{"database": "openregs", "table": "congressional_record", "rows": [["CREC-1996-10-21-pt1-PgS12425", "1996-10-21", 104, 2, null, null, "REFLECTIONS ON U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY", "SENATE", "SENATE", "ALLOTHER", "S12425", "S12435", "[{\"name\": \"Howell Heflin\", \"role\": \"speaking\"}]", "[{\"congress\": \"104\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"1627\"}, {\"congress\": \"104\", \"type\": \"HR\", \"number\": \"2029\"}]", "142 Cong. Rec. S12425", "Congressional Record, Volume 142 Issue 143 (Monday, October 21, 1996)\n\n[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 143 (Monday, October 21, 1996)]\n[Senate]\n[Pages S12425-S12435]\nFrom the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]\n\n                REFLECTIONS ON U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY\n\n Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I have had the opportunity to serve\non the Committee on Agriculture since 1981. The agricultural community\nin Alabama and the Nation, while small in number, is a considerable\npart of our economy. In fact in Alabama, agriculture and forestry are\nthe largest sectors of the economy.\n  Therefore, I felt compelled to serve on this committee. It has been\nextremely difficult for most of the newspaper reporters in Alabama to\ncover the action of this committee. I felt at times that my press\nsecretary needed to give them a map to find the Senate Agriculture\nCommittee hearing room. The issues are complicated and few reporters\nhave an understanding of the basics of farm policy. As a general rule,\nthis accounts for the sparsity of news stories about agriculture in\nAlabama and Washington newspapers.\n  In addition to farm programs, the committee had jurisdiction over a\ngreat number of rural development programs, rural electrification, and\nrural water programs that are an extremely important aspect that can\nimprove the daily lives of the millions of people that live in rural\nareas of this Nation.\n  The agricultural community is considerably better off today than when\nI came to the Senate in 1979. During my years on the Agriculture\nCommittee, we have been able to craft foreign policy which provides\nmarket stability and allows U.S. farmers to aggressively pursue\ninternational markets. At the same time, these farm programs have\ndramatically reduced the cost to the U.S. Treasury. And the most\nimportant part that is so often overlooked, American farms provide a\nstable supply of food for American families at a lower cost than any\npart of the world. Legislation passed by the Committee is often called\nfarm bills. It would be more appropriately entitled Food Safety and\nConsumer Protection Legislation.\n\n                               Farm Bills\n\n  In 1981, I had my first experience with the Congress' major farm\nauthorization bill. With this bill, Members who strongly supported\nagriculture sought to expand foreign markets for U.S. exports and to\nprotect them from selective embargoes. But Alabama's chief priority was\nthe preservation of the peanut program. That year, the USDA and a\nnumber of Senators pushed for its elimination. But Alabama's farmers\nhad just suffered 2 years of droughts, and they were already in a\ndifficult situation. The program's proponents managed to push the\nprogram through the Agriculture Committee by a vote of 12 to 4.\nHowever, it was defeated on the floor of the Senate, and supporters had\nto work in the back rooms to devise the Heflin-Warner compromise. This\neffort succeeded. On the Senate floor, Senator Nunn credited me with\nthe compromise:\n\n       * * * I think the Senator from Alabama has worked longer\n     and harder on the peanut program than anyone I know in this\n     body. He has spent literally hundreds of hours working\n     diligently to protect the program that is of vital interest\n     to the State of Alabama and also the State of Georgia as well\n     as other states.\n       * * * I have been following his lead on this issue as well\n     as many other farm issues, and I thank him for an exceptional\n     job all the way through.\n\n  However, it was just that--a compromise--and I was not entirely\nplease with the outcome. For instance, although the 1981 farm bill\nestablished farm-based poundage quotas, increased loan supports, and a\ncost-of-production price escalator, it technically eliminated the\npeanut allotment program.\n  During the farm bill debate, Alabama's delegation was also very\nconcerned with improving soybean production and exports. Over the\nprevious few years, the U.S. share of the world soybean export market\nhad dropped from 90 percent to 70 percent. Despite this drop, U.S.\nsoybean production had tripled, but only because planting had tripled.\nCrop yields had not improved, and export policies were lagging. In\nfact, if the situation did not change, the United States would only\ncreate a domestic surplus of soybeans. So I introduced a bill to create\nthe Research Soybean Institute, which would examine ways to improve\nproduction, exporting, and marketing. The institute would also address\nproblems such as the cyst nematode parasite--and other issues like it.\nThese provisions became a part of the 1981 farm bill.\n  With Senator Melcher's help, we passed another amendment to the farm\nbill which required that imported meats be held to the same inspection\nstandards as domestic meats. Specifically, we sought to prohibit horse\nand kangaroo meats from being sold as ``beef.'' Clearly, this language\nhad a dual purpose, to protect the interests of the cattle ranchers,\nand to ensure that consumers who bought hamburgers actually ate beef.\n  When the farm bill debate came to an end, I objected strongly to the\nadministration's substitute bill. Although it retained the peanut\ncompromise, the kangaroo and horse meat language, and the soybean\ninstitute, this bill has gone too far. This was the first attack on the\nfarmer during my career; he had become a victim of the USDA's fiscal\nausterity in the Republican administration's sometimes too broad\nattempts to cut domestic spending in the wrong places. I objected\nchiefly to the commodity provisions, especially loan levels and target\nprice figures, but I voted for the bill anyway because I thought it was\nmore important to have a 4-year bill than none at all.\n  But implementation of this farm bill proved nearly as difficult,\nespecially for peanuts. The USDA tried to enact regulations to cut the\npeanut poundage quotas. Its cuts would only hurt the small quota\nholders who could not afford the overhead of production. Supporters\ncontracted the USDA, and cited the provisions in the peanut language\nwhich required a fair and equitable system for quota reduction.\nTargeting the small farmer like this was--* * * a misinterpretation of\nboth the spirit and intent of the Congress if not an outright violation\nof the letter of the law itself. The USDA agreed to back off until it\nhad received clarification of congressional intent.\n  The years following this farm bill also saw difficulties for the\ncotton program. In 1984, the administration sought a freeze in target\nprices, which it won. I blocked the bill when it came to the Senate\nfloor, and I set conditions on this freeze. Specifically, I succeeded\nin setting the inventory carryover trigger for the paid diversion of\ncotton at 2.7 rather than 4 million bales in 1985, increasing the rate\nfrom $0.25 to $0.30 per pound if this inventory reached 4.1 million\nbales, and $0.35 if it reached 4.7 million bales. I also secured\nassurances for an extra $500 million in CCC export credit loan\nguarantees for 1984, including $100 million specifically for cotton,\nand $2 billion in 1985. Other successes which came out of this bill\nincluded changes to the FmHA disaster loan programs, including\nincreased funding and increased loan ceilings, eligibility expansion to\ncounties adjacent to declared disaster areas, extension of application\ndeadlines to 8 months, extension of repayments limits by 8 years, and\nscheduling of interest rates to their original level or the current\nprevailing rate, whichever was lower. Sometimes it's like dealing with\na mule--you have to use a 2 by 4 to get its attention.\n  When the next farm bill around in 1985, we introduced the Southern\nAgriculture Act of 1985 preemptively to save the peanut and cotton\nprograms. Specifically, it would increase peanut poundage quotas to the\nexisting level for the national, edible market. I also sought to allow\nfor double cropping, conservation tillage, and other ideas endemic to\nthe South. But these programs represented only one small part of\noverall farm policy; the export-import programs were certainly as\ngreat. I had hoped that the United States might also be able to\nincrease its share of foreign markets.\n  The House Agriculture Committee adopted my Southern Agriculture Act\n\n[[Page S12426]]\n\nthat year without changes, making it, for a time, part of the farm\nbill. House Chairman Kika de la Garza of Texas gave me considerable\nsupport. Incorporation of the peanut program was eminently logical\nbecause it was the only program which had actually made the Government\nmoney over the previous 2 years. The Senate Agriculture Committee also\nadopted much of my measure, but I knew that it would be difficult to\npass it through the full Senate. The Senate committee also incorporated\nlanguage proposed by Senator Dole which I cosponsored to create a\nNational Commission on Agriculture Policy into the farm bill.\n  When the Senate committee passed its version of the bill, I was\ncertainly pleased that it included the Southern Agriculture Act, but I\nwas disappointed with its export provisions. As I saw it, the problem\nwith U.S. farm exports had been that the agriculture secretaries had\nnot used the tools Congress created for them to implement an aggressive\nexport promotional program.\n  In fact, when the conference committee reported its version of the\nbill, I was struck that it deceived and betrayed soybean farmers. The\nconferees had dropped our amendment to prevent the U.S. Government from\nproviding loans or grants to foreign soybean producers. The committee\nhad also changed another of our amendments to establish a marketing\nloan without lowering soybean loan rates. I intended the measure, which\nhad passed the Senate, to authorize the Agriculture Secretary to\nimplement a plan to increase competitiveness of American soybeans in\nforeign markets. The conference version, however, effectively\nlegislated lower soybean prices for the farmer since it lowered the\nloan rates. American taxpayer dollars were being used to enhance the\ncompetitive capability of major soybean competitor countries such as\nBrazil and Argentina.\n  In fact, I voted against the 1985 farm bill coming out of conference.\nI believe that it effectively legislated lower commodity prices. The\ncredit provisions were also unforgiving. FmHA loan availability\ndecreased, and foreclosures were therefore likely to increase, I\nbelieved.\n  However, I was pleased that the bill maintained the peanut program,\nincluded better research titles, and addressed conservation.\nSpecifically, the bill included the Conservation Reserve Program, and\nthe swamp-buster and sod-buster provisions, which would allow for\nbetter long-term farming.\n  In hindsight, though, one of the most important provisions, if not\nthe most important, was the establishment and implementation of the\ncotton marketing loan. It is generally understood that U.S.\nagricultural commodities must be competitive in the world market if the\nsector is to be economically viable.\n  Some 95 percent of cotton entering world trade does so with the\nbenefit of a subsidy of one kind or another. The net effect is a world\nprice which is often below the cost of production in most, if not all,\nexporting countries. In shaping cotton policy to address this kind of\nglobal competition, we had to decide whether to fashion a program which\nwould enable U.S. cotton to compete aggressively or, instead, assume\nthe role of residual supplier.\n  Until implementation of the marketing loan in 1985, U.S. cotton was\ngenerally relegated to the role of residual supplier. In 1985, however,\nwe made a decision to meet subsidized competition head on. The\nestablishment of the marketing loan has served to accomplish several\nfundamental marketing objectives: First, permits U.S. commodities to\nmeet price competition, second, avoids excessive stock accumulations,\nthird, allows producers to market commodities over a period of time,\nrather than dumping the entire crop on the market at harvest time and\nfourth, serves as a safety net under producer income.\n  I am proud of the cotton marketing loan and believe it has become the\ncornerstone of the U.S. cotton program. The indisputable success in the\nindustry supports this assertion as the marketing loan has spurred\ndomestic mill consumption and aided exports. For instance, the\nmarketing loan is responsible for: reversing a 26-year decline in\nofftake of U.S. cotton; reversing a 43-year decline in U.S. mill cotton\nconsumption; and reversing a 70-year decline in cotton's share of U.S.\nmill fiber consumption.\n  When the Senate considered its version of the 1986 tax reform bill, I\nstrongly supported an amendment to restore provisions which allowed\nfarmers to average their incomes over several years. It made up for\nrevenue losses, which were estimated at $66 million, by repealing a tax\nbreak on wealthy, foreign real estate investors in the United States.\nSince there had been an increasing amount of foreign investor\nspeculation in U.S. property, particularly in farmland, I thought it\nwas appropriate to compensate for the revenue losses through this\nsource. Another amendment the Senate adopted would refund unused\ninvestment tax credits to farmers. Specifically, the language provided\nfor farmers to apply the credits against previous years' taxes at $0.50\nper dollar. It also established yearly limits for the refund. The\nauthors of this tax reform bill sought to eliminate credits for the\nfuture. However, since farmers were heavily capitalized with the high\nlevel of mechanization of modern farming, Congress needed to make tax\nreform a little fairer for agriculture by permitting farmers to trade\nin some of their unused tax credits for cash.\n  In 1986, critics of the cotton program maintained that it involved\nmillion dollar payments to large corporations. But this was an unfair\ncharacterization of the program. These large payments resulted from the\nSecretary's discretion; they were not mandated by the program itself.\nIn fact, the program had ameliorated price reductions from domestic\nsurpluses and improved sales overseas due to U.S. cotton prices that\nwere on par with world prices for the first time in nearly 2 years.\nCompetitive prices should provide the commodity with a turnaround.\n  In 1987, I introduced the farmers recovery tax bill to restore the\nincome averaging price, investment tax credits, and capital gains, all\nof which had been repealed in the 1986 tax reform bill. As in the case\nof the amendments which I supported in 1986, these provisions applied\nexclusively to farmers. Before the passage of that bill, it had\nappeared that our tax policy was the only policy that provided some\nequity or incentive to the agriculture and timber sectors, but to\ncompound the economic woes of rural America, the Tax Reform Act of 1986\nrepealed provisions of the tax laws that were beneficial to these areas\nof our economy.\n  When the 1990 farm bill came before the Congress, President Bush's\nadministration sought to cut the cotton and peanut programs, but it\nfailed. We also won a marketing loan for soybeans, specifically to\nincrease America's international competitiveness in this market. Last,\nthe bill included provisions we designed to provide funding for rural\nfirefighting and to double the amount the Government could spend on the\ndevelopment of rural water and sewer systems.\n  As in 1985, I introduced the Southern Agriculture Act to reauthorize\nthe cotton and peanut programs. The administration had proposed a 10-\npercent cut in these programs, but this bill would maintain the 1985\nbill's statutes. What could the farmer buy that cost 90 percent of what\nit did in 1985? Certainly, farm machinery and fertilizer prices had not\ndecreased.\n  With regard to the peanut program, Secretary Yeutter's proposed cuts\nwould be devastating. If it had been adopted by Congress, it would not\nonly destroy the peanut farmers, it would also cause a serious\nrecession in the peanut-producing areas of Alabama and other States. At\nthe end of July, the Senate defeated an amendment to implement his\ncuts.\n  One of the biggest problems about forging the peanut compromise in\n1990 was the fact that division existed among the country's peanut\nfarmers. Georgia's farmers had split from the rest, and I assumed the\nrole of peacemaker between Georgia's peanut-growers and the rest,\nincluding farmers from Alabama. Notably, my compromise was the first\nsupported by all the grower groups and major peanut product\nmanufacturers.\n  The soybean loan included in the bill would serve to combat cheaper\nforeign competition. The loan was something I had fought for since the\n1985 farm bill.\n  In 1986, I objected to the Reagan administration's decision to pursue\nthe World Bank's loan to Argentina. Argentina was America's second\ngreatest\n\n[[Page S12427]]\n\ncompetitor in soybeans, and it was able to undercut U.S. prices and\nflood the world markets by directly subsidizing those firms that\nprocess and export soybeans. The World Bank loan would further\nsubsidize competition to the United States--an unfair practice. In\n1987, I attached language to the agricultural trade bill to prohibit\nU.S. subsidies for foreign farmers competing with U.S. farmers. One\nissue that had brought more complaints and more attention from Alabama\nfarmers is the Government subsidies that enhanced the competitiveness\nof agricultural producers in countries such as Brazil and Argentina.\nSadly enough, many of these subsidies were provided not by the\ngovernments of these countries, but rather by the U.S. Government.\n  At the end of 1987, I attached a soybean marketing program to the\nSenate budget reconciliation bill. This amendment would revive language\nthat I had attached to the 1985 farm bill, but the conferees had\neffectively killed the provision by leaving it to the Secretary's\ndiscretion. He did not exercise that discretion. The soybean program\ninvolved CCC loans from 1988 through 1990, and I modeled it after my\n1985 cotton program. I hoped that it would be an innovative approach\nthat would provide enough flexibility to the Secretary of Agriculture\nto meet our world competitors on a level playing field. Although it\npassed the Senate shortly later, I had to reintroduce it in 1988. With\na marketing loan, U.S. soybeans will be available on the world market\nat the same price as that made possible by foreign government subsidies\nfor our foreign competitors. At that time, U.S. soybean acreage had\ndropped to a quarter of its 1979 level. Of course, the loan ultimately\nbecame a part of the 1990 farm bill.\n  With other provisions I included in the final bill, I sought to\nincrease the farmer's flexibility to plant second crops on program\nplots. This practice is known as double-cropping.\n  With the Southern Agriculture Act, we also sought to create a\nSouthern Institute for Agriculture Resource Policy to conduct\nscientific studies on improved farming techniques.\n  The committee also approved a proposal to provide Federal matching\nfunds for rural firefighters. The money would go to State forestry\nagencies and volunteers, and it was included in the final version of\nthe bill. My language also proposed a Southern Forest Regeneration\nCenter.\n  The final bill included my provisions to expand the Talladega\nNational Forest into Cherokee County and extend an Alabama trail closer\nto the Appalachian Trail.\n  The final bill also included our language to create the star schools\nprogram. Through the use of state-of-the-art telecommunications\nequipment, the Star Schools-Medlink program that was passed in the 1990\nfarm bill allows small rural schools or hospitals to be linked with the\nhighest quality educational programs and technology developments of\nother areas. Using this technology in a medical situation, a doctor at\na clinic in a rural area could send moving images of a brain scan to a\nspecialist at a hospital hundreds of miles away.\n  The final bill also included language to provide Federal assistance\nfor rural development, including water and sewers, and a loan program\nto aid small, rural businesses. There is no one answer that every\ncommunity can use to achieve economic vitality. However, there are\ncommon threads. First of all, the leadership for rural development must\nbe taken to local community organizations--rural electric cooperatives,\ncounties, economic development district, and other local entities. I\nwas especially proud of these provisions as they were included in the\nfinal version of the bill.\n  With Senator Pryor's help, we included language in the 1990 farm bill\nto authorize $15 million for research on poultry diseases and to\nrequire that foreign poultry meet domestic inspection standards.\nHowever, President Bush failed to meet this requirement, arguing that\nit was an impediment to free trade. In fact, he even imposed a 1990\nhiring freeze on inspectors.\n  In 1991, peanut farmers faced another problem when the ITC ruled that\n300 million pounds of foreign peanuts be allowed into the American\nmarket--a total equaling 10 percent of the domestic market. I contacted\nthe President to protest this ruling, in some large part because it\nviolated language that I included in the 1990 farm bill to require that\nimports meet the same quality as the domestic product. Chinese peanuts,\nknown to be infected with the striped virus, would be among the\nimports. Further, allowing such a high number into the country would\ncost the government $84 million, according to the USDA. Although he\nreduced the number to 100 million, the President decided to allow the\npeanuts into the country. In 1993, we contacted the trade\nrepresentative to urge inclusion of a provision in NAFTA requiring that\nthe stringent domestic inspection standards be imposed on imports.\n  Although farm bills had always been the result of compromise, and\ntherefore were somewhat less than I had wanted, supporters had\nsucceeded in maintaining the commodity programs at an acceptable level\nuntil this year. The 1996 farm bill debate posed a serious threat to\nthe continuation of farm programs, and southern farmers would be\nespecially affected by various proposals.\n  From the beginning of last year, the Republicans had pushed for\nelimination of the commodity programs and the price supports. Given the\nsuccesses of these programs, like the cotton program, I cannot\nunderstand the prejudice with which they approached the cuts.\n  To pass programs that I believe are worthwhile, I have frequently\ninvolved myself in the strategy which has worked so well for Senators\nover the years. To demonstrate this point, when I saw that the cotton\nprogram was in serious trouble, I offered by support for other programs\nto gain backing for cotton. As I told the American Sheep Industry\nAssociation in June 1994, there isn't much wool in Alabama, but there\nisn't much cotton in Idaho or Montana. But if those of us in\nagriculture didn't work together, we cannot survive the plans to\ndismantle the fundamentals of farming in this country.\n  As it came up for review, supporters tried to impress upon Members\nthe importance of the cotton program. The cotton program was designed\nto meet market conditions in the United States and abroad. In 1995, the\nyear that the Republicans tried to eliminate it, the cotton program\nproved itself effective. Although there was a bumper cotton crop, the\nmarket price remained above the target price. Additionally, we stressed\nthat wheat and feed grains account for 50 percent of all farm program\ncosts, and the cotton program cost only 10 percent of the total Federal\nfarm outlays.\n  Agriculture had already taken its fair share of cuts. The agriculture\nbudget had dropped from $26 billion in 1985 to just under $10 billion\nin 1995. However, reductions in the peanut program had never resulted\nin Americans paying less for their groceries. The cost is always\nabsorbed by someone in the chain between the producer and the\nsupermarket, and economic studies and history do not suggest that cuts\nwould reduce the price now.\n  With agriculture very much in mind, I voted against the Republican\nbudget resolution. This resolution would have cut $8 billion from\nfarming over 5 years. Naturally, I had other concerns when I decided to\noppose the bill including Medicare and Social Security, as well as the\nidea of promising to cut the deficit and taxes.\n  After the Senate agriculture committee completed its mark-up on the\nbudget resolution, preliminary estimates for the cuts in the commodity\nprograms totaled $13.3 billion over 7 years. Chairman Lugar's intention\nwas to do his best to eliminate the commodity programs, and he had\nstated his strong opposition for some time.\n  Along with others, I continued the fight for the preservation of the\ncotton and peanut programs. Noting that cotton had enjoyed a record\nyear, I promised to introduce a bill to extend that program as written,\nwith just a few changes.\n  The average peanut farmer has only 98 acres, whereas the 7 largest\ncorporations that use peanuts to manufacture their products had more\nthan $140 billion in total sales during 1994. It is no coincidence that\nsome Members of Congress who oppose the program just happen to have\nsome of those same corporations in their states. It is these same\ncorporations that stand to be the big winners if the peanut program\nwere eliminated, not the real consumers.\n\n[[Page S12428]]\n\nThe GAO had issued a study which showed that the consumer absorbed a\ncost of $300-$500 million, but the program's opponents misrepresented\nthis study in the last round, arguing that this cost was passed onto\nthe retail consumer. As a matter of fact, in testimony before the House\nAgriculture Subcommittee on Specialty Crops and its Chairman, Charlie\nRose, the GAO testified that the consumer they referenced was the first\npurchaser of peanuts, or the manufacturer. They further testified in\nsubstance that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that any\nreduction in the loan rate would be passed along to the retail\nconsumer.\n  Critics who sought to eliminate the peanut program during the 1995\nfarm bill debated used this GAO report as one justification for ending\nthe peanut program. Armed with the earlier GAO testimony,\nrepresentatives from the peanut product manufacturers association were\nasked if any reduction in the loan rate would be passed to the\nconsumer. They responded by stating that loan rate reductions would not\nbe passed along to the consumer, instead, savings would be used to\ndevelop new products.\n  The peanut program has served to balance the playing field between\nsmall farmers and multinational corporations. It is bad policy to\neliminate the peanut program only to increase corporate profits at the\nexpense of rural economies and the true consumer who will notice\nabsolutely no difference in the price they pay at the grocery store.\n  In September, I introduced the Southern Agriculture Act of 1995 to\nrevise and extend the loan and other programs for cotton, peanuts, and\noilseeds. Under this bill, the cotton program would have been extended\nas written. The 1994 crop had been a record crop in production,\nexports, and total offtake. Many of our competitors had experienced\ninsect infestations causing higher world market prices. As a matter of\nfact, cotton prices had climbed to their highest levels at any time\nsince the Civil War, topping $1 a pound. Therefore, I saw no reason to\nalter a program that was functioning effectively. The peanut program\nwould be slightly changed, with a freeze imposed on the support prices\nat the 1995 crop level. In an effort to address the claims of the\npeanut program's critics, the National Peanut Growers Group adopted a\nseries of program changes to eliminate all taxpayer costs and open the\nprogram to new products. I included many of the NPPA no-net-cost\nreforms into my peanut title, including eliminating the undermarketings\nprovisions. However, from a strategy perspective, I knew that the farm\nbill debate would require a great deal of give and take and felt that\nunder no circumstances should we begin negotiating from our bottom\nline. Since they did not receive price supports, my bill would have\nextended the marketing loans for soybeans and oilseeds. In addition to\nextending the marketing loan, we increased the loan rate from $4.92 a\nbushel to $5.25 a bushel. The lower loan rate had ceased to be an\neffective safety net for oilseed producers. Our title on oilseeds was\nheralded by the American Soybean Association as the best proposal put\nforward for oilseed producers. In the end, a modified version of my\nproposal was adopted and signed into law.\n  The reason why I introduced this bill was simply that I utterly\nopposed Chairman Lugar's farm bill. Among other things, his bill would\nhave destroyed the peanut program. However, I believed that 14 of 18\nSenators on the committee favored a peanut bill without a cut in the\nprice support. Because he had such a strong opposition, the chairman\nemployed delay tactics to push the bill back to the reconciliation\ndeadline when the members of the Budget Committee could write the farm\nbill. These Senators were much less sympathetic to the needs of the\nsouthern peanut farmer.\n  At that time, certain Senators tried to put an additional assessment\non peanut producers. They were trying to force the farmer to pay for\nthe entire adminstrative cost of the program. However, the Senators who\npushed for this assessment were from wheat States; notably, they did\nnot try to impose the same condition on wheat farmers. However, we\nsecured language which stated that the existing budget deficit\nassessment paid by producers would be targeted to offsetting program\ncosts and no other assessments would then be necessary.\n\n  With regard to the ongoing farm bill negotiations, the Agriculture\nchairman continued to refuse meetings, despite the strong bipartisan\nsupport for the peanut program. He knew that he would not get his way,\nbut that was no reason to keep us from meeting to come up with a budget\nbill that saved money but did not destroy the peanut program. In the\nend of committee action that year, the farm provisions included a\npeanut compromise, but I was never consulted. I was shut out of all\ndiscussions about it; the Republicans told me it would be their bill. I\ncould not explain to farmers why these Senators voted for a 7-year\nprogram for wheat, corn, rice, sugar, and other commodities, but\ndecided to kill the peanut program after 5 years.\n  Simply stated, this bill would force a disproportionate share of\nagricultural budget cuts on the South. It would have its most profound\nnegative effects on new and old farmers there. Most of the growth in\ncotton production had occurred in the South, but the new cotton program\nwould shut out new farmers from its provisions. This bill required that\nfarmers demonstrate participation in 3 of the previous 5 years in order\nto continue participation in the cotton program. Many of the new cotton\nacres in this program were the result of the successful boll weevil\neradication program. Land once infested with boll weevils had recently\nbeen eradicated, however, the majority of these new acres had not been\nin the program long enough to qualify under these new rules.\nEligibility for participation in the cotton program would be reduced\nnationally by 30 percent, and in Alabama, 38 percent of cotton farmers\nwould be excluded. Furthermore, Buck Johnson, director of the Federal\nFarm Service agency of Georgia, estimated that the Senate's version of\nthe reconciliation bill would put 30 percent of older farmers in the\nSouth out of business.\n  In response to being closed out from the historically bipartisan task\nof writing farm legislation, and seeing the unacceptable changes to the\npeanut program, Representative Charlie Rose and I introduced a no-net-\ncost peanut program bill in an effort to preserve a viable program for\npeanut farmers. It would achieve savings by eliminating the standing\n1.35-million-ton floor for the national poundage quota; in fact, the\nHeflin-Rose peanuts program would have saved $43 million more than the\nRepublican plan contained in the reconciliation bill. Under our no-net-\ncost bill, the Agriculture Secretary would set this national poundage\nquota, thereby eliminating undermarketings and limiting disaster\ntransfer payments. By contrast, the Republican plan would reduce the\nsupport price and freeze it for 7 years. The USDA estimated that the\nRepublican plan would immediately reduce peanut farmers' income by 30\npercent. Not only did it cost more, the Republican plan slashed a\npeanut farmer's income by $68 per ton. A study by Auburn University on\nthe impact of potential policy changes in the peanut program found that\na reduction in the support price to $610 per ton, and a reduction in\nthe national poundage quota to 1.1 million tons, would result in a\nnegative impact of $219 million and a loss of almost 3,000 jobs in\nAlabama, Georgia, and Florida. The economic impact and job losses are\nnot limited solely to peanut producers. Under this analysis, the\nwholesale and retail trade, service industries, real estate and\nfinancial sectors are especially hard hit. In fact, nationwide, the\nstudy indicated total job losses of 5,440 and a negative economic\nimpact of $375 million.\n\n  The cotton program in the Republican proposal, too, made no sense.\nUnder its provisions, cotton farmers would no longer be paid for the\ncotton they produced. Instead, they would sign a production flexibility\ncontract which would subsidize a farmer, whether or not he produces a\ncrop. These decoupled payments would apply to cotton, rice, wheat,\ncorn, and feed grain producers, and they would actually encourage a\nwheat or corn grower to plant cotton if the world price were high\nenough to justify the switch. The Republican bill provided for 7 years\nof narcotic welfare payments designed to bring about the corporate\ntakeover of agrarian America. This Republican\n\n[[Page S12429]]\n\nproposal would have undermined everything accomplished with respect to\nfarm legislation; it would have eliminated the farmer safety net and\ndisrupted the delicate balance of supply-price stability taken for\ngranted by consumers.\n  I commend the President for vetoing this bill. It would have created\na welfare state. the Republicans claimed that they could lower interest\nrates by balancing the budget, but ironically, their farm bill raised\ninterest rates solely on CCC borrowers. They also claimed that they\nwanted farm programs to be more market oriented, but it removed the 8-\nmonth-loan extension for cotton. Further, their failure to pass\nlegislation left farmers with no clear direction for the upcoming\nplanting season, and, therefore, banks would not give farmers loans for\nthis year's crops.\n  At the end of last year, Representative Rose and I introduced another\nno-net-cost peanut program that would be funded by an assessment on\nimported peanuts and revenue from NAFTA and GATT. This bill would have\nmaintained the $678-per-pound-quota rate. It would also assure that\nrevenue from NAFTA and GATT would pay for the program rather than\nreducing farm income. Last, the bill would require that imported\npeanuts meet the same high quality standards as domestic peanuts,\nensuring that they were not grown with chemicals and pesticides banned\nin the United States.\n  Clearly, the Congress had failed rural America by not passing a farm\nbill. By including, historically, stand-alone-farm legislation in the\nbroad Republican proposal to balance the budget, farmers and rural\nAmerica became hostage to a myriad of issues culminating with a\nPresidential veto. As a result, farmers were left without congressional\ndirection for the upcoming planting season and were anxiously awaiting\na new farm law. This necessity had become most pressing at the\nbeginning of this year. Without a farm bill, the Agriculture Secretary\nwould be forced to implement the 1949 Agriculture Act. That law\nprovided a formula based on parity with the standard of living in 1949.\nThe difference in the value of the dollar and the standard of living\nbetween 1949 and 1996 would create an explosion in the price of food.\n\n  But fearful of efforts to resurrect the freedom-to-farm bill, I\npointed out that its provisions to guarantee payments to farmers\nwhether they produced a crop or not was fundamentally flawed. In times\nof high market prices, the program would provide a bonus check, and it\nwould not be sufficient in times of low market prices. It is\nunconscionable to make these kinds of payments in times of high market\nprices, especially when we are reducing school lunches and other\nessential programs.\n  Ultimately, the Senate passed a modified version of the farm\nprovisions that had been contained in the Republican reconciliation\nbill. I voted for it, because we were able to make marginal\nimprovements in the bill and, therefore, I felt that the good\noutweighed the bad. Most importantly, the Senate version of this bill\nreinstated permanent law. By doing so, the inclusion of permanent law\nensures that Congress must again address farm laws rather than simply\nallowing them to expire. Republican lawmakers had intended the\ndecoupled, fixed-but-declining payments to farmers to be the price paid\nfor eliminating farm programs. Congressional Democrats, on the other\nhand, believed that a stable and abundant food supply to be in the\nnational interest and, therefore, refused to turn our back on American\nfarmers. The inclusion of permanent law was an enormous victory for\nDemocrats thus ensuring our commitment to farming families and the role\nthey play in our society.\n  Additionally, I was able to beat, soundly, efforts by a freshman\nSenator to kill the peanut program and to keep a 5-percent penalty for\nthe use of the loan program out of the bill. Opponents of the peanut\nprogram had conspired to include this last provision to penalize\nproducers who put their peanuts into the loan. The provision was\nremoved from consideration due to my strong objections.\n  During conference, the committee fought off a number of detrimental\npeanut provisions. I successfully fought off a House provision to lower\nthe loan rate another 5 percent if a producer put his peanuts under\nloan. If this language had passed the rate would have dropped to\n$579.50 per ton; we worked to maintain it at $610. I also fought off\nanother House provision to allow unlimited cross-county sale of\npeanuts. Instead, the committee adopted a compromise to allow 40\npercent transfers after 5 years. Under the House-passed version,\nproducers would have to pay an additional assessment to cover program\ncosts if any at the end of the year. Further, the shellers' assessment\nhad been exempted by House Republicans from offsetting program costs\neven though they benefit from the program. However, we were able to\narrange this so the shellers' assessment will also go to offsetting the\ncosts, which will protect the producers from having an unlimited\npossibility for increased assessments. As far as the pool compliance\nlanguage is concerned, the House bill would exempt the profits from\nadditional peanuts from going to cover peanut program losses. This was\nchanged to the Senate version that would permit additional gains from\nbuyback and redemption to be used to offset program costs. This change\nwould also reduce the possibility of the need for increased assessments\non producers.\n\n  Problems with the overall farm bill included: It did not provide a\nsafety net for farmers and it made payments regardless of price, but it\ndid give farmers something to work with as they prepare for planting\nseason; the peanut language would cut farmers' income; but cotton came\nout fairly well, specifically preserving the marketing loan, and back\npayments would come soon, which would help weather-damaged cotton\nfarmers.\n  Administration: In the early 1980's, the greatest problem facing\nfarmers was the 20-percent or higher interest rates. Most farmers who\nborrowed money to finance their crops in 1980 borrowed the money when\ninterest rates were already high, then they lost money because of the\ndrought. I arranged meetings with Reagan's Agriculture Secretary Block\nto impress this point upon him.\n  During 1982, I fought the Reagan administration's plan to subject\nagriculture to FTC control in the Commerce Committee. American farmers\nwere having a tough enough time making ends meet without having to deal\nwith yet another layer of bureaucrats in Washington, DC, meddling in\ntheir affairs.\n  I strongly supported the recent reorganization of the USDA. During\n1994, the Agriculture Committee considered a bill to facilitate the\nreorganization. The bill would reform the administrative functions, and\nreassign sub-Cabinet officers by mission, reduce the number of agencies\nfrom 43 to 29, and it would consolidate country offices in favor of\none-stop shopping centers. Through this effort, the USDA hoped to\nreduce staff and cut costs. Although much of this reorganization could,\nand did, take place on the regulatory level, the committee wanted to be\ncertain to work out any legislation that might become necessary. Given\nconcerns about the deficit, the time had clearly come to reduce the\nsize and cost of the USDA in favor of a more efficient department. In\nthe final days of the 103d Congress, a USDA reorganization bill was\npassed creating a more streamlined and efficient Department of\nAgriculture.\n  Disaster aid/crop insurance: I have always done my best to pay\nattention to the needs of farmers in times of natural disasters in\nAlabama. In 1979, we had a drought and Hurricane Frederick. In 1980, we\nhad an even worse drought. In 1982, interest rates forced me to request\nAgriculture Secretary Block to initiate the Economic Emergency Loan\nProgram. The same year, I urged Block to change a FmHA regulation\nrequiring the rescheduling of loan at the cripplingly high rates of the\nday. I testified before the Forestry Subcommittee to warn of the impact\nof these rates. In 1982, I also fought to save the NWS agriculture\nprogram during Commerce Committee action. The farm weather forecasting\nservice saved American farmers more than $750 million each year in the\nproduction costs of the major agricultural commodities of cotton, corn,\nsoybeans, livestock, wheat, and rice, but it only cost $1.2 million.\nThe committee approved a bill I cosponsored to combat these high\ninterest rates on farms. The bill would extend the economic emergency\nloan\n\n[[Page S12430]]\n\nprogram for a year and create an individual evaluation program to\nreschedule existing FmHA loans at their original interest rates, rather\nthan the high rates of 1982. I also called a farm crisis meeting in\nMontgomery to discuss interest rates and other problems facing the\nState's farmers. In 1983, the FmHA ran out of money to pay for its\noperating loans in 17 States, including Alabama. I urged the USDA to\nreallocate the money, threatening legislative action, the USDA\ncomplied. Spring freezes also plagued farmers in 1983. Near the year's\nend, I sponsored a measure to disregard payment-in-kind acreage in\neligibility determination for natural disaster emergency loans. The\nexisting program required that a farmer suffer a 30-percent loss to be\neligible. However, payment-in-kind acreage would not count in these\nestimates, so they were frequently inaccurate. In 1984, the Senate\npassed a bill I cosponsored to establish a 15-member special task force\non agricultural credit to ensure its availability at reasonable\ninterest rates. I noted a survey of bankers, many of whom believed that\nfarmers would default on their loans. Further, 100,000 farmers would be\nforced out of business that year, and the statistics indicated that\nhalf of family farmers would disappear in less than a generation. In\n1985, I emphasized the farm credit crisis in the country, with a farm\ndebt the size of the Federal deficit; the FmHA had not acted to combat\nthe problem--it had $630 million available for Federal loan guarantees\nbut used only $25 million. That same year, I met with Willie Nelson to\nadvise him on how to distribute the proceeds from FarmAid. We had\nanother drought in 1986, which spurred me to begin hearings to\ninvestigate drought cycles in the South and possible ways to handle\nthem.\n\n  In 1987, I introduced a bill to save the farm credit system. It would\nhave authorized bonds and the restructuring of the system, including a\ncooling-off period before mergers went into effect. It would protect\nimportant farmers' stockholdings in the system and establish an\nassistance board to financial institutions providing farm loans. I\nintroduced another amendment to protect advanced payment for prepayment\naccounts held by Federal land banks, part of the farm credit system.\nThe amendment would simply have required that money deposited into\nthese advanced payment accounts would immediately, prior to the capital\ndepletion or insolvency of a Federal land bank, be applied as payment\nagainst the borrower's loan.\n  Alabama suffered another drought in 1988. I introduced a drought\nassistance bill to mandate emergency aid from the Secretary of\nAgriculture. The bill also included a private water project. It would\nhave created water cooperatives financed by loans or bonds to transport\nwater for irrigation. When conferees finished their report, I\ncriticized their changes to the feed and livestock provisions, but I\nwas pleased that the House had not weakened the peanut provisions.\n\n  In 1989, I pushed the Air Force to track hurricanes in the gulf and\nPacific coast States; Hurricane Frederick in 1979, for example, had\ncaused relatively little property damage and loss of life because of\nadvanced warnings. The Air Force agreed to retain the WC-130 program.\n  In August of that year, the Senate approved the Rural Partnership Act\nof 1989. The bill strengthened Federal support of State and regional\neconomic programs, or rural electric cooperatives, and of land grant\nuniversity research and extension programs. It was only a modest\nbeginning, but it might be a great help to rural communities.\n  That same month, the Senate also approved a disaster relief bill.\nAlabama had another drought in 1990. And we had an unusually rainy\nspring in 1991. With Senator Cochran, I introduced legislation that\nyear to force the President to provide emergency funding. The USDA had\nmade money available through FmHA loans, but the President had not\ndelivered it according to his authority provided by a 1991 supplemental\nappropriations bill. In the fall of that year, I supported the passage\nof a bill to provide aid through FEMA. This bill included language\npractically identical to language I introduced during the 1990 farm\nbill debate to make 65-percent payments to farmers who had suffered 35\npercent or more in losses. After continued contacts with the President,\nhe finally released the disaster money in 1992.\n  Winter storms and flooding, as well as a number of tornadoes, plagued\nthe State in 1994. Tropical storm Alberto also caused a great deal of\nflooding that year. I also pushed the disaster assistance amendment to\ninclude funding for flood victims in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida in\nthe fiscal 1995 agriculture appropriations. I also pushed a bill I\nsponsored to authorize funding for flood relief through the Agriculture\nCommittee. The Senate passed this measure unanimously. In fact, the\nvote on flood relief compelled me to miss my chance to act as the\nPresident's personal representative on the 50th anniversary of the\nliberation of Guam; I had served as Marine lieutenant and I was one of\nthe first on the beaches. In 1995, I asked the USDA to extend the\nFederal crop insurance deadline; there were a number of farmers who had\nnot applied. The USDA established this deadline under the previous\nyear's crop insurance bill, but it would not help any farmers who had\nnot applied; they would no longer be eligible for disaster payments.\nWith the passage of Federal crop insurance reform late in 1994, the\nprogram signaled a break from the routine of passing disaster bills.\nWith this new program and approach, I knew there would be a period of\nadjustment. I believed that it was a reasonable request given that\nCongress had only months before passed the crop insurance reform and\nUSDA had not fully implemented the program while expecting farmers to\neducate themselves and embrace the reforms in a very short period of\ntime. The least that could be done was extend the crop insurance sign\nup deadline and allow farmers adequate time to inform themselves of\nthese significant changes regarding disaster assistance.\n\n  Hurricanes Erin and Opal passed through Alabama in 1995. I\ncosponsored a Cochran bill to authorize the Agriculture Secretary to\nprovide supplemental crop disaster assistance in addition to benefits\nprovided by the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994. Cotton producers had\nbeen plagued by a severe drought and worm infestations during the 1995\ncrop. This was particularly disappointing due to the fact that 1994 was\na record year for the U.S. cotton crop. Expectations were high for 1995\nand nationwide plantings were up by as much as 20 percent in some\nStates. While the drought contributed a great deal to the 1995 cotton\ndisaster, the insect infestations were particularly devastating. The\ninsect situation was so bad that the EPA authorized the temporary use\nof the insecticide Pirate to fight the tobacco budworm and beet army\nworm.\n  The final blow to cotton farmers was Hurricane Opal. After already\nexperiencing terrible growing conditions in 1995, just prior to\nharvesting what cotton that was left, Opal took care of the cotton that\nthe drought and insects had not.\n  Hurricane Opal was a devastating storm, not only for its timing\nregarding cotton farmers, but for all Alabamians in southeast Alabama.\nOpal caught a great deal of structural damage and produced a large\namount of debris. Fortunately, we were able to successfully petition\nthe USDA for assistance under the Emergency Conservation Program [ECP].\nUnder the ECP, Alabamians received approximately $5 million in\nassistance for debris removal and structural repair.\n  In an effort to address the problem of annual disaster assistance\nbills, and provide a model for crop insurance reform, in 1993 I began\nmeeting with grower groups to hear their ideas on an effective system\nof crop insurance. In this endeavor, the National Cotton Council was\nparticularly helpful.\n  The message from farmers was that the cost of production was\ncontinuing to rise, cotton prices were declining or flat at best, and\ndisaster assistance was triggered only by production or yield losses.\n  As a result of these roundtable meetings, I introduced the Farmers'\nRisk Management Act of 1994. This legislation called on the Federal\nCrop Insurance Corporation to offer producers the option of a cost-of-\nproduction system which would be based upon each individual producer's\nactual cost of production. This bill would have also allowed a producer\nto choose between using his actual yields and his farm program yields\nin determining his crop insurance yields.\n\n[[Page S12431]]\n\n  Many of the ideas put forth in this legislation were rolled into the\nFederal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994. As a matter of fact, the\nHeflin proposal on a cost-of-production system was used to design an\nincome-protection pilot program that is being implemented this year.\n  This new approach will cover farmers when gross income falls below\nestablished limits. This pilot program creates a system that would\nguard against yield losses and low harvest prices.\n  The implementation of this pilot program could not have come at a\nmore important time. This first year's experience with the catastrophic\ncoverage under the new crop insurance reforms has proven to be\ninadequate. More importantly, though, after the 1996 farm bill and its\nuncertain future effects on American farmers, we find ourselves faced\nwith the possible phase-out of farm programs. It is, therefore,\nabsolutely essential that we have a reliable crop insurance plan that\nwill provide some type of safety net for producers. The significance of\nthis new approach is that it addresses fluctuations in price, where the\ncurrent crop insurance program only takes into account losses from\nreduced yields.\n  I am proud of these efforts made on behalf of trying to forge a new\nand more effective direction in regard to crop insurance. It is my hope\nthat this pilot program will grown and be implemented on a national\nlevel.\n  In 1984, Senator Hollings and I introduced a bill to create a\nnational storm-scale operational and research meteorology [STORM]\nprogram to update the country's extreme weather prediction systems.\nWith this bill, we sought to emphasize the transition from the old\nradar systems to the implementation of the new NEXRAD system. This bill\npassed the Senate, but it died in the House. Senator Hollings and I\nreintroduced this bill in 1986 after NASA lost a weather satellite. Our\nresolution would also have urged the administration to launch another\nGOES satellite and increase weather reconnaissance flights in the\ninterim. The Commerce Committee passed this resolution in June.\n  In 1990, the battle to preserve Huntsville's weather station began;\nthe NWS had proposed dropping the weather station serving northern\nAlabama in the implementation of its NEXRAD system. That year, I met\nwith the Deputy Director of the NWS to urge him to consider\nHuntsville's proposal to donate a weather radar system. I continued\nthis fight in 1994, making certain to be continually in contact with\nthe NWS and the NOAA to advocate maintenance of the Huntsville\nfacility. In 1994, I also contacted the Vice President to solicit his\nhelp in the continuation of the Huntsville National Weather Service\nRadar. I told him that I believed eliminating the station under NEXRAD\nwould leave northern Alabama and southern Tennessee in a vulnerable\nposition. That same year, I extracted promises from the Director of the\nNWS, Dr. Elbert Friday, to push back closing of this doppler radar\nstation. I also introduced the Weather Service Modernization Review Act\nof 1994 to require a study on the potential impact of closing weather\nstations. The Vice President ordered the study by the National Research\nCouncil. This study revealed that the Huntsville area would, in fact,\nsuffer from the lack of its own NEXRAD station. In 1995, I cited this\nstudy, and contacted the committee chairmen who oversaw the NOAA and\nthe NWS: Gramm, Pressler, and Hollings. The Commerce Committee approved\nan amendment to the Weather Service authorization to make it more\ndifficult to close 32 weather stations, including the Huntsville\nstation. I also contacted the Secretary of Commerce to advocate a new\nstation in the Huntsville area; he promised to install a center in\nnorthern Alabama. After his death this year, the NWS announced that it\nwould honor its commitment to install that center.\n\n  After a number of tornadoes in northeast Alabama in 1994, the USDA\nand I jointly announced that the NWS' All Hazard Weather Radio Network\nwould put up a station to provide early warnings in the area. I had\ntoured this area, including Goshen and its United Methodist Church--\nwhich had been destroyed by the storm--with Vice President Gore, where\nI solicited his support to deal with such problems in the future.\nHowever, I was concerned about the performance of early warning systems\nin the State after more tornadoes hit Arab and Joppa the next year.\n  In 1995, I supported a Cochran amendment to the Commerce, Justice,\nState appropriations bill to restore funding for the agricultural\nweather service centers at Stoneville, MS, and in Auburn. Weather is\nthe single most important external element in the production equation.\nBut this year, as the deadline for these centers' cutoff approached, I\nmet with NWS officials to discuss forecasts in the future. With\nRepresentative Browder, I pushed for continuation of these ag forecasts\nby transferring the NWS over to the USDA. Despite Senator Cochran's\nsupport, who realized the importance of specialized ag weather\nforecasts, the Republican agenda of the 104th Congress called for\ndownsizing the Federal Government and this vital service fell prey to\nprivatization.\n\n                                Research\n\n  An action I am most proud of in the field of research is the passage\nof a bill that I authorized making it a Federal crime to vandalize,\ndestroy or make unauthorized use of animal research facilities,\nincluding data, equipment and the animals themselves. The Animal\nResearch Facilities Protection Act, which was signed into law as the\nAnimal Enterprise Act would impose severe penalties on individuals or\ngroups who interfered with medical and other research facilities where\nanimals are use.\n  Unfortunately, some groups are so opposed to the use of animals in\nthis essential research that they set fire to research facilities or\nbreak into laboratories to steal animals and destroy equipment, records\nand research data. The real price of these types of crimes are paid by\nall those who are waiting for cures and treatments for their\nafflictions. Research into Alzheimer's disease, cancer, AIDS, substance\naddiction and mental health were at stake here.\n  Public interest in animal welfare should be encouraged. Research\nutilizing laboratory animals has led to many of medical history's most\nsignificant breakthroughs. These animals are used only when necessary\nand should be housed, handled and treated humanely. Those who disagree\nwith the responsible use of animals in research do not have the right\nto take the law into their own hands.\n  While a few States have already enacted laws increasing penalties for\ncrimes against research facilities, I felt it was necessary to\nestablish protections on the Federal level.\n\n                                Tuskegee\n\n  In 1862, the U.S. Congress passed the first Morrill Act which\nprovided for the establishment of land-grant institutions in the\nSouthern and border States. These institutions were designed to educate\ncitizens in the field of agriculture, home economics, the mechanic arts\nand other practical skills. Since the Southern States were\nuncooperative in funding historically African-American institutions\nunder this law, Congress passed a second Morrill Act in 1890, creating\nthe 1890 land-grant institutions.\n  Alabama has two 1890 land-grant institutions, the Tuskegee Institute\nand Alabama A&M. Tuskegee was created by an act of the Alabama\nLegislature and granted land by the U.S. Congress.\n  Although the 1890 institutions were chartered more than 100 years\nago, a stream of ``hard'' money for research was not created until\nfiscal year 1967. The Tuskegee Institute was not officially a land-\ngrant college, but in 1980, I was able to have the Tuskegee Institute\nadded to the permanent list of 1890 institutions and ensure there would\nbe a continuous stream of Federal research funds. Further, Congress\ncreated the Chappie James Center at Tuskegee with the 1890\nreauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965, and it ensured\nfunding for each of these institutions with the 1981 farm bill.\n\n                                 Auburn\n\n  I have worked closely with Alabama's 1862 land-grant institution,\nAuburn University, over the years and the 104th Congress was no\nexception. I was especially successful in completing, or continuing,\nfunding for several very important research initiatives through the\ncollege of agriculture and the Alabama Agriculture Experiment Station\nin cooperation with the Department of Agriculture.\n  Funding for the completion of the new poultry science facility at\nAuburn\n\n[[Page S12432]]\n\nwas achieved in the fiscal year 1997 agriculture appropriations bill.\nThis $12 million facility will provide a state of the art facility for\nessential research into one of the most important agriculture sectors\nin Alabama, the poultry industry.\n  I was also successful in securing funds for continued water quality\nresearch conducted at the Alabama Agriculture Experiment Station. The\nresearch involves a team effort by scientists at Auburn and other land-\ngrant universities, the CSREES, the TVA, State and private agencies,\nand most importantly, the producers. New technology is implemented\nimmediately, which enhances the development and growth of agricultural\nindustries. The water quality research also addresses problems that\nconfront rural development and the sustainability of agricultural\nenterprises. Most importantly, though, this research is responsible for\ndeveloping and implementing water and crop management practices that\nboth enhance agriculture production and protect and preserve an\nimportant natural resource--water.\n  One specific example of this is the irrigation project being\nconducted at the experiment substation in Bell Mina, AL. Increased\ndemand for irrigation water in the southwestern United States is\ncausing increased stress on many streams where farmers are pumping\ndirectly from the stream. As a possible method to decrease this demand\nduring periods of low stream flow and to make more water available for\nirrigation, a study was initiated to evaluate the feasibility of\npumping during high stream flows to off-stream storage sites. These\nsites could be on-farm or farmer-shared reservoirs. The irrigation\nreservoir at Bell Mina has been completed and the early results appear\npromising.\n  The National Soil Dynamics Laboratory at Auburn conducts research\ndesigned to solve soil management problems. Developing effective\nmethods of managing soil to maintain its quality, and to improve the\nquality and productivity of degraded soil, requires a multidisciplinary\nprogram. One component of this research being conducted at the soil\nlaboratory is the agronomic portion. House appropriators eliminated\nfunding for this component in their agriculture appropriations bill.\nFortunately, I was able to have this funding restored in the Senate\nbill. The agronomic portion of the multidisciplinary program at the\nsoil lab is vital because it is the very portion that facilitates the\ntechnology transfer from the lab to the field.\n\n                                  TVA\n\n  I fought for continuation of TVA's National Fertilizer and\nEnvironmental Research Center after the Clinton administration had\ntargeted it for elimination. The administration argued that this\nresearch should be conducted privately. But I contacted the VP and the\nBudget Director, and it was simply a matter of explaining that NFERC\nwas an up-and-running research center that was already accomplishing\nmany of the environmental goals set by the administration. Once this\nwas laid out for them, they saw that it made no sense to kill a working\nprogram in order to create new programs with similar goals.\n  I also introduced a bill to transfer aquaculture from the Interior\nDepartment to the USDA. This was a long-overdue streaming measure that\nwill greatly improve the overall efficiency and timeliness of\naquaculture research. Specifically, it saved the Southeastern Fish\nCultural Laboratory in Marion by moving it from Interior to the USDA.\nIt was adopted in the most recent farm bill. The U.S. aquaculture\nindustry has grown more than 15 percent annually since 1980. As a\nresult, aquaculture has emerged as a solid alternative for farmers and\nallowed them to diversity. In fact, aquaculture is of vital importance\nto the economy of west Alabama. Over 20 percent of the area's\npopulation is employed directly in the production or the processing of\ncatfish.\n\n                             Rural Electric\n\n  While commodity programs seem to dominate agriculture policy, rural\ndevelopment policy is an area that I have paid special attention to.\nThis is particularly true with regard to rural electrification.\n  Most recently I authored the Rural Electrification Loan Restructuring\nAct of 1993 which was signed into law on November 1, 1993, as Public\nLaw 103-129.\n  This legislation eliminated the authority of the REA Administrator to\nmake 2 percent loans, established criteria for a REA electric\ndistribution borrower can qualify for a 5 percent loan, and authorized\nthe Administrator to make loans at the municipal cost of capital. This\nlegislation also addressed high density cooperatives, rural development\neligibility, and private capital requirements among other things.\n  In the 1996 farm bill, I was instrumental in securing additional loan\nrestructuring authority for the Secretary of Agriculture regarding\nrural electric loans. We are currently working with the USDA to\npromulgate regulations that will provide the Secretary with sufficient\nflexibility to carry out the intention of Congress.\n  As part of the Republican plan to balance the budget, Republicans\nproposed selling off the Power Marketing Administrations, which provide\nelectricity to regional distribution cooperatives. The primary concern\nwith this proposal was that PMA ``purchasers'' would have to increase\nthe price at which they made electric power available in order to\nrecover their purchasing costs. I believed strongly that this would\nultimately translate into higher utility costs for end-users of rural\nelectric cooperatives.\n  With this issue being debated in the Energy Committee, when a seat on\nthe committee became available, I returned to the Energy Committee and\nassisted in preventing this proposal from being made a part of the\nRepublican reconciliation bill.\n\n                                 Trade\n\n  In 1981, I applauded the President's decision to lift the Soviet\ngrain embargo. I did believe that the United States needed to take\naction against the Soviets for invading Afghanistan. However, it is\nmost regrettable that the farmers of the United States have had to bear\nthe cost of this foreign policy instrument alone. For that reason, in\n1982, I urged the President to develop a long-term, Soviet grain\nagreement. I advocated ending grain embargoes and working to expand\nexport markets, including multiple year extensions of trade agreements.\nA 1-year extension has the effect of a defacto embargo because it keeps\nthe specter of an embargo looming over the whole grain growing and\nexporting industry. The mere threat of an embargo keeps grain prices\ndepressed and plays havoc with the entire farm economy. In 1983, after\nthe downing of the Korean jetliner attack, I feared that the President\nwould impose another embargo on the Soviets, so I introduced a bill to\ncreate a state undersecretary for agricultural affairs. It seemed that\nincreasingly our agricultural policy is being set by officials of the\nState Department as they respond to international events. In 1984, the\nSenate passed a bill I cosponsored to require congressional approval of\ntrade embargoes. It would require that both Houses approve an embargo\nwithin 60 days and review it every 6 months. There was no doubt that\npast embargoes, and the threat of new embargoes, significantly\ncontributed to the erosion of U.S. export dominance and the resulting\ndecline in farm income.\n  In 1983, when the President was preparing to visit Japan, I sponsored\na sense-of-the-Senate resolution to urge that United States negotiators\nshould insist that Japan dismantle all of its barriers on imported\nbeef. This resolution passed. I urged the passage of a similar\nresolution in 1984. In 1988, the beef agreement with Japan expired, and\nnegotiations stalled.\n  Then an unusual series of events occurred. The Japanese Ambassador\nasked me in my capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts of\nthe Judicial Committee to pass a courts bill allowing the use of\nJapanese language interpreters in Federal court cases. We succeeded in\ngetting the necessary legislation approved. The Ambassador thanked me\nand then asked me if there was anything he could do for me. I replied I\nwould like to meet with the Japanese Minister of Agriculture, trade\nrepresentatives, and two members of the Diet. I was able to bring\nrepresentatives of the National Cattlemen's Association to the meeting.\nWe had a very frank discussion and reported the progress to the U.S.\ntrade representatives. Fortunately, a few\n\n[[Page S12433]]\n\ndays later a very favorable trade arrangement was worked out and\nAmerican beef was allowed to be exported to Japan in far greater\nnumbers than before. The arrangement further eliminated the quotas\nafter 3 years, at which time the Japanese could impose tariffs if beef\npassed trigger levels.\n  I have been concerned about poultry exports for some time. In 1983, I\nwrote to the trade representative to urge him to address Brazil's\nincrease in poultry exports. From 1976 to 1980, the U.S. share dropped\nfrom 20 percent to almost nothing. Since Brock did not act, several\nother Senators and I contacted the President directly, noting that the\nU.S. share of the world poultry market had fallen from 97 percent to 13\npercent over 20 years. To address these concerns, I attached a poultry\nexport marketing program to the Agriculture Committee's payment-in-kind\nbill. This bill was designed to open new markets and recapture old\nones.\n  In 1984, I joined several other Senators to urge the President to\nnegotiate with the Canadian Prime Minister to address hog trade.\nLegislation was before the Congress to impose duties, we informed the\nCPM, and their exports to the United States had risen 10 times. In\n1985, I pressed this point again. Disputes with Brazil over poultry,\nChina over cotton, and Australia over beef, combined with this trade\nimbalance had clearly demonstrated that the United States needed to put\nan end to the use of unfair subsidized competition and to recoup its\nfair share of world export trade. I was pleased that the Commerce\nDepartment acted to impose duties on Canadian pork. I also wrote to the\nTrade Representative in 1994 to urge him to seek Canadian compliance\nwith the terms of NAFTA. I also joined Representative Rose to urge an\nITC investigation of dumping of Canadian peanut paste in the United\nStates.\n\n  When the United States began to consider food aid to the Soviet Union\nin 1990, I encouraged the USDA to aid that country by developing food\ndistribution practices rather than simply granting money. The precedent\nfor such aid was the food for progress program created in the 1985 farm\nbill and successfully implemented in the Uruguay round. But as the\nsituation became more severe in the Soviet Union, I urged the\nAgriculture Secretary to provide emergency, ready-to-cook provisions.\nPeople were in desperate need of immediate help, and raw commodities\nlike grain would not be as helpful. I did, however, remind the\nSecretary that the aid would need to be provided as a credit, not a\ngrant. I also urged the Agriculture Secretary not to abandon United\nStates textile bags in this Food for Peace Program; that decision would\nhave resulted in the loss of American jobs in favor of Chinese slave\nlabor. I also advocated sending peanut butter and other peanut products\nto Russia, which was looking for a cheap meat substitute.\n  This year, I urged the President to resolve the trade dispute with\nthe Russians when they announced that they would no longer import\nUnited States poultry. The Russians had refused to recognize the United\nStates system of poultry inspection. Along with several of my\ncolleagues, we urged President Clinton to carry this issue to the\nhighest levels of the Russian Government. While in Russia, Vice\nPresident Gore and Secretary Glickman raised this issue and soon\nafterward, an agreement was reached. The poultry industry is extremely\nimportant to the economy of Alabama. It accounts for 54 percent of all\nfarm income in the State and 75 percent of farm exports.\n  In conjunction with other Senators from poultry producing States, in\nthe 104th Congress we also had to fight barriers to interstate free\ntrade. The current regulation regarding the labeling of ``fresh''\npoultry states that poultry preserved above zero degrees fahrenheit\nshall be labeled fresh, and poultry below zero degrees, the point at\nwhich animal flesh freezes, shall be labeled frozen.\n  The USDA, on behalf of California poultry producers, promulgated\nregulations to raise the benchmark for fresh to 26 degrees based on the\npremise of consumer claims that the current regulations for poultry\nlabeling was misleading.\n  We were able to demonstrate, however, that this was actually an\neffort by the California poultry industry to erect a barrier to\nshipments of poultry from historic poultry producing regions,\nspecifically the Southeast. I obtained a copy of a report by the\nCalifornia Poultry Working Group, an industry panel designed to study\nand make recommendations on the California poultry industry, that\nstated in its findings that the single, most significant barrier to\nindustry growth was the high cost of poultry production in California.\nOn the other hand, poultry producers in the Southeast are able to\nproduce broilers and ship them to other parts of the country at a\nprofit.\n  With Senator Cochran's leadership, we were able to block the\nimplementation of this new regulation in the fiscal year 1996\nagriculture appropriations bill. During negotiations on the fiscal year\n1997 agriculture appropriations bill a compromise was agreed to.\nIronically, the compromise was essentially the same proposal that I put\nforward a year earlier. Nevertheless, it was a deal that Southeast\npoultry producers could live with.\n\n                               Conclusion\n\n  In addition to rewriting farm policy, the 104th Congress made\nsubstantial progress in other areas under the agricultural policy\numbrella. Earlier this year, the Congress passed and the President\nsigned H.R. 2029, the Farm Credit System Reform Act of 1996. This\nimportant legislation brought a degree of regulatory reform to the Farm\nCredit System Banks while also addressing needed charges in Farmer Mac\nand resolving the FAC debt issue.\n  Of major significance, Congress finally broke the logjam that had\nlasted for nearly 2 decades and passed legislation to rewrite Federal\npesticide laws, bringing about much needed reform of the outdated\nDelaney clause.\n  The Food Quality Protection Act, H.R. 1627, received unanimous\nsupport once all the pieces of the puzzle were put into place.\nTraditionally, the battleground between industry and environmental\nsupporters, the urgency to resolve pesticide legislation was created by\ncourt rulings that would have ordered the EPA to begin canceling the\nuse of some common chemicals.\n  The bill as signed into law will revise pesticide registration under\nthe Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947,\nspeeding up some EPA registration procedures. The bill also recognizes\nseparate registration procedures for minor use chemicals, and under\nlegislation I coauthored, antimicrobials, or common household and\nindustrial chemical cleansers.\n  Most importantly, this legislation reformed the notorious Delaney\nclause of the 1958 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which barred\nprocessed food from containing even minute amounts of cancer-causing\nchemicals. The hard-fought compromise of the Delaney reform will impose\na safety standard to ensure that pesticide residues on both raw and\nprocessed food pose no reasonable risk of harm. This standard\nessentially means that there will likely be no more than a one-in-a-\nmillion chance that a residue would cause cancer. The old standard was\ncompletely outdated, given modern technology, that prevented some\nchemicals from being used that actually reduced the natural level of\ncarcinogens in many commodities. This is an important reform and I am\nglad that we were able to achieve this victory this year.\n\n  While there were some victories over the last 2 years, there were\nalso some defeats and close calls. I have long been a supporter of\nprivate property rights legislation. As a matter of fact, the only\nprivate property bill to pass the Senate in the 103d Congress was the\nHeflin-Dole private property bill. I am sorry to say that the effort to\npass private property rights legislation failed in this Congress. I\nalso regret that attempts to move regulatory reform legislation were\nnot successful.\n  As I close out my career in the U.S. Senate, I reflect back on all\nthat has been accomplished. With regard to agriculture, I am extremely\npleased and proud of the progress made on behalf of rural America and\nfamily farms.\n  Over the last 18 years, I am proud to say that I have been a part of\nworking to ensure that electricity and water and sewer systems were\nextended to areas where they once were not. We have strengthened the\nfamily farm by providing adequate capital to farms and agribusiness. We\nhave passed farm bills that have stabilized the family farm, made the\nAmerican farmer the\n\n[[Page S12434]]\n\nenvy of the world and at the same time, protected the environment and\nreduced the deficit. Through the work on the Agriculture Committee we\nhave extended technological advancements into rural America through\ntelemedicine and distance learning initiatives. Foreign markets for\nU.S. agricultural products have been opened wide and agricultural\nresearch has led to more efficient farming with breakthroughs such as\nno-till agriculture and precision farming employing satellite imagery.\n  While a great deal has been accomplished, I am still concerned about\nwhat the future may hold. As the American society continues to become\nmore urban, fewer and fewer have an appreciation for issues affecting\nrural America. Furthermore, I believe that most take for granted that\nonly 3 percent of the American population, in addition to feeding the\nworld, provide this country with the highest quality, most abundant and\naffordable food supply of any nation in the world.\n  The 1996 farm bill, which is a major departure from traditional farm\nprograms, leaves an uneasy feeling for the future. Although it was\nostensibly designed to bring certainty to farming, I believe the 1996\nfarm bill created many potential problems that we may not even be aware\nof for some years to come. Specifically, I believe decoupling payments\nfrom market prices was a mistake. Only time will tell, but I hope that\nthere will be Members of Congress who are sympathetic to the needs of\nrural America should the Freedom to Farm proposal fail.\n  I am also concerned about the state of the cotton industry. I have\nbeen contacted recently by sectors of the industry raising concerns\nabout the growing volume of cotton imports into this country. This is\nsomething that I plan to monitor in the near future. Also, I am curious\nto see the effectiveness of the bioengineered Bt cotton seed. Bt cotton\nwas engineered to be resistant to insects. To date, reports indicate a\ngreat deal of success with this new cotton. I will be curious to review\nresults after the current harvest is complete,.\n  Farming families and rural communities are the backbone of this great\nNation. I am proud to have served on their behalf on the Agriculture\nCommittee for 18 years. As I return to Alabama and the many farmers in\nnorthern Alabama, I will continue to meet with, and monitor, the state\nof U.S. agriculture and the proud farmers who produce our food and\nfiber. It is my sincere hope that those who remain in Congress, and\nthose to come, will give the proper consideration to rural issues as\nthey come before this body.\n   Mr. President, back on August 20, 1996, the Alabama Peanut Producers\nheld a dinner in my honor. I was very thankful and humbled by their\noutpouring of affection and humor that evening.\n  One of the most memorable and humorous speeches was one given by\nTexas Congressman Charlie Stenholm, a long-time friend and colleague. I\nhave had the pleasure of working with him over the years on many\nagricultural issues, particularly those relating to the peanut program.\nShould the Democrats regain the House majority this fall, Charlie will\nprobably be the Agriculture Committee's new chairman.\n  I ask that a copy of Congressman Stenholm's remarks be printed in the\nRecord. It gives an entertaining and humorous inside account of some of\nour behind-the-scenes battles on these important issues over the years.\n  The material follows:\n\n    Notes for Speech at Senator Howell Heflin Event, August 20, 1996\n\n       Senator Heflin was elected to the United States Senate in\n     1978, and begin serving on the Senate Agriculture Committee\n     just as the committee began work on the 1981 farm bill.\n     Everyone knew the '81 bill would be a challenge, the\n     Republicans had just taken the White House and the Senate.\n     Senator Richard Lugar became the Chairman of the Senate\n     Committee on Agriculture. The Indiana Senator was not known\n     for his support of the peanut program.\n       Those present at the time and involved in the development\n     of the farm bill remember that then Freshman Senator Howell\n     Heflin took a particular interest in the peanut program. One\n     producer representative, Larry Meyers, has commented that in\n     his 24 years in Washington, Senator Heflin was the only\n     Senator who, when asked to support the program, made Larry\n     sit at the Senator's desk while he went through the entire\n     bill, discussing even the proper placement of commas and\n     semicolons, to ensure the bill reflected truly what was best\n     for peanut growers.\n       That kind of detail and preparation has made Senator Heflin\n     a formidable foe on the Senate floor for those who sought to\n     end the program. A couple of interesting stories came out of\n     that 1985 farm bill period. Early in the farm bill process,\n     another new Senator and now Governor of California Pete\n     Wilson tried to offer a difficult to understand amendment\n     affecting a small crop in California. It was just before\n     lunch, members were anxious to adjourn the meeting and there\n     was little interest in the amendment. When Senator Wilson\n     finished offering his amendment, there was an awkward silence\n     when no one seconded the amendment. Suddenly, just before the\n     Chairman was about to rule the amendment out of order and\n     adjourn the committee for lunch, Senator Heflin suddenly\n     spoke of the amendment's outstanding merit and seconded the\n     motion. With that, the Committee quickly approved the measure\n     and adjourned for lunch.\n       Senator Wilson quickly left his seat and came around the\n     table to say thank you to Senator Heflin, who he admitted he\n     really did not know since they were both new to the\n     committee.\n       Senator Heflin replied to Senator Wilson with a smile and a\n     wink, ``Senator, we don't grow your California crops in\n     Alabama, but we do grow peanuts!''\n       Senator Wilson got the message, and later voted in support\n     of the peanut program.\n       At another point about this time, then Secretary of\n     Agriculture came before the Senate agriculture committee to\n     promote a new program called ``P, I, K'' or Payment In Kind.\n     After the Secretary finished testifying in favor the PIK\n     program, Senator Heflin questioned the Secretary with a long\n     inquiry wherein Senator Heflin clearly referred to the\n     program as ``P, I, P'' or as the ``PIP'' program several\n     times.\n       In responding to the Senator, Secretary Block first tried\n     to correct Senator Heflin, ``It's the P, I, K program,\n     Senator, PIK!'' Senator Heflin paused for a dramatic moment\n     and replied, ``Oh, I thought you said P, I, P, the Pig in a\n     Poke program.'' The room roared with laughter, and everyone\n     understood Heflin's attitude about the proposed new program.\n       On a more serious note, there can be little doubt, that,\n     over the years, Senator Howell Heflin has been ``Mr. Peanut''\n     in the Senate, and the real reason the program has enjoyed\n     such strong support over the years in the Senate.\n       It was not always that way. During the debate on the 1981\n     farm bill when the Senator was still new in the Senate, then\n     Committee Chairman Richard Lugar offered in the Senate a\n     motion that effectively killed the peanut program. In a\n     dramatic, difficult vote, the Senate approved Senator Lugar's\n     motion. There was then a pause in the deliberations when\n     Senator Heflin and Senator Warner of Virginia got all the\n     peanut representatives and farmers that were in Washington\n     for the Farm Bill debate into a room to discuss what to do\n     next. Everyone agreed the peanut acreage allotment program\n     was dead, but if another type of program could be designed\n     in a matter of minutes that would keep peanut farmers in\n     business without allotments, perhaps the Senate could be\n     persuaded to accept some type of new program.\n       Mr. Ross Wilson, a strong admirer of Senator Heflin and the\n     manager of the Southwest Peanut Grower's association sat down\n     with the peanut leadership present, and wrote out in longhand\n     on a yellow pad what is essentially the poundage quota\n     program we have today. Senator Heflin and Senator Warner then\n     took that yellow pad to the Senate floor and passed a new\n     peanut program.\n       It was a dramatic moment. It meant hundreds, if not\n     thousands of small farmers could stay in business, and it\n     came about because Senator Heflin was willing to stand up\n     with farmers.\n       And as a result, you can say Senator Howell Heflin is,\n     ``The Father of the Modern Peanut Program.''\n       In the ensuing years, during farm bill debates and even\n     during appropriations considerations, the peanut program has\n     been attacked several times, But each time, we had a peanut\n     leader in the Senate: Senator Howell Heflin would stand and\n     defend the program strongly as he did this year, and each\n     time, those attacking the program suffered defeat and the\n     peanut program continues.\n       We owe him a great deal of appreciation.\n       Yes, although it can be said Senator Heflin saved the\n     peanut program repeatedly over the years, but in addition,\n     there are several provisions of the peanut program we can\n     look to and know that they developed directly by the\n     Senator: The support price escalator based on the cost of\n     production we enjoyed since 1985 until this year; the\n     three marketing associations being written clearly into\n     the law; and dozens of smaller provisions that have made\n     the program work more efficiently and at lower cost to the\n     government.\n       In addition, and perhaps most significant, and something I\n     have personally witnessed, has been Senator Heflin's work in\n     Conference.\n       After the House and Senate pass a bill, there are almost\n     always differences that must be resolved in what we call a\n     ``Conference''; a meeting of members to iron out the\n     differences and come up with language both Houses will\n     approve.\n       This is where Senator Howell Heflin has been of most value\n     to this industry, particularly this year when we had to make\n     the most of a bad situation.\n\n[[Page S12435]]\n\n       Charlie Rose and I always knew, if we lost an important\n     provision, Senator Heflin would put it back in, or if we\n     could get a new provision, Senator Heflin could keep it in\n     when the bill came to conference.\n       This year it was particularly true when you can credit\n     Senator Heflin with killing the 5-percent penalty for loan\n     peanuts which would have hurt every peanut farmer in this\n     country.\n       It was fun to watch: When the debate got heated, if you saw\n     Senator Heflin lean back in this chair, slowly push the\n     plastic back on his cigar and begin to chew, you knew he was\n     thinking and was about to close in for the kill--this year on\n     the Republican Leadership that was seeking to decimate the\n     program.\n       I know you are not fully happy with the program the way it\n     turned out in the end, but we got one. And the challenge can\n     be summed up with the remark that Senator Richard Lugar was\n     heard to make after the farm bill conference: ``In looking at\n     this language, I can see that once again, Senator Howell\n     Heflin has prevailed over those of us who sought to end the\n     peanut program.''\n       Senator Heflin, that is a fitting tribute.\n       Congratulations, and thank you.\n\n                          ____________________"]], "columns": ["granule_id", "date", "congress", "session", "volume", "issue", "title", "chamber", "granule_class", "sub_granule_class", "page_start", "page_end", "speakers", "bills", "citation", "full_text"], "primary_keys": ["granule_id"], "primary_key_values": ["CREC-1996-10-21-pt1-PgS12425"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 2.3323071654886007, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}