[Page S11958]]\n\na provision included in the Intelligence authorization conference\nreport, which has been included in the intelligence reform legislation\nbefore us. I commend the efforts of both Chairman Roberts and Vice\nChairman Rockefeller for their hard work during the negotiations over\nthis legislation. But I, like the vice chairman, do not support the\ncontinued funding of a major acquisition program which is unnecessary,\nineffective, over budget, and too expensive. The easier path would be\nto step aside and let this program continue without dissent. In this\ncase, however, I do not believe the continued funding of this program\nis the best way to secure our Nation and the safety of our troops and\ncitizens.\n The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has raised concerns about\nthe need and costs of this program for the past 4 years and sought to\ncancel this program in each of the past 2 years. This has not been a\npolitical issue, a Democratic or Republican issue, nor should it be.\nThe members of the Senate committee have supported these efforts in a\nnonpartisan way with unanimous votes each time.\n The Senate Intelligence Committee has determined that this program\nshould not be funded based on firm policy judgments. Numerous\nindependent reviews have concluded that the program does not fulfill a\nmajor intelligence gap or shortfall, and the original justification for\ndeveloping this technology has eroded in importance due to the changed\npractices and capabilities of our adversaries. There are a number of\nother programs in existence and in development whose capabilities can\nmatch those envisioned for this program at far less cost and\ntechnological risk. Like almost all other acquisition programs of its\nsize, initial budget estimates have drastically underestimated the true\ncosts of this acquisition and independent cost estimates have shown\nthat this program will exceed its proposed budgets by enormous amounts\nof money. The Senate Intelligence Committee has also in the past\nexpressed its concern about how this program was to be awarded to the\nprime contractor.\n I understand why funding for this program was included in the\nconference report. The administration requested it, the appropriators\nhave already funded it, and the House wanted to maintain the funding.\nNevertheless, I believe this issue must be highlighted because it is\nnot going away. I wish more of my colleagues knew of the details of\nthis program and understood why we are so convinced that it should be\ncanceled. I encourage you to request a briefing, to come to the\nIntelligence Committee and let our staff explain why we believe we are\nright about this program. If you do, I believe my colleagues would\nagree with the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and vote to\nstop this program next year.\n I am pleased that the so-called ``lone wolf'' terrorist provision,\nwhich had passed the Senate twice since the attacks of 9/11, has been\nincluded in the intelligence reform legislation.\n As all my colleagues who have read the 9/11 Commission Report know,\nthe case of Zacarias Moussauoui--the ``twentieth hijacker''--showed\nthat current law was insufficient to address cases in which a foreign\nperson is suspected of terrorist involvement but had no known\nconnection to a terrorist organization. Current law under the Foreign\nIntelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, required that the FBI show that\nany suspected terrorist must have links to a known foreign terrorist\ngroup before the special FISA court would issue an intelligence warrant\nto surveil or search the suspect. The Senate passed bill made this\nneeded change and included reporting requirements necessary to ensure\nproper congressional oversight of how this provision was implemented.\nThe bipartisan effort to enact this provision was led by Senators Kyl\nand Schumer who proved that we can fight terrorism more effectively\nwithout giving up our privacy and cherished civil rights.\n The 9/11 Commission identified the Moussaoui case as one instance\nwhere, if things had gone right and with a lucky break here or there,\nthe disastrous attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon\nmay have been delayed, disrupted, or even stopped. I acknowledge the\nconcerns some have expressed regarding the possibility this provision\nmay be misused or unnecessarily extends the reach of the FISA statute.\nI believe that we can address these concerns with proper congressional\noversight of how this authority is used and review of this provision\nprior to its 2005 sunset.\n Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I now turn to the business\ncurrently pending before the Senate, the National Security Intelligence\nReform Act. I am pleased to be here at long last to speak in support of\nthe National Security Intelligence Reform Act. After 5 months of\nendless work, led by Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman, we are\npoised to achieve what people thought was impossible. Some have\ncriticized this legislation for being too hastily conceived or rushed\nto completion. To the contrary, this reform has been 50 years in the\nmaking and the issues have been the subject of 46 different commission\nreports. Most of them have suggested the same kinds of things we are\ndoing here.\n Now, under the extraordinary leadership coming from Senator Susan\nCollins and Senator Joe Lieberman, our Nation will soon have a Director\nof National Intelligence who can begin to effectively coordinate our\nintelligence agencies for the first time since the creation of the\nNational Security Act of 1947.\n This critical reform was first suggested during the Nixon\nadministration and was the central recommendation not only of the 9/11\nCommission, but also the joint inquiry--not so well known in this\nbody--that was conducted by both the House and Senate Intelligence\nCommittees, working together over a period of 2 years ago.\n The intelligence reform bill also establishes a National\nCounterterrorism Center where our analytical and operational efforts to\ncombat terrorism, here and abroad, can be brought together in a\ncoordinated way. This builds on the effort to centralize\nCounterterrorism analysis begun with the creation of the Terrorist\nThreat Integration Center.\n But unlike TTIC, the new center will coordinate much more than just\nintelligence analysis. The NCTC, National counterterrorism Center, will\nbe responsible for the strategic planning of all Counterterrorism\noperations across the Government. It will provide a unity of effort\nthat we have been lacking for all of these years.\n The final legislation is, I believe, a monumental achievement. I am\nproud to support it. But I am also very honest, as was the previous\nspeaker, Senator Levin from Michigan, that it does not address all of\nthe recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. That is somewhat natural in\nthe process of a conference. But it is important to point out what we\ndon't yet have and what we need to continue working for.\n I am disappointed that a number of important provisions in this bill\nwere dropped or weakened--in some cases necessarily--in order to get\nthis agreement. The agreement had to be reached. The intransigence of\nthe House conferees forced the Senate conferees to give up more than I\nwould have hoped. A couple of examples are the DNI's ability to\ntransfer funding and personnel. It is a basic part of what the\nPresident is asking for, what the commission was asking for. It is\nsignificantly weakened from the Senate bill, which passed 96 to 2.\n The comptroller established to execute the National Intelligence\nProgram funding has been dropped, requiring intelligence spending to\nstill be channeled through the Pentagon comptroller.\n The creation of the inspector general in the Office of the Director\nof National Intelligence is discretionary, not statutorily mandated. It\nis not going to be any good unless there is a person there doing their\njob.\n Many provisions in the Senate bill designed to ensure the objectivity\nof intelligence and improve congressional oversight were modified or\nwere dropped, including the provisions of the bill authored by Senator\nCarl Levin--many excellent suggestions that would have improved\ncongressional access to information and unvarnished intelligence\nreporting.\n\n Similarly, the Senate conferees were forced to modify other important\nprovisions on the civil liberties, privacy, and declassification boards\nin order to overcome House objections.\n Even with these shortcomings and others, the agreement reached is\nstill a\n\n[[Page S11959]]\n\nvery good one, one that I can support and one on which I hope we can\nbuild in the future in our intelligence authorization bills.\n While several provisions from the Senate bill were weakened or\ndropped, the final agreement still includes many very important\nprovisions--as I would say, the beginning of the turning of the\nbattleship--that will make meaningful improvements to the operation of\nthe intelligence community in all areas, not just counterterrorism.\n We had a press conference yesterday, and I pointed out that in 1998,\nGeorge Tenet announced and declared that there was a war against al-\nQaida. Nobody listened. Nobody had to listen, I guess, and they did\nnot. Under this new setup, if the Director of National Intelligence so\ndeclares and has the authority to follow through, that will be\nabsolutely enormous.\n Some of the good provisions are: Language directing the DNI to create\nan ombudsman to ensure the objectivity and independence of intelligence\nanalysis. That is so important because it means that people can come to\nan ombudsman within an intelligence agency and air their grievances,\nsaying they are being pressured to do analysis a certain way, whatever.\nBut having an ombudsman is very important in big and sensitive\norganizations.\n The establishment of a intelligence community reserve corps is, I\nthink, a really good idea. It is in the bill. It helps relieve the\nburden during periods of increased deployments, such as we are going\nthrough right now.\n And the establishment of an alternative analysis or ``red teaming''\ncapability--which is simply the act and the art of taking the\ncollection of intelligence and then the analysis that comes from that\ncollection and having people who are there to say: But did you ask this\nquestion? What about that? In other words, they bring a contrarian\npoint of view, thus disciplining intelligence at the collection,\ndevelopment, and production phase into a more worked product.\n These reforms address problems uncovered in the Senate Intelligence\nCommittee inquiry into the prewar intelligence on Iraq, some of the\nones I just mentioned. When we put them to those two heroic Americans,\nGovernor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, they supported them strongly.\nThey are very critical to this reform effort.\n The creation of a Senate-confirmed Director of National Intelligence\npresents the President with the opportunity and the challenge to select\nan individual with strong national security and management credentials\nand who will be viewed by all as a nonpartisan leader of the\nintelligence community. That goes without saying. That is absolutely\nbasic.\n Now, more than ever, we need an individual who will not only\neffectively manage the intelligence community for the first time ever,\nbut who can also be an objective adviser to the President, somebody\nimmune to the influence of political pressure.\n In order to carry out the enormous responsibilities created in this\nbill, the new Director cannot be seen as pursuing a political agenda of\nany kind or forcing the intelligence community to support a particular\nadministration policy. That would apply, obviously, to both Democratic\nand Republican Presidents and their administrations.\n We need a Director who will speak truth to power, as we say, and\npresent what the intelligence community knows, does not know, or\nbelieves in a timely and objective way.\n I urge the President to nominate an individual to serve as the first\nDirector of National Intelligence who embodies these qualifications.\n In conclusion, I again thank Senators Collins and Lieberman for\nleading us through this extraordinary process, watching the process\nseem to disintegrate, and then, through the absolute persistence of\nboth of them--even to the extent, I understand it, of BlackBerrying\neach other from the office to the Kennedy Center--and I will not say\nwhich Senator was at which place. But all of this helped bring the deal\ntogether.\n They were extraordinary in what they did. I have never seen anything\nlike it in the 20 years I have been here. I am really proud of both of\nthem. They never gave up their fight. They never took their eyes off\nthe prize. They overcame institutional resistance to change, and, in\nthe end, they overcame House efforts to undermine and emasculate the\nbipartisan mandate for intelligence reform, but did so in a way which\ndrew an enormously positive vote from the House last night. They are\nskillful, and we honor them.\n Madam President, I yield the floor.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.\n Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia\nfor his extraordinarily generous comments. We would not be where we are\ntoday without the support of the vice chairman of the Senate\nIntelligence Committee. He contributed greatly to the bill. He was\nthere from the very first day, drawing on his impressive experience in\nintelligence and national security matters, advising Senator Lieberman\nand me on what should be in the bill. He was one of our most active and\ndedicated conferees.\n I am very grateful for his support and efforts and his contributions.\nI realize the bill we produced is by no means a perfect bill, and I\nknow that in the years to come, he and his colleague, Senator Roberts,\nwill work to strengthen and improve our efforts. I thank him very much.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.\n Mr. WARNER. Madam President, might I inquire of the distinguished\nmanagers as to the recognition of speakers that meets the desire of the\ntwo managers? The Senator from Virginia has indicated a desire to\nspeak, and I believe I am on the list. I will be happy to take whatever\nposition is available. I can follow my distinguished colleague from\nWest Virginia. I am here to listen and learn.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.\n Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, it is my understanding that the Senator\nfrom West Virginia is scheduled to speak next. The Senator from\nVirginia is on the list for 30 minutes of time. The Senator from West\nVirginia is on the list for 2 hours of time. I am uncertain whether the\nPresiding Officer can be advised whether there is a further order\nbeyond what I have just indicated?\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the extent of the list of speakers.\n Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the senior Senator from West Virginia\nindicated to me that in all probability he might not use that time. To\nfacilitate matters, I can be on short notice to come after should he\nnot use 2 hours.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.\n Mr. BYRD. Madam President, am I recognized?\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator from Maine yields the floor.\n Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I will yield the floor. I just want to\nindicate that the Senator from Alaska, Mr. Stevens, is also on the list\nto speak for 5 minutes. I believe he wanted to follow the Senator from\nWest Virginia. And I see that the Senator from Louisiana is also here\nand would like to speak for 5 minutes. So I ask that they also be put\nin the queue.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The\nSenator from West Virginia.\n Mr. BYRD. What does ``in the queue'' mean in this situation?\n Madam President, maybe I can shed just a little bit of light here to\nhelp. I do not intend to take the full 2 hours which have been allotted\nto me under a previous request. I will be very happy to yield to the\nvery distinguished senior Senator from Virginia at this time if he so\nwishes to precede me.\n Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my colleague. As we discussed, I\nwould like to have the benefit of the remarks which he is going to\ndeliver to the Senate prior to my speaking. If we just leave it, I will\nbe available whenever the managers wish to indicate I can speak, I will\ndo so.\n Mr. BYRD. Madam President, as I say, I will not use the full 2 hours.\nThere will be ample time, I am sure, for some of the others whose names\nhave already been mentioned.\n When I refer to the distinguished Senator from Virginia, may I take\nthis opportunity to thank him for the service he continues to give to\nthe country and to his constituents, the people of the great State of\nVirginia. I have noted in the press some of the concerns he has\nexpressed with respect to this particular legislation, and I am sure\n\n[[Page S11960]]\n\nthose concerns have led to improved legislation, certainly improved\nchances for its passage today, and I want to thank him for that.\n Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my distinguished colleague.\nHistory will have to reflect, once this is adopted into law, and I\nintend to support it, upon certain provisions that I had some role in\npreparing, working with the distinguished managers of the bill and my\ncounterpart in the House, the distinguished chairman of the House Armed\nServices Committee, Duncan Hunter, who has been a very forceful and\ncommitted individual to achieve the common goals Congressman Hunter and\nI shared.\n I might add to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, there\nwere at least four or five others in the Chamber who consulted with me,\nworked with me, and provided ideas, and I want to thank them, although\nI shall not take the time at this time to mention their names.\n I will be available whenever the managers wish to put in a call to\nme.\n On another subject, I say to my distinguished colleague from West\nVirginia, the Christmas tree that is now gracing the west lawn of the\nCapitol grew on the border between Highland County and West Virginia,\nand my understanding is that some of the roots penetrated into West\nVirginia. So while the trunk may have been in our State, it really drew\non the wisdom of West Virginia and Virginia, and I think my colleague\nand I are very appreciative that this tree was selected.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). The Senator from West Virginia.\n Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the managers of this bill, Senator\nCollins and Senator Lieberman, for the courtesies which they never\nfailed to extend. I have the utmost respect for the dedication and for\nthe knowledge which they have brought to this particular subject\nmatter. They have spent many weeks, days, and hours in the\nconsideration of this matter in the committee, on the Senate floor, in\nthe conference, and their kindnesses, their studies, their knowledge,\ntheir ability to translate into action the concerns that so many of us\nhave held with respect to intelligence is something worthy of\nadmiration.\n I also thank Senator Roberts and my colleague in the Senate from West\nVirginia, Senator Rockefeller. They, too, have worked hard and have\ncontributed much and will continue to do so. I recognize that these\nSenators have worked tirelessly since last summer in trying to craft\nthe best legislation possible. So I have to compliment these Senators.\nI have to salute them. I have to respect them for their tenacity.\n I regret that I cannot join them in supporting the conference report.\nI will vote against it. Mine may be the only vote against it, for that\nmatter. But I feel that I must speak out and must vote my own\nsentiments as I attempt to represent the people of West Virginia\naccording to my own lights.\n I know the families of the individuals who perished in the September\n11 attacks are following the proceedings of the Senate closely today,\nand my sympathies go out to them, as my sympathies did immediately\nafter the terrible tragedy that befell them and befell the Nation. As\nchairman of the Appropriations Committee at that time, I responded in a\nvery positive way. We passed a $40 billion appropriations bill within 3\ndays. That is somewhat of a record, I must say. Again, I say, we\nenacted--when I say ``we,'' I mean the entire Congress--a $40 billion\nappropriations bill within 3 days of that tragic happening.\n These families who have grieved over the loss of their loved ones for\nmore than 3 years, and who will continue to grieve over these losses\nthroughout their lifetimes, have been critical to the efforts to create\nthe 9/11 Commission and allow their thorough investigation to be\ncompleted. The greatest tribute to their efforts of these past years\nwould be for the Congress to get these intelligence reforms right.\n When the elected representatives of the people allow themselves to be\ncoerced into a process that encourages the abdication of our\nresponsibility to understand and fully debate and thoroughly review\nlegislation, the people are robbed of their voice and their government.\nSenators take an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States.\nI have taken that oath many times over these 58 years that I have\nserved in public office. Common sense suggests that that means reading\nand studying the legislation before the Congress. We are dutybound to\nexplore the opinions on all sides of an issue and, especially an issue\nthat is so serious as is this one, we are dutybound to work toward a\nprocess that does not exclude opponents or silence the opposition.\n In its heyday, the Senate, this body, the U.S. Senate, was known as\nthe greatest deliberative body in the world. It should still be that. I\nwonder if it is. What we have seen in recent times, however, is a\nhollow shell, a hollow shell of that noble tradition. Time after time\nafter time, the Senate forgoes its responsibility to deliberate and to\ncarefully review legislation, and even defers to others to craft\nlegislation for it.\n Legislation is passed by the Senate and then, all too often, hastily\nrewritten in a conference report behind closed doors marked, as it\nwere, ``no minority view admitted.'' All too often during the 108th\nCongress, the party leadership has held bills until just before a\nrecess and then employed disingenuous rhetoric about, ``Oh, last\nopportunities, these are the last opportunities to get something\ndone.''\n\n Senators, preoccupied with holiday schedules and holiday travel\nplans, for example, roll over timidly and accept whatever is placed in\nfront of them. They do it. They do it time and time again. And they\nimportune those Senators who might be hopeful of speaking out and\nspending some time and debating with their colleagues. These Senators\nare pressured by their colleagues and by the leadership and by the\nWhite House to roll over and let the vote come and let us go home. I\nanguish about the eroding character of the Senate.\n I have now served in this Senate 46 years. I have seen the Senate\nwhen it took the time to speak and to debate and to amend, to ask\nquestions. I have seen those times, and those were the great days for\nthe Senate. It fulfilled its duties to the American people and to the\nFramers, to the forefathers, to those who have preceded us. I greatly\nregret that those days seem to be gone. They seem to be gone.\n I anguish, as I say, about the eroding character of this body. I\nanguish about the message it sends to the American people when this\nbody allows itself to be stampeded, as it so often does allow itself to\nbe stampeded, into passing legislation without thorough examination.\n Oh, we congratulate ourselves on a job well done and then vote\noverwhelmingly in support of the legislation, and yet we cannot even be\nbothered to ask questions about the changes made in conference. Like\npigmies on the battlefield of history, we cower like whipped dogs in\nthe face of political pressure when it comes to issues such as\nintelligence reform.\n I felt the pressure to forego any speech, forego any request for a\nrollcall vote but just to let it pass by voice vote. Can you imagine\nthat? Let this piece of legislation pass by voice vote; oh, Senators\nhave travel plans, and it would be well if we could just have a voice\nvote.\n\n We have too much of that around here. I for one have a rebellious\nfeeling against our relaxing in our duties to the Senate and to the\npeople by giving in to such pressure.\n I do not claim to know as much about this legislation as the managers\nof the bill. But I do know about process. And it galls me that the\nSenate has allowed itself to be jammed against a time deadline time and\ntime and time again--and in this instance, jammed against a time\ndeadline in considering this conference report.\n This is the most far-reaching reorganization of our intelligence\nagencies since 1947. These changes will remain for decades, and these\nchanges will impact upon the security of our Nation at countless\nlevels. Such matters ought to be held to a higher standard of\nconsideration by the Congress than is the case here.\n This conference report has been reworked and redrafted over the\ncourse of 2 months in a closed-door conference, and the Senate has only\nreceived a printed copy of the conference agreement less than 24 hours\nago. I\n\n[[Page S11961]]\n\ndon't know what is in the conference report. I would say that any other\nSenator who stands before this Senate and tells the American people he\nor she knows what is in the conference report is like the emperor who\nhad no clothes.\n As late as yesterday, the conferees were still making changes. It is\noutrageous, outrageous, to expect Senators to read and understand a\n615-page measure in less than 24 hours. Is that the way we ought to\nlegislate? Here we have young pages who come here from all States of\nthe Union. They expect to learn how legislation is made, how the Senate\nworks, how we Senators perform in the bright lights of publicity, how\nwe do the people's business. I know they read the casebooks and the\nhistory books and the textbooks and all these things about how\nlegislation is made. They come here with bright eyes, open eyes, open\nears, great hope, great aspirations, and they work for what I say has\nbeen rightly called the greatest deliberative body in the world.\n Is this deliberation, a 600-page report? If I stood before the\nAmerican people and said I can vouch for everything that is in this, I\nknow what is in it, the people would know I am misleading them,\nwouldn't they? But this is so often the way it is. We allow ourselves\nto be pressured by the leadership. The leadership calls up measures\nhere in the Senate. Any Senator can make a motion to proceed. But\nSenators don't do that. They defer to the majority leader. I have been\nthe majority leader. I have been the minority leader. Senators defer to\nthe majority leader, whether it is a Democrat or a Republican, to call\nup measures. I say that we often just do not have the debates the\nSenate should give to important measures.\n This conference report--as I say, it is outrageous for Senators to\nunderstand the 600-page bill in less than 24 hours.\n I want to call attention to the Washington Post of today and its lead\neditorial titled ``Reform In Haste.'' I shall just take the time to\nread the first two paragraphs of today's Washington Post lead editorial\ntitled ``Reform In Haste.'' I quote therefrom:\n\n The rhetoric emanating from the Capitol Hill in the past\n few days may have created the impression that, after a hard-\n fought battle over key provisions, Congress worked its way to\n a sensible plan for reorganizing the U.S. intelligence\n community. Sadly, that is far from the truth. The 600-page\n omnibus measure on its way to approval yesterday had not been\n read or carefully considered by the vast majority of members,\n including some of those most involved in its construction.\n What passed for a debate in the past couple of weeks was\n actually little more than a turf battle by Pentagon satraps\n and the Congressmen who share their interests on issues that\n are marginal to the broad reorganization outlined in the\n legislation.\n That shake-up, driven by an odd combination of election-\n year politics and the determination of the September 11\n commission to leave a mark, may improve the quality of\n intelligence information supplied to the President and other\n key policymakers; we have our doubts. Like the passage of the\n USA Patriot Act or the creation of the Department of Homeland\n Security, it has been mandated hastily and with scant\n consideration of its long-term consequences.\n\n That is what I am talking about. The Washington Post hit it right on\nthe head.\n I tell you that I am not going to vote for legislation of this\nimportance under such circumstances. I have done it before. I have\nvoted against other legislation from time to time which I felt was\nbeing rammed through the Senate without proper consideration, without\nample time for debate. And this measure, of course, cannot be amended.\nA conference report under Senate rules cannot be amended. So we have to\ntake it or leave it, vote it up or down. We are buying a pig in a poke\nhere, I can assure you.\n This conference report is very different from the legislation that\npassed the House of Representatives and the Senate 2 months ago. I have\nheard Senators here on the floor today talk about how this differs from\nthe legislation that we passed in the Senate a few weeks ago.\n For example, a number of provisions related to the U.S. PATRIOT Act\nand the law enforcement powers have been inserted into this bill, which\nagain has never been considered on the Senate floor.\n This legislation has encountered virulent opposition since the time\nof its conception. And while it may enjoy the support of the\noverwhelming majority of Members here today, nobody--I say nobody--can\nsay with any confidence or certainty as to how this new layer of\nbureaucracy will affect our intelligence agencies or the security of\nour country. We don't know if it will enable the intelligence agencies\nor enable the Government in all its ramifications to better guard\nagainst a terrorist attack or whether it will cause a host of\nunforeseen problems. We are failing in yet another misguided rush to\njudgment to take the time and effort to find out. We are failing to\ntake the time. It is a rush to judgment. There has been a mad scramble\nto cobble the pieces together and pass a bill. Oh, I have to pass a\nbill.\n\n The Senate barely understands how the experts line up on this bill.\nThe 9/11 Commission is for it. That much we know. But former CIA\nDirector George Tenet said last week he opposes this bill. That is\nsobering criticism from someone who, having left Government months ago,\nno longer has any turf to protect.\n A distinguished group of national security experts wrote in September\nthat they oppose any intelligence reform this year. That group included\nformer Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman David Boren; former\nSenator Bill Bradley; former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci;\nformer Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen; former CIA Director Robert\nGates; former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre; former Senator\nGary Hart; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; former Senate\nArmed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn; former Senator Warren\nRudman; former Secretary of State George Shultz.\n We do not know how these experts regard this conference report. We do\nnot know how they regard the bill today, but even months ago they urged\nwe take more time.\n Henry Kissinger appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee\nand urged we take more time. He suggested we take more time, even as\nmuch as perhaps 8 months--nothing this year.\n I read from an excerpt of a statement by former Secretary of State\nHenry Kissinger, as of Tuesday, September 21, this year:\n\n What we are urging is a time for reflection and a time for\n consideration with maybe a short deadline of 6 to 8 months,\n but to take it out of the immediate pressures of a period\n that is bound to affect the thinking.\n\n There we were, about to enter into the heat of an election campaign\nand Henry Kissinger was saying, whoa, whoa, wait a minute. Let's slow\ndown. Let's take adequate time. Don't be pressured by the election.\nLet's don't do these things in such a hurry.\n We do not know what these experts regard how they would perceive this\nconference report today. I don't know how Henry Kissinger would judge\nit. He doesn't know what is in the conference report, just as I don't\nknow what is in it. Why should Senators forego the valuable insight of\nalmost every public figure who may actually be able to assess what is\nin the new version of intelligence reform?\n So I say again, let us not say we believe we understand what is\nincluded in this conference report. I don't understand it. We have not\nhad the time to understand it. We do not have sufficient resources by\nway of assistance from capable staff people. They have not had the\ntime. It is, in effect, a new bill and in some ways very different from\nanything the Senate has considered to date.\n Common sense suggests the Congress ought to hold hearings on the\ncontents of this new measure so we may be informed by experts about its\nbenefits and defects, so that we may ask questions, so that those\nquestions and answers may be compiled into printed hearings so we all\nmay have the benefit of the knowledge, the benefit of time to study and\nto reflect.\n There is no reason the Senate cannot proceed in this prudent matter\nearly next year. Instead of viewing this conference report as the final\nstage of the process, we ought to consider it as the starting point for\ndebate next year. It is only a few days away, next year. We ought to\ninvite witnesses back to testify and allow the process to begin anew\noutside the election cycle and built on the foundations of knowledge\nacquired this year.\n Instead, we are allowing ourselves to be lulled into the fallacious\nbelief that we must accept this bill, we must accept this conference\nreport, we cannot\n\n[[Page S11962]]\n\namend it, we must accept it from page 1 through page 615. We have to\naccept it lock, stock, and barrel.\n We do not know what is in it. There may be several pigs in this poke,\nbut we buy them all; we embrace the whole thing virtually sight unseen.\nWe allow ourselves to be lulled into the fallacious belief that we must\naccept this bill or risk it not passing next year, with some even\nsuggesting a terrorist attack could result from it.\n Now, a terrorist attack may happen, but it won't happen because this\nconference report would have been put over until next year. If it is\ngoing to happen, it will happen and nothing in this conference report\nwould stop it if it happened next week or the next month or the next\nseveral weeks or months. That is nonsense. Don't believe it.\n I have heard even some comments from people who ought to know better\non the TV saying, What I am concerned about, if we don't pass this\nreport, I just hope we don't have another terrorist attack--as though\npassage of this conference report will make any difference to any\nterrorist who may be planning an attack next week or 10 days or the\nnext month or the next 2 or 3 months. No legislation alone can\nforestall a terrorist attack on our country.\n The momentum is strong now to reform our intelligence agency. I\nsubmit the greater risk is not that the momentum will dissipate next\nyear if this bill does not pass today or this week, but that the\npassage of this bill will remove any incentive to focus on the broader\nintelligence failures that have occurred outside the war on terror.\n This legislation is appropriately focused on the failings of\nSeptember 11 but oblivious to the many other glaring deficiencies in\nour intelligence community. Our country went to war in Iraq, a war we\nshould not have engaged in, a war in Iraq on the shoulders of false\nclaims about weapons of mass destruction. But this bill dances around\nthat issue on tippy toes. It is as though Congress is too afraid to\nmention the fact that faulty intelligence claims deceived the public\nout there, deceived the man and the woman on the street, deceived the\npeople of this country into believing there was an imminent threat from\nSaddam Hussein.\n Why is Congress avoiding that critical issue? Is it because some do\nnot wish to expose the role of the White House in feeding bad\nintelligence to the American people? The Founding Fathers intended\nCongress to be a check on the power of the Chief Executive, but\nincreasingly Congress appears content merely to be a cheerleader for\nthe President depending upon which party might be in control at a given\nmoment.\n The intelligence bill fails to address the unfolding prison abuse\nscandals in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay.\n The Armed Services Committee has held six hearings on the abuse of\nprisoners in U.S. military jails. There is mounting evidence that the\nCIA had some hand in the mistreatment of detainees. The Red Cross has\nreported on the illegal practices of U.S. intelligence agencies holding\n``ghost detainees'' in secret prisons. Why is this intelligence bill\nsilent on such outrageous policies? How can Congress claim to fix what\nis wrong with our intelligence agencies if this major piece of\nlegislation does not even address such colossal intelligence failures?\n The only way to reduce the risk of such failures is to ensure the\naccountability of this new Intelligence Director to the people's\nrepresentatives in the Congress. It is the Congress that must make the\ndecision to declare war, and it is the Congress that is responsible for\nthe oversight of this new intelligence program to help guard against\nfuture intelligence failures.\n It is paramount that the Congress do everything possible to ensure\nitself access to timely, objective intelligence. Yet that is not what\nwe see in this legislation.\n This conference report eliminates provisions to ensure that the\nCongress receives timely access to intelligence. It also allows the\nWhite House's Office of Management and Budget to screen testimony\nbefore the Intelligence Director presents it to the Congress.\nWhistleblower protections for intelligence officials who report to the\nCongress have also been stricken from the Senate-passed bill.\n The conference agreement creates senior intelligence positions but\nexempts many of them from confirmation by the Senate. It eliminates the\nprivacy and civil rights officers included in the Senate-passed bill.\nIt strips 18 pages of legislative text that would have created an\ninspector general and ombudsman to oversee the Intelligence Director's\noffice. That language has been replaced with one paragraph, authorizing\nthe Intelligence Director, at his discretion, to create or not to\ncreate an inspector general, and provides the Director with the power\nto decide which, if any, investigative powers to grant the inspector\ngeneral.\n That means the new Intelligence Director could exempt his office from\ninspector general audits and investigations, and that the Congress\nwould not receive reports from an objective internal auditor. The\nCongress is limiting its own access to vital information within this\nnew intelligence office, and it will have thereby compromised an\nessential mechanism for identifying potential abuses within the new\nintelligence program.\n Given the dark history of abuses of civil liberties and privacy\nrights by our intelligence community, I had hoped that the Congress\nwould exercise more caution, but it has not done so in this\nlegislation.\n The 9/11 Commission recognized that its recommendations call for the\nGovernment to increase its presence in people's lives, and so it wisely\nendorsed the creation of an independent Civil Liberties Board to defend\nour privacy rights and liberties. The Senate-passed bill embraced this\nrecommendation and included additional protections to help ensure that\nexecutive agencies could not exert undue influence on the Board. This\nconference agreement, however, scuttles those protections by burying\nthe Board deep inside the Office of the President, subjecting Board\nmembers to White House pressure. Why?\n The conferees included language making changes to the 1978 Foreign\nIntelligence Surveillance Act, the law that blurs the rules on\nelectronic surveillance and physical searches by the U.S. Government.\nThis conference report, though, states that the Intelligence Director\nshall have authority to direct or undertake electronic surveillance and\nphysical search operations pursuant to FISA if authorized by statute or\nexecutive order. This is dangerous ground, isn't it? This is dangerous\nground to walk when the President, through executive order, and without\nthe authorization of the Congress, can direct this new Intelligence\nDirector to undertake electronic surveillance and physical search\noperations.\n\n Yet another provision would make terrorist crimes subject to a\nrebuttable presumption of pretrial detention, which means that\nprosecutors will not be required to show a judge that the defendant is\na flight risk. Instead, the defendant will be presumed to be a flight\nrisk. Are Senators sure we are not trampling on the civil liberties of\nthe American people with the hasty passage of this conference report?\n Again, few, if any, Senate hearings have been held on these\nprovisions by the full Senate Judiciary Committee. The inclusion of\nthese provisions in title VI, with so little examination of their real\nmeaning, reminds one of how the PATRIOT Act itself was enacted in haste\nwithout sufficient review, and with no real understanding of its true\nconsequences.\n These are unsettling provisions, and the Senate ought to insist on\nits rights to consider them more carefully. The Senate has not had\nenough time to understand this legislation or its implications. This\nnew Intelligence Director has been granted significant authorities, and\nthe Congress has not done enough to ensure adequate checks on the\nactions of the Intelligence Director.\n With regard to homeland security, the bill authorizes a significant\nincrease in the number of Border Patrol agents, immigration\ninvestigators, and a significant increase in the number of beds for\nimmigration detention. The bill also authorizes increased funding for\nair cargo security and for screening airline passengers for explosives.\nAll of these are worthy goals, but the provisions are just empty\npromises.\n Last September, when I offered an amendment to the Homeland Security\n\n[[Page S11963]]\n\nappropriations bill to fund these precise activities, the White House\nopposed the amendment and my Republican colleagues lined up, virtually\nto the man or woman, and voted against it. And today, Members will line\nup and vote for more empty promises.\n President Bush had the opportunity to support Congressman\nSensenbrenner and insist on tougher immigration reforms in this bill,\nbut the President welched. Senators talk about reforms needed to\nprotect against terrorism, and the fact is that this bill is a\nhodgepodge of empty border security promises that the administration\nhas no intention of funding--and I am certainly concerned about that;\nno intention of funding--and that will only encourage the kind of\nillegal immigration that leaves our country wide open to terrorists.\n Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield?\n Mr. BYRD. Yes, I will yield.\n Mr. INHOFE. I ask the distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia\nif he would yield me a little bit of his time, and then I will yield\nright back, because something the Senator said I think is worth\nelaborating on a bit.\n Mr. BYRD. Very well. Will the distinguished Senator inform me as to\nhow much time?\n Mr. INHOFE. Oh, 10 minutes, but I probably will not use it all.\n Mr. BYRD. Does the Senator wish me to yield at this point?\n Mr. INHOFE. I would like that, yes, or I will wait until the Senator\nfinishes his current thought. I want to reference former Senator Boren\nand some things that you mentioned.\n Mr. BYRD. Yes.\n Mr. INHOFE. I will wait.\n Mr. BYRD. I will certainly yield to my friend very shortly. Let me\nsay, however, continuing my thought, it may well be that the only\nproblem that this bill will actually fix is one of politics.\n Passing this bill in the waning hours of the 108th Congress means\nthat for all intents and purposes intelligence reform will be removed\nfrom the agenda of the next Congress. By passing this bill today, the\nSenate will be giving political cover to those who wish to dismiss\ncalls for more thorough reform of intelligence agencies to fix problems\nthat are not addressed in the legislation, including the Iraq WMD,\nweapons of mass destruction, fiasco and the abuse of prisoners in\nsecret detention facilities.\n Intelligence reform should be done right the first time. But the\nactual implementation of this bill will be shrouded in secrecy and\nhidden from public scrutiny. Under this conference report, the total\namount of intelligence spending will remain classified so that the\nAmerican people may never know if the President is shortchanging the\nreform effort that this bill requires. Senators ought not be so willing\nto rush this bill through knowing that it may serve as political cover\nfor an administration that has a sorry history of promising big reform\nefforts that it never funds.\n Mr. President, I am happy to yield now, if I may retain my right to\nthe floor, to my friend from Oklahoma.\n Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator for yielding.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, the Senator had referred to a report and\nnamed several very distinguished people, including the former Senator\nfrom Oklahoma, my predecessor, current president of Oklahoma\nUniversity, David Boren.\n Mr. BYRD. Yes.\n Mr. INHOFE. I would share with the Senator from West Virginia that\nwhen I won the election to replace him, he and I had a talk. And he\nsaid: I have something very significant to talk to you about.\n If the Senator from West Virginia will recall, Senator Boren was the\nchairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee at that time.\n Mr. BYRD. Yes.\n Mr. INHOFE. He said: You have to do something. I have tried and I\nhaven't really succeeded because no one is aware of the shambles that\nthe system is in in terms of the turf battles in intelligence\ncollection and all of that.\n I told him at that time I would do everything I could even though I\nwas going to be on the Intelligence Committee but not on some of the\ncommittees dealing directly with this. So he talked about the crisis it\nwas in.\n I will read to you from the CSIS report that was written by the very\npeople the Senator from West Virginia listed. It reads:\n\n Racing to implement reforms on an election timetable is\n precisely the wrong thing to do.\n\n I think that it does have to be deliberative, and we do have to have\nmore time.\n Additionally, there is no one I hold in higher regard in terms of his\nbackground and capability than Porter Goss. I served with him in the\nother body. Here is a man who has the background, yet we haven't heard\nanything from him on this. It seems to me if we all agree, as we did\nwhen his confirmation took place, that he is the expert that he is, he\nshould have some participation. At least I want to know what his\nthinking is about this.\n Just for a moment, I saw several things in the House bill I liked. I\nhave a very short list of things that were taken out of the House bill\nin conference. This disturbs me. For example, they took out any\nrequirement for proof of lawful presence in the United States. The\nrequirement applies to immigration law provisions passed in 1996, which\nI supported, as did the Senator from West Virginia, that were signed\ninto law by President Clinton.\n Secondly, the temporary license requirements, including a\nrequirement--again this was in the House bill and was taken out--that\nthe license term should expire on the same date as a visa or other\ntemporary lawful presence authorizing document. This means if you are\nhere on a document--it might be a visa--and it expires, your driver's\nlicense should expire at the same time. That was a part of the House\nbill that was taken out.\n The required documentation for identity is the hard document. Many\nStates have inadequate and outdated proof of identity. This provision\nensures that the States would have hard documentation on this.\n The restriction of the State's ability to accept foreign documents\nfor a driver's license, we have discussed this. I, for one, do not hold\nin as high a regard foreign documents as I do our own documents that\nare generated here.\n The antitrafficking provision was taken out. The House bill adds to\nthe existing criminal code addressing identity theft and fraud language\nto address the growing and lucrative crime of selling the technology\nand information that facilitates counterfeiting of identity documents.\nThis was taken out. I have not had the opportunity to find out the\nreason for this. Notwithstanding that, I know there are many good\nprovisions we should be passing.\n One of them I draw to the attention of the Senator and the Senate is\nthe electronic confirmation by the various State Departments of Motor\nVehicles to validate other States' driver's licenses.\n Had Virginia referenced the Florida records of Mohammed Atta who was\nstopped here, it is likely they would have discovered that his license\nwas not current. Who knows whether that would have prevented 9/11 from\nhappening. However, we do know this: He piloted one of the airplanes\nthat went into the towers, and he was also one of the masterminds at\nthat time. Mohammed Atta was actually stopped in Virginia. The House\nput a provision in to make it very difficult for that to take place.\n This morning on a news show on Fox News, Congressman Sensenbrenner\nwas on, and E. D. Hill asked him some questions:\n\n . . . Explain to me this whole driver's license thing.\n Because I know that out in California they're giving out\n licenses and then there are these matricular I.D.s--all sorts\n of stuff like this.\n This bill--the last part that I read--said that they wanted\n national guidelines for federal--for identification, for\n driver's licenses and that type of identification form.\n What does this mean?\n\n Congressman Sensenbrenner responded:\n\n Well, it would be proof of lawful presence in the United\n States, which means either a birth certificate, a U.S.\n passport, a foreign passport with a green card. Or if someone\n is here on a temporary visa with an expiration date, that\n passport and changing the law to have the driver's license\n expire as of the date the visa expires.\n\n He goes on and talks about Mohammed Atta and when he was stopped and\nwhat happened. That part is very disturbing to me.\n\n[[Page S11964]]\n\n Finally, there has been a lot of talk about the 16-mile gap that was\nin there that has now been returned back to about a 2\\1/2\\ mile gap\nbetween San Diego and Tijuana. It is a gap because there is no fence\nthere. People come and go as they will. That is where a lot of the\nillegals are coming through, a lot of people who could be terrorists.\nWe don't know. Nonetheless, they are going through.\n They had closed that gap in the House bill, and that language was\ntaken out. That might be something that has been said on this floor. I\nhaven't heard anyone justify why that was done, but it seems like it\nwas done.\n I know that Congressman Hunter placed a provision to close the gap,\nand apparently there were some endangered species lawsuits that came in\nand have caused this conference report to leave that gap open.\n I suggest that if we are leaving it open, I say to the Senator from\nWest Virginia, we are leaving it open to protect a maritime succulent\nshrub which is something that is required or could create a harassment\nto some endangered species. So I checked to see what that was. I found\nout that the two major species that might be endangered species, that\nmight be harassed--not killed, harassed--were the vireos or the\nflycatchers.\n I am holding a picture of a flycatcher. Let me get the full name.\n I don't seem to have that here.\n Anyway, this is one of the species that might be harassed--not\nkilled, but harassed. The other is this critter, a vireo. I checked\nwith the U.S. Geological Survey, and I found out there are an estimated\n2,000 vireos in existence today and 1,000 flycatchers in existence\ntoday, and the most this would prevent, not from being killed but from\nbeing harassed, would be 2 of these and 3 of these.\n Now, I ask you to prioritize this. Is it better to harass five of\nthese endangered species and at the same time leave this 3.5-mile gap\nopen for perhaps terrorists or someone else to come through? I have\nbeen very concerned about these things.\n I do understand that the House has said they are going to fix all\nthis in January--I cannot remember, I think in the first part of\nJanuary sometime--but every time that happens, when they say they are\ngoing to fix something that we rush through to pass, it doesn't happen.\n I saw my friend, the Senator from Florida, walking through here a\nminute ago. He reminded me that I was the only Senator in 2000 to vote\nagainst the Everglades Restoration Act. I did so because we did not\nhave a core plan, a feasibility study, and we didn't know about the\ncost. We were given assurances that if we would pass that bill on that\nparticular day, we would have a feasibility study and the cost would\nnot exceed where they are today. Now we find out that the costs have\ndramatically exceeded the estimates in 2000.\n I only say this not to criticize anyone, but only to say that,\nwithout exception, every time we have rushed to do something, we have\nused the excuse that we are going to fix it 3 weeks from now or\ntomorrow or in the beginning of the next session, but it doesn't seem\nto take place. So like a lot of reforms that are in this, I would\nrather go back and have the opportunity to make sure we get the reforms\nI outlined that were taken out or put in by the House. The reason is\nthat once you pass a bill, you lose your leverage to get those things\nthat were controversial back in. I don't have any doubt that the\nSpeaker--he says he will bring this up, and I don't doubt that. I have\nserious doubts that if they pass something in the House and send it\nhere to correct those five areas I outlined, it would be done over in\nthis body.\n I appreciate very much the Senator yielding me a few minutes of his\ntime to share those thoughts with him.\n Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator who has expressed,\nrightly, his concern. The Senator has cited excellent examples of why\nthis bill is being rushed and why it should not be rushed.\n I am for intelligence reform. There are many things in this package,\nI am sure, that are worthwhile. But we cannot fully protect ourselves\nagainst terrorists unless we address the gaps in our borders and stem\nthe rise of illegal immigration. There is a great deal of friction in\nthe House of Representatives with respect to this conference report\nbecause of the failure to address many of the problems Congressman\nSensenbrenner spoke about. I hope we will still have an opportunity to\ndo that. But this is just one area in the conference report that ought\nto have had more time, but it did not get the time, as the subject\nmatter in its entirety should have had more time.\n Next year, the President will ask the Congress to pass a sweeping\namnesty. It's clear that illegal aliens will continue to pour into this\ncountry until the Congress takes action to protect its borders.\n The 9/11 Commission's endorsement of this legislation will mean\nnothing if these so-called reforms lead to future intelligence\nfailures.\n What the American people will remember, however, is that the\nCongress--the Senate and the House--abdicated its role to fully protect\ntheir security interests. The American people will remember that the\nCongress empowered an unelected bureaucrat while doing little else to\nprotect against future intelligence failures.\n This process has been hurried and rushed from the beginning. It has\nbeen tainted ever since the decision was made to tie its consideration\nto a political schedule.\n When the 9/11 Commission needed more time to conduct its\ninvestigation into the September 11 attacks, the Congress acted\nmagnanimously in granting a 2-month extension. Senators said at the\ntime:\n\n It would be counterproductive to deny the commission the\n extra 2 months it now says it needs to complete its\n investigations. . . .\n\n Mr. President, the Founding Fathers would be ashamed of the notion\nthat time is a luxury reserved for the unelected members of independent\ncommissions. What about the Senate? What about the elected\nrepresentatives of the people who serve in this body?\n The Framers of the Constitution conceived a Senate that would resist\nthe forces that urge us to bend with each change in the political\nbreeze. To the contrary, the Constitution binds Senators to serve the\ngreater causes of the Republic and reserves the power of each Member to\ndemand more time for debate, more time for thoughtful consideration. So\nshame on us for not invoking that wisdom in claiming the additional\ntime we need to better assess this legislation and to better protect\nthe security of this Nation and to better enhance the well-being of the\nAmerican people, who stand in need of closer examination and scrutiny\nof legislation that will provide for their security and the security of\ntheir children and the security of the institutions that need that\nprotection and that security.\n Mr. President, I yield the floor.\n\n Fostering the Flow of Information\n\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the 9/11 Commission found that the\nbiggest impediment to ``connecting the dots'' was resistance to\ninformation sharing. As the Commission stated in its report: ``Agencies\nuphold a `need to know' culture of information protection rather than\npromoting a `need to share' culture of integration.'' I ask if the\nranking member on the Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator\nLieberman, would explain how this legislation addresses this finding of\nthe Commission.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. In drafting this legislation, we fully considered the\nfinding of the 9/11 Commission that Senator Collins refers to, and we\ndesigned the bill to foster a shift away from a ``need-to-know''\nculture of excessive secretiveness, toward a more integrated and open\nculture of ``need to share.'' The bill assigns key responsibilities to\nthe DNI and to the President to achieve this shift in culture.\n The bill makes the DNI responsible for establishing guidelines for\nthe intelligence community to ensure maximum availability of, and\naccess to, intelligence information within the community, and to\nmaximize the dissemination of intelligence consistent with protection\nof sources and methods. The legislation recognizes that there will\nsometimes be a tension between the need to share intelligence\ninformation and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods,\nand the DNI will be responsible for establishing policies and\nprocedures to resolve any conflicts in this area. The DNI's guidelines\nare to foster a shift from a culture of undue secrecy by, among other\nthings, allowing for dissemination of intelligence products at the\nlowest possible\n\n[[Page S11965]]\n\nlevel of classification consistent with security needs--and in\nunclassified form to the extent possible.\n The President will be responsible for also establishing an\ninformation sharing environment for communicating terrorism information\nbeyond the intelligence community. This program will facilitate the\nsharing of information among all appropriate Federal, State, local, and\ntribal entities and the private sector. To help shift from a culture of\nundue information protection that can impair our security efforts, the\nlegislation instructs the President, among other things, to require a\nreduction in overclassification of information. The President will also\nissue guidelines to ensure that information is provided in its most\nshareable form, such as by using ``tearlines'' to separate data from\nthe sources and methods by which the data is obtained.\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator.\n Mr. President, some concerns have been expressed to us about whether\nthe authorities under this bill might be used, or abused, to unduly\nlimit the flow of information to the Congress, State and local\ngovernments, and the public. Nothing could be farther from our intent\nthan to chill the appropriate and desirable dissemination of\ninformation. This bill does not grant any new authority for the DNI or\nthe President to establish a regime of undue government secrecy. The\nbill properly affords the DNI authority to protect intelligence sources\nand methods, but this is the same authority that is currently vested in\nthe Director of Central Intelligence. The legislation does not include\nany new provisions to criminalize or unduly suppress the lawful sharing\nof unclassified information, nor does the bill waive any existing\nprotections of government employees who raise legitimate concerns by\ndisclosing information to Congress or through other lawful channels.\n\n I fully expect the DNI and the President will exercise their\nresponsibilities under this bill in a way that fosters--not\nunreasonably restricts--the flow and dissemination of information to\nCongress, State and local officials, and the public. Certainly, if\nthere is any indication that the authorities under this legislation are\nbeing misused to unduly stifle the flow of information and to thereby\ndefeat the purposes of the bill, I fully expect and intend that\nCongress will promptly look into and remedy the situation.\nCongressional oversight of these issues will be fostered by the reports\nthat are required during the implementation and operation of the\nInformation Sharing Environment, and through the establishment of the\nPrivacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.\n Does the Senator from Connecticut agree with my assessment?\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I could not agree more. This legislation is designed\nto enable the Governmental and non-Governmental entities with security\nresponsibilities to have access to the intelligence information they\nneed to do their jobs. And the legislation will also enable and\nencourage the diffusion of information about terrorism to the American\npeople. It has often been said that an informed citizenry is a bulwark\nagainst tyranny, but an informed citizenry is also a bulwark against\nterrorism. By fostering the diffusion of information, consistent with\nthe need to secure intelligence sources and methods, the legislation\nshould help enable the American people to have the information they\nneed to make informed decisions about the threats our nation faces and\nthe steps we must take to overcome those threats.\n Mr. NELSON of Florida. I would like to make a statement in regard to\nan important provision in the conference report: Section 4071, Watch\nLists for Passengers Aboard Vessels. I would like to first commend the\ncruiseline industry for all of its proactive measures to enhance\npassenger vessel security. Both the cruise industry and I share the\nsame commitment--that is to ensure the safety and security of the\nmillions of passengers and crew traveling on their vessels each year,\nin addition to securing our ports.\n In an effort to clarify the intent of the provision included in the\nIntelligence Reform Conference Committee Report, I want to take this\nopportunity to recognize the current procedures in place at the\nDepartment of Homeland Security in regard to passenger vessels and\nexpress support for the increased security procedures undertaken in\nthis area. Currently, passenger vessels electronically transmit advance\npassenger information through the Federal APIS reporting system or\nthrough the 96-hour advanced notice of arrival. This allows the\ngovernment to review all passenger and crew manifest information and\ncheck against numerous Federal agency databases to ensure that all\npassengers and crew are cleared for sailing, though not always before\ndeparture.\n The purpose of section 4071 is to prevent terrorists or suspected\nterrorists from physically boarding cruise vessels that depart from\nU.S. and U.S. controlled ports. Currently, both Customs and Border\nProtection and the Coast Guard require the submission of passenger and\ncrew manifests. This provision would codify the reporting requirement\nfor vessels, and ensure that both manifests are checked against one\nconsolidated terrorist watchlist prior to departure. The provision also\nincludes language which would allow the Secretary to waive the\nrequirement for vessels embarking at a foreign port if the requirement\nis impractical, however, in such cases the passengers and crew would\ncontinue to be screened prior to arrival at a U.S. port according to\nthe 96-hour rule.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator from Florida for highlighting this\nimportant matter. As the Senator pointed out, since January 2003 DHS,\nthrough the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, has required\ncommercial aircraft and commercial vessels to electronically transmit\nadvance passenger and crewmember information in order to assist the\nDepartment in the effective inspection of passengers and crew.\nCurrently, passenger vessels provide advanced passenger manifests both\nupon the original departure of the voyage and 24 to 96 hours before\narrival into the United States. This provision will help streamline the\nprocess, by requiring the manifest data be compared against one\nconsolidated, comprehensive terrorist database, and by requiring that\nthe comparison be done prior to the departure of the vessel. The cruise\nindustry will do its part by ensuring that complete and accurate data\nis collected as early as possible, and the Department of Homeland\nSecurity will work to ensure the comparison is done effectively and\nefficiently, and make every effort to not delay the departure of these\nvessels. We expect the cruise industry and the Department to work\nclosely together on these issues throughout the rulemaking process.\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank both Senators for their excellent summary of the\nDHS reporting requirements currently in place. The intent of section\n4071 is to encourage DHS to establish a simple and timely method of\ncollecting information. I want to make clear that the intent of this\nprovision is to ensure accurate passenger vessel information is\ncollected and shared with the appropriate authorities in an efficient\nmanner, so it may be compared against one consolidated database to be\ndeveloped by DHS. The provision is not an entirely new requirement. It\nis based, in part, on current practices, but is designed to utilize one\nconsolidated and comprehensive terrorist database that can be used to\nscreen crew and passenger data more effectively in all transportation\nmodes, while keeping delays to a minimum.\n Mr. NELSON of Florida. I thank Chairwoman Collins and Ranking Member\nLieberman for their comments and support on this important issue. Our\nefforts here today are focused on encouraging the Department of\nHomeland Security to further increase passenger vessel security. I urge\nthe Department to work closely with the cruise line industry in\ncrafting this rule to prevent any unnecessary departure delays from\noccurring.\n\n terrorist sanctuaries definition\n\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, section 7102 of the conference report\nprovides that the term ``repeated provided support for acts of\ninternational terrorism,'' as used in the Export Administration Act,\nshall include, but not be limited to, ``the recurring use of any part\nof the territory of the country as a sanctuary for terrorists or\nterrorist organizations.'' I ask if the ranking member on the\nGovernmental Affairs Committee, Senator Lieberman, would clarify the\naddition of this criteria to the definition used in the Export\nAdministration Act.\n\n[[Page S11966]]\n\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. ``The recurring use of any part of the territory of\nthe country as a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations''\nis not the only factor the administration should take into account when\nmaking determinations of which nations are terrorist sponsors for the\npurposes of the Export Administration Act. It is just one of the\nappropriate factors to be taken into account when the Secretary\nexercises his discretion to determine whether the government of a\ncountry has repeatedly provided support for acts of international\nterrorism. I understand from the State Department that other factors\nthat the Secretary of State typically takes into account include:\nWhether the government of a country is furnishing arms, explosives or\nlethal substances to individuals, groups or organizations with the\nlikelihood that they will be used in terrorist activities or whether a\ngovernment is providing direct or indirect financial backing for\nterrorist activities.\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator.\n\n driver's license and personal identification card provisions\n\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Illinois to\nspeak on one of the provisions in the conference report.\n Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I want to discuss section 7212 of the\nconference report accompanying the intelligence reform bill that deals\nwith minimum standards for driver's licenses and personal\nidentification cards.\n I am joined on the floor by Senators Collins, Lieberman, Sununu, and\nLautenberg, who are all my colleagues on the Governmental Affairs\nCommittee, and who have been leaders in this effort. I hope they will\njoin in a colloquy to help explain what we collectively intended as we\ndrafted this provision.\n In the days immediately following September 11, 2001, we read in the\nnewspapers that the hijackers had in their possessions multiple\ndriver's licenses and State identification cards. The press reported\nthat some of the nineteen hijackers had obtained these documents from\nDMV offices in States that, at that time, had lenient rules on issuing\nsuch documents. They also obtained other official-looking\nidentification documents from the Internet.\n In the last Congress, the Governmental Affairs Committee held a\nhearing that revealed that the 9/11 terrorists took advantage of\nloopholes in some State DMVs' issuance processes that have been\napparent for years to anyone willing to obtain fake IDs.\n Following the hearing, I asked the GAO to study how easy it would be\nfor someone to obtain driver's licenses and State ID cards from DMVs,\nusing false pretenses. The GAO investigators went out to several States\nand conducted undercover operations where they tried to obtain licenses\nusing fake breeder documents, or using other false methods. Incredibly,\nthe GAO investigators succeeded every single time. More incredibly, the\nGAO study was undertaken several months after some of these same States\nclaimed that they reformed their driver's license issuance processes\nfollowing the 9/11 tragedies.\n In October 2002, I introduced S. 3107, the Driver's License Fraud\nPrevention Act of 2002, with Senator McCain, to address the glaring\nproblems we uncovered with the hearing and the GAO study. The core goal\nof that bill was to allow for the Federal Government to work with\nStates and interested parties to develop a set of minimum security\nstandards to be applied uniformly to all States.\n In drafting that bill, we had three main principles for reforming the\nState processes: 1. reform must apply uniformly to all 50 States; 2.\nState's rights and jurisdictions must be respected; and 3. applicants,\nholders, and users of driver's licenses must have their privacy, civil\nliberties, and other constitutional rights protected.\n Then, a few months ago, when Senators McCain and Lieberman drafted S.\n2774, their comprehensive bill to implement the 9/11 Commission Report,\nI worked with them to add a provision that would provide Federal\nstandards for driver's licenses. This addressed one of the\nrecommendations that the 9/11 Commission made:\n\n [T]he federal government should set standards for the\n issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification,\n such as drivers licenses. Fraud in identification documents\n is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to\n vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft,\n sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure\n that people are who they say they are and to check whether\n they are terrorists.\n\n This provision was adopted unanimously by the Senate as an amendment\nto the Collins-Lieberman intelligence reform bill, and is also in the\nconference report before us today. I am glad to see that the provision\nin the conference report before us today lives up to the three\nprinciples I outlined above.\n First, the provision would prohibit Federal agencies from accepting,\nfor any official purpose, a driver's license or identification card\nnewly issued by a State more than 2 years after the regulations on\nminimum Federal standards are promulgated, unless the document conforms\nto such standards. The language also requires the Transportation\nSecretary to set a date after which no license may be accepted unless\nit conforms to the new standards.\n This should encourage all 50 States to work together and adopt the\nminimum Federal standards at the same time so that no State will remain\nthe weakest link in our national efforts to protect our homeland. We\nwant to make sure terrorists and criminals do not forum shop for the\neasiest State from which to obtain fraudulent ID cards.\n\n Second, the language of the Senate bill as adopted in the conference\nreport requires a negotiated rulemaking process under the\nAdministrative Procedure Act. This requires the formation of a\nnegotiated rulemaking committee that would include representatives of\nStates, among other stakeholders. The committee is empowered to make a\nrecommendation for the minimum standards to be promulgated by the\nDepartment of Transportation. The mininum standards would address among\nother issues 1. documentation required as proof of identity of the\napplicant; 2. verifiability of documents used to apply for a license;\n3. processing of the applications to prevent fraud; and 4. security\nfeatures to be included in the card.\n On this point, I would like to commend the chair of the Governmental\nAffairs Committee for her tireless efforts on behalf of the States'\ninterests. Senator Collins has worked to ensure that this bill\nrecognizes the limited role of the Federal Government in this area--\nissuing driver's licenses are a unique State function and that we\nshould not impose reform measures on States without their valuable\ninput.\n Third, the rulemaking process includes safeguards to protect the\nprivacy and due process rights of applicants.\n Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator from Illinois would yield, I would like\nto speak on that issue.\n Mr. DURBIN. I am happy to yield to the distinguished manager on the\nfloor.\n Ms. COLLINS. I want to take this opportunity to thank Senator Durbin\nfor his leadership on this issue. He and I serve together on the\nGovernmental Affairs Committee and we have worked hand-in-hand on\nidentity theft issues.\n I wholeheartedly agree with what the Senator has said, and I want to\nemphasize again how important it is for the appropriate stakeholders to\nhave a seat at the table in developing a recommendation for minimum\nstandards that the Department of Transportation will promulgate. I know\nthat State officials and their representatives from the National\nGovernors Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures\nhave raised serious concerns about Congress imposing unfunded mandates\non the States and pre-empting State laws on eligibility requirements.\nThat is why I support the innovative approach we came up with in the\nSenate bill and the conference report that would allow representatives\nof State officials to have a real voice in the development of a\nrecommendation for these Federal standards.\n That is also why I believe it is important to emphasize that the\nconference report includes language ensuring that any recommendation\nmade by the negotiated rulemaking committee include an assessment of\nthe benefits and costs of the recommendation. The report also states\nthat the Secretary of Transportation shall award grants to States to\nhelp them conform to the minimum standards and that each State shall\nreceive a minimum allocation of grant monies to help offset the costs\nof implementing the new Federal standards.\n\n[[Page S11967]]\n\n Mr. SUNUNU. Will the Senator yield for a question?\n Ms. COLLINS. I am happy to yield.\n Mr. SUNUNU. I believe the National Governors Association and the\nAmerican Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators both endorsed the\nSenate version of this language over the House version because, among\nother things, the Senate version provided the flexibility and\npartnership between the Federal and State governments. Is this an\naccurate portrayal of their position?\n Ms. COLLINS. The Senator from New Hampshire is correct, and I would\nalso point out that the White House has also weighed in on that issue.\nIn its statement of administration policy, dated October 7, 2004, the\nWhite House emphasized the need for ``consultation with the states . .\n. to address important concerns about flexibility, privacy, and\nunfunded mandates.'' This conference report maintains those important\naspects of the approach in the Senate bill.\n Mr. SUNUNU. I thank the Senator.\n Mr. LAUTENBERG. I also have a question for the Senator from Maine, or\nfor any other Senator who helped draft this important provision in the\nbill. Would the Senator yield for a question about who else would be\ninvolved in the negotiated rulemaking?\n Ms. COLLINS. I see the distinguished Senator from Connecticut is on\nthe floor and I wonder if the ranking Democrat on the Governmental\nAffairs Committee, who is the expert on this issue, would be willing to\nengage in this dialog.\n Mr. LAUTENBERG. I will address this question to the Senator from\nConnecticut. In reading section 7212(b)(4)(B), I see that the\nnegotiated rulemaking committee to be established by the Secretary of\nTransportation has to also include ``interested parties.'' What does\nthe author of this provision understand to be the intent of this\ncategory?\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I want to thank the distinguished manager for yielding\nto me, and the Senator from New Jersey for the excellent question. The\ngeneral legal criteria for selecting such parties for inclusion in a\nnegotiated rulemaking is described in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act. We\nhave been told by many experts, including the\n9/11 Commission, that we need to address every vulnerability to prevent\nany future attacks, and that we need to enlist the assistance of\neveryone who can contribute to protecting our homeland. So in this\nprovision, we are really asking for experts and interested parties who\ncan bring some productive ideas to the table to join us in developing\nthese minimum Federal standards. Interested parties must also include\ngroups or organizations presenting the interests of applicants for and\nholders of driver's licenses and personal identification cards, such as\nconsumer organizations and organizations representing immigrants. It is\nimportant that the interests of these groups be considered.\n\n Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank the ranking member and also the chair of the\nGovernmental Affairs Committee. I am pleased that they agree that it is\nimportant that representatives of interested parties have a seat at the\ntable, and I would emphasize that the negotiated rulemaking committee\nshould also include organizations with technological and operational\nexpertise in document security, in addition to organizations that\nrepresent the interests of applicants.\n Mr. SUNUNU. I would also like to ask a follow-up question to the\nSenator from Connecticut. Although the conference report does not\nspecify any particular group or organization to be included on the\nrulemaking committee, it is certainly expected that privacy and civil\nliberties groups, along with organizations like the National Conference\nof State Legislatures, the National Governors Association, and the\nAmerican Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators would play an\nimportant role in the rulemaking process. I would ask my colleague from\nConnecticut if I understand this provision correctly?\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator from New Hampshire for his\ninquiry. The Senator makes an important point in noting that the\nlanguage of the conference report does not specify any particular group\nor organization to be included. However, I think a collaborative\nrulemaking process would be difficult to imagine without input from\ninterested groups and organizations. And I believe the distinguished,\nchair of the committee would agree that this is the intention behind\nour language.\n Ms. COLLINS. I absolutely agree with the Senator from Connecticut\nthat the negotiated rulemaking process has to include groups that\nrepresent the interest of many interested parties, including the\nStates, and applicants for, and holders of, driver's licenses. It is\nalso important to note the Department of Homeland Security and other\nFederal entities will represent the security interests of the Federal\nGovernment in the process.\n This collaborative process among all parties is essential to ensure\nthat the final rule strikes the right balance of all the competing\ninterests. One of the interests that should not be lost in this debate\nis the need for protecting privacy and civil and due process rights of\nall applicants for, and holders of, driver's licenses and personal\nidentification cards. 1 believe it is crucial that the American people\nbe assured that these new Federal standards will not encroach on their\nfundamental rights and that their personal information will be handled\nproperly, respectfully, and securely.\n That is why we included language in the conference report that\nspecifically requires the agency rulemaking to include procedural\nsafeguards for the privacy rights of applicants and holders of driver's\nlicenses and identification cards.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator from Maine has raised a very important\npart of our language that is worth emphasizing. Moreover, in making our\ncountry safer by tightening standards for identification documents, we\nmust never trample on any individual's civil and due process rights.\n\n One of the standards we require for the rulemaking is for a State to\nconfiscate a driver's license or identification card if any component\nor security feature of the license or identification card is\ncompromised. It is important that this standard, as well as all of the\nstandards, include procedures and requirements to protect the civil and\ndue process rights of all individuals who apply for and hold driver's\nlicenses and personal identification cards.\n Mr. DURBIN. I ask the Senator from Connecticut a related question on\nhow this provision of the conference report deals with the issue of\nimmigration laws.\n It is my understanding that the language of the conference report\nmakes it clear that the Federal regulations to be developed by the\nDepartment of Transportation cannot directly or indirectly infringe on\na State's power to set eligibility criteria for who can qualify to\nobtain a driver's license or identification card. So if a State has\nunique reasons for allowing or prohibiting certain groups of people to\nhold licenses based on their age, physical disability, in-State\nresidency, or legal status in the United States, then, under the\nconference report language, those would continue to be the State's\ndecisions.\n This issue was handled differently by the other Chamber. The House\nbill had language that would have taken away the States' rights to\ndetermine eligibility by imposing a new harsh legal presence\nrequirement for the issuance of driver's licenses. This is the\nprovision that, I believe, created a lot of misunderstanding in the\npress about what the conference report does.\n States around the country are already struggling with the issue of\nwhether to provide licenses to undocumented aliens, and they should\ncontinue to work on the issue through their own legislative processes.\nCongress should not preempt the rights of all 50 States through the\nbackdoor.\n The issue of how our country treats those who are here without proper\ndocumentation is a complex one that involves myriad of overlapping\nimmigration, foreign policy, and economic laws. We should not open that\ndebate here unless we are ready and willing to address all the\ncomprehensive proposals that ought to be included in such a debate.\n I certainly hope the President will engage in this debate, and soon.\nBut obviously, we cannot accomplish such an enormous task of\noverhauling our immigration laws through the 9/11 Commission bill, and\nthe 9/11 Commission did not ask us to do that. We should not use this\nbill to require the\n\n[[Page S11968]]\n\nStates to turn their DMV employees into immigration agents, and this\nconference report will not do so.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator from Illinois for pointing out\nthis language in the conference report. I know that this is a\ncomplicated and emotional issue and one which the States are already\ndealing with on a State-by-State basis. I agree that the conference\nreport language does not allow the minimum standards to directly or\nindirectly infringe on States' power to set eligibility criteria for\nwho can obtain a driver's license or personal identification card.\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senators from New Hampshire, New Jersey,\nIllinois, and the distinguished ranking member for their comments,\ntheir valuable contributions to this bill, and for participating in\nthis colloquy.\n\n dni, nctc\n\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the legislation that is before the Senate\nremedies the problem identified by the 9/11 Commission that there is no\none in charge of the U.S intelligence community. The Commission found\nthat the Director of Central Intelligence, DCI, has too many jobs--\nnamely leader of the intelligence community, principal intelligence\nadviser to the President, and director of the Central Intelligence\nAgency, CIA--to do any of them effectively. In addition, the Commission\nfound that the DCI lacks sufficient authority to manage the\nIntelligence Community, including authority over funding, personnel,\nsecurity, and technology.\n The intelligence community is dominated by its component agencies and\nis organized into ``stovepipes'' that do not share information\nadequately among themselves and with the rest of government\neffectively. The DCI lacks the authority to break-down these stovepipes\nand transform the Intelligence Community into a 21st century\nenterprise.\n The intelligence community needs to operate as a network in order to\ncounter 21st century terrorist networks and other agile foes. Despite\nmany impressive accomplishments since the 9/11 attacks, the\nintelligence community is unable to transform itself into a network due\nto its anachronistic structure and is still oriented toward fighting\nthe bureaucratic nation-state enemies of the Cold War.\n In response to the 9/11 Commission's findings, this legislation\nrestructures the intelligence community by creating a strong Director\nof National Intelligence, DNI, who can lead, shape, and transform the\n15 organizations of the intelligence community into a cohesive network.\nIt creates a DNI who has the authority needed to set the course for the\nintelligence community and ensure that the course is followed.\n It is fitting that this legislation should be completed during the\nweek of December 7, the day on which the United States was attacked at\nPearl Harbor in 1941. The National Security Act of 1947 was adopted in\norder to prevent another Pearl Harbor attack in the Cold War. This\nlegislation seeks to enable the intelligence community to prevent\nanother 9/11 attack from terrorists and other adversaries in the 21st\ncentury.\n Under this legislation, the DNI has two primary responsibilities.\n First, the DNI is the head of the intelligence community. In this\ncapacity, the DNI will unify and optimize the resources of the\nintelligence community to serve the President, the National Security\nCouncil, and other intelligence consumers. The direct locus of the\nDNI's authority is the National Intelligence Program, which is the new\nname for the National Foreign Intelligence Program. The renaming of the\nprogram signifies that the national security threats of the 21st\ncentury straddle the foreign/domestic divide and that our Intelligence\nCommunity must have capabilities that cross this seam.\n Second, the DNI is the principal intelligence adviser to the\nPresident. Accordingly, the DNI, not the CIA Director, will be\nresponsible for briefing the President, including the President's daily\nbrief. As the President's principal intelligence adviser, the DNI will\nrely on the National Counterterrorism Center and the National Counter\nProliferation Center; additional National Intelligence Centers\nestablished by the DNI, which will have primary responsibility for\nanalysis of particular topics or matters; the National Intelligence\nCouncil; and all of the analysts who reside within the various agencies\nof the Intelligence Community.\n Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut explain the National\nIntelligence Centers and their purpose?\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator and agree with her statements. The\nNational Intelligence Centers are a critical element in the\ntransformation of the intelligence community into a 21st century\nenterprise. The 9/11 Commission stressed the role of the centers in the\nrestructured intelligence community. The Commission's recommendation\nstems from the pre-9/11 and current situation in which no one below the\nDCI is responsible for how the CIA, the National Security Agency, and\nother intelligence agencies integrate their capabilities against\nspecific intelligence targets.\n The centers will provide unified direction across the intelligence\ncommunity to fulfill missions. They are analogous to the Defense\nDepartment's combatant commanders, who unify the military services'\ncapabilities to perform missions and fight wars. The purpose of the\nNational Intelligence Centers can be summed up in one word:\n``jointness.'' Just as, in the military, the Goldwater-Nichols\nDepartment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 sought to integrate\nthe military services' capabilities by strengthening the combatant\ncommanders, so this legislation fosters greater jointness among the\nintelligence agencies.\n The centers are to be created within the Office of the DNI, which\nalso will house the National Counterterrorism Center, the National\nCounter Proliferation Center, the National Intelligence Council, and\nother entities whose purpose is to integrate and unify the efforts of\nthe various intelligence agencies to accomplish intelligence missions.\nAmong their responsibilities, the centers will provide all-source\nanalysis of intelligence, identify and propose to the DNI intelligence\ncollection and analysis requirements, and have primary responsibility\nfor net assessments and warnings. With their ability to harness the\ncapabilities of entities across the Intelligence Community and create a\nunified effort, the centers will improve the intelligence community's\nability to respond with speed and agility.\n Each center will be led by a director who will be appointed by the\nDNI and serve as the DNI's principal adviser in that center's area of\nresponsibility. The center's director reports to the DNI. Each center\nwill have a professional staff, including personnel transferred,\nassigned, or detailed from elements of the intelligence community as\ndirected by the DNI. The centers will be administratively distinct from\nthe intelligence agencies, just as the combatant commands are\nadministratively distinct from the Military Services. This prevents a\ncenter from being subsumed within and dominated by a particular agency.\n I should add one point of clarification. The legislation calls on the\nDNI to explore creating an open source intelligence center to improve\nthe collection and analysis of open source materials. This entity is\ndifferent from the national intelligence centers, which are organized\non geographic or transnational topics rather than functional topics\nlike human or signals intelligence. This center would be like the\nagencies and entities in the intelligence community--like the CIA or\nthe National Security Agency--that are organized to exploit particular\ncollection disciplines.\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator and concur with his description of\nthe centers.\n This bill provides the DNI with significant new authorities regarding\nsuch areas as determining the National Intelligence Program budget and\nexecuting its appropriation, transferring funds and personnel, and\nreprogramming funds. I would like to summarize some of these critical\nauthorities.\n Under this bill, the DNI will have sole authority to ``develop and\ndetermine'' an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program\nbased on the budget proposals provided by the heads of the agencies and\norganizations of the intelligence community as well as these agencies'\nand organizations' respective department heads. The word ``determine''\nin the legislation means that the DNI is the decisionmaker regarding\nthe budget and does not share\n\n[[Page S11969]]\n\nthis authority with any department head. The DNI is to produce a\nconsolidated annual budget for the National Intelligence Program, which\nensures the integration of the agencies and entities within the\nintelligence community.\n The heads of such agencies and organizations within the intelligence\ncommunity must provide directly to the DNI such other information as\nthe DNI requests for the purpose of determining the budget. Thus, the\nDNI will have direct access to information from such agencies as the\nNational Security Agency in the budget-build process and so be able to\nunderstand the needs of each component of the Intelligence Community\nwhen determining the annual consolidated national intelligence budget.\nThe department heads may not interpose themselves between the DNI and\nthe heads of agencies and organizations within the intelligence\ncommunity.\n Whereas the DCI today effectively only has a role in the execution of\nthe CIA budget, the DNI will ``ensure the effective execution'' of the\nentire National Intelligence Program appropriation across the\nintelligence community. The Director of the Office of Management and\nBudget, OMB, for instance, must apportion National Intelligence Program\nfunds--whether for the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI,\nNational Security Agency, or any other element of the intelligence\ncommunity--at the DNI's ``exclusive direction.'' The DNI's ``exclusive\ndirection'' is intended to extend to apportionment plans as well, which\ndelineate how appropriated funds will flow from the U.S. Treasury to\nthe agencies and entities of the intelligence community. The DNI is\nfurther responsible for managing the National Intelligence Program\nappropriation by ``directing the allotment or allocation'' of such\nappropriation through the heads of departments containing elements of\nthe intelligence community. Department comptrollers must then allot,\nallocate, reprogram, or transfer those funds ``in an expeditious\nmanner.''\n In order to ensure that the National Intelligence Program budget is\nexecuted in accordance with the DNI's direction, the DNI will ``monitor\nthe implementation and execution'' of the appropriation, including by\naudits and evaluations. A department, agency, or entity has no\nauthority to refuse or obstruct DNI-mandated audits. If department\ncomptrollers act in a manner inconsistent with the DNI's directions,\nthen the DNI shall report such action to the President and to Congress\nwithin 15 days. I expect that the DNI will need to create a chief\nfinancial officer with comptroller-like responsibilities to implement\nthese authorities.\n Some observers have raised concerns regarding whether departmental\ncomptrollers are able to `tax' the National Intelligence Program\nappropriation channeled through their departments in order to pay for\nfact-of-life costs such as increased fuel costs. The legislation\nprecludes any reprogramming or transfer of funds from the National\nIntelligence Program without the DNI's consent. In addition,\napportionment plans--in which any `taxes' would have to be reflected--\nare to be prepared at the DNI's exclusive direction. Accordingly, under\nthis legislation, comptrollers are not authorized to exact such `taxes'\nunilaterally. Congressionally mandated cuts will also be implemented\nthrough the apportionment process, which will occur at the exclusive\ndirection of the DNI.\n We have worked closely with White House, OMB, and the National\nSecurity Council staff in developing this budget language, and all\nagree that this language will provide the new DNI with the full budget\nauthority needed to manage the national intelligence budget and\nappropriation effectively.\n The new DNI will also have significantly expanded authorities to\ntransfer personnel and funds. After OMB's approval and congressional\nnotification, the DNI may transfer personnel from one element of the\nintelligence community to another for not more than 2 years as long as\nthe transfer is for a higher priority intelligence activity and\nsupports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases\nefficiency. Most significantly, while personnel transfers must be made\nin accordance with procedures developed by the DNI and department\nheads, those department heads will no longer have the right to object\nto such transfers--as they do under current law. Finally, the DNI is\nalso provided additional authorities to transfer a limited number of\npersonnel upon the establishment of the Office of the DNI and each time\na new National Intelligence Center is created.\n As I mentioned, National Intelligence Program funds may not be\ntransferred or reprogrammed without the DNI's approval except in\naccordance with procedures prescribed by the DNI. All transfers and\nreprogrammings must be for a higher priority intelligence activity;\nmust support an emergent need, improve program effectiveness, or\nincrease efficiency; and may not involve funds from the CIA Reserve for\nContingencies or a DNI Reserve for Contingencies. Most importantly, the\nDNI will not require concurrence for such transfers or reprogrammings\nfrom affected department heads as long as they are less than $150\nmillion and 5 percent of a department's National Intelligence Program\nfunds and do not terminate an acquisition program. Thus, the DNI will\nhave unilateral authority to transfer or reprogram a significant\nNational Intelligence Program funds, subject to OMB approval and\ncongressional notification. Permit me to take a moment to mention the\nDNI Reserve for Contingencies. I believe that creation of this reserve\nis important to permit the DNI to meet special circumstances that\narise.\n\n The DNI is also responsible for overseeing the coordination of the\nintelligence community's liaison with foreign intelligence and security\nservices to avoid having each agency of the intelligence community\npursue an individualistic approach. The DNI will create common policies\nand strategy among the various entities in the intelligence community\nto ensure maximum returns from foreign liaison relationships. In\nimplementing the DNI's strategy, the CIA will coordinate foreign\nliaison ``on the ground'' in foreign countries.\n The DNI should be in the chain of command involving the conduct of\ncovert action and will be responsible and accountable to the President\nfor such conduct by the intelligence community, including their\nfunding. The DNI would be undercut if the President interacted directly\nwith the CIA Director--who is the DNI's subordinate--or any other\nelement of the Intelligence Community directly regarding covert action.\nInstead, this legislation envisions that the President will give orders\nregarding covert action directly to the DNI, who will then task the CIA\nand other agencies of the Intelligence community as appropriate.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree with the Senator's statements. I would like to\nelaborate on the CIA's role under this legislation. With respect to the\nCIA, the 9/11 Commission stressed that the DNI should no longer be\nresponsible for managing the day-to-day activities of the CIA. The\nlegislation has been very carefully crafted to ensure that the Director\nof the CIA is subordinate to and reports to the new DNI only, and not\ndirectly to the President, but that the DNI does not manage the CIA's\ndaily activities. This situation is similar to how a CEO runs a company\ncomposed of various business divisions. The CEO is the undisputed head\nbut focuses on high-level issues of strategy, policy, personnel, and\nbudgets rather than getting involved in the daily workings of any\nsingle business division. Likewise, the DNI should not manage the CIA\nand other intelligence agencies. No CEO would run a company that way,\nnor should the DNI manage the Intelligence Community that way.\n To emphasize that the DNI is no longer the head of the CIA, the\nlegislation stipulates that the Office of the DNI--which houses the\ncenters and other entities designed to unify and integrate agencies'\ncapabilities--cannot be co-located with any other element of the\nintelligence community after October 1, 2008. This provision ensures\nthat the DNI is not put in the inherently conflicted position of being\nboth the CEO of the intelligence community and closely aligned with one\nof the subsidiary elements simultaneously.\n The Senator from Maine previously stated that the DNI, not the CIA\nDirector, is the President's principal intelligence advisor and is\nresponsible for briefing the President or preparing the President's\ndaily brief. The CIA Director is subordinate to and reports to the\n\n[[Page S11970]]\n\nDNI only, and not directly to the President, both regarding\nintelligence activities and covert action. The CIA Director should\nconcentrate on ensuring that the Central Intelligence Agency transforms\nits human intelligence and special activities capabilities to meet the\ndifficult challenges of the 21st century. The CIA Director should also\nensure that the Central Intelligence Agency trains analysts of the\nhighest caliber for deployment to the centers and that whatever\nanalysis is conducted by the CIA in-house--which would primarily be on\ntopics for which there is no center--is done with the greatest\nindependence, clearest objectivity, and best tradecraft.\n I would like to discuss for a moment the CIA Director's salary. Under\ncurrent law, the DCI is paid at Executive Schedule Level II pursuant to\nsection 5313 of title 5, United States Code. The legislation places the\nDNI at Executive Schedule Level I but does not delete the reference to\nthe DCI at Executive Level II. Section 1081(b) of the legislation makes\nclear that any reference to the DCI in the DCI's capacity as the head\nof the CIA in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of\nthe United States shall be deemed a reference to the CIA Director.\nAfter passage of this legislation, the provision in current law that\nstates that the DCI is paid at Executive Schedule Level II will\ntherefore refer to the CIA Director.\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator and agree with his statements. I\npreviously discussed the purpose of the Office of the DNI, which is to\nhouse entities such as the centers which integrate and unify the\nefforts of the various intelligence agencies to accomplish intelligence\nmissions. The legislation authorizes the DNI to create new entities\nwithin the Office of the DNI to respond to new challenges, such as new\ncenters and ad hoc groups.\n The legislation also authorizes the DNI to coordinate the performance\nby elements of the intelligence community of services of common concern\nthat can be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner. For\nexample, there may be information technology services, security\nservices, and personnel services that are being performed in\nduplicative or competitive manner by various entities across the\nintelligence community and that the DNI believes would be more\nefficiently performed--such as by exploiting economies of scale, or\npreventing discrepancies between agencies--when done in consolidated\nmanner. The DNI may select one entity within the intelligence community\nto perform those services for the community. The DNI may also create a\nnew entity within the Office of the DNI to perform such services. I\nexpect that the DNI will exercise this authority in order to streamline\nthe intelligence community, reduce discrepancies across agencies, and\nsave resources that can be devoted to producing better intelligence.\n I want to highlight two other DNI authorities. Current law precludes\nthe DCI from directing, managing, or undertaking electronic\nsurveillance or physical searches under the Foreign Intelligence\nSurveillance Act, FISA unless otherwise authorized by statute or\nexecutive order. This legislation also precludes the DNI from directing\nor undertaking such operations. As the legislation makes clear, the\nrole of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General under FISA\nare unaffected by this legislation. However, this legislation does\ndelete a restriction that now precludes the DNI from managing FISA\ncollection. This change should better ensure that national intelligence\ncollected under FISA is used efficiently and effectively for national\npurposes.\n\n Current law also makes the CIA the manager of all human intelligence\noperations. The legislation changes that formulation, authorizing the\nCIA to manage human intelligence operations abroad. The intent of the\nlegislation is not to have human intelligence operations split among\nthe CIA, the FBI, and elements of other agencies with no one in charge.\nInstead, it is the DNI who is in charge. Of course, the DNI should not\nbe spending his or her day managing human intelligence operations.\nInstead, the DNI should delegate his or her authority to an official\nwithin the intelligence community, when appropriate.\n Indeed, the issue of delegation is critical. This legislation\ncentralizes authority in the DNI in order to clarify responsibility,\nauthority, and accountability for the intelligence community. However,\nthe intent of this legislation is not that the DNI should retain all\nauthority himself or herself. Like any good CEO, the DNI should\ndelegate and decentralize. This legislation centralizes authority so\nthat the DNI can build a network--with information, resources, and\npersonnel flowing freely across the agencies of the intelligence\ncommunity--that operates in a decentralized, fast, and flexible manner.\nFor example, the DNI should delegate authority to the heads of the\nNational Intelligence Centers so that they can utilize capabilities\nthroughout the intelligence community to accomplish intelligence\nmissions.\n Included in this legislation is very strong tasking authority for the\nDNI. Under current law, the DCI has authority to task assets across the\nintelligence community to collect information. Pursuant to the National\nSecurity Act of 1947 as amended, the DCI controls the tasking of\nnational intelligence assets. Section 403-3 of Title 50, United States\nCode, states explicitly that the DCI ``determine[s] collection\npriorities, and resolve[s] conflicts in collection priorities levied on\nnational collection assets.'' The President's latest Executive Order\n13355 on the issue is even stronger: It gives the DCI authority to\n``manage collection tasking.'' This language is interpreted in practice\nthat the DCI decides whether a satellite is to be positioned over North\nKorea or Iraq. Of course, the DCI consults closely with the Secretary\nof Defense--but the DCI is the final decision-maker. And there is no\nevidence that the military has been dissatisfied in recent conflicts\nwith the supply of intelligence from national collection assets.\n The legislation's provision regarding tasking authority merely\nsharpens current law by making the DNI's authority to task collection\nand analysis explicit. In this way, the bill essentially codifies\ncurrent practice.\n The DNI's tasking authority will be critical to the DNI's success.\nThe 9/11 Commission envisioned a strong, empowered DNI, with more--not\nless--authority to control the collection and analysis of intelligence\ninformation. The Commission cites specifically the DCI's limited\nability ``to influence how . . . technical resources are allocated and\nused'' as a problem. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 409. In a hearing\nbefore the Senate Armed Services Committee on August 17, 2004,\nSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke of the need to rebuild the\nintelligence community ``along 21st century lines.'' According to\nSecretary Rumsfeld, this reorganization includes ``a national\nintelligence director with authority for tasking collection assets\nacross the government.''\n This legislation includes a provision that the Senator from\nConnecticut and I drafted requiring that the President issue guidelines\nto ensure the effective implementation and execution within the\nExecutive branch of the authorities granted to the DNI under this\nlegislation, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the\nstatutory responsibilities of department heads. The interaction among\nthe DNI, department heads, and heads of agencies and entities within\nthe intelligence community is critical and must be as smooth and\nefficient as possible. These guidelines will be important for ensuring\nsuch seamless interaction.\n This provision does not authorize the President or department heads\nto override the DNI's authority as contained in this legislation. This\nlegislation has carefully crafted authorities for the DNI--including\nbudget, transfer, tasking, et cetera--that give the DNI sufficient\nauthority to manage the Intelligence Community. This provision is not\nintended and should not in practice trump or undermine in any way the\nDNI's authorities contained in the legislation.\n In addition, the legislation amends the Secretary of Defense's\nauthority to implement the DNI's decisions regarding the National\nIntelligence Program, contained in section 105(a) of the National\nSecurity Act of 1947 as amended, to ensure that the Secretary of\nDefense does not interact with the Intelligence Community in a way that\nis inconsistent with the DNI's authorities. This provision is another\nexample of Congress's intent to create a strong\n\n[[Page S11971]]\n\nDNI with sufficient authority to manage and be accountable for the\nIntelligence Community, including those elements within the Department\nof Defense.\n Some observers have raised concerns that this legislation will impede\nthe flow of intelligence to the warfighter. I believe that nothing is\nfurther from the truth. The warfighter will benefit from far-reaching\nintelligence reorganization that creates a DNI with significant\nauthorities. The DNI will have the power to force the various Defense\nand non-Defense intelligence entities to work together seamlessly,\ncreating a more accurate intelligence product that can be shared more\nquickly than today. The DNI would also be a single point of contact for\nthe military--and the military would know whom to hold responsible if\nintelligence from national assets is inadequate. The DNI inevitably\nwill prioritize the warfighter's need for intelligence, subject to the\ndirection of the President as to overall intelligence priorities.\n\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank and agree with the Senator. This reform\nlegislation will benefit our troops in the field, as well as better\nprotect our citizens at home.\n The 9/11 Commission found that the U.S. intelligence agencies are\nstill organized to counter yesterday's challenges, not today's threats.\nDuring the Cold War, the enemy was well-known, and our intelligence was\nappropriately focused on determining its capabilities. We could\ntolerate then a stove-piped intelligence system where the FBI's\nintelligence efforts were separate and disconnected from overseas and\nmilitary intelligence because our enemies were not attacking us from\nwithin our borders. We could tolerate then a separate overseas\nintelligence system run by the CIA because there was no clear reason to\nintegrate foreign military and domestic intelligence. We could tolerate\nthen a separate military intelligence system because we faced a\nmilitary force comparable to our own, using conventional tactics\nagainst us, different from the threats we faced at home.\n In the war on terror, all that has changed. The threat has become\nasymmetrical, meaning a weaker enemy attacks a stronger force at its\npoints of vulnerability. That's how al-Qaeda operates, working in the\nshadows, attacking us on all fronts: domestic, overseas, civilian and\nmilitary.\n The cold fact is that the killing zone has expanded. This requires a\nmuch more integrated and more agile intelligence apparatus. It requires\nsomeone in charge with the authority to force disparate agencies to\nshare information, to determine overall priorities, and to make sure we\nmaximize the return on our enormous investment in intelligence so that\nwe will be successful at thwarting an enemy determined to kill\ncivilians as well as military combatants.\n A modernized intelligence community will help us better protect both\nour citizens and our soldiers. Reforms that help achieve greater\n``unity of effort,'' as the 9/11 Commission put it, will clearly\nbenefit our troops in the field because information critical to their\nsafety and success could just as easily come from the CIA or the FBI as\nfrom the Pentagon's own intelligence systems. Similarly, the vital\nclues to stop the next attack on our own soil could come from the\nNational Security Agency or the other national intelligence agencies\nwithin the Department of Defense. Fully connecting all these pieces is\nnow critical to our total security effort.\n But as the 9/11 Commission showed in its powerful report, we will not\nsucceed if there is no one in charge who is able to forge unity among\nall of our intelligence agencies. A fundamental lesson of bureaucracy\nis that there will be no coordination at the working levels if there is\nno unified authority at the top. And there will be no real unified\nauthority in the intelligence community unless a Director of National\nIntelligence has significant authority over budgets and people. Our\ntroops battling in Iraqi streets must have, in real time, not simply\ntraditional military intelligence on the force levels they face, but\nCIA-developed intelligence on the nature and identity of the al Qaeda\nand insurgent combatants firing at them.\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator from Connecticut and agree with his\nstatements. Mr. President, I wonder if my distinguished colleague from\nConnecticut would be kind enough to describe the National\nCounterterrorism Center provision in our bill.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator from Maine. The 9/11 Commission's\nrecommendation for a National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC, arises\nfrom two main findings. First in keeping with the Commission's general\nfinding regarding the intelligence community, the intelligence agencies\nare not fully integrated in their efforts against terrorism. No one\nbelow the DCI has responsibility, accountability, and authority for the\ncounterterrorism mission. Second, counterterrorism requires an\nintegrated Executive branch-wide effort in which departments and\nagencies beyond intelligence must work together on a tactical level,\nwith agility, and a rapid pace--like a network--but today\n``stovepipes'' still dominate the Executive branch. Although\ndepartments and agencies are cooperating at unprecedented levels, the\nCommission concluded that such cooperation is more confederative than\ntruly joint and integrated. To remedy these two problems, the\nCommission proposed that the NCTC be responsible for both joint\ncounterterrorism intelligence and joint counterterrorism operational\nplanning.\n The legislation creates the NCTC along the lines of the Commission's\nmodel. Per the Commission's recommendation, the NCTC director is a\nDeputy Secretary-equivalent and with a dual line of reporting: (1) to\nthe DNI regarding the NCTC's budget and programs and concerning\nintelligence matters, and (2) to the President regarding Executive\nbranch-wide planning. This arrangement reflects the nature of the\nNCTC's mission, which is both to integrate intelligence--for which the\nDNI is the ultimate authority--and to conduct Executive branch-wide\nplanning--which is beyond the DNI's jurisdiction.\n As per the Commission's proposal, the NCTC will have two directorates\nto reflect its dual mission. The NCTC's Directorate of Intelligence\nwill in essence be the national intelligence center for\ncounterterrorism, but the NCTC will be more than just a strengthened\nTTIC. The NCTC will transcend the TTIC because the NCTC will clearly be\npreeminent in the intelligence community for counterterrorist analysis,\nwill propose collection requirements to the DNI and otherwise integrate\nthe intelligence community's capabilities, and will attract the best\nprofessionals from across the intelligence community. The tasks of this\ndirectorate are similar to those of any national intelligence center:\nintegrating the activities of intelligence agencies such as the CIA and\nthe National Security Agency; performing all-source analysis on\ntransnational terrorism; being the repository for intelligence on\ntransnational terrorism; conducting net assessment matching terrorist\ncapabilities and intentions with U.S. vulnerabilities and\ncountermeasures; and warning about potential threats.\n Some observers question whether the NCTC will absorb all the\ncounterterrorism analysts from across the intelligence community.\nHowever, those who question whether the NCTC would drain our precious\nsupply of analysts actually prove the case for the NCTC--because there\nare so few analysts, we need to centralize this precious resource\nrather than dissipate them across the intelligence community. And the\nsame reasoning applies to the National Counterproliferation Center and\nthe National Intelligence Centers as well.\n The NCTC's second directorate is for Strategic Operational Planning.\nThis directorate would conduct strategic operational planning for the\nentire Executive branch--ranging from the combat commands, to the State\nDepartment, to the FBI's Counterterrorism Division to the Department of\nHealth and Human Services to the CIA.\n Witnesses at the Committee on Governmental Affairs hearing on August\n26, 2004, argued that interagency operational planning is already\ntaking place organically and thus there is no need for the NCTC. Yet\nthe witnesses could only identify planning processes within their\norganizations in which representatives from other agencies were\ninvolved, not a single truly joint planning process across the\nExecutive branch. The military had a process--but so did then-DCI\nGeorge Tenet, who\n\n[[Page S11972]]\n\nhad a daily counterterrorism meeting. And the multitude of joint\nplanning processes drain personnel, time, and resources. Moreover, the\nlack of a central coordinating mechanism provides no safety net for an\nissue falling through the cracks when each agency--viewing it through a\nstovepipe--misses the issue's overall significance. There should be\nonly one interagency strategic operational planning process, run by the\nNCTC, for counterterrorism.\n The Commission has analogized this directorate to the J-3 Directorate\nof Operations of the Joint Staff, which works for the Chairman of the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff. J-3 does planning for operations conducted by\nthe combatant commands. However, because the Chairman is not in the\nDefense chain of command, J-3 has no operational authority to enforce\nits plans on the combatant commands. The Chairman's stature gives J-3's\nplans a certain amount of persuasive authority, but J-3 has no direct\nauthority over the combatant commands. As the Commission has stated\nexplicitly, and as reflected in this legislation, the NCTC's\nDirectorate of Strategic Operational Planning has no operational\nauthority. Accordingly, the NCTC would not interfere with the military\nchain of command.\n I would like to discuss in-depth the definition of strategic\noperational planning. Some observers have advocated confining the\nNCTC's operational planning function to high-level strategic issues,\nsuch as fashioning an Executive branch-wide strategy for winning Muslim\n``hearts and minds''--leaving more tactical planning to the agencies\nindividually. An Executive branch-wide ``hearts and minds'' strategy\nwould fall within the NCTC's purview, but the NCTC must reach below\nthat strategic level in order to have the impact envisioned by the\nCommission and this legislation.\n The legislation defines strategic operational planning to include\n``the mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be performed,\ninteragency coordination of operational activities, and the assignment\nof roles and responsibilities.'' Examples of missions include\ndestroying a particular terrorist group or preventing a terrorist group\nfrom forming in a particular area in the first place. Objectives to be\nachieved include dismantling a terrorist group's infrastructure and\nlogistics, collapsing its financial network, or swaying its\nsympathizers to withdraw support. Tasks include recruiting a particular\nterrorist, mapping a terrorist group's network of sympathizers, or\ndestroying a group's training camp. Examples of interagency\ncoordination of operational activities include the hand-off from the\nCIA to the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI of tracking a\nterrorist as that terrorist enters the United States, or the\ncoordination between CIA and special operations forces when operating\nagainst a terrorist sanctuary abroad.\n With respect to the assignment of roles and responsibilities, the\nNCTC will not dictate to each department or agency which personnel or\ncapabilities to utilize, unless the selection of the personnel or\ncapabilities directly impact the mission such as a risk calculation or\nlikely collateral damage.\n Perhaps the best example of an issue for strategic operational\nplanning is the hunt for Osama bin Laden. There is no policy dispute\nabout the objective; all departments and agencies agree. But the\nmission inherently cuts across the Executive branch: Intelligence\nagencies must find bin Laden's whereabouts, diplomats must pressure\ncountries to cooperate, public diplomacy must persuade his sympathizers\nto turn him in, and special operations forces must raid suspected\nsanctuaries. Some of the action is longer-term, such as using\ndiplomatic and economic pressure to win countries' cooperation. Some of\nthe action is very short-term. For example, the NCTC would recommend to\nthe CIA and the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, SOCOM,\nwhether to infiltrate or raid a sanctuary; indeed, one can imagine a\nsituation in which the CIA recommends infiltrating while SOCOM\nrecommends raiding, and now the only independent interagency body that\ncan help resolve the issue is the National Security Council staff. If\nSOCOM objected, then the legislation's provision for the resolution of\ndisputes would apply. If the CIA and SOCOM accepted the NCTC's plan,\nthe NCTC would not dictate how the department or agency performed the\nmission, i.e., how the CIA infiltrated the group or SOCOM executed the\nraid.\n An analogy for strategic operational planning is like lanes in a\nhighway, each lane symbolizing an agency's expertise (e.g., special\noperations, espionage, and law enforcement). The NCTC will not tell\neach agency how to drive in its lane. But effective counterterrorism\nrequires choosing which lane--meaning which type of activity, and thus\nwhich agency, to utilize in a particular situation. The NCTC would\nselect the lane but would have no authority to order an agency to\ndrive.\n Returning to the discussion of the DNI's authorities, I note that the\nnew DNI will take on a number of additional duties and responsibilities\nbeyond what the DCI has today. I would ask my friend from Maine, how\nwill the new DNI manage the new community functions that he or she will\nneed to direct as head of the intelligence community?\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank my colleague and agree with his statements. The\nnew DNI will not need to create a staff from scratch to manage the\nintelligence community. Today, the DCI relies on the Deputy Director of\nCentral Intelligence for Community Management, DDCI/CM, and that\nofficial's staff to coordinate the activities of the intelligence\ncommunity. This professional staff already has substantial experience\nthat will be invaluable to the DNI in managing the intelligence\ncommunity. This legislation supplants the DDCI/CM but transfers the\nofficial's staff as the DNI considers appropriate to the Office of the\nDNI. The DNI can then build on this staff as necessary to implement the\nDNI's new authorities.\n Finally, I would like to describe the implementation of this\nlegislation. The legislation does not permit the current DCI to become\nthe DNI without going through the Presidential nomination and Senate\nconfirmation process for the DNI position. This legislation gives the\nDNI different authorities and responsibilities than the DCI has today.\nAs such, the Senate will need to provide advice and consent to the\nPresident's selection for the DNI.\n Title I of the intelligence reform legislation takes effect not later\nthan six months after the Act's enactment. The legislation envisions\nthat the President will decide upon the effective date for title I and\nmay effectuate parts of title I at different times within that 6-month\nperiod. For example, the President could decide that all or parts of\ntitle I become effective upon the confirmation of the DNI. Until such\ntime as the President determines--but in no event later than six months\nafter enactment--the DCI will remain head of the intelligence community\nand the DDCI/CM and the various assistant DCIs will continue to report\nto him. The legislation requires that the President submit an\nimplementation report to Congress not later than 180 days after the\nact's effective date, but it is desirable that this report be submitted\nas soon as possible.\n Some provisions in title I explicitly state that they are effective\non the act's date of enactment, namely the transfer of the TTIC or its\nsuccessor to the NCTC and the transfer of the staff of the DDCI/CM to\nthe Office of the DNI as appropriate. The NCTC has already been created\nby Executive order, absorbing the TTIC. With respect to the staff of\nthe DDCI/CM, that staff does not cease to exist upon the act's\nenactment but rather becomes available for transfer to the Office of\nthe DNI after the Office of the DNI is established.\n This legislation requires the DNI to take various actions within 180\ndays of the act's enactment, including submitting a report to Congress\nconcerning operational coordination between the CIA and the Defense\nDepartment, assigning an individual or entity to be responsible for\nanalytic integrity, and identifying an individual to serve as an\nombudsman. The DNI also shall prescribe regulations and other\ndirectives not later than one year after the act's enactment. Thus we\nhope that the President will move speedily to nominate an individual to\nserve as the DNI. The threats arrayed against the United States do not\nafford us a grace period.\n\n information sharing\n\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I wish to call attention to an\nimportant\n\n[[Page S11973]]\n\npart of this legislation--the provision in section 1016 on information\nsharing.\n The effective use of information, from all available sources, is\nessential to the fight against terrorism. The 9/11 Commission, in fact,\nconcluded that the biggest impediment to all-source analysis, and to a\ngreat likelihood of ``connecting the dots,'' is the resistance to\ninformation sharing. As the commission documented, in the period\npreceding September 11, 2001, there were instances o potentially\nhelpful information that was available but that no person knew to ask\nfor; information that was distributed only in compartmented channels;\nand information that was requested but could not be shared.\n As a result of its findings, the commission urged that a new approach\nto information sharing be developed that would help move from a ``need-\nto-know'' culture of information protection to a ``need-to-share''\nculture of integration. Noting that no single agency could develop a\nmeaningful information sharing system on its own, the commission\nrecommended a new, government-wide approach, based on the conceptual\nmodel of the Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange SHARE\nNetwork proposed by a task force of leading professionals assembled by\nthe Markle Foundation.\n This legislation puts the commission's information sharing\nrecommendations in place, requiring that the President establish a new,\ngovernment-wide Information Sharing Environment ISE to share\ninformation among federal, State, local and tribal entities, and, where\nappropriate, with the private sector which owns or controls much of the\nnation's critical infrastructure)--in a manner consistent with national\nsecurity and with the protection of privacy and civil liberties.\n Ms. COLLINS. I agree wholeheartedly with my colleague about the\nimportance of these information sharing provisions. I also want to\nemphasize that the ISE is not some mammoth new database. Indeed, it is\nnot just technology, but rather represents a combination of\ntechnologies and policies designed to facilitate the appropriate\nsharing of terrorism information.\n Section 1016 includes a list of attributes the ISE is required to\nhave. These include such things as facilitating the sharing of\ninformation among those who have differing levels of access or\nclearance or different capacities to make use of the information--i.e.,\nproviding information from the beginning in its most shareable form, so\nthat the maximum number of individuals can access the information in at\nleast some meaningful form at its earliest point of consumability--\nwhile having additional details available to those who are granted\nappropriate access; in this way, the right information gets to the\nright consumer at the right time. It also includes building on existing\nsystems where possible, rather than creating whole new, and potentially\noverlapping, systems, and employs an information access management\napproach that controls access to the data rather than just systems and\nnetworks without sacrificing security. And it includes incorporating\nprotections for individuals' privacy and civil liberties from the very\nbeginning--both in the policies of the environment and in technologies\nand processes to ensure that the policies are adhered to.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. Another important aspect of this provision is the\nmechanisms it puts in place to ensure that this new approach to\ninformation sharing actually gets implemented. We have known for some\ntime now about the critical importance of information sharing in the\nfight against terrorism. But translating generalized calls for improved\ninformation sharing into a working, fundamentally changed system\nrequires hard and sustained work. To help ensure that this ambitious\nnew effort will succeed, and that the ISE is actually implemented as\nenvisioned, the legislation provides for a staged development process,\nwith periodic reporting and the promise of significant and sustained\nCongressional oversight.\n The first benchmark in the ISE development process is 180 days after\nenactment: by this date, a review must be conducted of current agency\ncapabilities; in addition, a description of the technological, legal\nand policy issues presented by the creation of the ISE, and how they\nwill be addressed, must be submitted to the President and Congress.\nWithin 270 days of enactment, the President is required to issue\nguidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using information,\nand, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight\nBoard established in section 1061 of the legislation, guidelines to\nprotect privacy and civil liberties in the development and use of the\nISE. These two sets of guidelines are critical in defining the\nframework of the ISE, and their issuance will provide an important\nopportunity for Congress to evaluate the proposed direction of the ISE.\nWithin a year, a detailed implementation plan for the ISE, including\nbudget estimates and proposed performance measures, must be submitted\nto Congress, which will provide for a further opportunity for\nCongressional evaluation. Finally, in 2 years, and annually thereafter,\nthe President must submit a report to Congress on the state of the ISE\nand of information sharing across the Federal Government.\n Ms. COLLINS. In addition to the step-by-step development process my\ncolleague has described, I would also note that the other key means by\nwhich the legislation seeks to ensure the successful implementation of\nthe ISE is through the appointment of a program manager. Not later than\n120 days after enactment of the legislation, the President is required\nto designate an individual who is to be responsible for information\nsharing across the Federal Government. By placing a single individual\nin charge of the development of the ISE, the legislation seeks to\nensure the accountability and focus necessary to accomplish this\ncritically important task.\n Although the President has discretion to determine whom to designate\nas program manager, it is essential, and required by subsection\n1016(f)(1), that the program manager have and exercise government-wide\nauthority; the ISE will involve the sharing of terrorism-related\ninformation from across the government, including from entities outside\nthe intelligence community--whether bioterror information from the\nCenters for Disease Control or relevant border information from Customs\nand immigration offices at the Department of Homeland Security--so that\nthe program manager will be someone with responsibilities that cut\nacross the Federal Government as well. Although the DNI is, and will\ncontinue to be, responsible for setting information sharing standards\nthroughout the intelligence community (a responsibility expressly\nrecognized in subsection 1016(e)(10)(A)), it is not our intent that the\nDNI also assume the further responsibilities of program manager. We\nexpect and intend that whomever is designated as program manager will\nhave the development of the ISE as their sole or primary\nresponsibility, and we believe that it is desirable that the individual\nhave management expertise in enterprise architecture, information\nsharing and interoperability.\n The legislation provides that the program manager is to serve for 2\nyears, during the initial development of the ISE, to ensure that the\nproject gets off to a sound start. As part of the implementation plan\nto be submitted to Congress after one year, the program manager is to\nrecommend a future management structure for the ISE, including a\nrecommendation as to whether the position of program manager should\ncontinue. During this two-year start up period, the program manager\nwill be assisted in his or her efforts by an Information System Council\nestablished by the legislation and based on the existing Information\nSystem Council established by the President through executive order.\nThe council, made up of representatives from agencies participating in\nthe ISE, will not only advise the President and the program manager,\nbut also, among other things, provide a means of coordinating among the\nvarious agencies participating in the ISE, helping to resolve\ninteragency disputes that may arise. In performing its duties, the\ncouncil is to consider input from those outside the Federal Government\nas well--including state, local, and tribal officials and those in the\nprivate sector who are potential participants in the ISE or who have\nrelevant policy or technical expertise.\n I also note the legislation provides that the individual agencies\nthat possess terrorism information or otherwise participate in the ISE\nare to fully\n\n[[Page S11974]]\n\ncooperate in the development of the ISE. The cooperation of all\nrelevant agencies is critical to the success of this government-wide\ninformation sharing effort, and agencies can expect Congressional\noversight to ensure that they are planning for, and fully contributing\nto, the construction of the ISE.\n\n Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board\n\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, among its other significant provisions,\nthe bill before the Senate, S. 2845, establishes a new Privacy and\nCivil Liberties Oversight Board. Waging the war on terror has required\nthat the federal government take steps that consolidate governmental\nauthority and increase the government's presence in our lives. As the\n9/11 Commission observed, this shift of power and authority to the\ngovernment, while necessary, calls for ``an enhanced system of checks\nand balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our\nway of life.'' Following the commission's recommendation on this point,\nthis bill creates, for the first time, a Board that can look across the\nfederal government and ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately\nconsidered in the policies and practices of the executive branch.\n Ms. COLLINS. Specifically, the board established in the bill is to be\nmade up of five members, who are to be appointed by, and serve at the\npleasure of, the President. Two of the five members--the chairman and\nvice-chairman--are also required to be Senate-confirmed. To help ensure\nan independent and effective board, all of the members are to come from\noutside the federal government and are expected to be people of\nstature, selected on the basis of their achievements, experience and\nindependence. All of the members of the board are expected to devote\nsignificant time to this important endeavor, and the chairman may be\nappointed to a full-time position; given the broad responsibilities of\nthe board, we believe that having a full-time chairman though not\nrequired would usually be the wisest course.\n The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight board's purpose is to\nensure that privacy and civil liberties concerns are appropriately\nconsidered in the implementation of all laws, regulations, and policies\nthat are related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.\nThe board is empowered to carry out its mission in two equally\nimportant ways. First, the board is to advise policy makers at the\nfront end, to ensure that when executive branch officials are\nproposing, making or implementing policy, they appropriately consider\nand protect privacy and civil liberties. Second, the board is to\nconduct oversight, by investigating and reviewing government actions at\nthe back end, reviewing the implementation of particular government\npolicies to see whether the government is acting with appropriate\nrespect for privacy and civil liberties and adhering to applicable\nrules. Further, the bill provides the board with the tools it will need\nto carry out its functions.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree with the Senator from Maine that the board\nwill have the tools necessary to carry out its purpose. In its advice\nrole, the board has a broad mandate to review and provide advice to the\nPresident and to federal agencies on proposed policies, whether or not\ncodified formally in regulations, and on the implementation of new and\nexisting laws, regulations and policies, in order to ensure that\nprivacy and civil liberties are appropriately considered. Following a\nrelated 9/11 Commission recommendation, the board is further\nspecifically directed, when providing advice to executive branch\nofficials on proposals to retain or enhance particular governmental\npowers, to consider whether the need for those powers have been\nbalanced against the need to protect civil liberties and privacy and\nwhether there are adequate guidelines and supervision to ensure that\nthe use of the power is properly confined and that privacy and civil\nliberties are protected.\n\n Although the board has no authority to veto or delay executive branch\nactions, executive branch officials are expected to routinely consult\nwith the board, and the board to routinely review and provide input, on\nthe development and implementation of policies intended to protect the\nNation a against terrorism; indeed, a suggestion in conference\nnegotiations that would have limited the board to providing advice only\nwhen requested by the head of an agency was specifically rejected. It\nis our intention that the board become an institutionalized voice that\nensures that privacy and civil liberties concerns are always considered\nand, where appropriate incorporated, in policy making.\n With respect to its oversight role, the board has broad authority to\nreview and investigate executive branch actions, whether limited to a\nsingle agency or involving interagency policies, to determine whether\nthe government is appropriately protecting privacy and civil liberties.\nTo carry out this function effectively, the board has been given\ninvestigative powers similar to those of a government-wide inspector\ngeneral. Specifically, the and is to have access to all relevant\ndocuments and materials in the executive branch, including classified\ninformation, and to all relevant federal officials to interview them\nand take statements. Departments and agencies, moreover, are required\nto cooperate with the board: if the board believes information or\nassistance has been unreasonably refused, it is to notify the relevant\nagency or department head, who, unless the information cannot lawfully\nbe provided to the board, is to ensure compliance with the request.\n The bill provides an exception to the requirement that an agency\ncomply with a board request for information only in cases where the DNI\nin consultation with the Attorney General, determines that withholding\ninformation from the board is necessary to protect the national\nsecurity interests of the United States or where the Attorney General\ndetermines that withholding the information is necessary to protect\nongoing sensitive law enforcement or counterterrorism operations. In\nlight of the fact that board members must in any event have appropriate\nclearances to see classified information, as well as the expected\nnature of the board's work, we anticipate that these exceptions will\nrarely need to be invoked.\n In addition to getting information from the executive branch, the\nboard may also request information and assistance from State, local and\ntribal officials, and it may request documents or testimony from others\noutside the executive branch, including private parties who may have\nrelevant information, such as former federal employees and government\ncontractors. Although the board does not itself have the authority to\nsubpoena documents from private parties, if the card is unable to\nobtain relevant information from a nongovernmental party, it may refer\nthe matter to the Attorney General, who may take such action as\nappropriate to ensure compliance, including the use of compulsory\nprocess.\n I would also like to note that although the board's jurisdiction is\nnot intended to extend beyond matters related to efforts to protect the\nNation against terrorism--to, for example, claims that the IRS is not\nadequately protecting the confidentiality of tax returns--it is our\nintent its jurisdiction be interpreted inclusively, to reach, for\nexample, laws that were originally adopted to protect against\nterrorism, but may now have been turned towards other purposes.\n\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank my colleague for his clear explanation. Just as\nimportant to the other authorities provided to the board is ensuring\nsome transparency of the activities of the board. Transparency helps to\ngive confidence to the American people that the protection of their\ncivil liberties and privacy is being addressed as we take actions to\nfurther protect our Nation from terrorism. To that end, the board is to\nreport to Congress at least annually on its activities, and may do so\nmore frequently, as would be expected should the board complete an\nimportant investigation or otherwise make findings or recommendations\nof which Congress would wish to be apprised. The bill requires that the\nboard's reports to Congress be unclassified to the greatest extent\npossible, in order to facilitate public discussion of the board's\nactivities; where it is necessary to include classified information in\nthe reports, it is to be included in a separate classified annex.\nWhether and when to release reports directly to the public or to\notherwise engage in activities that directly involve and inform\n\n[[Page S11975]]\n\nthe public is left to the discretion of the board, but we believe that\ngiven the public importance of the issues entrusted to the Privacy and\nCivil Liberties Oversight Board, openness is called for and will\nultimately foster public trust that the government is appropriately\nprotecting privacy and civil liberties as it continues to vigorously\nfight the war on terror.\n Also intended to foster this public trust is the fact that, while the\nboard is exempted from the requirements of the Federal Advisory\nCommittee Act because, as a permanent, ongoing entity, it does not fit\ncomfortably into the mold of the usual subjects of that act, the board\nis expressly subject to the Freedom of Information Act, like any other\nagency.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. I would also like to point out that the bill\nencourages federal departments and agencies involved in law enforcement\nand anti-terror functions to designate an agency official to serve as a\nprivacy and civil liberties officer. Such officers, modeled on similar\nofficers at the Department of Homeland Security and newly created in\nthe Office of the DNI, can play an important role in providing day-to-\nday advice and insights on civil liberties and privacy matters and\nconducting internal reviews. Because such officers would be highly\nknowledgeable about their own agencies, they could augment the role of\nthe board and help address issues early on. The role of such officers\nwould be distinct from those of the new chief privacy officers created\nin the Omnibus Appropriations bill. Those officers would be largely\nresponsible for focusing on informational privacy issues and not\nresponsible for addressing broader civil liberties concerns.\n Ms. COLLINS. I would like to thank my friend for working with me on\nthese very important provisions. In the wake of the terrorist attacks\non September 11, 2001, during his joint address to Congress, the\nPresident called on all Americans to ``uphold the values of America and\nremember why so many have come here. We're in a fight for our\nprinciples, and our first responsibility is to live by them.'' Indeed,\nas we improve government to better secure our Nation against future\nattacks, we must at the same time protect those American values that\ndefine our free society. These freedoms and values are what define us\nas Americans and what defines our Nation. Since the inception of our\nNation, there has been much sacrifice in order for us to have the\nfreedoms we enjoy today. These liberties are what have been entrusted\nto us to protect. That is why, as we protect our Nation from future\nterrorist attacks, we also must ensure that we do no trample on the\nvery values that the terrorists seek to destroy.\n Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I wish to commend Senators Collins and\nLieberman for their leadership in working round the clock for months to\ntranslate the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission into reality.\nThanks to their tireless and bipartisan effort, I and my colleagues\ntoday can point to a provision in the intelligence reform bill that\nwill clear the fog of unnecessary secrecy that has for too long clouded\nour national intelligence picture. As the principal sponsor of this\nbipartisan provision, which will establish for the first time an\nappeals procedure that members of Congress may use regarding the\nclassification of materials for national security purposes, I wish to\nexplain how I envision this new process working.\n The power to classify documents as secret is one of the most powerful\ntools in American Government, and it seems to be very much in vogue.\nOver-classification of documents is now the rule rather than the\nexception. Documents are sometimes classified for political reasons\nrather than to protect national security interests. Last year alone,\nthe Federal Government spent $6.5 billion creating 14.3 million new\nclassified documents. That is double the number of documents 10 years\nago. This awesome power should be used judiciously, and it surely\nshould not be the subject of old fashioned horse trading, as it was\nlast summer during the preparation of the Senate Intelligence\nCommittee's report on pre-Iraq war intelligence.\n Last summer the Senate Intelligence Committee, on which I serve with\nmy co-authors, spent more than 6 weeks arm-wrestling with the Central\nIntelligence Agency, CIA, over how much of the report on pre-Iraq war\nintelligence would be made public. Originally, the agency wanted to\nblack out more than half of the report. In the end, ``only 20 percent''\nof the report was blacked out.\n At that time, there was no independent body to which the committee\nmembers could turn to find out what should and should not be classified\nfor national security purposes. That is precisely the problem addressed\nby the provision crafted by Senators Lott, Bob Graham, Snowe, and\nmyself. Our provision will give Congress for the first time a means of\nappealing classification decisions.\n The provision gives Congress the authority to appeal classification\ndecisions to an independent standing body, the Public Interest\nDeclassification Board. This Board is made up of nine members with\nexpertise in national security and related areas; five are appointed by\nthe President and four by the bipartisan leadership of the Senate and\nHouse. Under the amendments made by section 1102, when any Member of\nCongress asks the Board to declassify a document or materials, the\nBoard ``shall advise the originators of the request in a timely manner\nwhether the Board intends to conduct such review.''\n This means that if I or another Member of the Senate were to ask the\nBoard to determine whether a document is properly classified for\nnational security purposes, the Board must respond in a timely manner.\n``Timely'' is defined as ``early'' or ``soon.'' It is my expectation\nthat whether it is a member of Congress or a committee seeking the\nBoard's decision on the proper classification of information, the Board\nwill get back to the requester expeditiously.\n I am of the view that the problems in our intelligence community will\nnot be addressed until the problems in the national security\nclassification system are addressed. Thomas Kean, who chaired the 9/11\nCommission, said that three-quarters of the classified material he\nreviewed for the Commission should not have been classified in the\nfirst place. Now, as the Senate acts on the conference report that\nstrongly reflects the 9/11 Commission recommendations, it only makes\nsense to include this provision.\n I have no illusions that this classification appeals mechanism will\nabolish the strongly rooted institutional bias in favor of\noverclassification, but taken in conjunction with the overall review of\nthe standards used to classify information contained in other sections\nof the conference report, it is a very sound first step.\n I am grateful to Senator Lott, my principal cosponsor, for\nchampioning this matter in conference. He and his staff worked nonstop\nto preserve this provision. I also want to acknowledge the efforts of\nSenator Bob Graham, another conferee, and his staff to defend our work.\n Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the\nintelligence reform provisions negotiated by the House and Senate.\nThese measures provide common sense restructuring of our Nation's\napproach to national intelligence.\n For years the United States has contemplated reorganizing the\nintelligence community. Unfortunately, it took the tragedy of September\n11 and the loss of nearly 3,000 citizens to achieve systemic change.\nThis legislation, however, is the culmination of a serious national\ndebate that has occurred since that fateful day. It is a just tribute\nto those we lost, their families and to future generations of Americans\nwhose security depends on our actions today. I believe this legislation\nbetter prepares us to meet the security challenges of today and I would\nlike to make note of some important provisions.\n First, it creates a National Director of Intelligence who has the\nnecessary authority to write and execute intelligence budgets. This\ncritical change will help ensure that resources and personnel can be\nmoved to areas of priority throughout the intelligence community for\nmore effective management of intelligence operations and analysis. This\nchange was strongly endorsed by both the 9/11 Commission and Joint\nInquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and I believe\nit is essential.\n Second, it establishes a National Counterterrorism Center. This will\n\n[[Page S11976]]\n\nachieve an integrated approach to counterterrorism intelligence and\nstrategic operational planning. Given the continuing threat the United\nStates faces from international terrorists, it is vital that we\norganize our information and resources in a highly coordinated fashion\nto meet this challenge. The NCTC provides the proper mechanism to\nfacilitate this coordination by gathering relevant information from all\nappropriate departments and agencies within our government.\n In addition to these primary reforms provisions, I am pleased the\nconference report includes two other provisions of importance to New\nMexico. By retaining my language directing the Department of Homeland\nSecurity to report on development of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle border\nsurveillance capability, this legislation recognizes the need to\nexploit emerging technologies for securing the homeland. The porous\nnature of our borders, particularly in remote areas of the Southwest,\nis vulnerable to terrorists, drug smugglers and other criminal\nactivity. My language begins to seek new solutions to this significant\nsecurity concern. Also, I am gratified that the conferees recognized\nthe value of the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center\noperated by our national laboratories as Sandia and Los Alamos. The\nformal relationship this legislation creates between NISAC and the\nNational Director of Intelligence ensures the intelligence community\nhas access to the very best capability our Nation has for understanding\nvulnerabilities to critical infrastructures.\n In conclusion, I believe this legislation is historic. Nothing is\nmore important than the security of our country and intelligence is the\nunderpinning of success in the war on terror. Objective, timely,\naccurate intelligence is what our policymakers need to make the right\ndecisions affecting the safety of Americans at home and abroad. This\nlegislation takes an important step toward invigorating our\nintelligence gathering as we face the threats of the 21st century and\nit has my strong support.\n Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the\nconference report on legislation creating a Director of National\nIntelligence. Before doing so, I commend the tremendous effort made by\nSenator Susan Collins, the chairman of the Governmental Affairs\nCommittee, and Senator Joe Lieberman, the ranking member, who have\ndedicated the last few months to ensuring this legislation was passed.\nI salute them.\n Passage of this legislation ensures that many of the key\nrecommendations of the 9/11 Commission become law. Most important of\nthese are the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence,\nDNI, and a National counterterrorism Center, NCTC.\n However, much still remains to be done. I continue to believe that\nthe key to a stronger America lies not just in clarifying institutional\nlines of authority but in ensuring that we have the best and brightest\non the front lines of our national defense.\n One of the important objectives driven home by the 9/11 Commission's\nreport and in testimony before the Governmental Affairs Committee is\nthe need to have the right people in the right places in our\nGovernment, both civilian employees and military personnel, to combat\nfuture threats. We must ensure that our Federal workforce remains\ntrained and ready to respond to the challenges we may face in the\nfuture, just as Federal employees have responded with courage when\ncalled upon in the past.\n There is a human capital crisis in the Federal Government. Not only\nare we losing decades of talent as civil servants retire, we are not\ndoing enough to develop and nurture the next generation of public\nservants. Nowhere is this more evident than in our intelligence\nservices. Time and time again senior officials note the lack of trained\nlinguists, the lack of trained analysts to evaluate information, and\nthe lack of scientific technical expertise needed to confront these new\nthreats.\n Staffing new interagency intelligence operations centers on a 24/7\nbasis, developing new human intelligence, HUMINT, operations and\ninterpreting the information coming into our intelligence analysts pose\nmanagement problems of massive proportions. We continue to be seriously\nunderstaffed. I have been calling attention to this problem, along with\nmy colleague, Senator Voinovich, for a number of years.\n Thus, I am pleased that the legislation we vote on today contains\nprovisions similar to those in S. 589, the Homeland Security Federal\nWorkforce Act, which I introduced and was passed by the Senate last\nNovember.\n The National Intelligence Reform Act mirrors the intent of S. 589 by\nestablishing a program awarding scholarships to students in exchange\nfor government service in the intelligence community. I would like to\nreiterate that the language in the Governmental Affairs Committee\nreport relating to this provision and urge the DNI to give special\nconsideration to applicants seeking degrees in foreign languages,\nscience, mathematics, or a combination of these subjects.\n S. 2845 includes other aspects of S. 589, such as an incentivized\nrotational program for employees in the intelligence community in order\nto break down cultural and artificial barriers to information sharing,\nbuild a cadre of highly knowledgeable professionals, and ensure\ncooperation among national security agencies.\n In addition, the conference report includes language offered\nby Senator Bob Graham and Senator Richard Durbin, and myself requiring\nthe Director of National Intelligence to review existing programs to\nincrease the number of personnel with science, math, and foreign\nlanguage skills and report to Congress on the proposals to improve the\neducation of such individuals if existing programs are found\ninadequate.\n\n These programs partially address, however, a larger national problem\nin our educational system that must be tackled, including at the\nprimary and secondary level. I look forward to working with my\ncolleagues in the next Congress to implement additional programs to\nsolve the human capital crisis in our national security community as\nwell as elsewhere in the government.\n In addition, I am pleased that the legislation includes language\ncreating an Office of Geospatial Management in the Department of\nHomeland Security, which was added to S. 2845, the Senate version of\nthe bill, through an amendment offered by Senator Allard and myself.\nThis language is identical to S. 1230, the Homeland Security Geographic\nInformation Act. It will help to better coordinate the procurement and\nmanagement of geospatial information within the Department of Homeland\nSecurity and centralize activities within one office. Geospatial\ninformation has become a critical component in both assisting our war\nfighters and in protecting our homeland.\n However, I would be remiss not to mention areas that are not included\nin the legislation.\n I regret that the conference report did not include a Senate\namendment I sponsored with Senator Fitzgerald to create a chief\nfinancial officer, CFO, within the Office of the Director of National\nIntelligence. Our amendment would have placed the NIA under the Chief\nFinancial Officers Act of 1990, which requires agencies to submit\naudited financial statements and requires that CFOs be appointed by the\nPresident, confirmed by the Senate, and report directly to an agency's\nhead. This amendment is similar to legislation Senator Fitzgerald and I\nsponsored now Public Law 108-330--which brings the Department of\nHomeland Security, DHS, under the CFO Act and ensures a Senate-\nconfirmed CFO who reports directly to the Director of DHS. I plan to\nintroduce legislation that embodies our amendment because I strongly\nbelieve that this new entity must have the financial management systems\nand practices in place to provide meaningful and timely information\nneeded for effective and efficient management decisionmaking.\n It would be naive to say that this legislation by itself will make\nAmerica stronger. Americans will make America stronger. What this\nlegislation does offer is a framework within which we can build a more\nsecure nation if we all work together within the limits of our\nConstitution.\n In creating a Director of National Intelligence it is critical that\nthe President pledge to make this office accountable to the American\npeople. The DNI must be kept free of political pressures and\nindependent of partisan policy agendas. While employees working\n\n[[Page S11977]]\n\nunder the DNI will have the same rights and protections as those at the\nCIA, I urge the DNI to make every effort to ensure that whistleblowers\nare not retaliated against and that their disclosures, which may have a\nsignificant impact on the security of this nation, are taken seriously.\n The DNI must make civil liberties and privacy rights a capstone in\nthe structure of this new agency. Without these basic protections, our\nfreedoms will not be strengthened, our Nation will not be more secure.\n I pledge to do all I can to exercise my responsibility to oversee\nthis new intelligence agency and ensure it lives up to the trust being\nplaced in it by the Congress today.\n Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I will join many of my colleagues today in\nvoting for the Intelligence Reform bill; however, I do so with some\nreservations.\n First, let me highlight the provisions contained in this bill that\nare especially important to North Dakota. The bill includes a proposal\nI authored that would establish a pilot project on the Northern border\nto enhance security through the use of advanced technologies like\nremote sensors, cameras, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The bipartisan\n9/11 Commission Report recognized that the Northern border operates\nwith only a fraction of the manpower and resources that are devoted to\nthe Southern border, but poses no less risk for terrorists sneaking\nacross into the United States. This project will help the border patrol\nin monitoring the border more effectively and efficiently.\nAdditionally, I am pleased that the bill includes a provision directing\nthat at least 20 percent of any increase in the number of Border Patrol\nagents be assigned to the northern border. Both of these provisions\ntake a step in the right direction to improve the security of our\nnorthern border.\n In considering intelligence reform, I embraced the recommendations of\nthe 9/11 Commission. They made a major effort to understand what\nhappened on September 11, 2001, and to figure out how we could help\nprevent future attacks. This legislation never would have passed\nwithout their hard work. By adopting one of the key recommendations of\nthe 9/11 Commission, this bill takes a major step toward improving our\nCounter-terrorism efforts. Establishing a National Counterterrorism\nCenter that can both analyze the terrorist threat and do strategic\nplanning for operations to defeat terrorists will make us safer.\n This bill would never have become law without the commitment of the\nfamilies of the victims of the 9/11 attacks. They demanded real reform,\nwithout any further delay. We in Congress owed those families no less.\n Some of my colleagues today have said that this bill is the largest\nreform of our national security agencies since 1947. The provisions I\nhave just mentioned are important reforms. Nevertheless, I remain\nconcerned that creating a new Director of National Intelligence will\nnot do enough. It still leaves too many participants with an\nopportunity to fail to communicate and cooperate.\n No one can argue against the basic rationale for creating a Director\nof National Intelligence. The American intelligence community has\nsuffered from a lack of coordination and communication, as the 9/11\nCommission and many other reports have outlined. This lack of\ncoordination and communication comes in part from the absence of any\none person in charge and, ultimately, accountable for the accuracy and\ntimeliness of our intelligence. I strongly agree that we need a\nNational Intelligence Director. But such a Director cannot improve the\ncommunication and coordination between the intelligence agencies\nwithout the full authority and resources necessary to do the job.\n The concern I have with this final bill is that we have maintained\nthe CIA and all of the other intelligence agencies we had before, and\nadded a National Intelligence Director on top. Instead of consolidating\nthe various intelligence agencies, we have created additional boxes on\nan organizational chart that I fear will only create more turf battles,\nthereby undermining our ability to enhance and improve our intelligence\ncapabilities. I was concerned about this issue in the Senate's\nintelligence reform bill. The final bill has an even weaker Director of\nNational Intelligence. That makes me even more concerned.\n In my view, this bill simply does not provide the National\nIntelligence Director with all of the tools he needs to do the job. He\nwill have only a very limited power to move money among the different\nintelligence agencies. Without strong control over the money, the\nDirector could become just another layer of bureaucratic review.\n If that was the end of the story, I probably would have to vote\nagainst this bill. But I see this bill as a step in the right\ndirection. Its authors have assured me this is a beginning. In the end,\nthe success of the Director of National Intelligence depends on the\nPresident creating procedures that place that official at the heart of\nthe intelligence community, with real authority and real\naccountability. I am counting on President Bush to do so.\n Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise in support of the National\nSecurity Intelligence Reform Act.\n I am proud to cast my vote in favor of the first major reform of the\nintelligence community. Intelligence reform will make our Nation safer\nand stronger, and ensure we use our resources smarter. We have created\na framework that works to prevent a predatory attack on the United\nStates, supports our troops, and provides good intelligence to\npolicymakers so we can guard and guide the Nation.\n I am excited that we are going to pass such fundamental reform of our\nintelligence agencies. I have been fighting for intelligence reform for\nyears. It is overdue and greatly needed. Now is the time.\n This is a very good and important bill. This bill will make the\nAmerican people safer by reforming our intelligence community for the\n21st Century, by improving protection of our homeland, and by unifying\nand strengthening our efforts to combat terrorism.\n The reforms will help prevent another 9/11 attack and help ensure we\nnever go to war again on dated and dubious information. These reforms\nwill make highest and best use of the talent in our intelligence\nagencies, who will have a framework to be able to protect the Nation\nand speak truth to power.\n I have fought for reform of our intelligence community for years. I\nhave been a member of the Intelligence Committee since before 9/11 to\nbe an advocate for reform, particularly regarding signals intelligence.\n Since I joined the intelligence committee we have also investigated\ntwo serious intelligence failures:\n Why couldn't we prevent the 9/11 attacks on America?\n Why did we think Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction?\n The House and Senate intelligence committees had a joint inquiry into\nintelligence relating to 9/11. We found insufficient information,\nmissed opportunities, and failures to share information. So many\ntalented and highly skilled people in our intelligence community worked\nso hard and so effectively, but our intelligence agencies did not serve\nthem or us well.\n These investigations convinced me that our intelligence agencies\nneeded fundamental reforms. I recommended the creation of a Director of\nNational Intelligence to unify and lead the intelligence community and\nmany other important intelligence reforms. I am pleased that many of\nthe reforms I have been advocating are part of this bill.\n The National Security Intelligence Reform Act also builds on the work\nof the 9/11 Commission. I want to thank Senator Collins and Senator\nLieberman for their work on this bill in Committee, in the Senate, and\nholding the line in conference with the House. The result is broad,\ndeep and authentic reform.\n The bill gives the intelligence community one leader, a Director of\nNational Intelligence, with real authority over the National\nIntelligence Program budget and personnel, to manage and unify and\noversee the intelligence community.\n The bill creates a National Counterterrorism Center to unify our\nNation's intelligence information and planning to fight terrorism more\neffectively.\n The bill creates a National Counterproliferation Center to provide\nthe same unity of effort and effectiveness in the effort to prevent the\nspread of weapons of mass destruction.\n\n[[Page S11978]]\n\n The bill provides for diversity of opinion in intelligence analysis\nand protects the independence of analysis from policy and political\npressures, by using red-teaming to test assumptions and avoiding group-\nthink by ensuring that alternative views are presented to policy-\nmakers.\n The bill requires better sharing of intelligence information, both\nwithin the intelligence community and with first responders in our\nStates and communities who have a need to know.\n The bill provides protections for the rights of Americans by creating\na Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and making officials in\neach agency responsible for protecting civil liberties and privacy\nrights.\n The bill will also unify and streamline the standards for granting\nsecurity clearances and require that a clearance granted by one agency\nis accepted by other agencies.\n This bill goes beyond intelligence reform to address many of the\nother 9/11 Commission recommendations: to improve aviation security,\nincluding air cargo inspections, to improve maritime security, to\nstrengthen border enforcement, and to strengthen criminal laws on\nterrorism, building weapons of mass destruction, and financing\nterrorist groups.\n I have been fighting for many of these reforms and am very pleased\nthat this bill includes them. They are going to make America safer,\nstronger and smarter.\n This is not a perfect bill; no bill is. There are some provisions in\nthis bill that raise questions or concerns. You can count on me to be\nvigorous and rigorous in oversight, to make sure we have real reform to\nprotect America and protect the freedoms that America stands for.\n Thanks to the dedication, commitment and persistence of the 9/11\nfamilies and the Congress, we had an independent commission to\ninvestigate 9/11. The 9/11 Commission brought into the sunshine what\nmany of us knew from our classified hearings. The 9/11 Commission\nreport was not just riveting reading--it was a good blueprint for\nintelligence reform. Senators Collins and Lieberman picked up that\nblueprint and ran with it. The Senate produced a bipartisan bill that\nis a shining example of what can be done around here when we work\ntogether, not as blue State Democrats, not as red State Republicans,\nbut as Americans--as members of the red, white and blue party, working\ntogether for America and the American people. As a proud member of the\nred, white and blue party, I enthusiastically support the National\nSecurity Intelligence Reform Act.\n Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for S. 2845,\nthe intelligence reform bill.\n I first want to commend the 9/11 families who have worked so\ntirelessly to ensure that necessary reforms were implemented through\nthe formation of the 9/11 Commission and the enactment of this bill.\n I believe this bill is an important first step toward needed\nintelligence reform. As we are all aware, intelligence is the key to\nkeeping America safe and winning the global war on terrorism. I think\nthat there are many provisions of this bill which will improve U.S.\nintelligence. It creates a Director of National Intelligence who has\npersonnel and budget authority; establishes an Information Sharing\nEnvironment to facilitate the sharing of terrorism information among\nall appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector\nentities; provides for training and education to meet linguistic\nrequirements; and emphasizes the use of open intelligence, a resource I\nbelieve we have overlooked recently to our detriment.\n I am also pleased that this bill establishes a National\nCounterproliferation Center since I believe the proliferation of\nweapons of mass destruction and the potential for terrorists and rogue\nstates to obtain these weapons are the greatest threats facing us\ntoday.\n In addition, I commend the House and Senate for providing for a\nPrivacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board within the Executive Office\nof the President that would ensure that privacy and civil liberties\nconcerns are appropriately considered in the implementation of laws,\nregulations, and executive branch policies related to efforts to\nprotect the Nation against terrorism. While Americans are more willing\nto give up some of their privacy after 9/11, necessary intrusions must\nbe carefully balanced against the rights of U.S. citizens and I believe\nthe Board will help maintain the balance.\n Again, this bill is simply a first step. The United States remains\nvulnerable in many areas. I do not believe the bill does enough to\nprovide for transportation security such as for ports, public\ntransportation and railroads. In addition, it does not address other\nasymmetrical threats such as food safety. Two days ago Secretary of\nHealth and Human Services Thompson noted how easy it would be to tamper\nwith and poison our food supply.\n Finally, I would like to express my disappointment with the\nadministration's and Republican congressional leadership's\nparticipation in this undertaking. The administration originally did\nnot want a 9/11 Commission and its support of this bill was lukewarm at\nbest. The tragedy of September 11 made it clear that our Nation was not\nas secure as it could be and changes needed to be made. It is the duty\nof the administration to make those changes as quickly as possible.\nSeptember 11 was over 3 years ago and we are just now enacting the\nfirst changes. The process certainly could have proceeded more quicky\nif the administration had been more actively engaged throughout the\nprocess.\n But we have a bill which is a good first step. I support this bill\nand look forward to working with my colleagues on future reforms.\n Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, an enormous amount of time and effort\nby the White House, the Congress, the 9/11 Commission, the families of\nthe victims the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, and others have\ngotten us here, today, to make a final decision on the Intelligence\nReform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. We owe a debt of gratitude\nto all those involved with this process. However, not everyone will\nagree, nor should they, with everything contained in, or missing from,\nthe bill we are about to vote on.\n This should not surprise us, since no one individual or group has all\nthe answers on how best to reform our vast intelligence community. What\nwe can all agree upon, however, is the dedication and sense of purpose\nof everyone in the Congress who has worked on this legislation. The\nMembers and staffs, from both sides of the aisle, all tried to do what\nthey thought was best for the future security of the United States and\nfor that they all deserve our appreciation.\n I rise today not simply to commend the hard work of a lot of people,\nrather, I want to make the point that today marks the start, and not\nthe end, of the intelligence reform process. Our work in the Congress\non this issue is not ending today; it is just beginning in earnest.\n We were attacked on 11 September 2001 in a vile, unprovoked manner\nthat employed methods heretofore never used in warfare. Before 11\nSeptember, the idea of hijacking civilian airliners, loaded with\ninnocent people, and using them as guided missiles to destroy landmark\nbuildings and thousands of non-combatant people was something you would\nonly find in a book of fiction.\n It was difficult to imagine before that attack that a group of people\ncould be so evil, so focused on destroying innocent lives, and so ready\nto kill themselves for some warped sense of their own religion and\ntheir distorted sense of justice.\n We can fault our intelligence analysts for not ``connecting the\ndots,'' but maybe they had too few ``dots'' to work with and maybe what\nthey did have didn't seem quite plausible at the time relative to our\nown understanding of human nature and how wars have been fought in the\npast.\n The House Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security issued the\nfirst report outlining problems within the intelligence community about\nour failure to stop the 9/11 attacks. As the chairman of that\nsubcommittee, I released that report on 17 July 2002. What we\ndiscovered was that the two most egregious intelligence failures\ninvolved human intelligence or HUMINT and the sharing of intelligence,\nprimarily between the CIA and the FBI.\n A dedicated enemy without any constraints on their behavior is a\ndifficult\n\n[[Page S11979]]\n\nand extremely dangerous foe to defeat. As I said in this Chamber last\nJuly 21, ``. . . there is only one principle to follow on intelligence\nreform. Intelligence is our first line of defense against terrorism,\nand we must improve the collection capabilities and analysis of\nintelligence to protect the security of the United States and its\nallies.'' The question we all need to ask ourselves is does this bill\nstrengthen this principle or not? The answer is a qualified one and\nthere is much more to do before we can unequivocally say we have done\neverything possible on reforming our intelligence community. Let me\nmention just six issues that we will need to focus on early in the\n109th Congress relative to intelligence reform:\n\n One, once this bill becomes law, the President will be nominating the\nfirst Director of National Intelligence, DNI. This will be one of the\nmost important decisions of his presidency and, in like manner, the\nconfirmation of the individual nominated will be one of the most\nimportant responsibilities of this Senate. We need to make sure that\nthe DNI has the ability, experience, and leadership qualities to\nsuccessfully implement the legislation we are voting on today.\n Two, the Congress needs to put its primary focus on rebuilding the\nmost critical aspect of our intelligence collection capability, namely\nHUMINT. If we are ever to win the war on terrorism we need to put our\nspies inside of al-Qaida and other organizations that mean us harm. We\nalso need good HUMINT to get a better indication of the threats being\nposed by nation states such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria.\n Three, in this regard, we need to reshape the culture in the\nDirectorate of Operations at CIA, which is responsible for managing our\nHUMINT activities, from ``risk-avoidance'' to ``risk-taking.'' Porter\nGoss has begun this process, but he will need the strong support of the\nCongress to institutionalize this new, aggressive culture. It is\nbecause of this very point that I voiced objections to the creation of\na Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, both in the original\nbill passed by the Senate and in the Conference Report. We need to take\nmore risks in HUMINT and we need to rebuild the morale of our HUMINT\ncollectors. What kind of message are we sending to our intelligence\nagents in the field who are risking their lives to protect us by\ncreating a board designed to look over their shoulders and, which is\nredundant to the President's Board on Safeguarding Americans' Civil\nLiberties? This may create a morale problem throughout our intelligence\ncommunity that might take years to repair and, I hasten to add, at a\ntime when we need HUMINT more than ever to protect our citizens.\n Four, to help Porter Goss rebuild our HUMINT capabilities and to\nraise the importance and priority of HUMINT reform, the Senate Select\nCommittee on Intelligence, SSCI, should establish in the 109th Congress\na Subcommittee on HUMINT to focus our attention on this critical aspect\nof our security. Without a subcommittee structure in the SSCI, I fear\nwe will not be up to the task of providing in-depth oversight of the\nintelligence community, which would be a failure of one of the\nCongress' most important constitutional responsibilities.\n Five, the span of control for the new DNI that is being created by\nthis legislation is enormous. In fact, it is almost impossible. This\nbill leaves the intelligence community at fifteen members, eight of\nwhich are in the Department of Defense. I had a bipartisan amendment to\nS. 2485 that was co-sponsored by my colleague from Nebraska, Senator\nBen Nelson, that would have created a unified command for military\nintelligence giving the new DNI a single point of contact for military-\nrelated intelligence requirements and collection capabilities instead\nof eight. Collectively, the eight members of the intelligence community\nthat this bill leaves in the Department of Defense are huge, with tens\nof thousands of people and multi-billion dollar budgets. How someone\noutside of the Department of Defense, like the DNI, could adequately\nand efficiently manage these vast intelligence capabilities by dealing\nwith eight separate military members is beyond me. Senator Nelson and I\nare committed to fix this shortcoming by introducing a bill to create a\nfour-star command for military intelligence in the 109th Congress.\n Six, Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner championed several critical proposals\nrelative to immigration reform, including improving our asylum laws and\nstandards for issuing driver's licenses. I regret his proposals are not\nin the conference report before us today. We should be committed to\nworking on legislation to strengthen our immigration laws as soon as\npossible.\n Yes, our work in the Congress on intelligence reform is just\nbeginning. Confirming the first DNI, focusing our effort on HUMINT,\nshaping a ``risk-taking'' culture among our intelligence officers,\nimproving our oversight of the intelligence community, creating a four-\nstar military intelligence command, and strengthening our immigration\nlaws will assuredly keep the 109th Congress fully focused on\nintelligence reform. Today is but the beginning of this effort and this\nprocess.\n Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, today, nearly 38 months after the\nSeptember 11 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, the Senate will\npass a bill to make Americans safer at home and abroad. What was broken\nbefore 9/11 must be fixed. S. 2845 is based on the lessons learned from\nthe National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States--\nthe 9/11 Commission. This legislation is a great step forward to revamp\nand strengthen our intelligence community to thwart terror attacks on\nAmericans in the future.\n It has not been an easy task to bring this legislation to the Senate\nfloor for a vote. Initially, the 9/11 Commission was not to report its\nfindings to Congress and the American public until after the November\nelections. Fortunately, the Commission was permitted to issue its\nfindings during the summer, which allowed Congress to draft S. 2845 and\nact upon nearly all of the 9/11 Commission's 41 recommendations to\nreform the intelligence community and improve the public's safety.\nNevertheless, there were roadblocks along the way. Many Members in both\nHouses tried to kill this legislation, and it is a major accomplishment\nthat we will hold a vote today and send this bill to the President this\nevening.\n Of course, the credit goes to Senators Susan Collins and Joseph\nLieberman, the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Committee on\nGovernmental Affairs. With great skill, they pushed and pulled in\nunison when they needed to keep this legislation afloat. They refused\nto let our national security fall prey to those who sought inaction\nover action. Additionally, Senator John Warner, the able chairman of\nthe Armed Services Committee, worked tirelessly to ensure that S. 2845\nwould preserve the military's chain of command and ensure necessary\nintelligence resources would remain available to the military at all\ntimes. As a result of the efforts of these Senators, we will pass a\nbipartisan bill that will achieve the goal of centralizing U.S.\nintelligence operations while helping intelligence agencies better\ncoordinate with U.S. military efforts.\n Again, the 9/11 Commission found that our Nation was vulnerable to\nattacks because we were not properly collecting, analyzing, and acting\nupon intelligence. Our domestic intelligence agencies were not talking\nwith their foreign intelligence counterparts, and federal law\nenforcement offices were not working with local law enforcement. And\nso, perhaps most importantly, this bill creates a Director of National\nIntelligence, DNI, and a National Counterterrorism Center, both of\nwhich will go a long way toward ensuring that our Nation's many\nintelligence and military agencies have the oversight, resources and\ncoordination necessary to protect our borders and our citizens.\n This bill will also help improve interagency cooperation by requiring\nextensive sharing of intelligence and law enforcement operations among\nFederal, State, and local agencies. That alone is a key step toward\nbetter protecting our citizens by ensuring information that could be\nvital to our national security makes it to the appropriate level. To\nbetter balance security with citizens' rights, this bill also\nestablishes a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to review Federal\npolicies and practices.\n Before I close, I do want to point out a provision that was deleted\nin the conference which could have made this bill even stronger. Our\nNation needs a director of national intelligence with the mandate to\nprovide the President and\n\n[[Page S11980]]\n\nother intelligence consumers with accurate, truthful, and even blunt\nintelligence. The DNI should not feel hamstrung to tell the President\nand other intelligence consumers what they want to hear; rather, the\nDNI must be able to tell them what they need to hear. The DNI must be\nindependent and unsusceptible to the political whims of his/her\nsuperiors. S. 2845 does not go as far as I would like to ensure that\nthere will be no politicization of the gathering and analysis of\nintelligence. The original Senate bill contained safeguards to ensure\nintelligence would not be politicized. I am hopeful the DNI will not\nfeel pressured to validate certain political or policy points of views\nwhere the intelligence simply cannot provide such validation.\n While I hope we can revisit this issue in the 109th Congress, this\nbill is a success. It will benefit the American people greatly, and I\nlook forward to its passage.\n Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I am pleased that in one of the final acts\nof this Congress we have overcome the objections of the House\nleadership to pass a major intelligence reform bill. The 9/11\nCommission report provided a unique opportunity for Congress to act. If\nwe had allowed this moment to pass and we had not succeeded in enacting\nthe Commission's reforms, it is unlikely that we would ever achieve\neffective intelligence reform, leaving us right where we started--with\na fragmented counterterrorism infrastructure struggling to keep up with\nthe terrorist threats of tomorrow.\n The legislation before us creates a Director of National Intelligence\nwho will have broad authority over the many elements of our\nintelligence community. While many of us were confident that the Senate\nbill did not jeopardize the chain of command, language was added to\nensure that the military would have access to the intelligence it\nneeds.\n In addition to creating a National Counterterrorism Center to\ncoordinate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, the bill\nincludes important provisions strengthening FBI intelligence\ncapabilities, transportation security, border protection, and\ndiplomatic and military efforts in the war on terrorism. We cannot rely\non intelligence alone to prevent the catastrophic terrorist attacks of\nthe future. We must remain vigilant in all these areas.\n Finally, I want to applaud the diligence of our colleagues and the\nmembers of the 9/11 Commission who pressed on when it seemed that this\nbill was doomed to die. While I have no illusions that this bill will\nsuddenly make us invincible, it is critical that we begin the difficult\nprocess of realigning the way our government anticipates and responds\nto terrorism. That is why I intend to support this bipartisan\nlegislation.\n Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to support the Intelligence\nReform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. I first must recognize and\ncongratulate the extraordinary hard work and leadership of Senator\nCollins and Senator Lieberman and their respective staffs. It is only\nbecause of their determination and tireless efforts that we are able to\nconsider this legislation today. I would also thank and recognize\nRepresentatives Hoekstra and Harman and their staffs for their hard\nwork. On balance, this legislation is an important step in improving\nour national security.\n This legislation establishes a Director of National Intelligence with\ngreater budget authority than the current Director of Central\nIntelligence to provide leadership and direction to the 15 agencies of\nthe Intelligence Community.\n It also establishes a National Counterterrorism Center to conduct\nanalysis of terrorism-related intelligence and conduct strategic\nplanning for the War on Terror.\n To ensure that the civil liberties of Americans are protected during\nthis time of justifiably increased government powers, the legislation\nalso establishes a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board within\nthe Executive Office of the President.\n All of these provisions were key recommendations of the 9/11\nCommission, and I am pleased that they are included in this\nlegislation.\n I am also pleased that the legislation we are considering includes\nthree provisions that I have sponsored.\n The bill reforms the broken process of granting security clearances.\nThe extended length of time it has taken to conduct and subsequently\nadjudicate a security clearance prevents qualified Federal employees\nand their private sector partners from doing important work to enhance\nour national security. In addition, a lack of reciprocity among\nagencies for already granted clearances delays and mobility of Federal\nemployees within the government and places an unnecessary\nadministrative burden on agencies as they duplicate the clearance\nprocess.\n The reforms in this legislation are an important step in expediting\nthe process, while preserving national security interests. The\nPresident designates a single entity to oversee the security clearance\nprocess and develop uniform standards and policies for access to\nclassified information. The President also designates a single entity\nto conduct clearance investigations. Additional investigative agencies\ncould be designated if appropriate for national security and efficiency\npurpose. Reciprocity among clearances at the same level is required.\n The bill also includes a provision I added in Committee to improve\nthe intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.\nSpecifically, the FBI Director may work with the Office of Personnel\nManagement to develop new classification standards and pay rates for\nintelligence analysts. This will facilitate the development of a robust\nnational security workforce at the FBI and falls squarely within the\nspirit of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. It is my sincere hope\nthat the FBI will utilize these flexibilitie4s to build an elite cadre\nof intelligence analysts that will help win the War on Terror.\n Finally, this legislation attempts to reform the Presidential\nappointments process, which has been broken for decades. An amendment I\noffered on the Senate floor would require the Office of Government\nEthics to submit a report to Congress evaluating the financial\ndisclosure process for executive branch employees within 90 days of the\ndate of enactment. It would require the Office of Personnel Management\nto submit a list of presidentially appointed positions to each major\nparty candidate after his or her nomination. It would require the\nOffice of Government Ethics, in consultation with the Attorney General,\nto report to Congress on the conflict of interest laws relating to\nFederal employment. The provision would also require each agency to\nsubmit a plan to the President and Congress that includes\nrecommendations on reducing the number of positions requiring Senate\nconfirmation. I hope that we are able to take definitive action to\nreform the appointments process in the 109th Congress and finally\nreform a process that has been examined by no less than 15 commissions,\nincluding the 9/11 panel.\n\n I would like to offer an observation regarding the Office and\nDirector of National Intelligence which this bill establishes. The\ndirector only will be successful if an individual is chosen who can\ndevelop a strong working relationship with the President. In other\nwords, the DNI can be successful with the powers provided by Congress\nif this individual has the confidence and trust of the President. If\nnot, then no amount of authority granted to that individual by Congress\nwill make a difference.\n Similarly, the Office of the Director will have to be staffed by the\nbest and brightest minds in the Intelligence Community if it is going\nto be successful in managing and improving U.S. intelligence efforts. I\nhope that our Intelligence Community agencies will work closely with\nthe DNI, his staff, and the new intelligence centers to ensure their\neffectiveness and enhance the security of the United States.\n The passage of this legislation also places a new burden on Congress.\nEvery Member of the Senate, but especially the members of the Senate\nSelect Committee on Intelligence, will need to be involved in ensuring\nthat this legislation is implemented effectively. Robust congressional\noversight of intelligence is vital, and we here in this chamber are not\noff the hook just because we have passed this bill.\n Finally, I want to inform my colleagues that while we have\ndemonstrated our willingness to reform the\n\n[[Page S11981]]\n\nstructures and processes of the executive branch to better protect our\nNation, we have been less willing to reform our own structures and\nprocedures. The 9/11 Commission recognized that changing congressional\ncommittee jurisdiction is exceptionally difficult but also noted\nreforms of the executive branch ``will not work if congressional\noversight does not change too.'' They recommended that the Senate and\nHouse each establish a single authorizing committee for the Department\nof Homeland Security.\n I remain deeply disappointed that the Senate did not do this in\nOctober. Rather, Senate Resolution 445 maintains authorizing\njurisdiction over significant elements of DHS with at least three\ndifferent committees. The inappropriately renamed Committee on Homeland\nSecurity and Governmental Affairs will have jurisdiction over less than\n10 percent of the DHS workforce and less than 40 percent of its budget.\nLet me repeat that. We didn't even give the proposed Homeland Security\nCommittee the jurisdiction over either the majority of the budget or\nthe personnel of the department.\n It is disappointing that the Senate was unable to put aside turf\nconsiderations and adopt meaningful reform of its committee structure.\nShame on us for not doing better. I intend to raise this issue again\nwhen Congress reconvenes in January and hope that my colleagues will\njoin me in that effort.\n Once again, I would like to thank Senators Collins and Lieberman and\ntheir staff for all their hard work on this legislation. I hope they\nare proud of their efforts.\n I yield the floor.\n Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise to support the conference report to\naccompany the intelligence reform legislation before us today.\n First and foremost, I want to recognize and thank my colleague, the\nSenator from Maine and chair of the Governmental Affairs Committee, Ms.\nCollins, for her exceptional and tireless work throughout the past\nseveral months to produce this comprehensive to reform to our nation's\nintelligence community. I applaud her for undertaking this historic\neffort and for guiding this legislation through her committee and\nthrough the conference with the House of Representatives on a\nbipartisan basis.\n As well, I want to express my appreciation to the ranking member,\nSenator Lieberman, for his efforts in bringing us to this day. It truly\nwas an enormous undertaking that was assigned to the Governmental\nAffairs Committee, and I want to thank them for all they have done on\nthis intelligence reform legislation.\n Intelligence community reform is not a new issue. Since the First\nHoover Commission in 1949, studies have been conducted, commissions\nhave been established, and reports have been issued on how best to\nstructure and reform our Intelligence Community.\n Despite over 50 years of debate on the issue, it was the morning of\nSeptember 11, 2001, and all that followed thereafter that provided the\nmajor impetus to get us where we are today, on the floor of the U.S.\nSenate passing legislation to finally address what has eluded so many\nfor so long.\n To say that September 11 is a seminal moment for our nation is an\nunderstatement. That day forever changed the way we view the world. It\nwas that day, more than any one before, that proved that we have\nentered a new era where our nation faces very different, more pervasive\nand inimical threats.\n It was a day, more than any before, which proved that intelligence is\nnow and must always be our best, first line of defense against a\ncommitted enemy who knows no borders, wears no uniform and pledges\nallegiance only to causes and not states.\n It was a day that has proven that the intelligence community's old\nstructure and old ways of doing business are insufficient for\nconfronting the challenges of the twenty-first century.\n As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, my\nposition on intelligence community reform has been steady and\nconsistent--I was an early supporter of comprehensive reform and came\nto believe that a new Director of National Intelligence was vital in\norder to address the deficiencies and failures that became evident to\nus as a Congress and as a nation. The work of the Senate Select\nCommittee on Intelligence over the past 2 years in undertaking a\nthorough review of the pre-war intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass\ndestruction programs, the regime's ties to terrorism, Saddam Hussein's\nhuman rights abuses and his regime's impact on regional stability\nallowed me to delve into those failures and ask pointed questions about\nthe methods and organization of the community.\n After the in-depth analysis of 30,000 pages of intelligence\nassessments and source reporting, and the interview of more than 200\nindividuals, the committee produced a report in July, 2004 that\nindisputably begged for intelligence community reform.\n I joined several of my colleagues, most notably, Senator Feinstein,\non legislation overhauling the community and championing the idea of\nestablishing a position, to be filled by single person, independent\nfrom the day to day responsibilities of running a single intelligence\nagency, and whose sole responsibility is to lead and manage the\nintelligence community. The Feinstein legislation, I believe, was a\ncatalyst from which to begin this reform and I am proud to have been\nassociated with it. Senator Feinstein's early and steadfast work on\nthis issue was crucial and I commend her for her dedication and vision.\n The conference report we have before us today is not perfect. It is\nnot, in my mind, an ideal solution. There are holes--some glaring--that\nI believe should be filled. But the fact that we are on the precipice\nof passing such a landmark package is indeed impressive. This bill is a\nproduct of compromise and again, I want to thank my Senate colleagues,\nled by Senators Collins and Lieberman, who served on the conference\ncommittee that produced this bill.\n Mr. President, issues of accountability have often been central to\nthe work we as Senators do in seeking to bring better government to our\nconstituents--particularly when matters of national security are at\nstake.\n In that vein, Mr. President, before the release of the 9/11\nCommission report earlier this year, I introduced stand-alone\nlegislation--cosponsored by Senator Mikulski creating an Inspector\nGeneral for Intelligence. The ``Intelligence Community Accountability\nAct of 2004'' proposed an independent inspector general for the entire\nintelligence community--all fifteen agencies and department members. I\nintroduced this legislation largely as a result of my experience as a\nmember of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the revelations of the\ninvestigation on the pre-war intelligence of Iraq.\n The version of the reform bill adopted by the Senate in October\nembraced the concept and spirit of my earlier bill and included\nlanguage creating an Inspector General for the Director of National\nIntelligence.\n I was disappointed to learn that much of the language included in the\nSenate-passed version of the bill was not ultimately included in the\nfinal package before us today. The conference agreement gives the DNI\nthe authority to establish an IG according to the guidelines set forth\nin the Inspector General Act of 1978. Unfortunately, the conference\nagreement does not mandate that he establish an IG.\n I want to make clear my intentions to continue working for better and\nmore comprehensive accountability in our intelligence community. It is\nmy view that the scaling back of the Inspector General provision in\nthis bill flies in the face of the 521 page report that followed the\nIntelligence Committee's investigation on Iraq pre-war intelligence and\nignores vital problems of information sharing that have been found\nthroughout the community.\n My strong preference would be to codify and explicitly define\nexpanded authorities for the DNI's inspector general rather than simply\ngive the DNI the authority to create an IG on his/her own. While I am\npleased that the conference agreement does retain DNI inspector general\nlanguage in spirit, I am dismayed that it is not stronger.\n I firmly believe that a community-wide IG should have the authorities\nto delve into the coordination and communication between and among the\nvarious entities of the intelligence community.\n An inspector general will help to enhance the authorities of the\nNational\n\n[[Page S11982]]\n\nIntelligence Director that we will shortly create, assisting this\nperson in instituting better management accountability, and helping\nhim/her to resolve problems within the intelligence community\nsystematically.\n Ideally, the inspector general for intelligence should have the\nability to investigate current issues within the intelligence\ncommunity, not just conduct ``lessons learned'' studies. The IG should\nhave the abilities to seek to identify problem areas and identify the\nmost efficient and effective business practices required to ensure that\ncritical deficiencies can be addressed before it is too late, before we\nhave another intelligence failure, before lives are lost.\n In short, an inspector general for intelligence that can look across\nthe entire intelligence community will help improve management,\ncoordination, cooperation and information sharing among the\nintelligence agencies. A strong, effective IG will help break down the\nbarriers that have perpetuated the parochial, stove-pipe approaches to\nintelligence community management and operations.\n Too many incidents of failure to prevent attacks, failure to properly\ncollect the needed intelligence, failure to adequately analyze that\nintelligence and failure to share information within the community beg\nfor better accountability in the entirety of the community. Who better\nto do this than a single IG, who can reach across the community, work\nwith the existing individual agency IG's, and confront any problem with\na macro, overarching view? This remains an issue on which I look\nforward to further working with my colleagues in the very near future.\n As I stated earlier, members of the Senate Select Committee on\nIntelligence have spent a great deal of the past year looking at the\nintelligence available to national policymakers in the run-up to\nmilitary action in Iraq. One of the major conclusions we drew was that\nthe intelligence community suffered from a collective presumption that\nIraq had an active and growing weapons of mass destruction program and\nthat this ``group think'' dynamic led intelligence community analysts,\ncollectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as\nconclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize\nevidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding weapons of mass\ndestruction programs.\n From our review, we know the intelligence community relied on sources\nthat supported its predetermined ideas, and we also know that there was\nno alternative analysis or ``red teaming'' performed on such a critical\nissue, allowing assessments to go unchallenged. This loss of\nobjectivity or unbiased approach to intelligence collection and\nanalysis led to erroneous assumptions about Iraq's WMD program.\n\n For this reason, I believed that was vital that we use this\nopportunity to reform the intelligence community to ensure that the new\nNational Intelligence Director was given the tools and the authority to\nensure that alternative analysis becomes a key component in the\ndevelopment of national intelligence products. To that end, I offered\namendment during the Senate debate that called on the Director of\nNational Intelligence to establish, as he sees fit, alternative\nanalysis units within our analysis agencies.\n I am pleased the conferees elected to retain provisions within the\nbill that require the Director of National Intelligence to establish a\nprocess for ensuring that elements of the intelligence community\nconduct alternative analysis of their intelligence products. National\npolicy makers must be confident that the underlying assumptions and\njudgements of any analysis have been tested and found valid before\nmaking decisions that affect our national security.\n Another key failure the committee uncovered was in the production of\na comprehensive and coordinated intelligence community assessment of\nIraq's WMD programs. In fact, a National Intelligence Estimate on\nIraq's weapons of mass destruction programs was not written until\nCongress requested that one be drafted in September 2002, in the midst\nof the debate about taking military action against Iraq.\n We received the NIE just 2 weeks before we voted to authorize the\nPresident to take action in Iraq. The intelligence community should\nhave been more aggressive in identifying Iraq as an issue that\nwarranted the production of a National Intelligence Estimate and should\nhave initiated the production of such an estimate prior to the request\nfrom Congress.\n For this reason, I offered an amendment that would have required the\nexamination of the process by which the NIE's are initiated, developed,\ncoordinated and disseminated to national decision makers. I believe we\nmust develop methods to ensure that NIE's are linked to priorities\noutlined by the President and Director of National Intelligence and not\nsimply developed in an ad hoc fashion.\n It is unacceptable that just weeks before Congress considered the\nweightiest matter that will ever come before us--the decision to commit\nour young men and women to war--the intelligence community only first\nbegan working on an intelligence estimate on what they would face. We\nmust do better than that. We must have the foresight to know what\nthreats face us in the future and the ability to develop and report\naccurate and timely national intelligence estimates.\n I am disappointed that the final bill passed out of conference did\nnot include provisions for streamlining the development of our National\nIntelligence Estimate and I will continue to work toward improving that\nprocess.\n During the year, we in the committee heard testimony that indicated\nthat the effectiveness and interagency coordination within the\nTerrorism Threat Integration Center left much to be desired so I am\nvitally interested in what structures work best for integrating the\nvast intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts\nnecessary to counter the international threat of terrorism. Coupled\nwith the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that a series of such centers\nbe established, I believed it was time that we took the time to\nunderstand what worked well in such centers and what didn't. Therefore\nI amended the Senate bill to require an evaluation of the effectiveness\nof the NCTC at the end of one year. That evaluation would have included\nan assessment of whether the NCTC is accomplishing their mission, the\nstate of interagency relations, problems or issues relating to\npersonnel assignments, funding, and so forth.\n Unfortunately, with this bill, will not have the opportunity to\nunderstand whether the NCTC construct is the best way to approach other\nthreats facing the nation. My concern has been amplified by the merging\nof the TTIC into the NCTC and the establishment of a National Counter\nProliferation Center in this bill. Congress will need to closely\nmonitor the effectiveness of such centers to ensure that they provide\nthe nation with the agility and flexibility we must have to counter the\n21st century threats.\n The legislation before us today addresses another key issue: the\ncontinuing vulnerability of our transportation system. Obviously,\nfailures in transportation security were paramount in the September 11\nattacks. As the 9/11 Commission report states, the 9/11 terrorists were\n``19 for 19'' in penetrating our shortcomings. To be sure, we can never\nsecure our entire transportation system 100 percent. But, given the\nconsequences of a failure to secure the system, that doesn't mean we\nshould not expend 100 percent of our effort in trying.\n First, the conference report implements the central 9/11 Commission\nrecommendation with respect to transportation security by requiring\nthat the Secretary of Homeland Security develop and implement a\nnational, overarching strategy for transportation security. Timely\ndevelopment of this strategy is critical so that we are able to\nunderstand what needs to be done, what we need to do to get there, and\nto fill the gaping holes in our homeland security system as quickly as\npossible.\n This bill also addresses the issue of air cargo security, which in my\nview is currently a gaping hole in our homeland security net--\nparticularly when you consider that half of the hull of each passenger\nflight is typically filled with cargo. As Governor Kean, Chair of the\n9/11 Commission, put it, quite simply, before the Senate Commerce\nCommittee this summer, ``The Transportation Security Administration\nmust improve its efforts to identify and physically screen cargo.''\n\n[[Page S11983]]\n\n The bill before us today would help TSA to do just that by\nincorporating an amendment written by Senator Rockefeller, which I\ncosponsored, authorizing $600 million to enhance security on both all-\ncargo and passenger aircraft. The conference report also requires TSA\nto develop better technologies for air cargo security, authorizes\nfunding for equipment and research and development and to create a\npilot program to evaluate the use of currently available and next\ngeneration blast-resistant containers.\n Overall, with respect to transportation security, I believe that the\ncomprehensive, bipartisan bill before us today will give TSA the tools\nit needs to carry out his critical piece of the homeland security\npuzzle--securing our air transportation system.\n I have addressed some of the issues that were central to my work on\nthis matter and shared many of my concerns with this conference\nagreement package. It is critical, however, that I also express my deep\nsense of satisfaction that we are here today, ready to pass this bill\nand send it to the President's desk.\n We have come a long way this year. And while it is not a perfect\nproduct, this legislation is still one the American people can be proud\nof. As of last week, we were not even sure this accomplishment would be\nattributed to the 108th Congress or if we would begin anew next year\nwith the 109th. This legislation builds on the recommendations of the\n9/11 Commission and also addresses the views of many other studies and\nrelated commissions which focused on protecting the United States.\n Mr. President, on September 7, 2004, I had the opportunity to\nquestion members of the 9/11 Commission during a SSCI hearing and in\nresponse to my question about how much we needed to accomplish in this\nround of reform, former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman reminded us\nthat in the 1947 National Security Act, there were at least three major\nfine-tunings in the subsequent years.\n He told us that the basic framework was passed as one package, but it\nwas recognized there was more needed to be done or refining what was\ndone in the original act. He said that if we could get the framework\npassed, then the flesh can be put on the bones further down the road.\nHe specifically mentioned that some things such as how many of the\nnational intelligence centers we should establish could wait until the\nDNI got his feet on the ground but that our primary focus should be to\nput the framework in place now.\n I agree with Secretary Lehman and that is why I will support passage\nof this bill even while believing we have much work left ahead before\nwe have successfully transformed our intelligence apparatus, in the\nexecutive branch and the legislative branch, into an organization that\nis fully equipped to meet the challenges and threats this Nation will\nface in the future.\n Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I am pleased to have this opportunity to\nvote in support of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention\nAct. Passage of this conference report today is an important step\nforward in defending our country against the new threats that face us.\n While I expect that the overwhelming majority of the Senate will vote\nin favor of the conference report today, it has not been an easy road\nto this point. The Bush administration fought tooth and nail against\ncreating an independent commission to investigate the Government's\nfailings leading to the tragic day of September 11, 2001. And, once the\n9/11 Commission was established, the President's record of cooperation\nwas spotty, at best. But largely because of the brave efforts and\npersistence of those families who lost loved ones on 9/11, these\nobstacles were overcome and the important recommendations made by the\nbipartisan 9/11 Commission will be enacted into law.\n The 9/11 Commission, led by co chairs Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton,\ndid this country a great service by conducting a thorough investigation\nof the events leading up to September 11, 2001. The report issued in\nJuly contained more than 40 important recommendations that will make us\na stronger nation as we work to confront the dangers of global\nterrorism. Through the hard work of Senator Collins, Senator Lieberman\nand others, these recommendations were incorporated into bipartisan\nlegislation that easily passed the Senate. And although the House of\nRepresentatives did not take the same bipartisan approach, the final\nnegotiated conference report is a good bill that will improve our\nability to fight terrorism in several ways.\n First, the bill creates a new Director of National Intelligence to\nserve as the head of all 15 intelligence agencies and control their\nbudgets. This person would be accountable to Congress, the President,\nand the American people in implementing the National Intelligence\nProgram.\n Second, the bill requires the President to create a new information\nsharing environment. The 9/11 Commission found that our ability to\ndefeat terrorism is severely hampered because government agencies are\nresistant to sharing information. This provision will ensure that\ninformation about terrorists is shared not only among Federal agencies,\nbut also between Federal, State and local agencies.\n Third, the bill creates a new National counterterrorism Center to\nplan and coordinate counterterrorism missions and a new National\nCounterproliferation Center to improve the Government's ability to halt\nthe proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\n Fourth, the bill increases the number of border guards and\nimmigration agents while also improving surveillance capabilities along\nthe southwest border.\n Finally, the bill improves security for our aviation system,\nincluding additional funds for Federal air marshals. And while I am\npleased that conferees took note of my concern about protecting the\nanonymity of Federal air marshals, I do not believe the final provision\nis strong enough.\n Clearly, this bill cannot be the last piece of legislation we pass to\nmake us safer. There is much more work to be done to protect our ports,\nour nuclear and chemical plants, and the flying public. Our first\nresponders need far more attention so they have the interoperable\ncommunications systems they need, and an adequate number of personnel\nto protect our streets at all times and for whatever reason. I also\nbelieve that we are moving far too slowly on developing countermeasures\nto protect commercial aircraft against the threat of shoulder fired\nmissiles. I will press hard for action on all of these issues so that\nwe do not simply return to business as usual.\n America will never forget the tragedy that took place on September\n11, 2001. We are a changed Nation because of it. The families of those\nwho lost their lives that day have done tremendous work in fighting for\nthis bill. That is why I am pleased we are passing this bill today. The\nFederal Government must do everything it can to prevent another attack\nand today's vote is a step in the right direction.\n Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, with a recognition that this bill is\nimperfect, and with the firm conviction that this effort is only one\nstep in a much broader effort needed to get this country on the right\ntrack to effectively defeat the terrorist forces that have attacked\nthis country, I will vote in favor of the intelligence reform\nconference report today.\n I have tremendous respect for the 9/11 Commission that made the\nrecommendations at the heart of this legislation. Their report was not\ncharacterized by an ill-considered rush to simply act, but rather an\nimperative to act wisely. It was not colored by partisan biases, or\ntainted by self deluding rosy scenarios about where we stand as a\ncountry. I may not agree with every word in the 9/11 Commission's\nreport, but I strongly agree with the vast majority of it, and I\nbelieve that the Commission performed a tremendous service for the\nAmerican people.\n Among the most detailed and thoughtful recommendations of the\nCommission were those focused on the urgent need for reform of\nAmerica's intelligence community. By stressing unified effort, and most\nimportantly, accountability, the Commission pointed the way toward the\nreforms contained in this bill.\n This bill puts someone in charge of America's intelligence\ncommunity--someone to be appointed by the President and confirmed by\nthe elected representatives of the American people in\n\n[[Page S11984]]\n\nthe Congress. The Director of National Intelligence will be in charge\nnot simply via title and not only because we reorganized boxes on an\norganizational chart. This legislation provides real authorities to the\nDNI in terms of allocating resources, establishing tasking priorities,\nand ensuring information-sharing to unify our efforts. It is up to the\nDirector to use the powers granted in this bill to make this community\nfunction--to make sure that the right people have the right resources\nand the right priorities, and that they share crucial information with\ntheir colleagues.\n And I will add that it is up to the President of the United States\nand this Congress to ensure that the lines of authority and the clear\naccountability laid out in the language of this legislation come alive.\nWe must insist on real accountability; we must accept nothing less.\n The conference report also establishes, in law, the mandate for the\nNational Counterterrorism Center to bring an integrated effort to that\nurgent priority. If we are ever to connect the disparate dots that can\nshed light on the methods, the plans, and the vulnerabilities of fluid,\nflexible terrorist networks that operate in the shadows, we must\nintegrate our own efforts, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental\norganizing principle.\n However, I am troubled by some provisions that were added in\nconference that have nothing to do with reforming our intelligence\nnetwork. The bill includes in section 6001 what has come to be known as\nthe ``lone wolf'' provision. The lone wolf provision eliminates the\nrequirement in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, that\nsurveillance or searches be carried out only against persons suspected\nof being agents of foreign powers or terrorist organizations. I am very\nconcerned about the implications of this provision for civil liberties\nin this country.\n It is important to remember that FISA itself is an exception to\ntraditional constitutional restraints on criminal investigations,\nallowing the government to gather foreign intelligence information\nthrough wiretaps and searches without having probable cause that a\ncrime has been or is going to be committed. The courts have permitted\nthe government to proceed with surveillance in this country under\nFISA's lesser standard of suspicion because the power is limited to\ninvestigations of foreign powers and their agents. This bill therefore\nwrites out of the statute a key requirement necessary to the lawfulness\nof intrusive surveillance powers that may very well otherwise be\nunconstitutional.\n By allowing searches or wiretaps under FISA of persons merely\nsuspected of engaging in or preparing to engage in terrorism, the bill\nessentially eliminates the protections of the Fourth Amendment. I voted\nagainst the lone wolf bill when it passed the Senate early in this\nCongress. I believe there are better and more constitutional ways to\ndeal with a situation where evidence of a connection to a foreign\ngovernment or terrorist organization is not easily obtained.\n Even if section 6001 survives constitutional challenge, it would mean\nthat non-U.S. persons could have electronic surveillance and searches\nauthorized against them using the lesser standards of FISA even though\nthere is no conceivable foreign intelligence aspect to their case. This\nprovision may very well result in a dramatic increase in the use of\nFISA warrants in situations that do not justify such extraordinary\ngovernment power.\n When the lone wolf provision was considered in the Senate as a stand\nalone bill last year, I supported an amendment by Senator Feinstein\nthat we thought was a reasonable alternative way to make sure that FISA\ncan be used against a lone wolf terrorist, without eliminating the\nimportant agent of a foreign power requirement. The amendment would\nhave created a permissive presumption that if there is probable cause\nto believe that a non-U.S. person is engaged in or preparing to engage\nin international terrorism, the individual can be considered to be an\nagent of a foreign power even if the evidence of a connection to a\nforeign power is not clear. The use of a permissive presumption rather\nthan eliminating the foreign power requirement would have maintained\njudicial oversight and review on a case by case basis on the question\nof whether the target of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign\npower. The permissive presumption would permit the FISA judge to\ndecide, in a given case, if the government has gone too far in\nrequesting a FISA warrant.\n\n Senator Feinstein's formulation would have put some limit on the\ngovernment's ability to use this new power to dramatically extend\nFISA's reach. If the government comes to the conclusion that an\nindividual is truly acting on his or her own, then our criminal laws\nconcerning when electronic surveillance and searches can be used are\nmore than sufficient. True lone wolf terrorists can and should be\ninvestigated and prosecuted in our criminal justice system. Section\n6001 allows the government to use FISA to obtain a warrant for\nsurveillance even if it knows that the subject has no connection\nwhatsoever with a foreign power or a terrorist organization. That is\nnot right.\n I am also very concerned about the material support, section 6601 et\nseq., and pre-trial detention, section 6952, provisions contained in\nthe conference report. Neither of these provisions was considered by\nthe Senate, or even by the Senate Judiciary Committee. While it appears\nthat the material support provision adopted by the conference is not as\nbroad as the provision contained in the House bill, its full\nimplications cannot possibly be analyzed in the brief time we have to\nconsider this bill.\n The material support provision amends and expands the current crime\nof providing material support to terrorists or terrorist organizations.\nOne federal court, of course, has ruled that a provision of the current\nstatute is unconstitutional because it criminalizes First Amendment\nprotected activities. In January, a federal judge in California ruled\nthat a provision added by the PATRIOT Act criminalizing the provision\nof ``expert advice or assistance'' to a terrorist organization was\nvague and therefore unconstitutional. The judge found that the term\n``expert advice or assistance'' could be interpreted to include\nunequivocally pure speech and advocacy protected by the First\nAmendment. The judge found that the PATRIOT Act bans all expert advice\nand assistance, including providing peacemaking or conflict resolution\nadvice, and places no limitation on the type of expert advice and\nassistance that is banned.\n The conference report attempts to cure this constitutional defect in\nthe law. It states that the law criminalizing providing material\nsupport to a foreign terrorist organization shall not be construed to\nabridge rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. The conference report\nalso allows an exception for providing personnel, training, or expert\nadvice or assistance that is approved by the Secretary of State and the\nAttorney General. But I am not convinced that these provisions cure the\nconstitutional flaws. And expanding this provision is therefore the\nwrong way to go.\n Furthermore, as I noted earlier, the material support provision in\nthe conference report has not been debated and analyzed in the Senate\nJudiciary Committee or even on the floor of the Senate when this bill\nwas considered before the election. The 9/11 Commission strongly\nrecommended that when determining whether to expand Federal law\nenforcement power, the burden is on the executive branch to show how\nits proposals would materially enhance security and what steps it will\ntake to ensure the protection of civil liberties. The executive branch\nhas not even started to meet that test here. We don't know how this new\nprovision will work, and what problems might arise because of it. We\nhaven't had the opportunity to consult with experts and consider\namendments in the normal legislative process. Congress and the American\npeople deserve a full debate on this issue. Inserting this provision in\nthe conference report without that debate was a mistake.\n Similarly, the pretrial detention provision was not recommended by\nthe 9/11 Commission, and the administration has never shown how current\nlaw is inadequate. Furthermore, like the material support provision,\nthis provision did not receive adequate consideration by the Senate. At\nthe only hearing where this issue was raised this year, the Department\nof Justice could not give a single example where current\n\n[[Page S11985]]\n\nlaw failed and this expanded presumption of pretrial detention was\nneeded. Current law, which allows for bail to be denied if a defendant\nis a flight risk or a danger to the community, is fully adequate to\ncover the kinds of terrorism cases where bail should not be granted.\nReasonable bail is a constitutional right. I am very troubled by the\nexpansion of the presumption that bail will be denied.\n Unfortunately, this Justice Department has a record of abusing its\ndetention powers post-9/11 and of making terrorism allegations that\nturn out to have no merit. It is worth noting that the crime of\nmaterial support of terrorism, which has been expanded in this bill, is\none of the crimes where a suspect is presumptively denied bail. In sum,\nas with the material support provision, the administration has not met\nits burden of showing how the expanded pretrial detention provision is\nnecessary and would not impair constitutional rights and protections.\nIt has no place in this bill.\n This bill is not perfect. Over time, as the new structure begins to\noperate, we may find that additional changes are needed. But the\nconference report takes critically important steps in the right\ndirection. I commend Senators Collins and Lieberman for working\ntirelessly to ensure that this legislation becomes law this year.\n Mr. REID. Mr. President, the United States of America today is the\ngreatest military force in history. Our men and women in uniform are\nsecond to none. Nobody disputes our military superiority. And yet,\nmilitary might alone will not win the war on terror.\n Military might alone will not win because our enemies will never meet\nus face to face. Instead, they will try to hit us when we aren't\nlooking. That is why good, solid intelligence is one of our most\nimportant weapons in the war on terror.\n Our enemies caught us off guard on September 11, 2001. And even as we\nvowed that it must never happen again, we realized that we needed to\nmake some fundamental changes in our intelligence agencies. The\ncreation of the\n9/11 Commission was a major step toward needed change. There was\ninitially some political opposition to this Commission, but mainly\nbecause of the unrelenting support of the families of\n9/11 victims, we created the Commission.\n One of these family members is Denise Keasler of Las Vegas, who lost\nher daughter, Karol Keasler, in the twin towers. Karol worked on the\n89th floor of the World Trade Center. After the first plane hit the\nnorth tower, she called her mother to tell her that she was OK. Then\nthe line went dead.\n Like many of the people who lost loved ones that day, Denise has\ndedicated herself to reforming our intelligence system. And was because\nof the dedication of people like her that the\n9/11 Commission was created. Once the Commission was in place, its\nmembers rose above partisan politics. They unanimously passed a report\nthat contained comprehensive recommendations to make our intelligence\nbetter and our country safer. The Senate responded to the Commission's\nwork and on October 6 overwhelmingly passed a reform bill that enjoyed\nthe support of the commission and the families.\n This conference report also enjoys the strong support of the 9/11\nCommission, and the families who lost loved ones. Most important of\nall, it enjoys the strong support of the American people. This bill\ncreates a strong National Intelligence Director and a Counterterrorism\nCenter, as well as an independent board to protect our civil liberties.\n These reforms will make it harder for information to slip through the\ncracks of our intelligence system. They will make it easier for our\nintelligence officials to connect the dots and see the kind of warnings\nthat could have prevented the tragic events of 9/11. They will make it\neasier to coordinate the efforts of the 15 different agencies that are\nresponsible for providing the good intelligence we must have to win the\nwar on terror.\n Along with the Congressional reforms we achieved in October, we have\nimproved our intelligence operations and followed the key\nrecommendations of the 9/11 Commission.\n I appreciate the hard work of the Commission and its co-chairs Tom\nKean and Lee Hamilton, who endorsed this conference report. I\nappreciate the House leadership for allowing a vote on this bill,\ndespite opposition from many members of the majority parry. And of\ncourse our Nation owes a debt of gratitude to Denise Keasler and all\nthe other Americans who lost loved ones on 9/11, and who fought\ntirelessly for these reforms.\n Denise said today that she is so glad this bill is passing, because\nshe doesn't want a single other American to endure the kind f pain that\nshe has suffered since her daughter was killed on 9/11. That is the\ngoal we all share. This bill will move us closer to making our country\nsafer.\n Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I today offer my support for the\nconference report on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention\nAct of 2004. Simply put, this legislation represents the first, and\nmost critical, step towards bringing our national security structure\ninto the 21st Century.\n I begin by offering my thanks, and praise, to Senators Susan Collins\nand Joe Lieberman. This bill would never have been done without their\nextraordinary work. Their effort combined intellectual distinction and\nadherence to the best traditions of the United States Senate. They were\nable to construct good, solid law and then build a consensus that\ncrossed party lines in the midst of an intensely political season.\n When we speak of how the Senate should work--with a spirit of\ncollegiality and mutual respect--we are talking about Senators Collins\nand Lieberman, and what they did here to make America safer.\n This legislation is particularly important to me, for I have been\nworking to bring about the essential reform contained in this law--the\ncreation of Director of National Intelligence to effectively lead the\nintelligence community--for a long time.\n This work began in 2002, when I introduced the Intelligence Community\nLeadership Act, which would have created a Director of National\nIntelligence with authority over budget, personnel, and strategy,\nsimilar to what is in the bill before the Senate today.\n First, the Senate and House Intelligence Committees joined together\nto create the ``Joint Inquiry into the attacks of September 11th,\n2001.'' That inquiry carefully examined the intelligence-related\nbackground of the attacks.\n The resulting report had, as its very first recommendation, the\ncreation of a Director of National Intelligence. This recommendation\nwas unanimously adopted by both the Senate and House Intelligence\nCommittees.\n The following year, the Senate Intelligence Committee examined the\nintelligence relating to the assertions that Iraq possessed weapons of\nmass destruction.\n As we all know, no such weapons were found, despite prewar\nintelligence which unambiguously stated that Saddam Hussein both\npossessed and intended to use such weapons.\n The findings of that report illustrated what the Joint Inquiry had\nfound the year before: The failures were in part due to flaws in the\nintelligence community, most notably the lack of an effective\nleadership structure.\n Even as the Senate Intelligence Committee was completing its work, so\ntoo was the 9/11 Commission.\n Again, their findings were clear. The Commission found that America's\nintelligence community needed structural reforms, most important of\nwhich was the creation of a single head of the intelligence community,\nwith adequate budget, personnel, and statutory authority. Further, that\nperson could not simultaneously serve as Director of the Central\nIntelligence Agency.\n In the beginning of this Congress, I reintroduced the original 2002\nlegislation, and soon I was not alone. Senators Snowe, Lott, Wyden, and\nMikulski joined my effort, along with Senators Rockefeller and Graham,\nthe current and former Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee.\n In August of 2004, I wrote with Senators Snowe, Graham, Mikulski and\nWyden to the President asking for his ``support and assistance in\nmoving forward with legislation to make needed changes to the structure\nof our nation's intelligence community.'' I ask unanimous consent that\nthis letter be printed in the Record immediately following this\nstatement.\n\n[[Page S11986]]\n\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n (See exhibit 1.)\n Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Soon thereafter, Senators Collins and Lieberman were\ngiven the monumental task of moving forward with the project of\nintelligence reform. They were certainly the right choice. I provided\nmy legislation to them, and I am pleased that much of it was included\nin their finished product, which in turn forms the basis for the\nconference report we are considering today.\n Let me now turn to the substance of the law we are about to vote\nupon, noting that this legislation is just a first step towards reform.\nIt is a top-level structural change that is designed to lay the\ngroundwork for the deep cultural, bureaucratic and operational changes\nwhich are needed throughout the intelligence community. The DNI will\nhave a big job to do, and this legislation is just the beginning.\n As I have noted, the way our intelligence community is structured is\nfundamentally flawed. It is unsuited for the 21st century. The old days\nof the Soviet Union and Communism are over, replaced by a world of\nasymmetric threats, rogue states, and shifting terror organizations.\n The most important of these structural failings is related to what\nunder current law is called the office of the Director of Central\nIntelligence, known as the DCI. That title involves two separate, and I\nbelieve incompatible, jobs--head of the intelligence community and head\nof the Central Intelligence Agency.\n Thus, there is only a nominal head of the intelligence community, who\ncannot be effective. This is because of two problems built into its\nstructure.\n The first problem is that the DCI has two basic, incompatible jobs:\nLeader of the intelligence community, which includes 15 agencies and\ndepartments, and in that role is the principal intelligence adviser to\nthe President; and leader of the Central Intelligence Agency, which is\nonly one of the 15 agencies which make up that big, and sometimes\nfractured, community.\n These two jobs cannot effectively be held by one person. Each is a\nfull time job. They require full and undivided attention.\n Perhaps worse, they can be in direct conflict, because what is good\nfor the intelligence community in terms of mission, resources, and\nstrategy, may not be good for the ``troops'' at the Central\nIntelligence Agency.\n Secondly, under the current structure, the DCI lacks basic tools\nneeded to run any large government department--budget, personnel, and\nstatutory authority.\n Today, the DCI nominally administers the nuts and bolts functioning\nof the intelligence community, money and people. I say ``nominally''\nbecause the DCI does not really control all that much of that money, or\nthe people who use that money to run operations, conduct analysis, and\nbuild spy systems.\n The solution to this problem is to ensure that the position of\nintelligence community director is provided real budget authority, real\npersonnel authority, and real authority to set strategy and policy, and\nthis bill does that.\n This conference report includes compromises that slightly diminish\nthese authorities as they were originally conceived in the Senate bill\nwhich overwhelmingly passed in September.\n I would have preferred that the DNI have more authority, but I\nunderstand and respect the concerns raised by some, including my friend\nand colleague Senator Warner of the Armed Services Committee, that we\ncould unintentionally harm the uniformed military.\n The result is a compromise, and I think we can and should live with\nthat compromise.\n The structure that is set out in the conference report closely tracks\nwhat originally was contained in the 2002 Intelligence Community\nLeadership Act: It creates a Director of National Intelligence,\nseparate from the CIA Director; The DNI is given adequate budget,\npersonnel and strategic planning authority; The DNI can set priorities\nfor intelligence collection and analysis, and manage tasking across all\n15 agencies.\n It also contains some ideas advanced by the 9/11 Commission which I\nbelieve are important. Most important of these is the creation of a\nNational Counterterrorism Center, which will serve under the DNI when\nengaged in intelligence-related matters. It also includes the creation\nof a Directorate of Intelligence within the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation.\n What is the bottom line? It is that, with the passage of this bill,\nwe will have taken a critical concrete step towards equipping our\nNation to defend against the enemy of the 21st century--terrorists,\nrogue states and others who would do us harm.\n We recognize that what worked in 1947 does not necessarily work\ntoday. We create a new intelligence community, and a new leader of that\ncommunity, with stature and authority to do the job.\n I thank my colleagues in this and the other body who worked so hard\nto bring us to where we are today, prepared to pass a truly historic\nlaw which will make everyone safer in an unsafe world.\n\n Exhibit 1\n\n U.S. Senate,\n\n Washington, DC, August 3, 2004.\n Hon. George W. Bush,\n The White House,\n Washington, DC.\n Dear Mr. President: We write to seek your support and\n assistance in moving forward with legislation to make needed\n changes to the structure of our Nation's Intelligence\n Community. We are co-sponsors of the ``Intelligence Community\n Leadership Act of 2003,'' which was first introduced on\n January 16, 2003, legislation which we believe is a valuable\n starting point for this effort.\n That legislation closely matches the recommendations\n recently made by the 9-11 commission, most importantly by\n ``splitting'' the two jobs held by one person into two: a\n ``Director of National Intelligence'' to lead the\n Intelligence Community, and a ``Director of the Central\n Intelligence Agency'' to provide leadership for the CIA.\n You announced yesterday your support for the creation of a\n Director of National Intelligence to oversee our nation's\n intelligence agencies. In addition to this fundamental\n structural change, we agree with many of the Commissioners'\n most important recommendations concerning additional\n intelligence reform. We look forward to working with you in\n implementing these important reforms.\n We would welcome the opportunity to discuss the legislation\n with you, and look forward to working together to address\n these critical issues.\n Sincerely yours,\n Dianne Feinstein,\n Olympia J. Snowe,\n Bob Graham,\n Barbara A. Mikulski,\n Ron Wyden,\n United States Senators.\n Enclosures as described.\n Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for\nthe Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This\nlandmark legislation will modernize and unify our intelligence\ncommunity and help ensure the safety of our country.\n I strongly support this vital intelligence reform bill. The 9/11\nCommission worked incredibly hard to identify how to better protect our\ncountry from terrorism and gave us an excellent roadmap to protect our\npeople. We in Washington State are proud of the outstanding work put in\nby Commissioner Slade Gorton. He has again done his State proud in\nservice to our country.\n My colleagues, Senators Collins and Lieberman, deserve a great deal\nof credit for getting us here today. When some thought that real reform\nof our intelligence community was just a dream, too complicated to be\nrealized, it was their dogged determination to craft a good piece of\nlegislation that carried us through. And when others threw roadblocks\nin their path, it was their patience and perseverance that allowed us\nto come together and put the safety and security of our nation before\npolitics.\n I especially commend the September 11 families who bravely stood up\nand spoke out in favor of creating the Commission. They forced our\nGovernment to fully examine the terrorist attacks and to find ways to\nmake our people safer. Their brave advocacy has made a difference, and\nthis bill is a fitting tribute to their loved ones.\n As a member of both the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee\nand the Senate's 9/11 Working Group, I have looked closely at these\nchallenges. Over the past few years, I have worked closely with the\nDepartment of Homeland Security, including the Coast Guard, FBI, TSA,\nBorder Patrol, as well as the National Guard and local law enforcement\nthroughout Washington State. Through our work together, I have learned\nfirst hand the difficulties they face every day in defending our\ncountry.\n\n[[Page S11987]]\n\n We need clear direction for our country's intelligence community. The\nCommissioners stressed better coordination between the various\nintelligence agencies, and this bill accomplishes that and so many\nother important goals. I am glad that in the same bipartisan spirit\nthat the 9/11 Commission showed throughout their work, we in Congress\nwere able to work through our differences to pass this most important\nreform bill.\n I fully support the steps this bill in taking in several areas,\nincluding:\n Intelligence--through the creation of a Director of National\nIntelligence, DNI, this bill restructures and strengthens the\nintelligence community. The DNI will have the authority and resources\nto transform the intelligence community into an agile network to fight\nterrorism.\n Information sharing--the 9/11 Commission recommended a new,\nGovernment-wide approach to information sharing. This bill will\nfacilitate information sharing among Federal, State, local, tribal, and\nprivate sector entities.\n Privacy and civil liberties--this bill creates an oversight board\nthat will ensure privacy and civil liberties are appropriately\nconsidered as laws regulations, and policies are implemented to protect\nour country against terrorism. This oversight board will safeguard\nindividual's rights.\n Transportation security--the 9/11 Commission highlighted several\ndeficiencies in transportation security. This bill will improve\npassenger prescreening on airlines and cruise ships and require the TSA\nto develop better technologies for air cargo security.\n Border and immigration enforcement--this bill includes provisions to\nenhance security of our borders and enforce border and immigration\nlaws. It allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out a pilot\nprogram to test advanced technologies that will improve border security\nbetween ports of entry along the northern border of the United States.\nThese technologies would be used for border surveillance and operation\nin remote stretches along the border where resources are stretched\nthin.\n Since the tragedy of September 11, Congress has passed strong\nlegislation to protect the homeland only to see the President fail to\nrequest adequate funding to achieve the homeland security mission. We\ncan not play homeland security roulette forever and expect to\nsuccessfully defeat terrorism. To best protect the American people, we\nmust fund our intelligence and homeland security efforts to swiftly\nimplement these changes.\n Today's action is an important step toward achieving a truly\nintegrated national effort in the global war on terror. This bill makes\nsignificant changes necessary to meet current and future national\nsecurity challenges.\n I am proud to support this historic legislation, and I look forward\nto working with all of my colleagues in the Congress and the\nadministration to provide the critical funding needed to achieve the\nhomeland security mission.\n Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I am pleased today to vote for the\nIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The bill\nrepresents a critical step toward improving our intelligence\ncapabilities. If faithfully implemented, it will allow our intelligence\ncommunity to coordinate its efforts to thwart terrorism and defeat\nterrorists abroad. The establishment of a Director of National\nIntelligence is also necessary if we are to successfully prioritize our\nefforts to fight terrorism, confront threats from nation states,\nstabilize failed states that act as breeding grounds for terrorists,\nand stop the proliferation of nuclear and other dangerous weapons. The\nDirector will also be responsible for ensuring that our policies are\nonce again informed by accurate and objective intelligence.\n Improving our intelligence capabilities is especially important to\nthe people of New Jersey. More than 700 of New Jersey's citizens died\non September 11, 2001. At least two of the 9/11 terrorists lived in New\nJersey, and the anthrax that struck Washington in October 2001\noriginated in New Jersey. Our State is also especially vulnerable to\nterrorist attack. Our transportation infrastructure, chemical plants\nand ports are not adequately secured, and one stretch of road has been\ncalled by the FBI the most dangerous 2 miles in America.\n We would not be passing this bill were it not for the families of 9/\n11 victims. They turned our national tragedy into meaningful reform.\nThey have inspired us, even as they have helped make us safer. This\nbill is also a testament to the incredible work of the 9/11 Commission.\nUnder the steady leadership of former New Jersey Governor Tom Kean and\nformer Representative Lee Hamilton, the bipartisan commission put our\nNation's safety ahead of politics. The Commission brought the country\ntogether in understanding the attacks of 9/11 and the events that\npreceded the attacks. Through its public hearings and transparent\napproach, they also rallied the country behind the hard, but critical\nwork of intelligence reform.\n The bill itself will not, however, make us safer, unless it is fully\nimplemented in letter and spirit. The success of these reforms is also\ndependent on the people tasked with carrying them out. As a new member\nof the Senate Intelligence Committee, I will make sure that the bill is\nimplemented as intended, that our intelligence community has the tools\nand resources to protect us, and that reforming our intelligence does\nnot result in the infringement of our civil liberties. I will also\nensure that our intelligence agencies are led by the best people our\ncountry has to offer.\n Mr. BIDEN. Mr. president, I wish to speak briefly about section 7109\nof the bill, which relates to public diplomacy responsibilities of the\nDepartment of State. I commend the conferees for setting forth the\nimportant statement that public diplomacy must be integral to American\nforeign policy. I don't have any doubt that Secretary Powell\nunderstands that fact, but it is worth codifying this statement in law.\n Section 7109 adds a new section 60 to the State Department Basic\nAuthorities Act of 1956, which, as the name implies, is the main\noperating statute for State Department activities. Subsection (b) of\nsection 60 instructs the Secretary of State to make every effort to\ncoordinate the public diplomacy activities of the Federal Government,\nand to coordinate with the Broadcasting Board of Governors to develop a\nstrategy ``for the use of public diplomacy resources.''\n The Broadcasting Board of Governors, BBG, is an agency that is\nseparate and distinct from the Department of State. It was established\nas a separate agency in 1998 for an important reason: to place a\n``firewall'' between the foreign policy makers and the journalists who\noperate our international broadcast services as a means of protecting\njournalistic integrity. The Board consists of nine members, one of whom\nis the Secretary of State. Of course, the two agencies do cooperate, as\ncurrent law already instructs. The State Department has a voice in the\nBoard's activities through the Secretary's seat on the Board, and the\nDepartment has a statutory mandate under the U.S. International\nBroadcasting Act of 1994 to provide ``information and guidance on\nforeign policy issues to the Board.'' And, by law, the Secretary must\nbe consulted whenever decisions are made about adding or deleting\nlanguage services.\n The requirement for a strategy under section 60 must be read in light\nof this existing law. It does not breach the firewall. Rather, it\nrecognizes the reality that creating a public diplomacy strategy for\nthe Government will involve collaboration between the State Department\nand the BBG. The provision in this legislation does not give the\nSecretary any more authority with regard to the international\nbroadcasting activities of the BBG than he has under current law, nor\ndoes it give the BBG any authority over other public diplomacy\nactivities outside of international broadcasting.\n Subsection (b) of section 7109 amends current law to further\ndelineate the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for\nPublic Diplomacy. Among other things, this subsection tells the Under\nSecretary to assist the Broadcasting Board of Governors to ``present\nthe policies of the United States clearly and effectively,'' and to\n``submit statements of United States policy and editorial material to\nthe [BBG] for broadcast consideration.'' These provisions are\nconsistent with the current practice under which editorial statements\nof U.S. policy are reviewed by\n\n[[Page S11988]]\n\nthe Department of State. The language in the bill that material is to\nbe submitted for ``broadcast consideration'' makes clear that final\nauthority about what is to be broadcast rests with the BBG.\n Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the conference\nreport of the national intelligence reform bill, which is currently\npending before this body. I would like first to commend Senators\nCollins and Lieberman, as well as Representatives Hoekstra and Harman,\nfor their efforts in crafting this legislation.\n Let me be clear from the outset. I support the 9/11 Commission's\nrecommendations, as I think do most of us here in the Senate. The\nCommission was a bipartisan group whose members dutifully dedicated\nwell over a year of their lives to the protection of our Nation. We owe\nthem a great debt of gratitude--not only for the hard work that went\ninto preparing their report, but for their concerted effort since then\nto keep the issue of intelligence reform at the front of the national\nagenda.\n But as we all know, many months have passed since the 9/11 Commission\nissued its report. And our Nation's intelligence system remains broken.\nThat is not because the Senate failed to act. I was pleased in October\nwhen the Senate came together in a bipartisan fashion to pass the\nNational Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which closely followed the\nimportant recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I strongly supported\nthat bill.\n Had the House's version of that bill followed the 9/11 Commission's\nrecommendations as closely as the Senate's version, we would not have\nbeen here today talking about the lingering need to pass intelligence\nreform. Unfortunately, House Republicans included several provisions in\ntheir bill--and insisted on them during conference--that nearly\nderailed the entire effort.\n The 9/11 Commission urged them to drop these provisions. But their\npleas fell on deaf ears.\n President Bush was also slow to react. Although he has professed his\nsupport for intelligence reform, during most of this time, the\nPresident sat on the sidelines as members of his own party nearly\nprevented its implementation.\n Having said that, I am pleased that House-Senate conferees worked out\ntheir differences over this measure. I voted in support of this\nconference agreement a short while ago because reform of our\nintelligence systems is long overdue. It can not be put off any longer.\n In part, this bill achieves some important objectives set out by the\n9/11 Commission. It establishes the position of Director of National\nIntelligence, DNI, the person who, hopefully, will help coordinate the\nflow of intelligence to the President, as well as set budgetary\npriorities for a fair amount of our Nation's intelligence activities.\nAmong other things, this bill will also establish a national\ncounterterrorism center, and direct the Transportation Security\nAdministration to take steps to strengthen our transportation security\nefforts.\n But I also have strong reservations about certain aspects of this\nconference report.\n First, the new Director of National Intelligence, DNI, would not be\ndirectly in charge of day-to-day intelligence-gathering operations.\nIndeed, this bill--whose language, in some crucial places, is\ndisturbingly vague--provides that the DNI will not in practice head up\nthe intelligence pyramid providing recommendations to the President.\n Instead, the DNI will now have competition from the CIA Director, as\nwell as the Director of the newly created National counterterrorism\nCenter--both of whom will be presidential appointees requiring\nconfirmation by the Senate. Rather than simplification and\nconsolidation, it is possible that this could have the effect of\ncreating new bureaucracies and increasing confusion.\n We should remember that among the purposes of creating a DNI was to\nconsolidate intelligence coordination efforts in one person who could\ncraft a suitable budget, ensure sharing of information among agencies,\nand consolidate information for presentation to the President. It is by\nno means certain that this purpose will be achieved by this\nlegislation.\n Second, although the DNI would have control over much of America's\ntotal intelligence budget--roughly $40 billion--he or she would not\nhave control over approximately 30 percent of this total, including\ncertain tactical military intelligence operations. The Department of\nDefense, DOD, would retain control over those operations and funds.\n Why is this a problem? Because these DOD intelligence collection\nagencies provide three-quarters of our Nation's military and\ninternational intelligence. Leaving aside operational control, if the\nDNI doesn't have budgetary authority over three-quarters of some of our\nmost important intelligence activities, how will that person be able to\neffectively carry out their job of protecting the American people?\n Also of concern are provisions which could affect Americans' civil\nliberties. For example, this bill will create an FBI intelligence\ndirectorate, and it will require the FBI to specifically train and\ndedicate a group of its agents to gather domestic intelligence against\nsuspected terrorists. Obviously, we need to prevent terrorists from\nreaching our shores and root them out if and when they are here. But we\nwill have to keep close watch to ensure that Americans' civil liberties\nare not violated as part of these efforts.\n That is why I am so concerned that although this legislation creates\na panel to protect civil liberties and to prevent privacy abuses, this\npanel will not have subpoena power, and its members will serve at the\npleasure of the President. This situation calls into question whether,\nin practice, the panel will be able to fulfill its role of protecting\nAmericans from the excesses of power exercised by their Government.\n Despite these reservations, I voted in support of this conference\nreport. We have already waited too long--3 years and 3 months--and the\nprocess of intelligence reform must begin. This legislation is a\nbeginning.\n The tragedy of 9/11 continues to echo today with each family that\nlost a loved one that horrible day. No legislative reforms can\nalleviate that loss or wash away the heart-wrenching pain felt by these\nfamilies. But if done right, reforms might help prevent another such\ntragedy from happening again.\n That is why I would also offer a word of advice to the\nadministration, to the officials who are eventually confirmed for these\nposts, and to those whose jobs will be to root out terrorists within\nour borders. The American people will be watching you, as will\nCongress. And together, we will make every effort to ensure that the\nprocess of reform continues and that Americans' constitutionally\nguaranteed rights are protected.\n Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, today is a historic day. We are coming\nto the end of a process that began immediately after the September 11\nattacks and is ending with a historic reorganization of the\nintelligence community. Today's vote, coming after months of testimony\nbefore the 9/11 Commission, weeks of hearings on Capitol Hill and tough\nnegotiations in Congress, represents a signal accomplishment in\nreforming our government to protect our homeland and fighting the war\non terror.\n Today's accomplishment, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism\nPrevention Act of 2004, would not have been possible without the\ncourage, dedication and hard work of the families of the victims of\nSeptember 11. It was the persistence and resilience of these brave\nfamily members who lost their loved ones on September 11 that led to\nthe creation of the 9/11 Commission. And it was their continued resolve\nthat helped to keep the heat on Congress to insure that those\nrecommendations were put into law. While not every recommendation of\nthe 9/11 Commission is included in this bill, the bill makes historic\nchanges in the way our government will collect and analyze intelligence\nso that we hopefully never again have to live through a day like\nSeptember 11.\n In the aftermath of September 11, and as the 9/11 Commission report\nso aptly demonstrates, it is clear that our intelligence system is not\nworking the way that it should. The Commission report, following on the\nwork of prior commissions that have studied the\n\n[[Page S11989]]\n\nissue, details how we have 15 different intelligence agencies who are\nnot sharing information, not communicating with one another and missing\nimportant linkages. This legislation, through the creation of a\nDirector of National Intelligence, DNI, breaks down the artificial\nbarriers in the intelligence community and insures that there is a high\nlevel official, answerable to the President, who is working to insure\nthat our intelligence agencies are sharing information and\ncommunicating with one another.\n This legislation gives the DNI budget authority over the intelligence\ncommunity which will allow him or her to exercise proper control over\nthe coordination among agencies. In Washington, budget authority means\nreal authority and strengthening the DNI is a major accomplishment of\nthis bill. He or she will also be responsible for budget execution and\nhave the authority to reprogram funds and transfer personnel. These\npowers will allow the DNI to establish objectives and priorities for\nthe intelligence community and manage and direct tasking of collection,\nanalysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence.\n This legislation also establishes a Privacy and Civil Liberties\nOversight Board, as the 9/11 Commission recommended. The creation of\nthis Board is intended to ensure that at the same time we enhance our\nNation's intelligence and homeland defense capabilities, we also remain\nvigilant in protecting the civil liberties of Americans. Our civil\nliberties define us as Americans. As the 9/11 Commission said, ``Our\nhistory has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty. Yet, if our\nliberties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to\ndefend.'' The conference report being considered today essentially\ncharges the Board with primary executive branch responsibility for\nensuring that privacy and civil liberty concerns will be appropriately\nconsidered in the implementation of provisions designed to protect us\nagainst terrorism. While the legislation that initially passed the\nSenate explicitly provided the Board with subpoena powers, the\nconference report that we are voting on today does not. That omission\nis unfortunate, and I will work with my colleagues in Congress to\naddress this issue and provide such powers in the future, so that the\nBoard will have the tools it will need to help us maintain the proper\nbalance between our Nation's security and our liberties.\n The legislation calls for dramatic improvements in the security of\nour Nation's transportation infrastructure, including aviation\nsecurity, air cargo security, and port security. Through this\nlegislation, the security of the northern border will also be improved,\na goal I have worked toward since 2001. Among many key provisions, the\nlegislation calls for an increase of at least 10,000 border patrol\nagents from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, many of whom will be\ndedicated specifically to our northern border. There will also be an\nincrease of at least 4,000 full-time immigration and Customs\nenforcement officers in the next 5 years.\n While I look forward to a productive debate on immigration issues in\nthe next Congress, I am pleased that there are a number of key\nimmigration reform provisions in this legislation, including those\naddressing the process of obtaining U.S. visas.\n I am also pleased that the legislation addresses the root causes of\nterrorism in a proactive manner. This is an issue that I have spent a\ngood deal of time on in the past year because I believe so strongly\nthat we are all more secure when children and adults around the world\nare taught math and science instead of hate. The bill we are voting on\ntoday includes authorization for an International Youth Opportunity\nFund, which will provide resources to build schools in Muslim\ncountries. The legislation also acknowledges that the U.S. has a vested\ninterest in committing to a long-term, sustainable investment in\neducation around the globe. Some of this language is modeled on\nlegislation that I introduced in September, the Education for All Act\nof 2004, and I believe it takes us a small step towards eliminating\nmadrassas and replacing them with schools that provide a real education\nto all children.\n But we are being shortsighted if we limit our educational investments\nto countries with predominantly Muslim populations, and if we focus\nsolely on expanding the number of U.S.-run schools in these areas, as\nthe Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act does. Instead, the\nU.S. should work with the global community to create strong incentives\nfor developing countries to build universal, public education systems\nof their own. Only then will our investments have the maximum impact\nbecause only then will they result in systemic change.\n\n We do not know where the next Afghanistan will spring up, but we do\nknow that extremism will flourish where educational systems fail.\n The 9/11 Commission, and the commissions before it, including the\nHomeland Security Independent Task Force of the Council on Foreign\nRelations, chaired by former Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart--\nHart-Rudman Commission--and the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic\nResponse Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass\nDestruction, chaired by former Gov. James Gilmore III--Gilmore\nCommission--called for dramatic improvements in the sharing of\nintelligence information. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11\nterrorist attacks, I worked with a number of my colleagues bipartisan\nbasis in focusing on the need for greater sharing of terrorist-related\ninformation between and among Federal, State and local government\nagencies. The sharing of critical intelligence information is vitally\nimportant if we are to win the war against terrorism. We need to ensure\nthat our frontline solders in the war against terrorism here at home--\nour local communities and our first responders--are as informed as\npossible about any possible threat so that they can do the best job\npossible to protect all Americans. I am pleased that this legislation\nmandates major improvements in this regard.\n Contained in title VII of the act are provisions from the 9/11\nCommission Implementation Act of 2004, legislation introduced by\nSenators McCain and Lieberman and for which I am proud to have been an\noriginal cosponsor. Among its provisions are those that address\nhomeland security preparedness, including a call for a unified incident\ncommand system and significantly enhancing interoperable communications\nbetween and among first responders and all levels of government. Title\nVII also speaks to the need for allocation of additional spectrum for\nfirst responder needs and to assess strategies that may be used to meet\npublic safety telecommunication needs, an issue that I have focused on\nintensely as cochair of the E-911 Caucus.\n I am extremely disappointed, however, that this legislation does not\nspecifically mandate an improvement in how the Federal Government\nallocates critical homeland security funds to States and local\ncommunities around the country. As many of my colleagues know, I have\nrepeatedly called upon the administration and my colleagues to\nimplement threatbased homeland security funding to ensure that the\nhomeland security resources go to the States and areas where they are\nneeded most. I have introduced legislation in this regard and even\ndeveloped a specific homeland security formula for administration\nofficials to consider.\n But threat-based funding is not only important to me and to the New\nYorkers whom I represent; it was also a primary recommendation of the\n9/11 Commission. Specifically, in its report, the Commission stated:\n\n We understand the contention that every state and city\n needs to have some minimum infrastructure for emergency\n response. But federal homeland security assistance should not\n remain a program for general revenue sharing. It should\n supplement state and local resources based on the risks or\n vulnerability that merit additional support. Congress should\n not use this money as a pork barrel.\n\n The 9/11 Commission also recommended that an advisory committee be\nestablished to advise the Secretary on any additional factors the\nSecretary should consider, such as benchmarks for evaluating community\nhomeland security needs. As to these benchmarks, the Commission stated\nthat ``the benchmarks will be imperfect and subjective, they will\ncontinually evolve. But hard choices must be made. Those who would\nallocate money on a different basis should then defend their view of\nthe national interest.'' In short, the Commission made unequivocally\nclear that the current method of allocating the majority of federal\nhomeland security resources, i.e., on a\n\n[[Page S11990]]\n\nper capita basis alone, must be changed.\n Not only did the 9/11 Commission recommend that such changes be made\nin how Federal homeland security funds are allocated, but commissions\nbefore it, such as the Rudman Commission, have strongly recommended it\nas well. Indeed, the Rudman Commission stated more than a year and a\nhalf ago that ``Congress should establish a system for allocating\nscarce resources based less on dividing the spoils and more on\naddressing identified threats and vulnerabilities. . . . To do this,\nthe federal government should consider such factors as population,\npopulation density, vulnerability assessment, and presence of critical\ninfrastructure within each state.''\n Both the Senate and House-passed intelligence reform bills that were\nreconciled in this conference report contained language that sought to\neffectuate this important recommendation but, unfortunately, such\nlanguage was not included in the conference report. As the 9/11\nCommission, Rudman Commission, many other homeland security experts,\nand I have repeatedly asserted, there are few issues more important to\nour nation's homeland defense than homeland security preparedness and\nthe proper allocation of the resources to achieve that preparedness.\nTherefore, I will continue to work as hard as I can with my colleagues\non a bi-partisan basis to make the 9/11 Commission's call for threat\nand risk-based funding a reality.\n At the end of the day, this legislation has the capacity to improve\nour security and make us safer. I would especially like to note the\ndogged persistence of Senators Collins and Lieberman, who were\nunflinching in their work on this important bill. However, passage of\nthis legislation is just the beginning. We have now given our\nGovernment the tools to make a difference. But as with anything in our\nsystem, success depends on the independence and accountability of those\nappointed to carry out these reforms. It is critical that the American\npeople, and we in Congress, insist upon accountability from those whom\nwe are asking to implement these reforms. I look forward to working\nwith my colleagues in the Senate in that effort.\n Once again, thank you to the 9/11 families, the 9/11 Commission and\nall those who have worked to make this legislation a reality. Now the\nhard work of implementing these reforms begins.\n Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today we vote on the conference report on the\nintelligence reform bill, S. 2845/H.R. 10. As did the House, we will\napprove it and send it on to the President for his signature.\n I strongly believe that our intelligence community must be reformed\nand appreciate the hard work in support of that objective of those\nSenate and House Members who have worked on the problem.\n Nonetheless, I have mixed feelings about this legislation. I am\nneither convinced that it will fix the core problems in our\nintelligence community, nor that it will do no harm. Particularly in\ntime of war, prudence demands Congress fully understand the\nconsequences, both positive and negative, of its actions, and be\ncautious about mandatory change. At the same time, there are some\npositive reforms that can be easily implemented. I note the inclusion\nin the conference report of a number of much-needed provisions, which\nwill help to ensure we have the legal authorities and resources we need\nto effectively fight terror. In fact, title VI includes about half of\nthe provisions of the Tools to Fight Terrorism Act, S. 2679, an omnibus\nantiterrorism bill that I introduced earlier this year with several\nother members of the Judiciary Committee and Senate leadership.\n This is the second time the intelligence reform measure comes before\nthe Senate. We previously considered the Senate version in October,\nprior to the Presidential election. I voted for it to ensure a modified\nversion could be worked out in conference, and, in the interest of\nallowing it to move quickly, withdrew an amendment on privacy and civil\nliberties oversight about which I felt very strongly. I did so with\ngreat reservations because of the many deficiencies in the Senate bill,\nbut was assured that my concerns would be addressed in the House-Senate\nconference. I know that a number of my Senate colleagues voted for the\nbill with a similar understanding.\n Unfortunately, I don't believe that some of the commitments to\naddress Members' concerns were fully honored, and I regret that our\nvote for the bill was used by Senate conferees to suggest almost\nunanimous Senate support in order to influence House conferees to\nsupport the Senate version. The Senator from Maine said the following\non October 20: ``I'm very proud of the fact that the Senate produced a\nbill that passed with only two dissenting votes, and I hope that we can\nlikewise produce a product from this conference that will be signed\ninto law shortly.'' In retrospect, it would have been better to have\nvoted against the flawed Senate bill so House conferees would have\nunderstood that it did not enjoy universal support.\n Over the last 2 months, I pressed my case on privacy and civil\nliberties oversight and other issues with the Members of the conference\ncommittee, the White House, and others. I know that some of my\ncolleagues have done the same. I have studied carefully the final\nproduct on which we will vote, and, though some changes have been made,\nI still have serious reservations that I will discuss today.\n To summarize: Regarding the central thrust of the bill,\nreorganization does not necessarily equal reform. This bill does\nreorganize; but it remains to be seen whether this reorganization will\nimprove or damage the system we currently have in place that gets\ntimely intelligence to our warfighters on the ground. Second, though\nsome changes have been made to the language originally adopted by the\nSenate, I continue to have serious concerns about the effect of the\nprivacy and civil liberties oversight provisions on the ability of our\nintelligence officers to perform their missions. I am concerned that\nthe manner in which this oversight will be conducted will exacerbate\nthe problem of risk aversion identified by the 9/11 Commission and the\nCongressional inquiry on the 9/11 attacks. Third, while I am pleased\nthat some House provisions to reform immigration, as well as a\nprovision I offered as an amendment to the Senate bill, were included\nin the final conference report, I am very disappointed that we have\npassed up an opportunity to do more in this area to protect our\ncountry.\n Fourth, while noting my concerns about the intelligence\nreorganization portion of this conference report, I do want to\nrecognize the inclusion of some important provisions from my Tools to\nFight Terrorism Act.\n During the debate on the Senate version of the intelligence reform\nbill, I discussed in detail the shortcomings of the 9/11 Commission's\nrecommendations, on which that bill and this conference report are\nbased. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger aptly summarized\nwhat I believe to be the key problem: ``[The Commission] has . . .\nproposed a substantial reorganization of the intelligence community--\nchanges that do not logically flow from the problems that the\nCommission identified in its narrative.''\n A number of former officials also cautioned Congress from acting\nhastily to pass legislation without a complete understanding of the\nproblems. For example, the Center for Strategic and International\nStudies released a statement before the original Senate vote on S.\n2845, which warned: ``Rushing in with solutions before we understand\nall of the problems is a recipe for failure.'' The statement was\nendorsed by: former Senators David Boren, Bill Bradley, Gary Hart, Sam\nNunn, and Warren Rudman; former Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci\nand William Cohen; former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre;\nformer Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates; former Secretary\nof State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger; and former\nSecretary of State George Shultz.\n In recent weeks, the editorial pages of several major papers, while\nnot necessarily sharing the same substantive positions, have strongly\nurged Congress to begin a new process next year to pursue intelligence\nreform, rather than rush to pass legislation this year. The Wall Street\nJournal in a November 22 editorial commented: ``If this reform is\nreally so vital, it will get done, but better to do it in a more\nconsidered fashion next year.'' Similarly, in response to Congress not\nconsidering the\n\n[[Page S11991]]\n\nconference report before Thanksgiving, the Washington Post ran an\neditorial which stated: ``. . . the legislation's failure strikes us as\na benefit. More time and more careful deliberation is needed before\nsuch sweeping changes are enacted.'' And the Washington Times ran an\neditorial on November 30 which advised: ``Intelligence reform is\nnecessary, and reasonable people can disagree on what constitutes a\ngood bill without being insulted. Rather than getting it now, we urge\nCongress to focus on getting it right.''\n\n I don't believe we can say with reasonable certainty that we are\ngetting it right. In large part, this conference report sets up a new\nbureaucratic structure. It does not, however, tackle the more difficult\nissue of resolving cultural problems within the intelligence community,\nincluding risk aversion, group think, and a failure of leadership.\nThese problems, along with other matters, like immigration reform and\nlegal tools and resources for fighting terror, all identified by the\n9/11 Commission, must be addressed if we are to improve our ability to\npredict and prevent future terrorist attacks. Indeed, those who say\nthat this bill is needed to prevent another 9/11 can no more guarantee\nthat result than those who advocate the status quo, reason being that\nneither scenario really gets at the core issues.\n Additionally, and as I already mentioned, we should be mindful of the\nfact that we are making drastic changes to the structure of our\nintelligence community and the process by which it operates, while our\ncountry is fighting a war. I discussed these concerns on the floor of\nthe Senate during the floor debate on S. 2845, the Senate version of\nthe intelligence bill, stating:\n\n In his testimony, Secretary Rumsfeld discussed in detail\n his concerns about how intelligence community reorganization\n could potentially adversely affect the Defense Department. He\n expressed his strong reservations about the national\n collection agencies--the NSA, NGA, and NRO--being removed\n from the Defense Department (where they are now located) and\n aligned under the direct leadership of the National\n Intelligence Director. He stated:\n ``We wouldn't want to place new barriers or filters between\n the military Combatant Commanders and those agencies when\n they perform as combat support agencies. It would be a major\n step to separate these key agencies from the military\n Combatant Commanders, which are the major users of such\n capabilities.''\n The Defense Department worked tirelessly in the decade\n after the first Gulf War to ensure that the speed and scope\n of intelligence support to military operations would be\n improved for future conflicts. It was General Schwartzkopf's\n view that the national intelligence support during Desert\n Storm was not adequate. Now, as we've seen from the success\n of our military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the\n broader War on Terror, ``gaps and seams,'' as Secretary\n Rumsfeld refers to them, have been drastically reduced.\n General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also\n expressed his concerns on the subject during his testimony to\n the Senate Armed Services Committee, stating:\n ``. . . for the warfighter, from the combatant commander\n down to the private on patrol, timely, accurate intelligence\n is literally a life and death matter every day. . . . As we\n move forward, we cannot create any institutional barriers\n between intelligence agencies--and of course that would\n include the National Security Agency, the National\n Geospacial-Intelligence Agency, and the National\n Reconnaissance office and the rest of the warfighting team.''\n I am concerned that the reorganization package before the\n Senate places this effective system in jeopardy.\n In S. 2485, the NSA, NGA, and NRO remain within DOD; but\n this is somewhat deceiving. These national collection\n agencies will also be within the newly defined ``National\n Intelligence Program.'' The Committee-reported bill would\n essentially remove the Secretary of Defense from any\n meaningful management role over these agencies.\n First, the National Intelligence Director would have the\n authority to appoint the heads of these agencies, albeit with\n the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. What makes this\n unusual and potentially problematic? Well, consider the fact\n that the Director of the National Security Agency, a General\n Officer, is dual-hatted as the Deputy Commander for Network\n Attack, Planning, and Integration at Strategic Command, or\n that the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office also\n serves as an Under Secretary of the Air Force. These\n positions truly support the mission of the Defense\n Department.\n Second, the National Intelligence Director would have the\n authority to execute the budgets of these agencies. It is one\n thing to say that the NID should manage the entire budget for\n the National Intelligence Program, and, therefore, to help\n develop agencies' budgets and even receive their\n appropriation. It is quite another to altogether remove the\n Secretary of Defense from the loop by requiring that the NID\n suballocate funding directly back to the agencies. This\n effectively removes the Secretary from the management loop.\n I have studied the Defense Secretary's testimony to the\n Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as the testimony of\n other experts. I am also aware that there were some good\n amendments in the Committee mark-up to help preserve the\n Defense Department's equities. But I am still not convinced\n that we are doing no harm. As General Myers commented during\n the course of the Senate Armed Services Committee's\n discussion on the subject, ``[T]he devil's in the details.''\n\n The chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, as\nwell as other Members of the House and Senate, have played a vitally\nimportant role in conference negotiations to make sure that\nintelligence support to our combatant commanders will not be disrupted.\nThey worked tirelessly to see that changes, some of which the Chairman\nof the Joint Chiefs of Staff said were needed, would be included in the\nconference report. I applaud their efforts, and appreciate the changes\nthat conferees were willing to make.\n Many of the potential defense-related pitfalls of the reorganization\nthat I discussed in the context of the Senate bill have been improved\nupon. One crucial change is the following provision intended to ensure\nthat the military chain of command is protected: ``The President shall\nissue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation and execution\nwithin the executive branch of the authorities granted to the Director\nof National Intelligence by this title and the amendments made by this\ntitle, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the\nstatutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of the\nUnited States Government concerning such departments\n. . .''\n\n Despite the improvements that have been made, and the protections\nthat have been added, I still believe that we simply don't know for\nsure how the changes we are making will affect the system we currently\nhave in place to support our men and women in uniform. For that reason,\nwe must commit to carefully monitor this legislation's implementation,\nspecifically, the DNI's authority to transfer military personnel within\nthe National Intelligence Program, authority to reprogram and transfer\nfunds, and the role of the DNI in intelligence acquisition programs\nmanaged largely by the Defense Department--and be prepared to make\nchanges if necessary.\n Perhaps the key concern I have with this conference report is its\nprivacy and civil liberties oversight provisions, which are totally\nextraneous to any problem related to 9/11 and will exacerbate the\ncultural problems in the intelligence community, in particular, the\nproblem of risk aversion.\n Risk aversion, which plays out not only in the intelligence\ncommunity, but also in foreign policy decisionmaking, economics,\nbusiness investments, and so on, is the tendency to avoid action which\nmight be criticized after the fact because of a poor outcome. There are\nmany potential causes a particular action might have adverse,\nunintended consequences, might get one into trouble with one's\nsuperiors, or might simply draw unwanted attention. When an individual\nor a Government acts, there is always a calculation of risk; but some\nGovernments and some individuals are more willing to take chances than\nothers. This is a product of both leadership and environment. Risk\naversion has contributed to numerous intelligence failures, including\nthe September 11 attacks, according to the 9/11 Commission.\n One contributor to risk aversion is the belief that third parties,\nincluding congressional committees, will challenge decisions after the\nfact. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board included in the\nSenate bill is just such an institution.\n I introduced an amendment to the Senate bill which would have\nmodified the privacy and civil liberties oversight provisions because I\nstrongly believed that the bill would have exacerbated the problem of\nrisk aversion by creating a redundant oversight bureaucracy and an\nunaccountable oversight Board with inappropriate authority over\nGovernment officials and private individuals. The bill went far beyond\nthe recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, which was to create an\nexecutive branch board to oversee privacy and civil liberties and\nadvise the\n\n[[Page S11992]]\n\nPresident. The President created such a board through Executive order\nin August.\n In summary, the Senate bill would have established: two officers\nwithin the National Intelligence Authority, one responsible for\nprivacy, the other for civil rights and civil liberties; an inspector\ngeneral within the National Intelligence Authority, who, in part, would\nmonitor and inform the National Intelligence Director of any violations\nof civil liberties and privacy; an Ombudsman within the National\nIntelligence Authority to protect against so-called ``politicization''\nof intelligence; a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board with\nextensive investigative authorities; and privacy and civil liberties\nofficers within the Departments of Justice, Defense, State, Treasury,\nHealth and Human Services, and Homeland Security, the National\nIntelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, and any other\ndepartment, agency, or element of the Executive Branch designated by\nthe Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to be appropriate for\ncoverage.\n While I believe that privacy and civil liberties should be protected,\nI do not believe that oversight should be conducted in a manner that\ncauses intelligence officers to be more worried about getting into\ntrouble than about performing their missions. The question is whose\ncivil liberties are jeopardized by improvement of our intelligence\ncapabilities? The Taliban? Al-Qaida? Saddam Hussein? Not American\ncitizens. The attacks of 9/11 were not caused by civil liberty\ndeprivation; but by inadequate intelligence and immigration law\ndeficiencies. So why hobble intelligence capabilities because of a\nperceived problem that has never been identified and was in no way\ninvolved in the 9/11 attacks? To the extent there is concern about laws\nsuch as the Patriot Act, they can be dealt with in the reauthorization\nof that Act. Such concerns have nothing to do with intelligence\nreorganization.\n My amendment would have eliminated some of the redundancy, for\nexample, by paring back the number of officers within the office of the\nNational Director of Intelligence responsible for privacy and civil\nliberties oversight, and altered the power of the Privacy and Civil\nLiberties Oversight Board by eliminating subpoena authority and the\nBoard's authority to compel executive branch compliance with its\nrequests.\n In the interest of allowing the intelligence bill to move forward\nquickly through the Senate, and noting that the House bill's provisions\non the subject were more reasonable, I withdrew this amendment with a\nverbal understanding that my concerns would be addressed in the House-\nSenate conference. I pressed my case firmly in writing with the\nconferees, outlining my concerns and suggesting various ``fixes.''\n Some improvements have been made in the conference report. For\nexample, the conference report consolidates the positions within the\noffice of the National Director of Intelligence responsible for privacy\nand civil liberties oversight into one. But the authorities of the\nPrivacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which was contained in the\nSenate bill but not in the House bill, remain problematic. Subpoena\nauthority over private individuals, which would have been entirely\ninappropriate, particularly given the location of the Board in the\nExecutive Office of the President, was removed, and the Board will now\nbe accountable to the President. But the authority to compel executive\nbranch compliance with Board requests remains. And this is the real\nproblem.\n Departments and agencies are required to comply with any Board\nrequest unless a waiver is exercised by the National Director of\nIntelligence or the Attorney General. This places an additional burden\non two key officials, whose attention should be directed toward other\nissues, including preventing a future terrorist attack. It also will\nlikely foster an environment in which our intelligence officers are\nincreasingly cautious, or risk averse, about completing the very tasks\nthat are required to fulfill their missions. Just because a Board\nrequest to a Department-head does not necessarily rise to the level of\nreasonably exercising a waiver does not mean that it does not act as a\ndeterrent or a distraction to those serving honorably in the\nintelligence community.\n Consider this example: The International Red Cross complains that\nterrorists captured in Pakistan are treated poorly and convinces the\nCivil Liberties Board to investigate. The Board demands that our CIA\nstation chief in Pakistan testify about what he knows. The DNI demurs\non grounds of national security, or doesn't. The hue and cry about\n``secrecy'' and ``cover-up'' cause the DNI to allow the Board to\ninterrogate the CIA official. Can anyone deny the national security\nimplications, let alone the resulting risk aversion that would settle\ninto the entire intelligence community? It would be disastrous.\n I intend to monitor closely the action of this Board once it is put\ninto place to ensure that its investigations and public reporting\nrequirements do not adversely affect our intelligence community, and\nwill urge further limitations on its authority. Fighting terrorists\nabroad means spying, gathering intelligence. Civil liberties for\nterrorists should not be high on the list of U.S. reforms for\nintelligence collection. Again, 9/11 was caused by intelligence\nfailures, not insufficient attention to terrorists' civil rights. A\nsense of perspective would have eliminated the most egregious features\nof the conference report.\n With regard to the immigration provisions included, or not included,\nin the final bill, I am pleased that a provision I authored requiring\nmandatory interviews for non-immigrant visa applicants was retained. I\nam also pleased that some other immigration reform provisions were\nincluded in the conference report, including an authorization for an\nincrease in Border Patrol agents by 2,000 in each of fiscal years 2006-\n2010; an increase of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents by 800\nin each of fiscal years 2006-2010; an increase in detention beds by\n8,000 in each of fiscal years 2006-2010, with priority for the use of\nthese beds to detain aliens charged with inadmissibility or\ndeportability on security grounds.\n I am also pleased that a requirement to develop and implement a plan\nto require a passport or other document, or combination of documents,\nsufficient to denote citizenship and identity for all travel into the\nU.S. by U.S. citizens and nationals from Western Hemisphere countries,\nfor whom such requirements have previously been waived, is included in\nthe conference report. And that a provision requiring a detailed plan\nfrom the Department of Homeland Security, within 180 days, about how to\naccelerate the full implementation of the biometric document\nrequirement of the Border Security Act that Senators Feinstein,\nKennedy, Brownback, and I authored, will be included. There are other\ngood provisions.\n I am very troubled, however, that many of the important immigration\nreform provisions included in the House-passed bill were either altered\nsignificantly or left out of the conference report. I understand that\nMembers have been assured that such provisions will be considered next\nyear. As the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism\nand a senior member of the Immigration Subcommittee, I have witnessed\nmany times the opportunities for real immigration reform slip through\nour fingers. This conference measure represents one example.\n There is no real substantive reason that these important provisions,\nwhich were described as immigration reforms but can also be accurately\nbe described as counterterrorism measures, should not have been\nincluded in the final bill. The primary goal of this legislation, is to\nbetter enable the U.S. Government to prevent future terrorist attacks\nlike that which occurred on 9/11. Many of the House-passed immigration\nprovisions ultimately excluded from the final conference report would\nhave enhanced the Government's ability to prevent entry of, and find,\nterrorists who wish harm to our country.\n The public and media debate about immigration reform and the\nintelligence conference report has focused on driver's license\nstandards and whether States should be prevented from issuing such\ndocuments to illegal aliens. The answer is unequivocally yes, and I\nwill discuss this matter again. There are additional important\nimmigration/terrorism reforms that the conference negotiators refused\nto\n\n[[Page S11993]]\n\naccept, and by doing so, I believe the bill was seriously, dangerously\nweakened. I will mention only a handful of them.\n Importantly, the House-passed bill included a section that would have\nrequired aliens in the United States to use only a Department of\nJustice- or Department of Homeland Security-issued document, or a valid\npassport, to establish identity to a U.S. Governmental official or\nworker. This would have effectively prohibited the use of the matricula\nconsular identification card for identification purposes for Federal\nidentification. The conference measure eliminated this section of the\nbill, and instead provides only for a process for determining minimum\nstandards that passengers will have to present to board a commercial\naircraft in the United States.\n Additionally, the House would have expanded the use of expedited\nremoval by requiring its use in the U.S. as well as along the U.S.\nborder, currently expedited removal is used only at U.S. ports of\nentry. The conference measure strikes this provision.\n The House-passed bill would also have overturned a Ninth Circuit\nprecedent that has effectively barred immigration judges from denying\nasylum claims on the basis of credibility. The Government is barred\nfrom asking foreign governments what evidence they have about the\nterrorist activities of asylum applicants. So the only evidence the\nGovernment can use in opposing an asylum request is to argue that the\napplicant is lying. The Ninth Circuit precedent barring immigration\njudges from denying asylum claims on the basis of credibility would\nhave been overturned if the conference report retained the House-passed\nprovision; but it was eliminated from the conference measure.\n Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has been granting asylum to\napplicants on the basis that their government believes they are\nterrorists, and, therefore, they deserve asylum because they are being\npersecuted on account of the political beliefs of the relevant\nterrorist organization. The House-passed bill overturned this precedent\nand would have required aliens to show they qualify for asylum based\nupon the currently protected grounds for receiving such, but conference\nnegotiators refused to accept this provision.\n\n Instead, what the final version of the bill included is a Government\nAccountability Office, GAO, study on the weaknesses in the U.S. asylum\nsystem that have been exploited by aliens connected to terrorism.\n The House version of the bill included a provision to close an\nexisting loophole in immigration law that allows foreign nationals\nwhose visas or other travel documents have been revoked by the State\nDepartment on terrorism grounds, to remain in the United States until\ntheir visa, or DHS-approved time here, expires, despite the revocation.\nThe current conference report retains that provision, which makes\nrevocation of a visa on terrorism grounds a legal ground for the\ndeportation of the visa holder. However, the conferees created another\nloophole through which a potential terrorist could remain in the United\nStates despite a visa revocation, by adding language that would allow\njudicial appeal of any visa revocation decision. Allowing judicial\nappeal of such decisions will only create another avenue through which\na potential terrorist can legally remain in the United States for an\nundetermined amount of time. Currently all decisions regarding visa\nissuance by Consular Officers are final, they are not subject to\njudicial review. The same should be true of visa revocation decisions.\nA number of Senators, including Senators Grassley, Sessions, Chambliss,\nEnsign, and I fully supported this provision and contemplated offering\nas a similar amendment during Senate consideration of the bill. I am\ndisappointed to learn that language was added to allow individuals\nwhose visas have been revoked on terrorism grounds to appeal the State\nDepartment's decision.\n Finally, while increasing the number of Customs and Immigration\nenforcement officers is important and is accomplished in the conference\nreport, another important House-passed provision, requiring that half\nof any new immigration investigators be focused on enforcing\nrestrictions on illegal immigrants in the workforce, was not included\nin the final version of the bill.\n As I mentioned in the beginning of my comments about the immigration-\nrelated sections, an important provision dealing with identity\nstandards in the Federal context was struck from the conference\nmeasure. While that measure wasn't necessarily perfect, it certainly\nrepresented a good beginning for development of a necessary standard of\nidentification in this country. The House-passed driver's license\nstandards section also represented a very good attempt at eliminating\nthe opportunity for illegal immigrants to obtain driver's licenses,\nwhich we all know allows illegal immigrants to live as though they were\nhere legally.\n While I would very much like to discuss the negative ramifications on\nthe workplace, and States generally, of the illegal immigrant\npopulation having such easy access to driver's licenses and other\ndocuments that allow them to live as though they are here legally, I\nwill instead focus on how important documentary validity is to\npreventing terrorists from entering and living in the United States.\nBoth the House and Senate, after reviewing the 9/11 Commission's\nrecommendation, voted to apply some form of standardization to the\ndriver's license. The question really is, Is the Congress willing to\nget to the root of the problem and prevent illegal immigrants from\nobtaining such licenses? True, most of the 9/11 hijackers had\n``valid,'' but improperly issued, visas. Hopefully, now, the State\nDepartment is following the law and making it harder for individuals\nwho shouldn't possess U.S. visas from obtaining them. But that still\nleaves millions of individuals who enter the country illegally, some of\nwhom could be terrorists, able to obtain the document that will allow\nthem to blend easily into our neighborhoods, workplaces, churches, and\nmosques, let alone board airplanes or otherwise gain access to\nsensitive areas. The conference report only requires that States\ninclude the following: the person's full legal name; the person's date\nof birth; the person's gender; the person's driver's license or\nidentification number; a digital photograph; the person's address of\nprincipal residence; and the person's signature. And a carve-out was\nincluded for States in order that any documentary requirements ``may\nnot infringe on a State's power to set criteria concerning what\ncategories of individuals are eligible to obtain a driver's license or\npersonal identification from that State.'' The driver's license\nprovision included in the final bill will not do much to better secure\nthe license, and will continue to allow illegal immigrants to obtain\nsuch documentation.\n As I have said, there are a number of immigration-related provisions\nin the conference report that will make a difference, including the\nsection of the bill that requires in-person interviews of non-immigrant\nvisa applicants, an authorization for an increase in consular officer\npositions, and others. But we also had an opportunity to include other\nsecurity-related immigration reforms, and we failed. I will work in the\n109th Congress to ensure their consideration, and the consideration of\nother important immigration reform measures. Such consideration is\nimportant to the future of our country, from a security perspective and\nfrom an economic perspective, and the course we take over the next year\nor two will, in part, contribute to our success at preventing future\nterrorist attacks and shape the future of our Nation. I will work to\nget it right and look forward to working with my colleagues on all of\nthese important issues.\n As I mentioned, one bright spot in the bill before us today is title\nVI, which provides new tools to law enforcement to investigate and\nprosecute terrorist crimes. Title VI includes about half of the\nprovisions of the Tools to Fight Terrorism Act, S. 2679, an omnibus\nantiterrorism bill that I introduced earlier this year with several\nother members of the Judiciary Committee and the Senate leadership.\nObviously, I am pleased that these important provisions are included in\nthe final legislation.\n Subtitles A and F through K of title VI of the conference report\nmirror parallel provisions in the Tools to Fight Terrorism Act. And\nTFTA itself consists of all or part of 11 other bills that currently\nare pending in the House and Senate. Collectively, these other bills\nhave been the subject of 9 separate\n\n[[Page S11994]]\n\nhearings before House and Senate committees and have been the subject\nof 4 separate committee reports. In addition, the entire TFTA was\nreviewed in a September 13 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on\nTerrorism, which heard testimony from Justice Department witnesses\nBarry Sabin, Chief of the counterterrorism Section of the\nCriminal Division, and Dan Bryant, Assistant Attorney General for the\nOffice of Legal Policy, as well as George Washington University law\nprofessor Jonathan Turley.\n\n These hearings and reports provide a substantial legislative backdrop\nto title VI of the present bill. The statement that follows is my\nattempt to provide some guide to navigating this legislative thicket.\nOf course, one might well ask whether it is an inherent contradiction\nto rely on legislative history supplied by a judicial conservative,\nsince judicial conservatives tend not to believe in legislative\nhistory. The short answer would be that in moments of litigation\ncrisis, every lawyer tends to believe in whatever talismans are\navailable. One might as well help him find them. With that disclaimer,\nI offer the following effort to illuminate the origins and objectives\nof the TFTA provisions in title VI.\n Subtitle A, section 6001, Lone-Wolf FISA Authority ``Moussaoui Fix,''\nthis section amends FISA to allow orders for surveillance of foreign\nvisitors to the U.S. who appear to be involved in international\nterrorism but are not affiliated with a known terror group. The need\nfor this provision is explained in Senate Committee Report No. 108-40,\nwhich accompanies a bill that Senator Schumer and I introduced at the\nbeginning of this Congress. I quote the relevant passages from that\nreport at length:\n\n The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the people of\n the United States underscored the need for this legislation.\n Several weeks before those attacks, federal law enforcement\n agents identified one of the participants in that conspiracy\n as a suspected international terrorist. These agents sought\n to obtain a FISA warrant to search his belongings. One of the\n principal factors that prevented the issuance of such a\n warrant was FISA's requirement that the target be an agent of\n a foreign power. Even if federal agents had been able to\n demonstrate that this person was preparing to commit an act\n of international terrorism, based on the suspicious conduct\n that had first brought him to the attention of authorities,\n the agents would not have been able to obtain a warrant to\n search him absent a link to a foreign power. As a result,\n these federal agents spent three critical weeks before\n September 11 seeking to establish this terrorist's tenuous\n connection to groups of Chechen rebels--groups for whom we\n now know this terrorist was not working.\n It is not certain that a search of this terrorist would\n necessarily have led to the discovery of the September 11\n conspiracy. We do know, however, that information in this\n terrorist's effects would have linked him to two of the\n actual September 11 hijackers, and to a high-level organizer\n of the attacks who was captured in 2002 in Pakistan. And we\n do know that suspending the requirement of a foreign-power\n link for lone-wolf terrorists would have eliminated the major\n obstacle to federal agents' investigation of this terrorist--\n the need to fit this square peg into the round hole of the\n current FISA statute.\n FISA allows a specially designated court to issue an order\n authorizing electronic surveillance or a physical search upon\n probable cause that the target of the warrant is ``a foreign\n power or an agent of a foreign power.'' 50 U.S.C. Sec.\n 1805(a)(3)(A), 1824(a)(3)(A). The words ``foreign power'' and\n ``agent of a foreign power'' are defined in 1801 of FISA.\n ``Foreign power'' includes ``a group engaged in international\n terrorism or activities in preparation therefor,''\n 1801(a)(4), and ``agent of a foreign power'' includes any\n person who ``knowingly engages in sabotage or international\n terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor,\n for or on behalf of a foreign power.'' 1801(b)(2)(C).\n Requiring that targets of a FISA warrant be linked to a\n foreign government or international terrorist organization\n may have made sense when FISA was enacted in 1978; in that\n year, the typical FISA target was a Soviet spy or a member of\n one of the hierarchical, military-style terror groups of that\n era. Today, however, the United States faces a much different\n threat. The United States is confronted not only by specific\n groups or governments, but by a movement of Islamist\n extremists. This movement does not maintain a fixed structure\n or membership list, and its adherents do not always advertise\n their affiliation with this cause. Moreover, in response to\n the United States' efforts to fight terrorism around the\n world, this movement increasingly has begun operating in a\n more decentralized manner.\n The origins and evolution of the Islamist terrorist threat,\n and the difficulties posed by FISA's current framework, were\n described in detail by Spike Bowman, the Deputy General\n Counsel of the FBI, at a Senate Select Committee on\n Intelligence hearing on the predecessor to S. 113. Mr. Bowman\n testified:\n ``When FISA was enacted, terrorism was very different from\n what we see today. In the 1970s, terrorism more often\n targeted individuals, often carefully selected. This was the\n usual pattern of the Japanese Red Army, the Red Brigades and\n similar organizations listed by name in the legislative\n history of FISA. Today we see terrorism far more lethal and\n far more indiscriminate than could have been imagined in\n 1978. It takes only the events of September 11, 2001, to\n fully comprehend the difference of a couple of decades. But\n there is another difference as well. Where we once saw\n terrorism formed solely around organized groups, today we\n often see individuals willing to commit indiscriminate acts\n of terror. It may be that these individuals are affiliated\n with groups we do not see, but it may be that they are simply\n radicals who desire to bring about destruction.\n ``[W]e are increasingly seeing terrorist suspects who\n appear to operate at a distance from these [terrorists]\n organizations. In perhaps an oversimplification, but\n illustrative nevertheless, what we see today are (1) agents\n of foreign powers in the traditional sense who are associated\n with some organization or discernible group (2) individuals\n who appear to have connections with multiple terrorist\n organizations but who do not appear to owe allegiance to any\n one of them, but rather owe allegiance to the International\n Jihad movement and (3) individuals who appear to be\n personally oriented toward terrorism but with whom there is\n no known connection to a foreign power.\n ``This phenomenon, which we have seen . . . growing for the\n past two or three years, appears to stem from a social\n movement that began at some imprecise time, but certainly\n more than a decade ago. It is a global phenomenon which the\n FBI refers to as the International Jihad Movement. By way of\n background we believe we can see the contemporary development\n of this movement, and its focus on terrorism, rooted in the\n Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.\n ``During the decade-long Soviet/Afghan conflict, anywhere\n from 10,000 to 25,000 Muslim fighters representing some\n forty-three countries put aside substantial cultural\n differences to fight alongside each other in Afghanistan. The\n force drawing them together was the Islamic concept of 'umma'\n or Muslim community. In this concept, nationalism is\n secondary to the Muslim community as a whole. As a result,\n Muslims from disparate cultures trained together, formed\n relationships, sometimes assembled in groups that otherwise\n would have been at odds with one another[,] and acquired\n common ideologies.\n ``Following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in\n Afghanistan, many of these fighters returned to their\n homelands, but they returned with new skills and dangerous\n ideas. They now had newly acquired terrorist training as\n guerrilla warfare [had been] the only way they could combat\n the more advanced Soviet forces.\n ``Information from a variety of sources repeatedly carries\n the theme from Islamic radicals that expresses the opinion\n that we just don't get it. Terrorists world-wide speak of\n jihad and wonder why the western world is focused on groups\n rather than on concepts that make them a community.\n ``The lesson to be taken from [how Islamist terrorists\n share information] is that al-Qaida is far less a large\n organization than a facilitator, sometimes orchestrator of\n Islamic militants around the globe. These militants are\n linked by ideas and goals, not by organizational structure.\n ``The United States and its allies, to include law\n enforcement and intelligence components worldwide[,] have had\n an impact on the terrorists, but [the terrorists] are\n adapting to changing circumstances. Speaking solely from an\n operational perspective, investigation of these individuals\n who have no clear connection to organized terrorism, or\n tenuous ties to multiple organizations, is becoming\n increasingly difficult.\n ``The current FISA statute has served the nation well, but\n the International Jihad Movement demonstrates the need to\n consider whether a different formulation is needed to address\n the contemporary terrorist problem.''\n The Committee notes that when FISA was enacted in 1978, the\n Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had not yet occurred and both\n Iran and Iraq were considered allies of the United States.\n The world has changed. It is the responsibility of Congress\n to adapt our laws to these changes, and to ensure that law\n enforcement and intelligence agencies have at their disposal\n all of the tools they need to combat the terrorist threat\n currently facing the United States. The Committee concludes\n that enactment of S. 113's modification of FISA to facilitate\n surveillance of lone-wolf terrorists would further Congress's\n fulfillment of this responsibility.\n [In a separate statement of additional views on S. 113,\n Senator Feingold expresses concerns about the\n constitutionality of allowing surveillance of lone-wolf\n terrorists pursuant to FISA. He suggests that by allowing\n searches of persons involved in international terrorism\n without regard to whether such persons are affiliated with\n foreign powers, S. 113 ``writes out of the statute a key\n requirement necessary to the lawfulness of such searches.''\n In order to address Senator Feingold's concerns, the\n Committee attaches as Appendix E to this report a letter\n presenting the views of the U.S. Department of Justice on S.\n 2586, the predecessor bill to S. 113.\n\n[[Page S11995]]\n\n The Department of Justice's letter provides a detailed\n analysis of the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,\n concluding that the bill's authorization of lone-wolf\n surveillance would ``satisfy constitutional requirements.''\n The Department emphasizes that anyone monitored pursuant to\n the lone-wolf authority would be someone who, at the very\n least, is involved in terrorist acts that ``transcend\n national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are\n accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or\n intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate\n or seek asylum.'' (Quoting 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801(c)(3).)\n Therefore, a FISA warrant obtained pursuant to this authority\n necessarily would ``be limited to collecting foreign\n intelligence for the international responsibilities of the\n United States, and the duties of the Federal Government to\n the States in matters involving foreign terrorism.'' (Quoting\n United States v. Dugan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984).) The\n Department concludes ``the same interests and considerations\n that support the constitutionality of FISA as it now stands\n would provide the constitutional justification for S. 2568.''\n The Department additionally notes that when FISA was enacted\n it was understood to allow surveillance of groups as small as\n two or three persons. The Department concludes that ``[t]he\n interests that the courts have found to justify the\n procedures of FISA are not likely to differ appreciably as\n between a case involving such a group . . . and a case\n involving a single terrorist.'']\n\n A provision substantially the same as section 6001 first was\nintroduced as a bill, S. 2586, by Senators Schumer and me on June 5,\n2002. The Senate Intelligence Committee held a hearing on S. 2586 on\nJuly 31, 2002. Witnesses included James Baker, Counsel for Intelligence\nPolicy with the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review, Department of\nState; Marion ``Spike'' Bowman, Deputy General Counsel, National\nSecurity Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel, FBI; and Fred Manget,\nDeputy General Counsel, CIA.\n\n The same provision was reintroduced in the 108th Congress by me and\nSenator Schumer as S. 113 on January 9, 2003. S. 113 was unanimously\nreported by the Judiciary Committee on March 11, 2003. The Committee\nissued Report No. 108-40 for S. 113 on April 29, 2003. S. 113 was\napproved by the Senate by 90-4 on May 8, 2003. The same provision also\nwas included in H.R. 3179, which was introduced by House Judiciary\nChairman Sensenbrenner and House Intelligence Chairman Goss on\nSeptember 25, 2003. The House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and\nHomeland Security held a hearing on H.R. 3179 on May 18, 2004.\nWitnesses at the hearing included Dan Bryant, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice; Thomas\nHarrington, Deputy Assistant Director, FBI; and Bob Barr, former\nCongressman. The same provision also was introduced as H.R. 3552 by\nRepresentative King on November 20, 2003.\n Subtitle F, section 6501, Sharing Grand-Jury Information With State\nand Local Governments, this section amends current law to authorize the\nsharing of grand-jury information with appropriate state and local\nauthorities.\n I do not think that one can overstate the importance of information\nsharing, of tearing down the walls that prevent different parts of the\nGovernment from exchanging intelligence and working together in the war\non terror. A graphic illustration of the importance of streamlined\ninformation sharing is provided by another pre-September 11\ninvestigation. Like the Moussaoui case, this investigation also came\ntantalizing close to substantially disrupting or even stopping the 9/11\nplot, and also ultimately was blocked by a flaw in our antiterror laws.\nThe investigation to which I refer involved Khalid Al Midhar, one of\nthe suicide hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77, which was crashed\ninto the Pentagon, killing 58 passengers and crew and 125 people on the\nground.\n An account of the investigation of Midhar is provided in the 9/11\nCommission's staff Statement No. 10. That statement notes as follows:\n\n During the summer of 2001 [an FBI official] . . . found [a]\n cable reporting that Khalid Al Mihdhar had a visa to the\n United States. A week later she found the cable reporting\n that Mihdhar's visa application--what was later discovered to\n be his first application--listed New York as his destination.\n . . . The FBI official grasped the significance of this\n information.\n The FBI official and an FBI analyst working the case\n promptly met with an INS representative at FBI Headquarters.\n On August 22 INS told them that Mihdhar had entered the\n United States on January 15, 2000, and again on July 4, 2001.\n . . . The FBI agents decided that if Mihdhar was in the\n United States, he should be found.\n\n These alert agents immediately grasped the danger that Khalid Al\nMidhar posed to the United States, and immediately initiated an effort\nto track him down. Unfortunately, at the time, the law was not on their\nside. The Joint Inquiry Report of the House and Senate Intelligence\nCommittees describes what happened next:\n\n Even in late August 2001, when the CIA told the FBI, State,\n INS, and Customs that Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and\n two other ``Bin Laden-related individuals'' were in the\n United States, FBI Headquarters refused to accede to the New\n York field office recommendation that a criminal\n investigation be opened, which might allow greater resources\n to be dedicated to the search for the future hijackers. . . .\n FBI attorneys took the position that criminal investigators\n ``CAN NOT'' (emphasis original) be involved and that criminal\n information discovered in the intelligence case would be\n ``passed over the wall'' according to proper procedures. An\n agent in the FBI's New York field office responded by e-mail,\n saying: ``Whatever has happened to this, someday someone will\n die and, wall or not, the public will not understand why we\n were not more effective in throwing every resource we had at\n certain problems.''\n\n The 9/11 Commission staff report assesses the ultimate impact of\nthese legal barriers:\n\n Many witnesses have suggested that even if Mihdhar had been\n found, there was nothing the agents could have done except\n follow him onto the planes. We believe this is incorrect.\n Both Hazmi and Mihdhar could have been held for immigration\n violations or as material witnesses in the Cole bombing case.\n Investigation or interrogation of these individuals, and\n their travel and financial activities, also may have yielded\n evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11\n plot. In any case, the opportunity did not arise.\n\n Congress must do what it can now to make sure that something like\nthis does not happen again--that arbitrary, seemingly minor\nbureaucratic barriers are not allowed to undermine our best leads\ntoward uncovering an attack on the United States. Section 6501 is a\nsubstantial step in that direction.\n The change made be section 6501 previously was enacted by the\nHomeland Security Act, but that change never went into effect because\nthe Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure amended by the HSA was revised\nby the Supreme Court shortly after the enactment of the HSA, and the\namendment made by HSA presupposed the earlier text of the Federal rule.\nThe same provisions were introduced as part of S. 2599 by Senators\nChambliss and me on June 24, 2004.\n Subtitle G, sections 6602 and 6603, and section 5402, Receiving\nMilitary-Type Training from and Providing Material Support to\nTerrorists, section 6602 makes it a crime to receive military-type\ntraining from a foreign terrorist group, and section 5402 makes aliens\nwho have received such training deportable from the United States.\nSection 6603 broadens the jurisdictional bases of the material-support\nstatute. It also clarifies the definitions of the terms ``personnel,''\n``training,'' and ``expert advice or assistance'' in response to\nconcerns expressed in recent court decisions. Furthermore, this section\nclarifies the knowledge required to violate the statute, and specifies\nthat nothing contained in the statute shall be construed to abridge\nfree-speech rights. All of these sections apply extraterritorially to\nU.S. nationals, permanent residents, stateless persons whose habitual\nresidence is the United States, and persons who are brought into or\nfound in the United States.\n\n In the final version of this legislation, all immigration- and\nborder-related provisions were placed in a new title V, and thus the\npart of the military-type-training provision making terror trainees\ndeportable ended up in that title as well, as section 5402. The new\n5402, rather than referencing the definition of military-type training\nin 6602, simply duplicates the key part of that definition, a\nprecaution against the event that the now-distant 6602 be repealed or\nnever enacted.\n Nevertheless, despite their now far-flung nature, these sections\nstill should be read together. Thus 2339D(c)'s definitions of ``serious\nbodily injury'' and ``critical infrastructure'' should guide the use of\nthose terms in 5402, even though, unlike the definition of ``military\ntype training,'' those definitions are not copied in the deportation\nsection. The extraterritorial scope of 6602, as articulated in\n2339D(b), also should\n\n[[Page S11996]]\n\ninform the application of 5402. The deportation provision is\narticulated in terms of conduct, which is the same thing everywhere--\nrather than offenses--which are a particular creature of each\njurisdiction. And obviously, Congress is just as anxious to remove from\nthis country those aliens who trained at an al-Qaida camp in\nAfghanistan as those who trained in the United States.\n In two key respects, however, the deportation provision operates\ndifferently than the criminal provision. First, the knowledge\nrequirement imposed by the second sentence of 2339D(a) was not imposed\nin 5402. While scienter is a traditional part of a criminal offense, it\nwas not thought a necessary consideration in deciding which alien\nvisitors should be allowed to remain in this country. If someone\ntrained at a terrorist camp, they should be removed forthwith,\nregardless of what they claim to have known about their host terror\ngroup. Second, 5402 will apply immediately at the time that deportation\nproceedings are initiated, regardless of the date of the triggering\ntraining. As the Supreme Court has noted, deportation ``looks\nprospectively to the respondent's right to remain in this country in\nthe future.'' INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038. Under 5402, the\nonly thing that need have occurred ``at the time the training was\nreceived'' is that the training or sponsoring organization have been\ndefined as a terrorist organization. Since there is no reasonable\n``reliance'' on any U.S. law whatsoever in attending an al-Qaida or\nother terrorist training camp, 5402 applies regardless of when the\ntraining was received, so long as the group was defined at that time as\na terrorist organization.\n The animating example behind this provision is the alien visitor in\nthe United States who is discovered to have attended an al-Qaida camp\nin Afghanistan in the summer of 2001. In the judgment of Congress, such\na person is a danger to the United States. And under 5402, that person,\nonce discovered, will be immediately deportable.\n The Justice Department testified in favor of a provision similar to\nsection 6602 at the Terrorism Subcommittee's hearing on the TFTA\nearlier this year. The joint statement of Messrs. Sabin and Bryant\nnotes that:\n\n It is critical that the United States stem the flow of\n recruits to terrorist training camps. A danger is posed to\n the vital foreign policy interests and national security of\n the United States whenever a person knowingly receives\n military-type training from a designated terrorist\n organization or persons acting on its behalf. Such an\n individual stands ready to further the malicious intent of\n the terrorist organization through terrorist activity that\n threatens the security of United States nationals or the\n national security of the United States. Moreover, a trainee's\n mere participation in a terrorist organization's training\n camp benefits the organization as a whole. For example, a\n trainee's participation in group drills at a training camp\n helps to improve both the skills of his fellow trainees and\n the efficacy of his instructors' training methods.\n Additionally, by attending a terrorist training camp, an\n individual lends critical moral support to other trainees and\n the organization as a whole, support that is essential to the\n health and vitality of the organization.\n\n And George Washington University law professor Jonathan Turley had\nthe following to say about TFTA's parallel provision to section 6602 in\nhis testimony before the Terrorism Subcommittee:\n\n This proposal would fill a gap in our laws revealed by\n recent cases, like that of Jose Padilla, where citizens have\n trained at terrorist camps. . . . The proposed crime has been\n narrowly tailored to require a clear knowledge element as\n well as a reasonable definition of military-type training.\n The United States has an obvious interest in criminalizing\n such conduct and to deter citizens who are contemplating\n such training. In my view, it raises no legitimate issue\n of free association or free speech given the criminal\n nature of the organization. Most importantly, given the\n use of these camps to recruit and indoctrinate such\n citizens as Padilla and John Walker Lindh, this new\n criminal offense is responsive to a clear and present\n danger for the country.\n\n With regard to section 6603, the Justice Department had the following\nto say about the parallel provision in TFTA at the Terrorism\nSubcommittee hearing earlier this year:\n\n The [provision] . . . improves current law by clarifying\n several aspects of the material support statutes. This is\n another key tool in preventing terrorism. As the Department\n of Justice has previously indicated, ``a key element of the\n Department's strategy for winning the war against terrorism\n has been to use the material support statutes to prosecute\n aggressively those individuals who supply terrorists with the\n support and resources they need to survive . . . . The\n Department seeks to identify and apprehend terrorists before\n they can carry out their plans, and the material support\n statutes are a valuable tool for prosecutors seeking to bring\n charges against and incapacitate terrorists before they are\n able to cause death and destruction.''\n\n Professor Turley, in his Terrorism Subcommittee testimony on TFTA,\nsaid of the parallel section to 6603 that ``[t]his proposal would\nactually improve the current Federal law by correcting gaps and\nambiguities that have led to recent judicial reversals. In that sense,\nthe proposal can be viewed as a slight benefit to civil liberties by\nremoving a dangerous level of ambiguity in the law.''\n The need for a stronger material-support statute and its application\nto terrorist training camps were the subject of a hearing before the\nSenate Judiciary Committee on May 5, 2004. Witnesses included Chris\nWray, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of\nJustice; Dan Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal\nPolicy, Department of Justice; Gary Bald, Assistant Director,\nCounterterrorism Division, FBI; David Cole, law professor, Georgetown\nUniversity Law Center; and Paul Rosenzweig, Senior Legal Research\nFellow, Heritage Foundation.\n Subtitle G, Section 6604, Concealment of Terrorist Financing, this\nsection amends current law to prohibit concealing having provided\nfinancing while knowing that it has been or will be provided to\nterrorists. This provision first appeared as part of S. 1837, which was\nintroduced by Senator Grassley on November 6, 2003. The Senate\nJudiciary Committee held a hearing on the need to better combat\nterrorist financing on November 20, 2002. Witnesses included Robert J.\nConrad, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina; Jimmy\nGurule, Under Secretary for Enforcement, Department of Treasury; David\nAufhauser, General Counsel, Department of Treasury; Nathan Lewin, Lewin\n& Lewin, LLP; Allan Gerson, Professorial Lecturer In Honors, George\nWashington University; Jonathan Winer, Alston & Bird, LLP, member,\nCouncil on Foreign Relations; and Salam Al-Marayati, Executive\nDirector, Muslim Public Affairs Council.\n Subtitle H, section 6702, Punishment for Hoaxes about Terrorism or\nDeaths of U.S. Soldiers, this section imposes criminal penalties for\nconveying false or misleading information, perpetrating hoaxes, about\nterrorist crimes or the death or injury of a U.S. soldier under\ncircumstances where such information may reasonably be believed.\n The Justice Department has commented on the harm caused by false\ninformation and terrorist hoaxes. In its TFTA testimony on a parallel\nprovision to 6702 earlier this year, the Department noted:\n\n Since September 11, hoaxes have seriously disrupted\n people's lives and needlessly diverted law-enforcement and\n emergency-services resources. In the wake of the anthrax\n attacks in the fall of 2001, for example, a number of\n individuals mailed unidentified white powder, intending for\n the recipient to believe it was anthrax. Many people were\n inconvenienced, and emergency responders were forced to waste\n a great deal of time and effort. Similarly, in a time when\n those in uniform are making tremendous sacrifices for the\n country, several people have received hoax phone calls\n reporting the death of a loved one serving in Iraq or\n Afghanistan.\n\n And Professor Turley, also at the Terrorism Subcommittee hearing on\nTFTA, commented on the provision similar to 6702:\n\n This new provision would create a serious deterrent to a\n type of misconduct that routinely places the lives of\n emergency personnel at risk and costs millions of dollars in\n unrecouped costs for the federal and state governments. Since\n a terrorist seeks first and foremost to terrorize, there is\n precious [little] difference between a hoaxster and a\n terrorist when the former seeks to shut down a business or a\n community with a fake threat. . . . This provision responds\n to the increase in this form of insidious misconduct and\n correctly defines it as criminal conduct.\n\n The key elements of section 6702 were introduced as H.R. 3209 in the\n107th Congress by Representative Lamar Smith on November 11, 2001. H.R.\n3209 was the subject of a hearing before the House Subcommittee on\nCrime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security on November 7, 2001. Witnesses\nincluded\n\n[[Page S11997]]\n\nJames Jarboe, Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division, Domestic\nTerrorism, FBI; and James Reynolds, Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crime\nSection, Criminal Division, Department of Justice. H.R. 3209 was\nreported by the House Judiciary Committee on November 29, 2001. The\nJudiciary Committee issued Report No. 107-306 for H.R. 3209 on the same\nday. H.R. 3209 was unanimously approved by the House of Representatives\non December 12, 2001.\n A provision similar to 6702 also was introduced as H.R. 1678 in the\n108th Congress by Representative Lamar Smith on April 8, 2003. H.R.\n1678 was the subject of a hearing before the House Subcommittee on\nCrime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security on July 10, 2003. Witnesses\nincluded Susan Brooks, the U.S. Attorney for the Souther District of\nIndiana; James McMahon, Superintendent, New York State Police; and\nDanny Hogg, a target of a war-time hoax about a family member serving\nin Iraq. H.R. 1678 was ordered reported by the House Judiciary\nCommittee by voice vote on May 12, 2004. The Judiciary Committee issued\nReport No. 108-505 for H.R. 1678 on May 20, 2004. The key provisions of\nsection 6702 also were introduced as S. 2204 by Senator Hatch on March\n11, 2004.\n Subtitle H, section 6703, Increased Penalties for Obstruction of\nJustice in Terrorism Cases, this section increases from 5 years to 8\nyears the penalty for obstruction of justice in terror investigations.\nIt also instructs the Sentencing Commission to increase the guidelines\nrange for making false statements in relation to a terrorism\ninvestigation. A provision similar to section 6703, albeit increasing\nthe penalty to 10 years instead of just 8, has in the past been\nincluded as part of the above-described anti-hoax bills.\n Subtitle I, sections 6802 and 6803, Expanded WMD Prohibitions,\nsection 6802 expands the jurisdictional bases and scope of existing\nprohibitions on use of weapons of mass destruction, and includes\nchemical weapons within the prohibition for the first time. Section\n6803 amends the Atomic Energy Act to more broadly prohibit directly and\nwillfully participating in the development or production of any special\nnuclear material or atomic weapon outside of the United States. This\nsection also makes it a crime to participate in or provide material\nsupport to a nuclear weapons program, or other weapons of mass\ndestruction program, of a designated terrorist organization or state\nsponsor of terrorism. And the offense created by this provision applies\nextraterritorially.\n In his TFTA testimony about parallel provisions to sections 6802 and\n6803 before the Terrorism Subcommittee earlier this year, George\nWashington University law professor Jonathan Turley stated:\n\n [Section 6802, the WMD-statute provision] would close\n current loopholes in the interest of national security and\n does not materially affect civil liberty interests.\n [Section 6803] would criminalize the participation in\n programs involving special nuclear material, atomic weapons,\n or weapons of mass destruction outside of the United States.\n This new crime with extraterritorial jurisdiction is an\n obvious response to recent threats identified by this country\n and other allies like Pakistan. The obvious value of such a\n law would be hard to overstate. . . . It is important for the\n purposes of our extraterritorial enforcement efforts to have\n a specific crime on the books to address this form of\n misconduct.\n\n These sections are substantially the same as H.R. 2939, which was\nintroduced by Representative Forbes on July 25, 2003, and S. 2665,\nwhich was introduced by Senator Cornyn on July 15, 2004.\n Subtitle J, sections 6901-11, Prevention of Terrorist Access to\nSpecial Weapons, this subtitle is designed to deter the unlawful\npossession and use of certain weapons, Man-Portable Air Defense\nSystems, MANPADS, atomic weapons, radiological dispersal devices, and\nthe variola virus, smallpox, whose potential misuse are among the most\nserious threats to homeland security. MANPADS are portable,\nlightweight, surface-to-air missile systems designed to take down\naircraft. Typically they are able to be carried and fired by a single\nindividual. They are small and thus relatively easy to conceal and\nsmuggle. A single attack could kill hundreds of persons in the air and\nmany more on the ground. Atomic weapons or weapons designed to release\nradiation, ``dirty bombs,'' could be used by terrorists to inflict\nenormous loss of life and damage to property and the environment.\nVariola virus is the causative agent of smallpox, an extremely serious,\ncontagious, and often fatal disease. Variola virus is classified by the\nCDC as one of the biological agents that poses the greatest potential\nthreat for public-health impact and has a moderate to high potential\nfor large-scale dissemination. There are no legitimate private uses for\nthese weapons.\n Current law allows a maximum penalty of only 10 years in prison for\nthe unlawful possession of MANPADS or an atomic weapon. No statute\ncriminalizes mere possession of dirty bombs. Knowing, unregistered\npossession of the variola virus is subject only to a maximum penalty of\n5 years.\n Sections 6903-06 make unlawful possession of MANPADS, atomic weapons,\nradiological devices, or variola virus a crime with a mandatory minimum\nsentence of 25 years to life. Use, attempts to use, or possession and\nthreats to use these weapons are a crime with a mandatory minimum\nsentence of 30 years to life. Use of these weapons resulting in death\nis subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment. These\npenalties should especially help to deter middlemen and facilitators\nwho are essential to the transfer of these weapons.\n\n Section 6907 amends current law to add the criminal offenses created\nby this subtitle as federal wiretap predicates. Section 6908 amends\ncurrent law to include these new offenses in the definition of\n``Federal crime of terrorism.'' Section 6909 amends current law to\ninclude these new offenses in the definition of ``specified unlawful\nactivity'' for purposes of the money laundering statute. And section\n6910 amends the Arms Export Control Act by adding the offenses created\nby this subtitle to the provision specifying crimes for which a\nconviction or indictment is a ground for denying an arms-export\napplication.\n In his Terrorism Subcommittee testimony on TFTA earlier this year,\nProfessor Turley said the following about a provision parallel to\nsubtitle J:\n\n Given the enormous threats to our country from such\n weapons, these increased penalties are manifestly reasonable.\n . . . While it is certainly possible that a defendant could\n be in possession of a MANPADS as part of arms trafficking or\n some other motive than terrorism, this is clearly one of the\n most likely forms of terrorist conduct.\n\n Subtitle J is the same as S. 2664, which was introduced by Senator\nCornyn on July 15, 2004.\n Subtitle K, section 6952, Presumption of No Bail for Terrorists, this\nsection would add terrorist offenses to the list of offenses, such as\ndrug crimes, that are subject to the statutory presumption of pretrial\ndetention. Under current law, a criminal suspect will be denied bail in\nFederal court if the Government shows that there is a serious risk that\nthe suspect will flee, obstruct justice, or injure or threaten a\nwitness or juror. The judge must presume this showing is present if the\nsuspect is charged with a crime of violence, a drug crime carrying a\npotential sentence of 10 years or more, any crime that carries a\npotential sentence of life or the death penalty, or the suspect\npreviously has been convicted of two or more such offenses. This\nsection would add terrorist offenses that are subject to a maximum\npenalty of at least 10 years to this list, judges would be required to\npresume that facts requiring a denial of bail are present. This is only\na presumption, the terror suspect still could attempt to show that he\nis not a flight risk or potential threat to jurors or witnesses.\n The Justice Department testified as to the importance of this\nprovision at the Terrorism Subcommittee hearing on TFTA:\n\n Current law provides that federal defendants who are\n accused of serious crimes, including many drug offenses and\n violent crimes, are presumptively denied pretrial release\n under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e). But the law does not apply this\n presumption to those charged with many terrorism offenses. To\n presumptively detain suspected drug traffickers and violent\n criminals before trial, but not suspected terrorists, defies\n common sense.\n This omission has presented authorities real obstacles to\n prosecuting the war on terrorism, as Michael Battle, U.S.\n Attorney for the Western District of New York, testified\n before this subcommittee on June 22. In the recent\n ``Lackawanna Six'' terrorism case in\n\n[[Page S11998]]\n\n his district, prosecutors moved for pre-trial detention of\n the defendants, most of whom were charged with (and\n ultimately pled guilty to) providing material support to al\n Qaeda. It was expected that the defendants would oppose the\n motion. What followed was not expected, however. Because the\n law does not allow presumptive pre-trial detention in\n terrorism cases, prosecutors had to participate and prevail\n in a nearly three-week hearing on the issue of detention, and\n were forced to disclose a substantial amount of their\n evidence against the defendants prematurely, at a time when\n the investigation was still ongoing. Moreover, the presiding\n magistrate judge did in fact authorize the release of one\n defendant, who, it was later learned, had lied to the FBI\n about the fact that he had met with Usama Bin Laden in\n Afghanistan. The Lackawanna Six case illustrates the real-\n life problems the absence of presumptive pre-trial\n detention has posed to law enforcement. But this\n shortcoming in the law has also enabled terrorists to flee\n from justice altogether. For example, a Hezbollah\n supporter was charged long ago with providing material\n support to that terrorist organization. Following his\n release on bail, he fled the country.\n\n The suspect described above eventually was recaptured by the United\nStates six years after his escape. During that time, he was not a\nparticipant in a terrorist attack against the United States, but he\ncould have been.\n Law Professor Jonathan Turley also commented on the legislative\nancestor of section 6952 in his testimony at the Terrorism Subcommittee\nhearing on TFTA. He stated:\n\n [Section 6952] would create a presumption against bail for\n accused terrorists. Under this amendment, such a presumption\n could be rebutted by the accused, but the court would begin\n with a presumption that the accused represents a risk of\n flight or danger to society. This has been opposed by various\n groups, who point to the various terrorist cases where\n charges were dismissed or rejected, including the recent\n Detroit scandal where prosecutorial abuse was strongly\n condemned by the Court. I do not share the opposition to this\n provision because I believe that, while there have been\n abuses in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism\n cases, the proposed change sought by the Justice Department\n is neither unconstitutional nor unreasonable.\n This proposal would not impose a categorical denial of bail\n but a presumption against bail in terrorism cases. Congress\n has a clearly reasonable basis for distinguishing terrorism\n from other crimes in such a presumption. In my view, this\n would be clearly constitutional.\n While I have been critical of the policies of Attorney\n General John Ashcroft, I do not share the view of some of my\n colleagues in the civil liberties community in opposition to\n this change. There is currently a presumption against\n pretrial release for a variety of crimes in 18 U.S.C. Sec.\n 3142(e), including major drug crimes. It seems quite bizarre\n to have such a presumption in drug cases but not terrorism\n cases.\n\n Section 6952 is substantially the same as the main provision of H.R.\n3040, which was introduced by Representative Goodlatte on September 9,\n2003. I introduced the same bill as S. 1606 on September 10, 2003. S.\n1606 was the subject a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on\nTerrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security on June 22, 2004.\nWitnesses included Rachel Brand, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney\nGeneral, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice; Michael Battle,\nU.S. Attorney, Buffalo, NY; and James K. Robinson, former Assistant\nAttorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.\n I have spent considerable time reviewing this conference report and\nthoughtfully considering its provisions. I have serious reservations\nand agree with the many experts in this field who have urged a more\nthorough study of the intelligence community's problems and, likewise,\na careful matching of those problems to solutions. Though I appreciate\nthe hard work of the 9/11 Commission to help Americans understand how\n9/11 happened, the Commission's recommendations--on which it spent far\nless time than on the narrative it took some 18 months to assemble--are\nnot the final answer to the intelligence community's problems.\n I intend to support this conference package, noting the improvements\nthat have been made since Senate consideration, but I intend to closely\nmonitor its implementation. I also strongly believe that Congress needs\nto focus its attention next year on resolving the more difficult\nproblems in the intelligence community and, more broadly in the\nhomeland security arena, like immigration, not addressed in this\nlegislation. I will work with my colleagues in the House and Senate to\nensure this happens.\n Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the\nconference report accompanying S. 2845, the Intelligence Reform and\nTerrorism Prevention Act of 2004. I highlight three specific terrorism\nprevention provisions in the conference report, provisions on which I\nhave worked particularly hard to incorporate into this new bill,\nprovisions which I am pleased to see enacted into law. These provisions\nmake important improvements to our Federal criminal law, improvements\nthat are critical to strengthening our ability to fight and win the war\nagainst terrorism.\n The first two provisions involve strengthening our efforts to ensure\nthat weapons of mass destruction do not get into the hands of\nterrorists. Earlier this year, I introduced two bills, S. 2664 and S.\n2665. I am pleased to see that both of those bills have now largely\nbeen adopted by the conference.\n S. 2664, also known as the Prevention of Terrorist Access to\nDestructive Weapons Act, can be found at Title VI, Subtitle J of the\nnew bill reported by the conference. This provision creates new federal\nprohibitions and strengthens current federal prohibitions against the\npossession of four categories of destructive items: (1) Man-Portable\nAir Defense Systems, known as ``MANPADS'', (2) atomic weapons, (3)\nradiological dispersal devices, known as ``dirty bombs'', and (4) the\nvariola virus, the virus that causes smallpox. There is no legitimate\nprivate purpose for possessing these items. Moreover, the potential for\nterrorist use of these items is among the most serious threats to our\nhomeland security. By prohibiting the unauthorized possession of these\nitems, and by imposing strong penalties on violators, these provisions\nwill play a major role in preventing and disrupting future terrorist\nattacks, by depriving terrorists of access to some of the most highly\ndestructive and dangerous items civilized society has ever faced.\n Specifically, these provisions would punish unlawful possession as\nwell as unlawful production or transfer of these items, and includes\nattempts, threats, and conspiracies related to such acts. These\nprovisions generally impose tough, mandatory minimum sentences of 25\nyears, and in some cases impose sentences up to and including life\nimprisonment. Tough penalties like these are appropriate for the most\ndangerous threats our nation faces, and that is exactly the kind of\nthreat that these items pose. We may not be able to deter the most\ndedicated of our terrorist enemies around the world from wanting to\nharm us, but we can deter individuals who serve at lower levels in\nterrorist organizations, and we can deter those who might try to profit\nfrom terrorism by supplying terrorists with such items.\n\n I would like to spend just a brief moment highlighting the particular\nproblem of MANPADS. MANPADS are lightweight, surface-to-air missile\nsystems designed to take down aircraft. MANPADS fire an explosive or\nincendiary rocket or missile equipped with a guidance system designed\nto target low-flying aircraft, typically around the time of landing or\ndeparture. They can be carried and fired by a single individual, from a\ndistance. Because they are small, they are easy to conceal and smuggle.\nThey are relatively cheap--ranging from $25,000 to $80,000 each--take\nonly seconds to prepare, require minimal training, and have a flight\ntime of just three to ten seconds.\n By some estimates, there are at least 500,000 MANPADS in circulation\naround the globe. Although most MANPADS are thought to be under the\ncontrol of an established military, as many as a thousand MANPADS are\nbelieved by some to be in the hands of al-Qaeida and other terrorist\ngroups. Coalition forces reportedly captured nearly 5,600 missiles\nduring the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Donald\nRumsfeld reported last year that MANPADS ``are widely available in the\nworld and do have the ability to shoot down aircraft and helicopters,\nand from time to time it happens in various locations.'' He said there\nare ``enormous numbers'' of such weapons still in Iraq--``have to be\nmore than hundreds. . . . There are weapon caches all over that\ncountry. They were using schools, hospitals, mosques to hide weapons.''\n A 2000 State Department report stated that ``one of the leading\ncauses of\n\n[[Page S11999]]\n\nloss of life in commercial aviation worldwide has been from MANPADS . .\n. attacks, with over 30 aircraft lost.'' According to a Congressional\nResearch Service report issued last year, there have been at least 36\nknown missile attacks on commercial planes in the last 25 years; 35 of\nthose incidents took place in war-torn areas, mainly in Africa. For\nexample, in 1983 and 1984, Angolan rebels shot down two Boeing 737s. In\nthe first incident, all 130 people on board died, but in the second\nattack, the plane managed to land without fatalities after being hit at\nan altitude of 8,000 feet. In 1998, a Boeing 727 was shot down in the\nDemocratic Republic of Congo, killing 41. And in November 2002, in\nMombasa, Kenya, two missiles were launched against a chartered Israeli\nBoeing 767 just after take off for Tel Aviv, Israel. The pilot reported\nspotting smoke trails near his plane, and some of the 261 passengers\nsaid they heard an explosion. The attempted attack has been linked to\nal-Qaida, and occurred on the same day as an al-Qaida-linked bombing of\na nearby resort hotel. Shoulder-launched missiles also brought down\nseveral smaller aircraft during the invasion of Iraq, including a\nChinook helicopter that crashed last November, killing 16. In January,\nan Air Force C-5 transport plane carrying 63 troops was struck by a\nsurface-to-air missile as it left Baghdad Airport, but it landed\nsafely.\n Accordingly, MANPADS are widely recognized as one of the greatest\nthreats to civil aviation today. And just last year, the President\nagreed with other world leaders at a G-8 conference to a series of\ncontrols on MANPADS. S. 2664 is a critical part of the President's\neffort to control and combat the proliferation of MANPADS, and I am\npleased that the conference has seen fit to incorporate the provisions\nof that bill into its report.\n In addition to MANPADS, S. 2664 also targets three other destructive\ndevices. No one questions the obvious danger posed by allowing atomic\nweapons and radiological dispersion devices, or dirty bombs, to get\ninto the hands of terrorists. In addition, the variola virus is the\ncausative agent of smallpox--an extremely serious, contagious, and\noften fatal disease. In fact, the Centers for Disease Control has\nclassified variola as one of the biological agents that poses the\ngreatest threat for public health impact. It has a high potential for\nlarge-scale dissemination. Accordingly, it may be attractive to\nterrorists as a biological weapon. These provisions, I am pleased to\nsee, have also been incorporated into the conference report.\n I will just add a quick word about S. 2665, also known as the Weapons\nof Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act. The provisions of S.\n2665 can be found at Title VI, Subtitle I of the new bill. Those\nprovisions generally expand current federal criminal prohibitions\nagainst the use and proliferation of WMD, both domestically and abroad,\nand fills a number of gaps in current law.\n They amend the current federal weapons of mass destruction statute by\ncriminalizing all WMD attacks on foreign government property in the\nUnited States, as well as U.S. government property, and expanding the\ncurrent prohibition on the use of WMD to include any acts affecting\ninterstate commerce in a variety of ways. They also amend the federal\nbiological agents and toxins law by extending the prohibition to\npossession by agents of terrorist nations or terrorist organizations.\n With respect to foreign WMD threats, the bill amends a provision of\nthe Atomic Energy Act to prohibit participation outside of the United\nStates in the unauthorized development as well as production of nuclear\nmaterial, and creates a new criminal code section to forbid the\nprovision of material support to, or any other participation in, any\nWMD program of a terrorist organization or terrorist nation.\n The third and final provision I want to highlight involves the\nperpetration of cruel hoaxes against the families of military personnel\nand terrorism hoaxes generally. I am pleased to be an original co-\nsponsor of S. 2204, also known as the Stop Terrorist and Military\nHoaxes Act, and pleased to see that provisions of those bills have been\nincorporated into the conference report.\n It is disturbing to think that anyone would want to engage in the\nfalse impersonation of a military officer in order to harass, terrify,\nor otherwise cause mental distress to military families. I cannot\nfathom why a human being would want to conduct a crank call to the\nfamily of a member of the Armed Forces and falsely inform them that\ntheir loved one has been killed in the line of duty.\n Yet during the recent war in Iraq, that is precisely what happened.\nSeveral families reportedly received hoax telephone calls informing\nthem that a family member serving the military in Iraq had been killed\nor captured. Not surprisingly, the families who received these calls\nwere terribly distressed. It must have been a cruel experience indeed\nto have to wait and work to confirm that their family member was\nactually alive and safe.\n Hoaxes against military families and terrorism hoaxes must be\npunished, because they utilize scarce resources that need to be focused\non combating terrorism, and distract the attention of our law\nenforcement and our military away from our terrorist enemies. But\nthat's not the only reason. Hoaxes are cruel. They are mean-spirited.\nAnd they can be very dangerous. I want to read a portion of a letter\nfrom one dutiful U.S. serviceman to his uncle. The letter is dated\nApril 18, 2003, and it reads: ``One guy died bringing me a sat. phone\nso I could call Dad to let him know I was alive. It made me think of\n`Saving Private Ryan.' Was it worth his life and the risk of the others\nto bring me a phone? I know it was a relief to all of you to hear I was\nokay. Now I feel I must make my life worth his. I don't know if I can\ndo that.'' No one should have to die in the line of duty in order to\ncorrect a hoax. And no one should have to live with the emotional pain\nthat this serviceman so eloquently describes in this poignant letter.\n Under current law, acts of impersonation are illegal only if the\nperson demands or obtains something of value from the victim. That does\nnot include military family hoaxes like the ones described here. In\naddition, many terrorism hoaxes fall outside the definitions of current\nlaw. S. 2204 fills these major gaps in the law, and I am pleased to see\nthese provisions incorporated into the conference report.\n Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise to express my approval of this\nmuch-delayed 9/11 intelligence reform bill. As a conferee on this\nimportant legislation, I am proud of what we produced. The terrible\nconsequences of the 9/11 attack will never be forgotten, but with the\npassage of this bill future generations will be safer from terrorist\nattack.\n On a personal basis, I, like so many from my State of New Jersey and\nour region, knew people who perished, families who were torn apart,\npeople who still feel the pain of their loss.\n I want to thank Senators Collins and Lieberman, and Representatives\nHoekstra and Harman for their efforts to get a strong bill. This was a\nroller coaster conference, but well worth the effort.\n The 9/11 Commissioners also deserve our appreciation for their steady\nleadership and thoughtful input during this process.\n Last, and most importantly, I want to salute the 9/11 families for\ntheir dedication to getting this legislation done. I especially want to\nthank the Steering Committee of 9/11 Families and the so-called\n``Jersey Girls.'' Had it not been for you 3 years ago, the 9/11\nCommission would have never been established. And were it not for you\nnow, this bill would have never passed.\n Mr. President, we can finally look the 9/11 families in the eye and\nsay: ``We have delivered.''\n This 9/11 bill is the most significant piece of intelligence\nlegislation we have passed in 50 years.\n The last major reform was the National Security Act of 1947, signed\ninto law by President Truman.\n While the process of compromise resulted in a bill that did not adopt\nall of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, this new law will\nbring significant improvements in our intelligence system for the\nbetter.\n Mr. President, the 9/11 Commission recognized a need to have one\nperson in charge of our intelligence community, to prevent the kind of\nmiscommunica-\n\n[[Page S12000]]\n\ntion that occurred before 9/11. This bill addresses this important\nissue by creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with real\nauthority over America's 15 intelligence-gathering agencies.\n This bill gives this intelligence director principal authority over\nthe estimated $40 billion intelligence budget and gives that person the\npower to establish clear priorities for the intelligence community. The\nbill makes clear: the buck stops with the DNI.\n This bill also creates a National Counterterrorism Center that will\nlead our counterterrorism efforts. It will be staffed by terrorism\nexperts from the CIA, FBI, and the Pentagon. The Center will coordinate\nterrorism intelligence from throughout the government, breaking down\nthe walls that have too frequently prevented agencies from sharing\nimportant information in a timely manner.\n The bill bolsters border security, particularly improving aviation,\nair cargo, and maritime security. It also strengthens border\nsurveillance, increases the number of border patrol agents and\nimmigration and customs enforcements investigators.\n This bill also has some provisions to safeguard our civil liberties\nby establishing a ``Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.''\nAlthough I do not believe that this board has quite the independence\nand power that I wanted, I am hopeful that the Board will help ensure\nthat new regulations and policies do not violate privacy rights or\ncivil liberties.\n Mr. President, despite the bipartisan support for this bill, it has\nfaced a difficult road. To be honest, we were ready for a vote on\nNovember 20. A strong majority of the conference committee approved\nthis bill and we were ready to go. I signed my name to the conference\nreport at that time.\n But later that same day, we found out that the House Republican\nleadership would not move forward on the bill. The reason? Because two\nRepublican Congressmen didn't like the conference report.\n Mr. President, in my view, the delay in passing this bill was\nunnecessary and unwise. Every day this bill was dragged out was a day\nthat made our communities less safe.\n The House Republican leadership nearly snatched defeat from the jaws\nof victory. But thankfully, in the end the families and the 9/11\nCommission made their voices heard, and we have reached this milestone\ntoday.\n Mr. President, my home State, New Jersey, lost 700 of its citizens on\n9/11. There is little we in Congress can do to heal their pain. But\ntoday, at least we can do something to help prevent such a tragedy in\nthe future.\n Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Yesterday was the anniversary of Pearl Harbor,\nwhich is remembered as one of the greatest intelligence failures in our\ncountry's history. The desire to prevent future Pearl Harbors helped\nlead to the creation of our national intelligence community in 1947.\n In the 15 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there has been a\ngrowing awareness that our national intelligence community is in need\nof serious reform. Despite frequent reviews of the intelligence\ncommunity's failures and structural problems--including the Hart-Rudman\nCommission; the Gilmore Commission; the Bremer Commission; the\nCongressional Investigation of 9/11; and the 9/11--there has been\ncontinued reluctance and resistance to reform.\n Recent intelligence failures--most notably the failure to detect the\nSeptember 11 plot, and the massive intelligence failures that led us to\nwar in Iraq--have given new exposure to the problem and new momentum to\nreform efforts. I am extremely pleased that we are now in a position to\nenact serious intelligence reform legislation for the first time in\nover 50 years. I consider this legislation to be one of the most\nimportant enactments of my 18 years in the U.S. Senate. There are\nseveral elements of this legislation which warrant more detailed\ncomment.\n One of the most important aspects of this legislation is the element\nthat Senator Roberts was just discussing--the need to centralize the\nintelligence agencies is not an end in itself, but a platform from\nwhich we can move to decentralize.\n As the United States military transformed itself from the military of\nSan Juan Hill and the World Wars, it first needed to centralize, under\nthe National Security Act of 1947, consolidating the secretaries of the\nArmy and Navy into the Department of Defense, and then to decentralize,\nunder the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 into the joint commands of the\nmodern military. Our intelligence community needs to transform itself\nand move from being designed around functions--such as electronic\neavesdropping, or satellite surveillance--to a focus on missions, such\nas counterterrorism or counterproliferation.\n This legislation makes the appropriate and necessary first step of\ncentralizing the intelligence community under a Director of National\nIntelligence. It also lays the foundation for the next step, which is\ndecentralizing the intelligence community through the establishment of\nmission-based intelligence centers. Two are established by statute--\nCounterterrorism and Counterproliferation--and the legislation gives\nthe DNI the power to establish other centers, to focus on those current\nor emerging threats he or she deems to be of priority importance.\n Among the shortcomings referred to earlier, one of the first and\nforemost is obviously an underdeveloped capacity for gathering human\nintelligence. Our intelligence community has come to rely too heavily\non electronic eavesdropping and satellite surveillance, and human\nintelligence has been neglected. A case could be made that both the war\nin Afghanistan and the war in Iraq were the products of our inadequate\nhuman intelligence capabilities. We must make a major effort to rebuild\nour capabilities, and this legislation begins to address that problem.\n One of the most important elements of a human intelligence program is\na corps of skilled and dedicated linguists. Unfortunately, while our\nintelligence agencies still possess a more-than-adequate number of\nRussian speakers, they lack individuals proficient in the Middle\nEastern and Central Asian languages that are of obvious current\nimportance. This legislation, along with language in the Defense\nauthorization bill that establishes a Reserve Officers Training Corps\ncounterpart for the intelligence community, helps to address this\nproblem as well.\n The third intelligence-related item deserving particular attention is\nthe issue of excessive classification. I want to comment senator Wyden\nand Senator Lott, who were very involved in this aspect of the\nlegislation. Our intelligence community has developed an unhealthy\nobsession with secrecy, and this has often led to bad analysis and bad\ndecisions. This obsession with secrecy prevented intelligence agencies\nthat had knowledge of various elements of the 9/11 plot from\n``connecting the dots'' and realizing that a major terrorist operation\nwas being plotted on American soil. This obsession with secrecy\ncontributed to inadequate scrutiny of intelligence relating to Iraq,\nand as a result we went to war because of weapons that did not exist,\nand terrorist connections that appear to have been imaginary.\n This obsession with secrecy poses a serious and continuing threat to\nour national security. As the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan\nsaid, ``Secrecy is for losers.'' If we do not want to lose in our\nstruggle with the various threats we face today, we must abandon this\nunhealthy obsession. This legislation addresses this problem by\ndirecting that more rational guidelines for intelligence classification\nbe established, and that an independent board be empowered to review\nthese decisions. This is an important first step toward abandoning this\ndangerous obsession, and making sure that secrecy decisions are made\nfor reasons of national security, rather than agencies trying to bury\ntheir mistakes.\n Madam President, what we are doing today is an important step, but it\nis not by any means the last step. Some of these steps are rather\ntangential to the issue of intelligence reform. For example, this\nlegislation includes a provision requiring face-to-face interviews with\nvisa applicants. If we are to implement this provision effectively we\nmust seriously consider increasing the capacity of our consular\nservice. Currently, in Brazil, visa applicants must travel to one of\nthree large cities in order to get a visa for travel to the United\nStates.\n Since Brazil is the size of the continental United States, and these\nthree\n\n[[Page S12001]]\n\ncities are located close together, this is the equivalent of telling\nAmericans who wish to secure a visa to Mexico that they must first\ntravel to either Dallas, Chicago, or Cleveland. While it is probably\nnot cost-effective to open new consulates in every city that might need\nvisa services, we should at lest open more visa offices, so that these\ninterviews can be conducted without unduly inconveniencing our foreign\nguests.\n This legislation also includes a section addressing the United\nStates' relationship with Saudi Arabia. It points out, and I quote,\nthat ``the Government of Saudi Arabia has not always responded to\npromptly or fully to United States requests for assistance in the\nglobal war on Islamist terrorism,'' and particularly cities the Saudi\ngovernment's inattention to the problem of terrorist financing. I would\nadd that we have compelling evidence to believe that Saudi interests\nactually played a role in financing insurgents in Iraq and earlier the\n9/11 hijackers. The extent of Saudi involvement in 9/11 was detailed in\na twenty-seven page section of our 2002 joint House-Senate Intelligence\nCommittees report on the attacks of September 11, 2001. Unfortunately,\nevery one of those twenty-seven pages was classified. This means that\nthe American people have, in that and other instances, been denied\nimportant information about our relationship with Saudi Arabia. I hope\nthat this intelligence reform legislation calling for more dialogue on\nthe U.S.-Saudi relationship is heeded, and that increased attention to\nthis relationship will lead to greater transparency and candor.\n Madam President, as I said in my farewell speech yesterday, in a\nquote from Winston Churchill, ``This is not the end, nor is it the\nbeginning of the end, but it is perhaps the end of the beginning''.\nThis Churchillian wisdom also applies to what we are accomplishing\ntoday. There is more that still needs to be done as we move beyond the\nend of the beginning of intelligence reform.\n Let me start with the President's responsibilities. The President\nwill have the responsibility for making a series of critical\nappointments, and he must appoint creative, dynamic and extremely hard-\nworking people who can be effective in the challenging new roles that\nwe are creating. He must also ensure that the people he appoints\npromote a value system that is conducive to open, honest and effective\nintelligence gathering and analysis. And he must also manage the\nrelationships between the new DNI and existing department and agency\nheads--most notably the Secretary of Defense--in order to ensure that\nthe goals of intelligence reform are realized.\n The new DNI will also have tremendous responsibility. He or she will\nhave to establish clear priorities for the intelligence community, and\nthis will be reflected in the National Intelligence Centers that are\ncreated to work, alongside the National Counterterrorism and\nCounterproliferation Centers. The DNI must also revise current budget\npriorities, such as the research and development budgets, and establish\ncommunity-wide personnel policies that support the recruitment,\ntraining and retention of effective intelligence community personnel.\n Finally, there will be a responsibility here on the Congress. In the\nSenate we have taken steps to reform our oversight of intelligence.\nTerms limits on the Intelligence Committee have been removed. By\ncreating a new appropriation subcommittee for intelligence we have\nfreed the intelligence budget from its previously unbreakable link to\nthe defense budget. These are good starts. But we will also have to\nlook at the culture of the congressional oversight committees, and make\nsure that they direct their attention to the front windshield of the\nfuture, and the threats that are coming at us, and spend relatively\nless of their time on looking through the rear view mirror at accidents\nthat have already occurred.\n By its nature, the intelligence community is going to create\naccidents from time to time. They need to be reviewed. But we cannot\nafford for them to consume all of our oversight responsibility. It is\nin the future that new threats are to be found, and it is our\nresponsibility to be able to assure the American people that our\nintelligence community is capable of identifying those threats, and of\nproviding information to the appropriate decision makers, in order to\nprevent those threats from becoming the next Pearl Harbor, or the next\n9/11.\n Madam President, in conclusion, I would like to note that this bill\nwould not have been possible without an extraordinary effort by dozens\nof members of Congress, the Joint House-Senate intelligence inquiry\nmembers and staff, the 9/11 Commission, and, particularly, the families\nof the victims of 9/11.\n Today is a celebration of the success of urgently needed reform,\nfinally overcoming the inertia of the status quo. But, this is only the\nend of the beginning. The President, the Congress, those Americans who\ndo and will serve the intelligence community, bear the responsibility\nof ensuring that the promise of enhanced security through reformed\nintelligence is achieved. The fulfillment of this promise will be\nneither quick nor easy. The most important undertakings seldom are. But\nthe goal is worthy of our most steadfast commitment to its attainment.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a list of my\nstaff members who worked so hard on this bill over so many months be\nprinted in the Record at this point.\n There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in\nthe Record, as follows:\n\n Michael, Bopp, Jane Alonso, Deborah Barger, Don Bumgardner,\n Jen Burita, Elissa Davidson, Ann Fisher, Jason Foster,\n Jennifer Gagnon, Priscilla Hanley, Johanna Hardy, Jennifer\n Hemingway, Keith Janssen, David Kass, Bruce Kyle.\n Gordon Lederman, Lesley Leger-Kelley, James McKay, Bill\n Murray, Jon Nass, Amy Newhouse, Bill Priestap, Alec Rogers,\n Kate Scontras, Amber Smith, Heather Smith, Cornelius\n Southall, Michael Stern, Sarah Taylor, Monica Wickey, and\n Keith Herrington.\n\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I also want to list the conferees on this\nbill. Contrary, perhaps, to the implications of what we have just\nheard, this was an extraordinarily open conference, where Democrats and\nRepublicans negotiated side by side in every single meeting. It was a\nbipartisan effort.\n Senators Lott, Roberts, Voinovich, Coleman, Sununu, DeWine, Levin,\nRockefeller, Durbin, Graham of Florida, and Senator Lautenberg were the\nSenate conferees on this important bill. I thank each of them\npersonally for how hard they worked. Each of them contributed greatly\nto the final product, and I am very grateful for their support.\n I wish to also respond to the concept that somehow this issue was\nrushed. The fact is there have been numerous reports and commissions\nthat have urged intelligence reform going back to 1954. Over and over\nagain, problems were identified in our intelligence structure, even as\nour country became more vulnerable to asymmetric threats, such as\nterrorist groups.\n The 9/11 Commission, which did, in my view, an outstanding job,\nreviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents, interviewed more\nthan 1,200 individuals, held 19 days of hearings, and took public\ntestimony from 160 witnesses. Congress held 44 hearings on the 9/11\nCommission's report and recommendations.\n The Governmental Affairs Committee, which I am honored to chair,\nalone held 8 days of hearings and marked up this legislation for 2 full\ndays. We were on the Senate floor for nearly 2 weeks. We considered\nhundreds of amendments to this bill. The conference on the bill lasted\nnearly 2 months and received a great deal of attention.\n I note that we have made substantive changes to only two provisions\nin the conference report since November 20 when the conference\nagreement almost came to the Senate floor.\n The November 20 language was widely circulated. It included being\nprovided to the staff of the distinguished senior Senator from West\nVirginia.\n I assert that this was an extraordinarily inclusive process, and all\nthe Members of the Senate have had ample time to review the conference\nreport since, with just two exceptions, which have been highly\npublicized. It is the same language, for the most part, except for\ntechnical changes, as we reported it on November 20.\n I wanted to make those points. I know there are other Members\ndesiring\n\n[[Page S12002]]\n\nto speak. I will yield the floor, but I reserve the remainder of my\ntime.\n Finally, Mr. President, I note that the Senator from New Hampshire,\nMr. Sununu, wishes to speak in favor of the conference report. I am\nprepared to yield him some of my time, but I am not certain how much\ntime I have remaining. If I could be informed by the Presiding Officer\nas to how much time I have remaining, that would be helpful.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 10 minutes remaining.\n Ms. COLLINS. I will yield at the appropriate time 5 of my remaining\nminutes to the Senator from New Hampshire. I thank the Chair.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.\n Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes of the\ntime of the Senator from West Virginia.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.\n Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise to state that I\nenthusiastically support this legislation. If I had to sum up in one\nsentence what would be one of the most powerful statements as to why we\nneed to pass this legislation, it would be from the television\ninterview of Governor Kean, the Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, when\nhe said: This bill will pass. It is just a question of will it pass now\nor will it pass after the next terrorist attack.\n His statement was full of so much meaning because of all the\ndeliberation and the factfinding that the 9/11 Commission had brought\nto the light of day in showing how the intelligence apparatus of this\ncountry had failed us in alerting that we were about to be attacked.\n We do not have the luxury of two big oceans protecting us as we have\nhad in the past, for we now have a new kind of enemy who deals with\nstealthiness. Our ability to protect ourselves is having the\ninformation ahead of time so we can thwart the attack.\n It was also very revealing in the 9/11 Commission Report when they\nconcluded that we are safer than September 11, but we are not safe.\n I commend the chair of the committee and her ranking member, as they\nhave done an extraordinary job in the crucible of legislative give and\ntake to stand on their principles and to insist on those principles\nthat a reorganization be done under which there would be accountability\ninstead of the separate and multifaceted intelligence communities that\nwe have seen in the past that do not talk to each other.\n My hat is off to the chair of the committee and to the ranking\nmember. My hat is also off to them because they have shown legislative\ndealmaking at its best. They have done it with aplomb, with respect,\nwith bipartisanship, with dignity, and that is the standard that has\nbeen so much a part of the historical tradition of the Senate. And the\ntwo of them, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, have shown us that\nstandard. This Senator from Florida is very grateful.\n There will be other issues that we have to address in the future.\nSome of these additional questions on immigration are absolutely\ncritical to our future protection, and we can do that in the context of\na big immigration bill. We simply cannot be safe if thousands of people\ncontinue to come across the Mexican border, as we have heard in\ntestimony in our Commerce Committee--specifically with our chairman,\nJohn McCain--having witnesses telling us how many people are coming\nacross the Mexico-Arizona border each week. It absolutely staggers the\nimagination how we can have this porous border and protect ourselves\nfrom this new threat of terrorism. So we have to deal with that issue.\n In part, this committee has dealt with it in giving new border agents\nand Customs officials, and for that I am grateful. With more coastline\nthan any other State, save for the State of Alaska, my State of Florida\nis a place that is ripe for infiltration, and we need that extra\nprotection.\n I am looking forward to the continuing debate and offering some\nobservations from the perspective of the State of Florida as we get\ninto that debate. But for the time being, the reorganization of the\nintelligence apparatus, where there will be accountability and where\nthere will be a centralized budget, is very important for the future\nprotection of this country. That is why I support this bill, and I will\nbe voting for this bill when we vote on it today.\n Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Byrd, I yield 5 minutes of his\ntime to Senator Lieberman, and I would then yield back Senator Byrd's\ntime, except for 5 minutes under Senator Byrd's control.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). Is there objection?\n Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I do not understand. I ask the Presiding\nOfficer to advise the Senate with regard to the current parliamentary\nsituation. When I left the floor earlier today, there was an informal\narrangement that Senator Stevens and Senator Warner would follow\nSenator Byrd. That is my recollection. I yield to the managers.\n Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, do I have the floor?\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair can clarify. There is no specific\norder to that effect. Does the Senator from Florida wish to clarify his\nunanimous consent request?\n Mr. NELSON of Florida. To my good friend, the chairman of the Armed\nServices Committee, I am yielding back Senator Byrd's time. He still\nhas time left. I stated specific parameters, 5 minutes for Senator\nLieberman and the additional 5 minutes that I stated.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I do want to clarify apart from this\nissue that I believe there was an informal--I thought we had made it\nformal--understanding that Senator Stevens would follow Senator Byrd's\nremarks, and Senator Warner would follow Senator Stevens' remarks. But\nall the Senator from Florida is trying to do--and I very much\nappreciate his endorsement of the bill--is to yield back the remainder\nof Senator Byrd's time at the request of Senator Byrd.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.\n Mr. STEVENS. Parliamentary inquiry: It is my understanding that part\nof the time was to be yielded to another Senator.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The request was to allot Senator Lieberman 5\nminutes of the remaining time.\n Mr. STEVENS. At this time?\n Mr. NELSON of Florida. No. If the Chair will clarify my statement.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. I believe I just did. The request was to yield\nback the remainder of Senator Byrd's time with the exception of 5\nminutes to be granted to Senator Lieberman and 5 minutes retained by\nSenator Byrd. So there would be 10 minutes reserved on the minority's\ntime.\n Without objection, it is so ordered.\n The Senator from Alaska.\n Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I rise to discuss this national\nintelligence reform bill with some reluctance, because as a member of\nthe Governmental Affairs Committee I was also involved, as the chairman\nof the Appropriations Committee, in the enormous omnibus bill and I\nhave not been able to pay the attention to this bill that I should\nhave. I regret that some of my feelings about the bill reflect the fact\nI was not there to participate in those meetings. I do commend my\ncolleagues in both Houses of the Congress for their hard work in coming\nto an agreement on this bill. As with every conference, each voice is\nheard but none can dominate, and compromise is absolutely required.\n I commend Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman for their attention\nto the concerns of the people of this Nation and for this bill that\naddresses those concerns in the wake of September 11. I do not believe\nthis bill fully resolved all of those concerns, but the American people\nshould know that Congress has indeed passed a bill to reform our\nintelligence community.\n This process has been a long and arduous one. I voted for the Senate\nversion of this bill, when it passed the Senate, with reservations. I\nwas concerned about the needs of the warfighters and the publication of\nthe top line numbers of the intelligence community and the broad\nauthorities granted to the Director of National Intelligence. It was my\nhope that these concerns would be addressed, and they have been\npartially met by this bill.\n I still believe that some of the sections of the bill grant such\nauthorities\n\n[[Page S12003]]\n\nto the Director of National Intelligence that place him or her above\nthose of any member of the President's Cabinet, and by passing this\nbill we will have created an intelligence czar whose authorities will\nfar exceed any governmental official other than the President himself.\nI believe this should be of some concern to every Member of the Senate,\nand Senator Byrd has outlined some of those concerns.\n This Director of National Intelligence is not an elected official and\nis not directly accountable to the American people. The Director of\nNational Intelligence will only be able to be reined in by the\nPresident himself, and that, I believe, puts an overwhelming burden on\nthe President of overseeing this official and the actions of the\nDirector of National Intelligence on a daily basis. No one else has any\nway to control this official.\n The intelligence community has also provided support to the\nPresident, to the administration itself, and to the Congress. I fear\nthis bill goes far beyond that role. When an individual or an\norganization is given such broad authorities, the lines between\npolicymaking and information gathering become blurred. This is\nparticularly true in the intelligence field, and I continue to have\nreservations as to how this new organization will integrate these\nduties with the overall governmental structure and particularly with\nthose of the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security.\n\n These are extraordinary authorities that will be given to the\nDirector of National Intelligence. That person will exercise power far\nbeyond those I have seen even in wartime. In my years in the Senate, I\nhave known 12 Directors of Central Intelligence. It has been my\nprivilege to know each one of them personally. My roots in the\nintelligence community go back to World War II when I flew the OSS\nplane in China. Since then, I have had a great deal of interest in and\ncontact with members of the intelligence community and continue to have\na great interest in the operations of intelligence for our National\nGovernment.\n Clearly, I believe I know a little history of intelligence. I\nchallenge anyone to name any official of a friendly or adversarial\nintelligence service over the past century who has been granted the\nbroad authority that this National Intelligence Director will have.\n What this requires, in my judgment, is persistent oversight by the\nCongress. Each committee of the Congress with oversight of intelligence\nmatters must scrutinize the actions of the intelligence community, and\nin particular this Director, to ensure there are checks and balances in\nthis system that are required by our Constitution. We must aggressively\nremain attuned to assure that none of the freedoms we celebrate are\nhampered by this new entity or its Director.\n Now, having said that, as I informed the President previously, I will\nvote for this bill, but it is my intention to ask that each general\ncounsel in the intelligence community and the Department of Defense\nreport to the next Congress, at least on a periodic basis, their\ninterpretation and the subsequent implementation of this legislation in\ntheir Departments to ensure that these concerns of mine and those that\nhave been expressed by other Senators on the floor do not come to\nfruition.\n Again, this is a bill that is needed, authority that is needed in the\npost-9/11 period. I believe still, as I have stated repeatedly on the\nfloor, there are many Members of the Senate who do not realize how much\nhas been accomplished since 9/11, and I assume this bill will be\ninterpreted in terms of the intelligence system as it exists today and\nnot based upon the intelligence system that existed on September 11,\n2001.\n I thank the Chair.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.\n The Senator from Virginia.\n Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the Presiding Officer to advise me\nwhen there is but 5 minutes remaining on my time such that I can allow\nthat time to be used by another Senator, and I would hope the managers\nwould yield to Senator Cornyn, if that is possible.\n Before my distinguished colleague from Alaska departs the floor, I\nassociate myself with his goals in this forthcoming legislation and\nwould like to cosponsor that with him. I think that is very much\nneeded. I do not join or do that in any criticism of the distinguished\nwork done by the managers of this bill. They certainly were given a\ndaunting challenge to perform in a very short period of time, but I\nhope the managers and others recognize the need for oversight, perhaps\nin some respect by my committee, the Intelligence Committee, and the\nGovernmental Affairs Committee, because of the enormity of the power\nthat this one individual has.\n As it relates to my specific concerns, that is of the chain of\ncommand and the operation of the new Director to involve himself in\nsome way in those decision processes, as that order comes down from the\nPresident through the JCS to the combatant commanders, we have to watch\nthe execution of those powers very carefully.\n So I commend my distinguished colleague, and I wish to thank our\ndistinguished majority leader for the very openminded and fair manner\nin which he dealt with those of us who had some concerns about this\nthroughout. He was joined, I think in some respects, by the Democratic\nleader. Together with Senator Stevens, Senator Byrd, Senator Sessions,\nSenator Kyl, Senator Allard, Senator Cornyn, and Senator Burns, and I\nwill let them speak for themselves, but I thought their contributions\nto this Senator, and I think from the conversations with the Senator\nfrom Alaska, were very helpful as I began to work my way through what I\nperceived as my responsibility with regard to this legislation in the\ncapacity as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.\n On Monday this week, I joined, at his invitation, Chairman Duncan\nHunter of the House Armed Services Committee, indicating that I planned\nto support this conference report, and that was predicated largely on\nthe achievements of Chairman Hunter and, to some extent, myself and\nothers working with the managers in providing a deletion of certain\nwords in the conference report and in their place providing others\nthat, in my judgment, give a greater degree of protection to the time-\ntested concept of chain of command within our military forces.\n Again, I have been working, and I think it is important for the\nlegislative history to set forth a chronology, on the chain of command\nlanguage over several months. I am particularly grateful to the Vice\nPresident, with whom I had consultations, and his staff, with whom I\nhad continued conversations, for their guidance and assistance on this\nvital issue as I worked with Chairman Duncan Hunter. The issue was of\ngreat importance. I believe, as a matter of fact, it was critical that\na clear record be laid out of the chronology of events that led to this\nnew language.\n\n Back in August and September of this year, when intelligence reform\nlegislation was being developed, the White House, on September 16,\nprovided draft legislation to the Congress. The process was somewhat\ninformal. I mean some of the processes throughout this legislative\nconsideration were somewhat unusual. But, anyway, they provided draft\nlegislation. It suggested legislation contain--and I refer to section 6\non preservation of authority. That is another definition of chain of\ncommand. This legislation would ensure the protection of the chain of\ncommand as proposed by the President. The bottom line is Cabinet\nofficers remain responsible for managing their departments and would\nremain accountable for the actions of their departments.\n I was advised at that time that this preservation of authority\nsection was drafted, indeed, with the personal involvement of the\nPresident and that he had expressed to his immediate associates the\nimportance of this concept to the President.\n Legislation reported to the Senate by the Government Affairs\nCommittee did not include this section. That, of course, was the\nchronology that the managers can provide if they deem necessary.\n The administration felt strongly enough to appeal for the inclusion\nof this provision of preservation of authority language during the\nSenate floor consideration of the bill. And in\n\n[[Page S12004]]\n\nthe Statement of Administration Policy, dated September 28, 2004, the\nadministration urged the Senate to include section 6 of their proposed\nlegislation in the Senate bill.\n On October 1, 2004, I introduced an amendment during the floor debate\nto accomplish this very purpose, as established by the administration\nin their communications. Unfortunately, after lengthy discussions with\nthe floor managers and the administration, I was just not able to\neffect what I believed was a compromise that would meet the goals that\nI had set out and, if I may say, I felt the goals that the\nadministration had set out. Consequently, the amendment was not\nconsidered and was withdrawn.\n I remained concerned about preserving the authority of Cabinet\nofficers to manage their departments and to remain accountable for the\nperformance of their departments as well as protecting the integrity of\nthe chain of command, from the President to the Secretary of Defense to\nbattlefield commanders.\n In a statement on the Senate floor on October 4, 2004, during the\ncourse of that debate, before final passage, I clearly indicated I\nwould vote for the bill, but I had sufficient confidence that the\nprocess would once again take into consideration the positions of the\nSenate and the House on the position of chain of command, and that the\nconferees would see the wisdom of incorporating that provision as\ndesired by the administration and along the lines of the amendment that\nI had considered.\n Clearly, this chain of command issue has been of significant concern\nover the past few weeks. It was one of the reasons the House of\nRepresentatives was not able to reach a decision to proceed with a vote\non this conference report prior to Thanksgiving. The record reflects\nwith clarity that it was important that this issue should be resolved.\nIt was not a trivial matter--I repeat, it was not a trivial matter, as\nhas been suggested in press reports, attributing those quotes to\nothers.\n\n Each time our President sends the U.S. Armed Forces into harm's way\nto defend our Nation, a series of events happens, including specific\norders to our combat support agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency,\nthe National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and\nthe National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, to provide very specific\nsupports to combatant commanders at specific times and places.\n This support is critical to the success of virtually all military\noperations, and those decisions often have to be made on a real time,\ninstantaneous basis. There can be no ambiguity in the statutory\nframework or regulations about these orders and the ability to execute\nthem. And there can be no conflicting directions to the implementers of\nthat intelligence to provide it and provide it expeditiously for the\nmen and women of the Armed Forces. The lives of our uniformed personnel\nare at risk, and the success of our military efforts can often hang in\nthe balance.\n The language contained in the November 20 draft conference report\npotentially inserted the newly created Director of National\nIntelligence into this chain of command with the authority to direct\nmilitary intelligence assets to what the DNI--that is the acronym for\nthe Director of National Intelligence--considered higher priorities,\nthereby possibly putting him in conflict with the Secretary of Defense\nand the combatant commanders. Such a situation would clearly, I judged,\nviolate the time-tested principle of continuity, of unity of command.\n The new law, however, as now redrafted, will presumably go forward\nfor many years. Although soldiers will come and go, personalities will\nbe different. Consequently, these potential ambiguities are best\nremoved now. I think the new language achieves, in large measure, that\ngoal.\n Our Armed Forces are the finest in the world and one of the reasons\nfor their excellence is an unambiguous, time-tested chain of command.\nConsequently, I was very concerned, as was my friend and colleague\nDuncan Hunter of the House Armed Services Committee, that the draft\nconference report, if it became law, would not be drafted in such a way\nas to disrupt the integrity of our chain of command, or even possibly\nhave the ambiguity that gave rise to the ability for such disruption.\n Chairman Hunter exhibited strong, determined leadership as a House\nconferee on this issue, and I was privileged to work with him. We have\nshared such responsibilities, the two of us working together, over more\nthan two decades of service in our respective memberships on the\ncommittees of the armed services of the Senate and the House.\n On Monday this week, after consultations with the White House, the\nChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman Hunter, and several\nconferees, an agreement was reached on the language that protects the\nintegrity of this chain of command, in my estimate, and preserves the\nauthority of heads of government departments to effectively manage\ntheir departments and remain accountable for the performance of all\nelements of their departments. The final language is a significant\nchange, which allays concerns of the Members, which I expressed\npublicly on December 3 in a press statement.\n\n Other colleagues had approached me with the same basic concerns. I\nthink, and I have assured them in conversations, that they have largely\nbeen met and that this proposed conference report, which will\neventually become statutory law, has been greatly improved.\n Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the preservation of\nauthority provision for the November 20 draft conference report, as\nwell as the final version be printed in the Record.\n There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in\nthe Record, as follows:\n\n November 20, Final Language Proposed by Conference Big 4\n\n SEC. 1018. PRESERVATION OF AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.\n\n Not later than 120 days after the date of the appointment\n of the first individual appointed as the Director of National\n Intelligence, the President shall, and on an ongoing basis,\n issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation\n within the executive branch of the authorities granted to the\n Director of National Intelligence by this title and the\n amendments made to this in a manner that maintains,\n consistent with the provisions of this Act, the statutory\n responsibility of the head of the departments of the United\n States Government with respect to such departments,\n including, but not limited to:\n (a) the authority of the Director of the Office of the\n Management and Budget, or\n (b) the authority of the principal officers of the\n executive departments as heads of their respective\n departments, including, but not limited to, under--\n (1) Section 199 of the Revised Statutes (22 USC 2651);\n (2) Title II of the Department of Energy Organization Act\n (42 USC 7131);\n (3) State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as\n amended;\n (4) Section 102(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6\n USC 112(a)); and\n (5) Sections 301 of title 5, 113(b) and 162(b) or title 10,\n 503 of title 28, and 301(b) of title 31, United States Code.\n\n Intelligence Reform Conference\n\n evolution of chain of command issue\n\n Current law, as established by the Goldwater-Nichols\n Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, provides for a clear and\n unambiguous military chain of command. This was a key aspect\n of the reform legislation to ensure that combatant commanders\n were provided with the unity of command necessary for\n successful execution of military operations.\n\n 10 USC 162\n\n SEC. 162. COMBATANT COMMANDS: ASSIGNED FORCES; CHAIN OF\n COMMAND.\n\n (a) Assignment of Forces.--\n (4) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of\n Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area\n assigned to a unified combatant command shall be assigned to,\n and under the command of, the commander of that command. The\n preceding sentence applies to forces assigned to a specified\n combatant command only as prescribed by the Secretary of\n Defense.\n (b) Chain of Command.--Unless otherwise directed by the\n President, the chain of command to a unified or specified\n combatant command runs--\n (1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and\n (2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the\n combatant command.\n\n 10 USC 164\n\n SEC. 164. COMMANDERS OF COMBATANT COMMANDS: ASSIGNMENT;\n POWERS AND DUTIES.\n\n (c) Command Authority of Combatant Commanders.\n (1) Unless otherwise directed by the President or the\n Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control\n of the commander of a combatant command with respect to the\n commands and forces assigned to that command include the\n command functions of--\n (A) giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands\n and forces necessary to\n\n[[Page S12005]]\n\n carry out missions assigned to the command, including\n authoritative direction over all aspects of military\n operations, joint training, and logistics;\n (B) prescribing the chain of command to the commands and\n forces within the command;\n (C) organizing commands and forces within that command as\n he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the\n command;\n (D) employing forces within that command as he considers\n necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;\n (E) assigning command functions to subordinate commanders;\n and\n (F) coordinating and approving those aspects of\n administration and support (including control of resources\n and equipment, internal organization, and training) and\n discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the\n command.\n In recognition of the possible conflict between the new\n authorities being provided to the National Intelligence\n Director and existing chain of command statutes, the Bush\n Administration's September 16 legislative proposal to\n implement the 9-11 Commission recommendations contained a\n specific provision to ensure protection of existing chain of\n command authorities.\n\n SEC. 6. PRESERVATION OF AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.\n\n Nothing in this Act or amendments made by this Act shall be\n construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority of: (1)\n the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; or (2)\n the principal officers of the executive departments as heads\n of their respective departments, including, but not limited\n to, under section 199 of the Revised Statutes (22 USC 2651),\n Title II of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 USC\n 7131), the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as\n amended, section 102(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 12002\n (6 USC 112(a)), and sections 301 of title 5, 113(b) and\n 162(b) of title 10, 503 of title 28, and 301(b) of title 31,\n United States Code.\n The November 20 conference proposal contained inadequate\n protection of the chain of command provisions as it\n subordinated these sections of law to the new authorities\n vested in the Director of National Intelligence. This\n proposal was opposed by Chairman Duncan Hunter.\n\n SEC. 1018. PRESERVATION OF AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.\n\n Not later than 120 days after the date of the appointment\n of the first individual appointed as the Director of National\n Intelligence, the President shall, and on an ongoing basis,\n issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation\n within the executive branch of the authorities granted to the\n Director of National Intelligence by this title and the\n amendments made to this title in a manner that maintains,\n consistent with the provisions of this Act, the statutory\n responsibility of the head of the departments of the United\n States Government with respect to such departments,\n including, but not limited to:\n (a) the authority of the Director of the Office of the\n Management and Budget; or\n (b) the authority of the principal officers of the\n executive departments as heads of their respective\n departments, including, but not limited to, under--\n (1) Section 199 of the Revised Statutes (22 USC 2651);\n (2) Title II of the Department of Energy Organization Act\n (42 USC 7131);\n (3) State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as\n amended;\n (4) Section 102(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6\n USC 112(a)); and\n (5) Sections 301 of title 5, 113(b) and 162(b) or title 10,\n 503 of title 28, and 301(b) of title 31, United States Code.\n The proposed December 6 agreement between Senate conferees\n and Chairman Hunter provides necessary protection of chain of\n command statutes.\n\n SEC. 1018. PRESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES ON IMPLEMENTATION AND\n PRESERVATION OF AUTHORITIES.\n\n The President shall issue guidelines to ensure the\n effective implementation and execution with the executive\n branch of the authorities granted to the Director of National\n Intelligence by this title and the amendments made by this\n title, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the\n statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of\n the United States Government concerning such departments,\n including, but not limited to:\n (1) the authority of the Director of the Office of\n Managements and Budget; and\n (2) the authority of the principal offices of the executive\n departments as heads of their respective departments,\n including, but not limited to, under--\n (A) section 199 of the Revised Statutes (22 USC 2651);\n (B) title II of the Department of Energy Organization Act\n (42 USC 7131 et seq.);\n (C) the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956;\n (D) section 102(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6\n USC 112(a)); and\n (E) sections 301 of title 5, 113(b) and 162(b) of title 10,\n 503 of title 28, and 301(b) of title 31, United States Code.\n Mr. WARNER. It has been clear, especially after the July report\nissued by the Senate Intelligence Committee under the leadership of\nChairman Roberts and Chairman Rockefeller, about weapons of mass\ndestruction in Iraq and the valuable contribution of the 9/11\nCommission and the comments and thoughts of many others, that led to\nthe impetus for the United States to have had major reform of our\nnational intelligence system. That was needed.\n The Governmental Affairs Committee was given this challenge and\naccepted it. They have worked to the best of their ability, and their\nfinal work product brings us to this point today where I presume there\nwill be a strong vote to endorse that workmanship.\n It has been my position during this process, however, to ensure that\nwe do no harm to the immeasurably improved intelligence system that has\nbeen built for our battlefield commanders over the past 15 years since\nshortcomings were identified during and after the Persian Gulf war.\nSenator Stevens commented on that. That is one of the reasons we were\nassociated in working on this language change. A much improved system\nexists today, and it will continually evolve in becoming more improved.\n It has been the goal of the Senate Armed Services Committee, working\nwith other committees of the Senate during this deliberative process on\nthis intelligence reform, to ensure that intelligence support to the\nPresident, the Congress, senior policymakers, and tactical commanders\nis enhanced. The agreement we reached on Monday is crucial in\naccomplishing that goal.\n The new language in the conference report before us today is a\nsubstantial improvement. President Bush, in his letter to the Congress\non December 6, 2004, stated that it is his intention to develop\nguidelines and regulations using the statutory guidance provided in\nthis provision ``to ensure that the principles of unity of command and\nauthority are fully protected.''\n With this agreement, it is now time to move forward to approval of\nthis bill, and I shall vote for it. Earlier today, the distinguished\nmajority leader made reference to this bill as ``not a perfect bill.''\nI associate myself with his opinion because there are several issues\nabout which I remain concerned; namely, the authorities of the Director\nof National Intelligence to establish personnel policy for military\npersonnel and transfer them within the National Intelligence Program;\nthe ability of the Director of National Intelligence to transfer and\nreprogram funds; the role of the Director of National Intelligence in\nmajor intelligence acquisition programs managed largely by the\nDepartment of Defense; and the relationship between the DNI and the\nDirector of the CIA, and between the DNI and the Director of the\nNational counterterrorism Center.\n At this point, I say thanks to Senator Stevens. I have worked closely\nwith the Central Intelligence Agency and the Directors of that\norganization for these many years. The principal headquarters is in my\nState. I am privileged to have had a long series of close personal\nrelationships with not only the Directors but many of the associate\ndirectors and others--indeed, the employees. I think overall they have\nstood the test of time and done their very best to provide America with\nthe best intelligence, and most particularly the men and women of the\nArmed Forces.\n Consequently, I will join others in this Chamber to carefully monitor\noversight implementation of this legislation over the coming months,\nand will, if deemed necessary, offer such legislation, an example being\nwhat the distinguished Senator from Alaska just mentioned, when\nappropriate to further strengthen this law to alleviate any unintended\nconsequences of this legislation.\n Again, I congratulate the managers of this bill. I look forward to\nworking with them as we implement these reforms and build an\nintelligence system that provides the best possible support for our\nnational decisionmakers, and most particularly to those in uniform\nserving on the distant battlefields and ramparts of the world.\n I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a working\ndocument on the chain of command issue which Chairman Hunter and I used\nduring our deliberations on this issue, and in response to questions\nthat were directed to us, as well as a chronology of events associated\nwith consideration of chain of command language during deliberations of\nthis bill.\n There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in\nthe Record, as follows:\n\n[[Page S12006]]\n\nChronology Preservation of Authority/Chain of Command Provisions in the\n Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004\n\n July 22, 2004--9/11 Commission Report released.\n August 2004--relevant committees of Congress conduct\n hearings.\n September 16, 2004--White House provides suggested\n legislation on intelligence community reform to relevant\n committees of Congress, which includes a section 6 on\n ``Preservation of Authority'' for heads of executive\n departments to manage their departments and remain\n accountable for their performance.\n September 23, 2004--Government Affairs Committee reports S.\n 2845 to the full Senate for consideration, without\n ``Preservation of Authority'' provision.\n September 28, 2004--White House submits Statement of\n Administration Policy supporting S. 2845, but expressing\n concern about several issues including the lack of a\n ``Preservation of Authority'' provision stating, ``The\n Administration supports inclusion of this provision [Section\n 6, Preservation of Authority and Accountability, of the\n Administration's proposal] in the Senate bill.''\n October 1, 2004--Senator Warner submits Amendment No. 3876\n to S. 2845, to preserve the authority of heads of executive\n departments to manage and remain accountable for the\n performance of their departments.\n October 4, 2004--Debate on Warner ``Preservation of\n Authority'' amendment ends with no agreement. Modified\n language jointly drafted by White House and Senator Warner is\n rejected. Amendment is withdrawn.\n October 6, 2004--S. 2845 is passed by the Senate, but\n without a section on ``Preservation of Authority.'' Senator\n Warner voices support for the overall legislation but cites\n continuing concerns, including the lack of a ``Preservation\n of Authority'' clause, and indicates his intent to try to\n resolve these concerns during the conference process.\n October 10, 2004--H.R. 10 is passed by the House.\n October 16, 2004--Conference begins.\n October 18, 2004--Director, OMB, and National Security\n Advisor send joint letter to conference chairmen expressing\n administration views on conference issues, including urging\n conferees to include section 6 of the original administration\n proposal on ``Preservation of Authority,'' and indicate this\n section is one of President Bush's three core principles for\n the bill.\n October 20-November 19, 2004--Conferees exchange\n approximately 12 offers and counteroffers on ``Preservation\n of Authority'' language.\n November 20, 2004--Conference managers propose final\n language. Chairman Hunter indicates his objection to the\n language believing it would potentially insert the DNI into\n the chain of command. Senate conferees approve draft\n conference report 13-2. House conferees defer action on\n conference report.\n November 21, 2004--House and Senate adjourn without taking\n action on the conference report.\n November 22-December 5, 2004--consultations between\n Chairman Hunter, Chairman Warner, Vice President Cheney,\n several conferees, and General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of\n the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on appropriate language to ensure\n the integrity of the chain of command.\n December 6, 2004--Agreement is reached between\n administration, conference managers, Chairman Hunter, and\n other concerned Members of Congress, on revised\n ``Preservation of Authority'' language that directs the\n President to issue guidelines for implementation that,\n ``shall respect and not abrogate the statutory\n responsibilities of head of the departments of the United\n States Government. . . .''\n Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I yield the floor. Again, I yield such\ntime as I might have remaining to Senator Cornyn.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). The Senator from New Hampshire\nis recognized.\n Mr. SUNUNU. I thank the Chair.\n It is a pleasure to stand in support of the intelligence reform bill.\n In my remarks today in support of the bill, I want to first emphasize\nthat there is no real way we can know exactly and precisely what all of\nthe benefits might eventually occur due to the reforms made by this\nbill. I think both the House and Senate went through a good-faith\neffort to try to develop a better, a better intelligence organization,\nbetter rules for sharing information than we currently have, changes\nthat conform in many ways to some of the difficulties identified, and\nrecommendations made by the September 11 Commission. But the real\nmotivator for reform I think began even prior to September 11.\n I think the impetus for change in our intelligence organization\nbegins with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the end of the Cold War, the\ndisintegration of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of terrorism--now\nthe greatest national security threat that faces America and our\nallies--and concerns over the proliferation of weapons technology to\nterrorists around the world. That was obviously brought to the\nforefront with the attacks of September 11. But the fact that we have a\nnew set of threats and a new set of risks to American security is what\ncalls on us to review the structure of our intelligence agencies and to\nmake the recommendations for change that are embodied in this bill.\n With this legislation, we will improve the budget process for\nintelligence agencies by giving more power and authority to the\nDirector of National Intelligence, the DNI. The DNI will coordinate\nwhere the funds and resources should be allocated among the 15 various\nagencies that have responsibility for intelligence gathering in the\nUnited States and around the globe.\n We reform the standard of accountability by having an independent\nDirector of National Intelligence. I think there is, to borrow a phrase\nfrom the previous speaker, a clearer chain of command for\nresponsibility and accountability in setting priorities and setting\ngoals for the President of the United States and all of those in the\nGovernment who rely on our intelligence-gathering operation.\n We reform the process of coordinating between these 15 agencies. We\nhave a new counterterrorism Center that will be the central focus for\ngathering information threats from law enforcement and intelligence\nagencies around the country.\n We now have a much better understanding of the degree with which\ncritical pieces of information can come from local or State law\nenforcement, and not just from the sophisticated apparatus of a\nnational intelligence organization.\n We have to coordinate and collect that information and then\ndisseminate it and do a better job of sharing that information.\n A final area of reform I would underscore is that with this\nlegislation we set clear guidelines, a clearer process, and in many\nways an easier process, for getting key pieces of information to the\ndecisionmakers that will act on that information.\n We saw, unfortunately, time and again in the wake of September 11\nmoments where there existed important information, but for a variety of\nreasons that information wasn't placed in the right hands at the right\ntime. So information sharing, as simple as it may sound, is a critical\npiece of the reform element in this bill.\n\n For all of those reasons, I am very pleased to support the\nlegislation because I think it will create a much better framework for\nunderstanding where we are successful and where we need to continue to\nimprove our intelligence gathering. Not every objective, not every\ngoal, will be attained in the next year or the next 2 years. But this\norganizational structure, the rules for intelligence sharing, this\nbudget process, all will make our intelligence organization much more\neffective.\n A lot of concerns have been raised about the legislation. A lot of\npeople point out the obvious--that it is not a perfect piece of\nlegislation. I don't think anyone has ever come to the floor of the\nSenate or the House of Representatives claiming they had finally\nwritten the perfect piece of legislation. But a lot of those criticisms\nas well are on a weak foundation; concerns, for example, about the\nprocess, the speed and the timing with which this legislation was\nwritten.\n The suggestion was made earlier last month that the Senate had rushed\nthrough this piece of legislation, that we moved it through too\nquickly, that there was not enough time taken for deliberations and\nhearings. I think of all the criticisms, that is probably the weakest I\nhave heard.\n The Chair well knows through a number of hearings we collected\ninformation--not just from the September 11 Commission and all the work\nthey did on these issues, not just from the families of those who were\nlost on September 11, but from intelligence-gathering organizations,\nfrom the FBI, from local law enforcement, information that was critical\nto developing legislation before the Senate today.\n\n The criticism of the process that somehow the conference between the\nHouse and Senate was done in secret is simply without foundation. The\nconference negotiations were extremely inclusive. In many ways I argue\nthey were inclusive because they included me. When the conference\nnegotiations\n\n[[Page S12007]]\n\nand the discussion about the final legislative language is inclusive\nenough to make available a role for the 95th most senior Member of the\nSenate, it is a pretty inclusive process. There were Democrats in the\nroom at the most sensitive times as well as Republicans. It was\nbipartisan discussion and negotiation.\n Obviously, not everyone got everything they wanted in the final bill.\nWhen the process is criticized for being exclusive or it was rushed,\nthat criticism is most often made by someone who just did not quite get\neverything they wanted in the bill.\n There is a criticism that we should have included more immigration or\nlaw enforcement provisions. This bill does deal with immigration in a\ndirect and substantive way: increasing customs agents and beds for\ndetainees; better information sharing that will make a huge difference\nfor the INS and for others engaged in securing our borders. But it does\nnot have every provision recommended by the House of Representatives,\nso it should come as no surprise we will deal with many of these\nissues, perhaps with a more comprehensive immigration reform bill, in\nthe next session of Congress.\n What is in the bill improves the status quo, improves the current\nsituation. That is something for which we can all be pleased.\n We have a lot of work to do on oversight in the coming session. We\nhave a lot of work to do to make sure this legislation does what we\nintended it to do. But it is an outstanding effort. I commend the work\nof the chairman and the ranking member on the Governmental Affairs\nCommittee as well as the House conferees.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.\n The Senator from Connecticut.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank the Chair. Senator McCain is\non the way.\n While Senator Snowe is in the Chamber and is the Presiding Officer, I\nthank the Senator from New Hampshire for the extraordinary\ncontributions he made to this bill and to the conference both on what\nused to be the Governmental Affairs Committee--I suppose it still is--\nand now the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,\nparticularly on the conference.\n Senator Sununu was an extraordinarily important member, very\nsteadfast in support of genuine reform, and very skillful as a\nlegislator, both within the Senate conference and without, on the\noccasional missions on which he would be dispatched to the other body\nwhere, I gather from the record, he previously served and still has\nsome people listen to him when he goes over there. The Senator from New\nHampshire should feel the great pride and gratitude of the Senator from\nMaine and this Senator for all he contributed to this historical\ndecision.\n I yield to Senator Collins.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). The Senator from Maine.\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, let me make a brief comment in response\nto the recent discussion on the chain of command language.\n First, I am very pleased we were able to reach agreement with the\nchairman of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee on this\nlanguage. Since I did not see the documents that the chairman put into\nthe Record, I state very clearly for the record that nothing in the\nfinal language in this bill in any way weakened the authority of the\nnew National Intelligence Director.\n In fact, the Director of National Intelligence will have significant\nbudgetary and other authorities and that makes sense. We do not want to\ncreate just another layer of bureaucracy. We do not want to create a\nfigurehead. We want to empower this individual with the authority to be\nable to marshal the resources to counter the very serious threats we\nface both today and in the future.\n In my judgment, nothing in this bill has ever hindered military\noperations or readiness, but I am pleased we were able to draft some\nadditional language that has provided some comfort to those who were\nconcerned.\n All Members have our first priority to the brave men and women who\nare fighting on the front lines of freedom. That is why this bill was\nvery carefully drafted to keep tactical and joint military intelligence\nprograms under the exclusive control of the Pentagon but to make sure\nthose national assets which serve multiple customers--including the\nPresident's National Security Council, our covert agents in the CIA, as\nwell as our military--to ensure that those assets are controlled by the\nDirector of National Intelligence just as today they are controlled by\nthe Director of the CIA in his role as head of the intelligence\ncommunity.\n\n I am told by those who have worked entire careers with the CIA that\nthe Department of Defense has always been very happy with the\nrelationship that allows a priorities committee to work out and resolve\nany conflicts in the use of these national assets. Certainly, this\nlanguage and this bill as a whole, the reorganization as a whole, will\nimprove the quality of intelligence that is provided to our troops, as\nwell as making civilians at home safer. That is our goal. That is what\nthis legislation achieves.\n Mr. President, the Senator from Arizona has arrived. He has been a\nstalwart proponent of reform. He has worked very closely with Senator\nLieberman and me. I am very grateful for his leadership and support.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.\n Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I came here to applaud the enormous\nefforts of my two colleagues, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman.\nThis has been a task that has been, in the view of many,\ninsurmountable. This piece of legislation was declared dead on numerous\noccasions. It was through their tenacity, hard work, and willingness to\ncompromise that we now have perhaps one of the most significant and\nimportant reorganizations of the Federal Government certainly since\n1947 when we created the Department of Defense.\n It is all very good news. No one could describe it better than my two\ncolleagues who point out this is a law that has to be translated into\naction. We have to change the reorganization of the boxes, but we also\nhave to change the culture, a culture that led the President of the\nUnited States to proceed to war on the assumption that Saddam Hussein\nhad weapons of mass destruction, which apparently he did not; an\nassumption that caused our Secretary of State to testify before the\nU.N. Security Council that Saddam Hussein was amassing weapons of mass\ndestruction, an assumption that, unfortunately, misled other\nintelligence agencies throughout the world, not only that of the United\nStates of America. But, as always, America leads. So I applaud their\noutstanding work. As they said, this is the beginning of a beginning,\nbut it is an important beginning. Without this legislation, I do not\nbelieve we could make significant progress.\n\n I would like to thank the families of 9/11 who have steadfastly\nsupported this legislation. Without their support, it would still be\nsitting at the desk as it was the day Senator Lieberman and I proposed\nit. I think their work is not over as well, because one of the failures\nof this body has been a total lack of congressional oversight\nreorganization. Still, there are numerous committees of congressional\noversight. There has been no coordination, there has been no\nconsolidation, and in the words of my friend, John Lehman, a member of\nthe 9/11 Commission, in his words: The old bulls are more interested in\nprotecting their turf in Congress than they are in national security.\n That is a tough indictment, but I think it is true; there is no\nmeaningful congressional oversight because of our failure to implement\neven the most modest reforms of congressional oversight, with the\nexception of permanent membership on the Intelligence Committee.\n I want to point out and just talk for a minute about what has caused\nthe holdup here the last month or so; that is, the immigration issues.\n First, I always believed this legislation was about reorganization of\nour intelligence capabilities and not about immigration. I think I can\nstate with some confidence that the issue of illegal immigration is one\nof overwhelming importance.\n My State has been devastated in a broad variety of ways by the\neffects of illegal immigration, ranging from people dying in the\ndesert, to overwhelming our health care facilities, to shootouts on our\nfreeways, to other terrible things that are happening all\n\n[[Page S12008]]\n\nacross the State of Arizona. We passed a ballot initiative this last\nelection which, although I opposed, was certainly an expression of the\nfrustration that the people of my State feel. But I would also point\nout, if anyone believes that simply strengthening our borders is the\nanswer to our Nation's illegal immigration problem, they do not\nunderstand the problem.\n Fifteen years ago, we declared a war on drugs, and we decided we\nwould stop the flow of drugs across our borders which was poisoning the\nbodies and minds of our young Americans. The fact is, the cost of an\nounce of cocaine on the street in Phoenix today is less expensive than\nit was 15 years ago. Why? Because there was a demand, and where there\nis a demand, there is going to be a supply.\n There is a demand for workers for jobs that Americans will not do.\nWhat we have to have is comprehensive immigration reform that certainly\nentails strengthening our borders, increasing Border Patrol, and having\nbetter laws and better enforcement.\n The issue of driver's licenses has to be discussed and debated\nbecause we are heading down--in a little straight talk--we are heading\ndown a path toward a national ID card. I think that is something we\nought to discuss and debate at some length before we take that step as\na necessary one, if it is, in the war on terrorism.\n So we have to have a comprehensive approach to immigration reform,\nand I hope that will be a top priority agenda item.\n I say again that I am committed, and I know the President of the\nUnited States is committed, to overall, comprehensive immigration\nreform. I look forward to working with my friends on the other side of\nthe aisle. This has to be a bipartisan issue, but it must be addressed\nbecause we can never assure the American people that they are safe from\nterrorists if our borders are penetrated, as they are today, by people\nwho can easily come across illegally. But, overall, we also owe it to\nall men and women who live and work in this Nation to have certain\nprotections.\n I look forward to working with my colleagues, and, again, my\ncongratulations to them.\n Mr. President, I yield the floor.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.\n Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend, the Senator from\nArizona, for his kind words. I was just thinking, as I was listening to\nSenator McCain, he is known as a straight talker, but he is also a\ngreat doer. When he sees something that is wrong, and nobody is doing\nanything about it, you are just not going to stop him until he gets it\nright. When he sees a need that is unmet, you are just not going to\nstop him until he figures out how to convince our Government to meet\nit.\n In this case, within a month after September 11, 2001, John McCain\nand I were together somewhere and he raised the subject that there\nought to be an independent, nonpartisan investigation of how this\noutrageous attack on the United States by Islamist terrorists could\nhave happened and what we can do to make sure, to the best of our God-\ngiven ability, it never happens again.\n We put the bill together in a commission. We had opposition. Every\nstep was tough, but ultimately it was adopted and filled brilliantly by\na group of citizens. Both parties rose to the occasion and presented a\nreport that was a scathing indictment of the status quo, an\nintelligence community without anybody in charge, where people with\ninformation in the FBI, CIA, and other agencies were not sharing it\nwith each other, and the gnawing conclusion that if the intelligence\ncommunity had been better organized and the dots had been connected, we\ncould have prevented September 11 from happening.\n John McCain and I welcomed that report which came out at the end of\nJuly. We began to work together to draft into legislation all of the\nrecommendations of the 9/11 Commission. He was persistent in driving to\nput those out there. His staff and mine worked very hard. We did so\nright after Labor Day. I am pleased to say, once again, as a result of\nthe persistence and patriotism of the Senator from Arizona, most of the\ncontents of that original legislation are in this conference report.\nNot just the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence and\nthe counterterrorism Center but a remarkable host of constructive and\nprogressive recommendations from the 9/11 Commission, which, frankly,\nmost of the country does not even know about yet, which I believe and\nhave confidence they will feel good about as they find out about them\nbecause they go not just to transportation security, not just for\naviation, but for all modes, for border security, civil liberties, and\nprivacy.\n In an age of terrorism, when the Government will have to be more\nactively involved in our lives, we want to protect the freedom that\ndefines us as Americans.\n There is a very progressive, farsighted section which says ultimately\nwe are going to do everything we can, hopefully with the assistance of\na greatly improved and organized intelligence community--and do\neverything we can to capture and kill the terrorists themselves--but\nultimately we are going to win this war on terrorism by draining the\nswamps of poverty and tyranny and totalitarianism in which the\nterrorism has grown. We recommend and now put, with the force of law,\naggressive steps for outreach to the Muslim world. We call for economic\ndevelopment in the Muslim world, for the extension of freedom's range\nin the Muslim world, for the increase of exchange programs--students,\nfaculties, others--between the United States and predominantly Muslim\ncountries, which is the ultimate hope for a secure future.\n So I thank the Senator from Arizona for his kind words, and I return\nthem to him. I hope it does not hurt his reputation, but in addition to\nbeing a straight talker, he is a great doer as well.\n Mr. President, as the Senate stands poised now to adopt this 9/11\nCommission recommendation bill, I believe we are at the brink of a\nturning point in our governmental history. It reflects the turning\npoint that occurred, tragically, outrageously, on September 11, when we\nwere attacked by 19 Islamist terrorists who, as someone else has said,\nhated us more than they loved their own lives, and so they killed\nthemselves to express that hatred and took with them 3,000 innocent\nAmericans.\n With this vote, we in Congress are saying that one era in our\nhistory, in our national security history, has ended and another one\nhas begun when we search for better and different ways to protect\nourselves from our sworn enemies. We are changing from one national\nsecurity strategy to another, from a Cold-War strategy to a strategy\nfit to bring us to victory in a war against terrorism.\n Our purpose in this legislation all along, from its drafting through\nits hearings, through the extensive negotiations and now with its\npassage, was to advance a new vision of how to protect the American\npeople in an unfortunately new world with different dangers, where our\nenemies don't distinguish between soldiers and citizens or foreign and\ndomestic military targets. The brilliant work of the 9/11 Commission\ninformed us that a lack of what they called the unity of effort, strong\nleadership, accountable leadership, allowed good intelligence to slip\nthrough our grasp, enabling the terrorists of September 11 to evade our\ndefenses.\n I have said before and I will say it again--it is a homely analogy or\nmetaphor--the American intelligence community today is like a very good\nfootball team with great players but no quarterback. This bipartisan\nproposal we are about to vote on will create a quarterback, a strong\nquarterback. It will upend the status quo which failed us on September\n11 and on other occasions in our recent history by reorganizing many of\nour intelligence agencies to create a unified command and control\nstructure so that one person, the new Director of National\nIntelligence, will be in charge and accountable for the Nation's\nintelligence operations.\n When somebody asks in the future, ``Who is in charge?'' the question\nwill not be met with the same blank stares and nonanswers that greeted\nthe 9/11 Commission when they asked that question. The answer will be,\n``the DNI is in charge,'' the Director of National Intelligence, is in\ncharge and responsible. That, we are confident, will make this Nation\nand its people safer.\n\n[[Page S12009]]\n\n The urgency of our times has demanded prompt action, but it has not\nbeen so prompt as to negate thoughtful consideration of just about\nevery sentence and word in this conference report; prompt because we\nare, after all, a nation at war. A war like none other we have ever\nfought, a war in which we must maximize our resources, begin anew to\nmeet our enemy and defeat them and find better ways to utilize the\nenormously capable human intelligence assets we have and the\nextraordinary technological assets we have as well to transform our\nability to defend ourselves.\n It never hurts to quote Sun Tzu, the classic Chinese strategist of\nwar, who said:\n\n If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory\n gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the\n enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle . . .\n but if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not\n fear the result of a hundred battles.\n\n The American people know themselves. We know our strengths. We know\nour purpose. We know our principles. As a result of this bill, I am\nconfident we will better know our enemy and, therefore, have much less\ncause for fear.\n I want to say a final word about the families, the survivors of\nSeptember 11, because they truly were our inspiration throughout this\njourney to reform. They insisted on the creation of a 9/11 commission\nand they insisted that its recommendations be acted upon by Congress\nand supported by the President. That is exactly what has happened,\nacross party lines, across Chambers, the executive branch and\nlegislative branch, working together. This is an accomplishment which\neveryone here involved, and those involved at the White House, can\ncelebrate. But ultimately it is a victory for the American people and\nparticularly for these survivors of 9/11. Their self-sacrificing\ncourage brings us to this historic moment of reform.\n I said before, the American people know themselves. If you want to\nknow the American people, meet the families and friends of those we\nlost on September 11. They represent the best of our country. They\nreflect our strength, our resilience, our values, our patriotism, our\nsense of purpose, our commitment and optimism. No matter what the\nobstacles, America and the American people will go on and will prevail.\nWe will prevail because we represent a cause, the cause of freedom, the\ncause of opportunity. I hope and pray the passage of this legislation\nwill help the families of 9/11 find some peace, as I am confident it\nwill help all Americans find cause for greater confidence in our\nNation's future security.\n I thank the Chair and yield the floor.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.\n Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, we are on the verge of voting on historic\nlegislation, landmark legislation that will reform our intelligence\nstructure to allow us to better fight the war against terrorism and to\ncounter future security threats. We will be taking a structure that is\ncharacterized by stovepipes, by a lack of sharing of information, that\nwas so indicated in the 9/11 Commission Report as being a major cause\nof intelligence failures. The 9/11 Commission, over and over again,\ndescribed the good people in our Government straining against\nstructures that did not allow them to communicate effectively vital\ninformation; thus, no one assembled the pieces of the puzzle that might\nhave allowed us to detect the hijackers' plot against our country.\n We have reorganized the intelligence agencies into a new structure\nwhere one person clearly will be accountable and responsible. The new\nDirector of National Intelligence will be able to marshall the\nresources we need to counter the threat to our citizens. We have a\nNational Counterterrorism Center, a National Counterproliferation\nCenter designed to bring together analysts from all the agencies so\nthey can pool their talents, analyze the intelligence, and produce\nbetter informed reports.\n This legislation will help make America more secure, and that is what\nthis entire debate is all about. As my colleague, Senator Lieberman,\nhas eloquently stated: The status quo failed us. Our bill may not be\nperfect. As the Presiding Officer indicated, no bill is. But it\nrepresents an enormous improvement over the status quo.\n We cannot turn away from the intelligence failures that have cost the\nlives of thousands of American citizens. We have to act. I am very\nproud that the Senate today will approve historic legislation that will\nmake our country more secure.\n Mr. President, I know Senator Frist plans to come down and speak\nright before the vote, and he has arrived on cue. I do want to take\nthis opportunity to request the yeas and nays.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?\n There appears to be a sufficient second.\n The yeas and nays were ordered.\n Ms. COLLINS. I thank all of my colleagues for their help and support.\n Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, as we approach this truly historic vote, I\nwant to once again thank those who have labored so hard to get to this\npoint over the last days, weeks, and literally months.\n Senators Collins and Lieberman, the chair and ranking member, deserve\nour highest praise--we oftentimes say that, but I mean it literally--\nfor their professionalism, dedication, persistence, and bipartisanship,\nwhich is something that we stressed up front from day one, when Senator\nDaschle and I first talked after the 9/11 Commission recommendations\ncame. It has been there throughout. I say thank you.\n John McCain also stands out as someone who endeavored to give the\n9/11 Commission life and to add many key elements to the Senate bill,\nmany of which are in this legislation, all of which work toward the\nimplementation of those 9/11 Commission recommendations. Senator Warner\nand Senator Stevens both labored to make sure we got the intelligence\nsupport to the military right, to make sure we did this in the correct\nway. Jon Kyl, part of our leadership team, worked hard on issues. I\nthank Pat Roberts for his diligent and persistent efforts. A whole host\nof Members on both sides of the aisle have participated.\n I want to mention Denny Hastert, who played a critical role in\nbringing this legislation to fruition, which played out before the\nAmerican people over the last several weeks. We would not be here right\nnow without the unflagging leadership of President Bush to fight the\nwar on terror and to meet the greatest challenge of our time. His\ncommitment has been steady. It has involved direct participation. He\nmade it clear to me from day one that it is his highest priority to\nmake America safer.\n This bill moves America into a position where we can say--once he\nsigns the bill--that America will be safer.\n Lastly, I thank the 9/11 families, without whom much of the momentum\nsimply would not have been there to see this bill all the way through.\nThey inspired us, they turned their personal tragedies into action, and\nit is manifested in the bill.\n In the 3 years since the 9/11 attacks, we learned a lot about our\nNation's vulnerabilities, our strengths, and the steps that we must\ntake, many of which we are taking today in this bill. The bill will\ncertainly make our Nation safer. Much more needs to be done, and we all\nrecognize that; but this is a major leap forward.\n As I said earlier, strengthening America at home and abroad, moving\nAmerica forward in the pursuit of freedom and prosperity, and\nprotecting the American people in our homeland have been the driving\nmotivations of the 108th Congress, and they are captured in this bill.\n Mr. President, I believe we are ready to proceed to a vote. At this\njuncture, I will yield back all time.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. The question is on\nagreeing to the conference report to accompany S. 2845, the\nIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.\n The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.\n The legislative clerk called the roll.\n Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent, the\nSenator from Missouri, Mr. Bond, the Senator from Colorado, Mr.\nCampbell, the Senator from Utah, Mr. Hatch, the Senator from\nMississippi, Mr. Lott, the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Nickles, and the\nSenator from Oregon, Mr. Smith.\n Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah, Mr. Hatch,\nwould have voted ``yea.''\n\n[[Page S12010]]\n\n Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Iowa (Mr. Harkin), the\nSenator from South Carolina (Mr. Hollings), and the Senator from Hawaii\n(Mr. Inouye) are necessarily absent.\n I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa\n(Mr. Harkin) would vote ``aye.''\n The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). Are there any other Senators in\nthe Chamber desiring to vote?\n The result was announced--yeas 89, nays 2, as follows:\n\n [Rollcall Vote No. 216 Leg.]\n\n YEAS--89\n\n Akaka\n Alexander\n Allard\n Allen\n Baucus\n Bayh\n Bennett\n Biden\n Bingaman\n Boxer\n Breaux\n Brownback\n Bunning\n Burns\n Cantwell\n Carper\n Chafee\n Chambliss\n Clinton\n Cochran\n Coleman\n Collins\n Conrad\n Cornyn\n Corzine\n Craig\n Crapo\n Daschle\n Dayton\n DeWine\n Dodd\n Dole\n Domenici\n Dorgan\n Durbin\n Edwards\n Ensign\n Enzi\n Feingold\n Feinstein\n Fitzgerald\n Frist\n Graham (FL)\n Graham (SC)\n Grassley\n Gregg\n Hagel\n Hutchison\n Jeffords\n Johnson\n Kennedy\n Kerry\n Kohl\n Kyl\n Landrieu\n Lautenberg\n Leahy\n Levin\n Lieberman\n Lincoln\n Lugar\n McCain\n McConnell\n Mikulski\n Miller\n Murkowski\n Murray\n Nelson (FL)\n Nelson (NE)\n Pryor\n Reed\n Reid\n Roberts\n Rockefeller\n Santorum\n Sarbanes\n Schumer\n Sessions\n Shelby\n Snowe\n Specter\n Stabenow\n Stevens\n Sununu\n Talent\n Thomas\n Voinovich\n Warner\n Wyden\n\n NAYS--2\n\n Byrd\n Inhofe\n\n NOT VOTING--9\n\n Bond\n Campbell\n Harkin\n Hatch\n Hollings\n Inouye\n Lott\n Nickles\n Smith\n The conference report was agreed to.\n Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.\n The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.\n Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that\nthe order for the quorum call be rescinded.\n The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). Without objection, it is so\nordered.\n\n ____________________"]], "columns": ["granule_id", "date", "congress", "session", "volume", "issue", "title", "chamber", "granule_class", "sub_granule_class", "page_start", "page_end", "speakers", "bills", "citation", "full_text"], "primary_keys": ["granule_id"], "primary_key_values": ["CREC-2004-12-08-pt1-PgS11939"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.5980920977890491, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}